Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Smith of Basildon and Lord Avebury

Monday 17th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Avebury]

My Lords, Clauses 41 and 42 prevent a person who is not lawfully resident in the UK from applying for a driving licence, and allow the Secretary of State to revoke the licence of a person who already has one, if he is not lawfully resident—meaning that he requires leave to enter or remain and does not have it. Under existing law, since March 2010 a person must have leave to remain in the UK for at least 185 days, ruling out the vast majority of unlawful residents—as indeed it should, because the possession of an identity document would help them to stay in this country when they are not entitled to. Asylum seekers, and those appealing against refusal of asylum, should not, however, be lumped in with illegal entrants. As long as their applications are not fully determined they are here lawfully; however, they would be caught by the 185-day rule. Most asylum seekers do not have cars, obviously, but for the few who do there is no reason that they should not continue to drive.

May I also ask about failed asylum seekers, a point I raised with my noble friend Lord Attlee in the previous debate? They cannot be sent back to their country of origin for one reason or another: generally it is because the country of origin refuses to accept them. I gave the example of Iran. My noble friend Lady Williams is also muttering in my ear about the many refugees from Zimbabwe who were stopped from returning to their country of origin for many years, with the full approval of the Home Office. Is the discretionary leave granted to them longer than 185 days? Would they be classified as lawfully resident? If they are allowed to work, as some of them are, it could be a severe disadvantage if they are not able to drive. As my noble friend the Minister will be aware, there are tens of thousands of people indefinitely stranded here because their country of origin—I named Iran and Zimbabwe but Somalia is another example—either cannot or will not accept them. Although their not being able to drive may not be the largest problem that they face, the Minister would send a glimmer of light into their lives if they could apply for a licence.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

My Lords, I have just a couple of questions on this group. The noble Earl may recall that at Second Reading, one thing that I said we would do in examining the Bill was, to look at first, the evidence base for bringing proposals forward and the workability of the measures proposed and, secondly, the impacts—including the unintended consequences. I would find it quite helpful if the noble Earl could say something about the reasons why this clause on driving licences has been brought forward.

On the point about the revocation of driving licences I would presume that someone who is in this country, even if they do not have a legal right to be here, is taking quite a responsible attitude if they have a driving licence. It means that they would probably have insurance. If that driving licence is then revoked, their insurance will also be revoked. Does that not cause a significant problem for other drivers on the UK’s roads if they are involved in an accident with a car whose driver, because of the revocation, has no licence at that point and whose insurance will have been revoked as well? It would be helpful to hear whether any thought has been given to that.

In terms of looking at the problems on our roads for those who are not entitled to be here, if the noble Earl were to do a straw test of members of the public, I think the issue causing them the most concern would be that of foreign cars being in this country for what is obviously longer than the six months that they are entitled to be before they are reregistered. Their drivers commit numerous offences on the roads, knowing full well that no one is going to track them down or do anything about it. The Government are taking action to bring us into line with the Irish Republic on driving offences but no action seems to be being taken regarding other countries. Can the noble Earl comment on why that matter is not being dealt with while that of driving licences is? That would be helpful in trying to understand the purpose of this clause.

Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules (Cm 8423)

Debate between Baroness Smith of Basildon and Lord Avebury

Monday 26th November 2012 Grand Committee

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, I have put forward this Motion to take note of the statement of changes in the Immigration Rules to make sure that the Government give your Lordships’ House an opportunity to debate a very serious matter. You just have to look at the Explanatory Memorandum to see the range of criteria covered by these changes to the Immigration Rules. The changes were brought in by negative resolution, so this is the first opportunity that your Lordships’ House has had to discuss the matter, despite the legal judgment that led to these changes being given on 18 July this year and the fact that the rules have already come into effect. It would have been helpful to your Lordships’ House had there been an opportunity for an earlier debate and an explanation of why the matter had to be dealt with in this way. I do not intend to go into the individual areas of guidance but I have a number of questions for the Minister. It would be helpful, first, to hear about the circumstances that led to the statement of changes being laid.

I think it is appropriate to say how grateful we should be to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, whose work on this matter has been extremely helpful. Perhaps the summary at the beginning of its report is the best place to start. To give some background, on 18 July the Government lost a major immigration case in the Supreme Court. In the case involving Alvi v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Supreme Court maintained that substantive changes affecting immigration applications must be laid before Parliament. Mr Alvi had been refused leave to remain under tier 2 of the points-based system because his level of skills and salary did not meet the criteria. However, the Supreme Court quashed that ruling as the criterion used to make the decision was not part of the rules as laid before Parliament under Section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 but had been published only in the guidance, which had not been subject to parliamentary scrutiny procedure and, therefore, approval.

The last compete revision of the Immigration Rules was laid before Parliament in 2008, but since then considerable guidance from the previous Government and this Government have been added. The question raised by this and previous cases was whether this was really guidance or a substantive change in the rules.

As we can see from this weighty document, Cm 8423, there are 290 pages of what had been issued as guidance but on 19 July, the day following the Supreme Court judgment, the Government laid the document before Parliament to take immediate effect on 20 July, even though the House of Commons was not then sitting— of course, your Lordships’ House was and a Written Statement was made by the Minister at that time. Does the ruling of 18 July 2012 mean that all immigration cases decided on the basis of guidance issued since 2008 have been decided on without a legal basis for that decision?

Paragraph 4.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum states that the changes apply to all applications on and after 20 July, when the statement to change the rules was laid, but what about the decisions taken before? What is the status of the decisions taken before Cm 8423 was laid? Have there been any further appeals against refusal since 18 July on the basis of the court’s judgment? It would be helpful if the Minister could say whether all the guidance issued is included in the statement. If it is, I am not 100% clear why all the guidance is imported into the rules—the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee referred to that as well. Was any work undertaken to see what should legitimately remain in guidance or whether it should all be imported into the rules?

It strikes me that within the rules—that is, what was in guidance—are lists and lists over pages and pages referring to banking organisations where the financial information will be accepted by the Government. That was previously in guidance but is now in the rules, so does that mean that any deletions or additions to the list can be made only by rules and in future not be changed in the guidance? Because of the volume of the material, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee was unable to verify the Government’s statement that the new statement of changes includes all and only that previously issued in the guidance. It would be helpful if the Minister could confirm that there is nothing in the rules other than what was previously in guidance.

The basis of the Supreme Court decision was that the guidance was not subject to any parliamentary procedure. Now that the Government have brought in this statement of changes by negative resolution, are they satisfied that they have done enough to ensure that this has the full force of law? One of my concerns relates to the negative procedure, which I shall mention again in a moment. If we had not requested this debate today, there would have been no debate in your Lordships’ House on this issue. We will not be asking for a vote on this, as the Minister is aware.

As the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee said, the statement of changes provides a short-term solution, but I know that from previous debates the Minister is aware of concerns that have been raised about the interaction between the Immigration Rules and the ECHR. The committee also raised further concerns about this on that occasion, as it had done previously. Is the Minister able to make any comment about that? I noted that paragraph 6 of the Explanatory Memorandum states that no statement is needed on the ECHR as the order is subject to the negative resolution procedure. However, unless I have misunderstood, that is not the view taken by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee.

We all understand that from time to time Governments have to bring forward emergency legislation or react immediately to events such as court judgments. Can the Minister confirm that that was the Government’s reason for laying the statement of changes by negative resolution on the day following the judgment in the case of Mr Alvi? If it was, I am then unclear about why the Government waited until then, because they had been aware of this problem for two years. It was pointed out to the Government by the then Merits of Statutory Instruments Committee, following a previous statement of changes—HC96—in 2010 that was also laid urgently following two other court judgments.

Having read through the judgments, it seems that in 2010 the situation could not have been clearer. In July 2010, the challenge made in the case taken by an education charity, English UK, was that the decisions were taken ultra vires. It said it was challenging the change made to the Immigration Rules because it,

“ought to have been introduced by a change to the Immigration Rules and was not capable of being introduced by a change in the UKBA’s Guidance”.

In his judgment on that case, Mr Justice Foskett said that,

“the revised criterion could not be put in place by virtue of a process of issuing guidance. The ratio of the decision appears to me to be that a provision that reflects a substantive criterion for eligibility for admission or leave to remain must be the subject of a process that involves a true Parliamentary scrutiny”.

He made other comments on that in his judgment, such as that:

“It would follow from this that, if a change to current practice (even if reflecting the requirement of a rule) did not involve any alteration of a substantive criterion for admission or for leave to remain, there would be no objection to the change being effected in some form of extrinsic guidance”.

Basically, if it is a substantive change to the rule, it cannot be in guidance but has to be via legislation. He also said:

“I do not doubt that the changed approach in the new guidance does operate to change materially the substantive criteria for entry for foreign students”,

and that that,

“cannot be achieved by a change in guidance—it must be achieved through the medium of a rule change”.

That was in July 2010.

He recognised the complexity of the issues and said that the difficulty,

“arises when something is done by means of a change in existing guidance which arguably constitutes a change in the practice adopted by the Secretary of State in the administration of the rules regulating the entry into the UK of non-nationals”.

He said that the,

“word ‘guidance’ itself would ordinarily connote something less prescriptive than a rule”.

He said that it was a very complex area. He then went on to say that, if that is correct, simply,

“extrinsic guidance cannot be used in the manner in which it was sought to be used in this case to make a material or substantive change in existing immigration policy without the negative resolution procedure set out in section 3(2) of the Immigration Act being implemented”.

There was a similar case in June 2010 in the Court of Appeal, where it was said that,

“immigration rules are today different from and more than policy”.

The Government also lost that case a month earlier.

I know that I have already asked the noble Lord a couple of questions but I struggle to understand this and perhaps he can help. Why did the Government not act earlier when the judgment in those two cases seems very clear? In both cases, the judge said that guidance was different from rules and substantive change could not be made by guidance. Were there any further challenges between those two dates, from June and July 2010 through to July 2012? Clearly, changes were not made in 2010 that should have been made. By bringing this order forward now, the Government recognise that perhaps changes should have been earlier. It would be helpful if the Minister could tell the Committee what changes there will be in practice from now on to ensure that the Government do not find themselves in this position again.

The other point concerns scrutiny. In his final comments, Mr Justice Foskett referred to the negative resolution procedure, but earlier in his judgment he said that there had to be true parliamentary scrutiny. It would be helpful to the Committee to be given an assurance that the negative procedure now being adopted satisfies the courts and the parliamentary process that this matter has been subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

This is a complex area. The bit that I struggle with most is that the measure was introduced as an emergency process to deal with the 2010 judgments. Anything that the noble Lord can say to enlighten me on that position will be very helpful.

[Lord Avebury]

My Lords, a month ago we debated the first of the post-Alvi statements of changes in Immigration Rules, on a Motion to Regret tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, not so much because she disagreed with the Government’s objectives but on the narrow ground that the minimum annual income requirement for a person wanting to bring in a spouse from a non-EEA country was not the most effective way of protecting the taxpayer and delivering fairness for the would-be sponsors and their partners. We wanted to highlight the far more questionable government objective of reducing the number of net immigrants below 100,000 by fair means or foul, picking on easy targets wherever they can find them.

As the noble Baroness has explained, the purpose of this statement, which is 295 pages long, including its Explanatory Memorandum, is to transfer requirements that were previously embodied in guidance into the Immigration Rules, satisfying the Supreme Court judgment in the Alvi case that only rules approved by Parliament could have the force of law. It is a weighty document and I cannot help feeling that it is a good thing the Almighty did not have anything to say about the Immigration Rules or Moses would have had a hard time carrying this lot down from the summit.

The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee suggests that we should ask the Government to clarify the status of cases decided on the basis of the guidance since 2008, when the last complete revision of the Immigration Rules was laid, and I will come back to that point. The committee goes on to observe that, in the light of its previous reports and a number of unresolved questions about the interaction between the rules and the European Convention, changes to the primary legislation might be necessary to put its application beyond question. I hope that we shall hear something from the Government on both those matters.

There is a further detailed point about the salary threshold for IT workers. These thresholds are now subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and we are prompted to ask the Government to set out the methodology for calculating them. The statement contains 74 pages specifying the salaries for particular occupations. How often is it intended to revise the figures, with presumably a statement requiring parliamentary approval every time? The problem with this approach is that every minute requirement that has to be satisfied by an applicant for leave to enter or remain in the UK now has to be set out in the rules without any element of discretion whatever being provided to the decision-makers. If a rule leads to an outcome that is unreasonable, it can be rectified only by a further statement of changes, and if there is a minor error in the documentation that has to be submitted in connection with an application, the decision-maker has no option but to reject it. The applicant has to submit a fresh application with all the delay and expense that that involves.

I give an example of the rigidity of the system. Mr AD is self-employed, and in connection with an application to bring his partner in from a non-EEA country he has to prove that his earnings exceed £18,600. For every other purpose “certified” accounts are acceptable, but on page 280 of this statement, the rules demand a full audit, at an additional cost which may exceed £1,000. In response to a letter from Mr AD’s MP, Stephen Lloyd, the Minister for Immigration, Mark Harper MP, says that the Home Office is currently considering whether it needs to insist on audited accounts—a requirement that must have already imposed an unnecessary burden on dozens of sponsors. That is clearly inconsistent with the Government’s declared policy of reducing the load of bureaucracy on small businesses and I would like the Minister to say this afternoon that it will be removed, presumably by a further statement of changes in the rules.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Smith of Basildon and Lord Avebury

Wednesday 4th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Avebury]

My Lords, under Sections 96 to 99 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the Secretary of State may issue a certificate causing a properly initiated and extant appeal before the First-tier Tribunal, Immigration and Asylum Chamber, or onward appeal against a decision of that chamber, to be summarily terminated. The cases dealt with in Sections 97 and 98 concern matters of national security or certain cases where the Secretary of State has certified that a person’s presence in the UK is, or would not be, conducive to the public good, and these amendments do not affect those provisions.

Section 96(1) and (2) concern situations where the Secretary of State asserts that the subject matter a person now relies upon could and should have been raised in previous appeal proceedings. However, the Secretary of State’s opportunity to make such an assertion and issue a certificate to exclude a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal is when she is making her decision in relation to the subject matter, not after she has rejected it and an appeal initiated. Indeed, Section 96 expressly recognises this. Section 96(7) states:

“A certificate under subsection (1) or (2) shall have no effect in relation to an appeal instituted before the certificate is issued”.

Section 99 was commenced on 1 April 2003 by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (Commencement No. 4) Order. Section 96, however, was later revised and Section 96(7) inserted on 1 October 2004 by the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (Commencement No. 1) Order 2004. However, when this revision was made, Section 99 was not amended so as to reflect the change introduced under the 2004 Act. The ineffective and erroneous part of Section 99, which the amendment seeks to remove, is another example highlighting the degree of complexity in the statutory immigration appeals provisions. I beg to move.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, I can be very brief on this, as the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, explained his amendment in great detail. My understanding from the briefing that I received is that this proposal would be a modest tidying and simplification of what the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association said was a highly complex statutory appeals process. On that basis, it appears to be a tidying-up amendment, but it would be helpful to know whether the Minister shares that view or whether he believes that it represents a significant change. My legal knowledge is not great enough, but I would like to hear the other side of it, and if it is just a simplification and tidying-up I hope that the Government would agree to it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Avebury]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 149B, I shall also discuss Amendment 149C. These are alternative amendments reducing the impact of the additional and highly restrictive requirement to show an important point of principle or practice, or some other compelling reason, in immigration and nationality appeals from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal. This additional requirement is referred to as the “second-tier appeals test”. The second of the two alternatives I have tabled is narrower, removing this test in asylum and human rights appeals but not other immigration appeals.

The second-tier appeals test was introduced by Section 13(6) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 for certain appeals from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal. During the passage of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill in 2009, your Lordships voted through amendments to prevent the test applying to immigration and nationality appeals. This amendment derives from the wording of the amendment originally tabled by my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill, QC, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, QC, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and subsequently adopted by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and the late Lord Kingsland as part of a wider amendment concerning the Upper Tribunal. The Joint Committee on Human Rights had concurred with the legal opinion of Sir Richard Buxton, a recently retired Lord Justice of Appeal in the Court of Appeal, that the introduction of such restrictions might not be compatible with the UK’s international obligations.

The same considerations apply now as they did then, and there is a new factor. The increased rotation of judges under the Crime and Courts Bill will mean that there are more judges in the Upper Tribunal who are not immersed in these cases making asylum and immigration decisions, and they will be without the supervision of the Court of Appeal if the clause is unamended. At the moment, we continue to see the higher courts engaged on these issues. There are some poor tribunal decisions but, to be fair, this is an incredibly complex, difficult and fast-moving area of the law. The tribunal judges sitting from time to time in the immigration and asylum chambers of the tribunal may be excellent tribunal judges. However, they are not infallible, and the effect of the LASPO Act 2012, whether directly, in immigration, or indirectly, in asylum, will be that more appellants are unrepresented.

Among the concerns expressed in 2009 was the impact of the second-tier appeals test in potentially excluding appeals to the Court of Appeal where the individuals faced removal in breach of the refugee convention and their human rights as a result of errors of law by the tribunal. Ministers gave assurances in both Houses that these sorts of cases would be the ones that could be expected to meet the test. Phil Woolas said,

“the test would not stop cases that raise important issues concerning human rights or asylum being granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/7/09; col. 210.]

There were other soothing comments, of which I will cite only one, made by the current Immigration Minister, Damian Green, who said:

“The widespread feeling is that Home Office failings must not be compensated for by a lessening of appeal rights in those complex cases that involve human rights issues or constitutional principles, and that the inadequate handling of judicial reviews by an untested tribunal risks increasing the work load of the supervising court, the Court of Appeal, and reducing supervision at the Home Office”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/07/09; col. 212.]

Those assurances have proved to be ephemeral following the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of PR (Sri Lanka). The Court of Appeal considered the ministerial assurances given in 2009, concluding that,

“it would be wrong in principle”,

to be constrained by those assurances and, in applying the second-tier appeals test, refused permission to appeal in each of the three asylum cases before the court. In one of those cases the appellant had been detained and tortured in Sri Lanka. Applying the test, the Court of Appeal concluded:

“The claimed risks are, unhappily, in no way exceptional in this jurisdiction, and not in themselves such as to require the attention of the Court of Appeal”.

In another of the three cases, the judge identified an error of law in the failure of the tribunals below to correctly apply country guidance in respect of Zimbabwe asylum claims, but concluded that the test none the less precluded any appeal to the court. In the last of the three cases, Lord Justice Pitchford found the reasoning of the tribunals below to be, “obscure and contradictory” and such as to give rise to a real prospect of success on the appeal if permission had been granted.

In the case of JD (Congo), however, the Court of Appeal granted JD permission to appeal on the basis that there was an error of law in the Upper Tribunal’s conclusion that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law, but the UT’s criticisms of the FTT’s decision amount to no more than a disagreement as to the proportionality of removal. The consequences of removal for JD and his partner were acknowledged to be very severe.

Taken together, these two judgments show that asylum and other human rights cases are neither exempt from the test, nor grounds in themselves to meet the test. That an error could lead to a person being returned to a country where he or she may be tortured will not necessarily mean that the test is met, as in the case of PR (Sri Lanka).

There are other significant conclusions to be drawn from these cases, as the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association emphasised in its briefing for your Lordships on these amendments. I hope that my noble kinsman has had an opportunity of considering them carefully in making up his mind as to how to respond this afternoon.

In conclusion, leaving aside all the complexities of the second-tier appeals test, which have preoccupied the Court of Appeal, it has been shown that without Amendment 149B, or at least Amendment 149C, we shall be in breach of our obligations under both the refugee convention and the ECHR and that we have been warned by no less an authority than the UNHCR itself. I beg to move.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, we are again grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, for the detail with which he explained his amendment. I think that these are amendments drafted by the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association. As I understand the noble Lord, they are alternative amendments. The first removes the requirement to show an important point of principle or practice, or some other compelling reason, in immigration and nationality appeals from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal: that is known as the second-tier appeals test. The second, if I understand it correctly, is a lesser amendment and would apply to all immigration and nationality appeals concerning asylum and human rights. The noble Lord indicates that I do understand correctly.

The noble Lord referred to the impact the second-tier appeals test has had and I would like to hear the response of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover. There were some serious points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. If the Government are opposing the amendment, we need to understand their case for doing so, including their views on the impact this would have if implemented and the reasons and evidence used to justify holding those views. It would be helpful to hear from the noble Baroness. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has made a detailed and interesting case and there must be some justification if the Government are not going to accept the amendments.