Lord Avebury
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Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
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Lord Avebury
“( ) This section shall not have effect in relation to an appeal against a refusal of entry clearance where that decision was taken wholly or partly on a general ground for refusal in rules as laid by the Secretary of State for the purposes of section 1(4) of the Immigration Act 1971.”
Lord Avebury
My Lords, the intention of Clause 24 is that refusal of a family visit visa will no longer be subject to a right of appeal, save on human rights or race discrimination grounds. However, as I shall explain, the race discrimination ground has been inadvertently removed, except in Northern Ireland.
In July 2011, the UK Border Agency stated in the publication Family Migration: A Consultation:
“Many British citizens and persons settled in the UK have family members living outside the UK. This results in a high volume of visa applications from people wishing to visit family in the UK”.
It goes on to say that such visits,
“are a means of maintaining family links and of enabling family members living abroad to participate in important family occasions in the UK, such as births, weddings and funerals. Such visits and associated tourism also bring economic benefits to the UK”.
The following month, the Prime Minister said:
“If it hurts families, if it undermines commitment, if it tramples over the values that keep people together, or stops families from being together, then we shouldn't do it”.
Clause 24 will undoubtedly stop many families being together by denying persons refused a visa to visit family a right of appeal to an independent tribunal to correct wrong assertions by entry clearance officers that otherwise would lead to the refusal of their current and future applications to visit family.
The rise in the success rate of appeals in family visit cases, from 19% in 2004 to 45% in 2010, underlines the necessity of the right of appeal against refusal. If Clause 24 remains in the Bill, nearly half of all applicants in future will be wrongly rejected and will have to reapply at a cost of £78 for a single visit or £270 for multiple visits over two years to get the decision reversed.
So what is the argument for this proposal? The Immigration Minister, giving evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee, complained that there were many more appeals than had been anticipated in 2000, when the right of repeal was restored. He suggested that the removal of the full appeal rights would be better for applicants because, if a genuine mistake has been made on the application, the amended version is normally dealt with in 15 days, whereas an appeal takes eight months. Clearly, one good reason for the increasing volume of appeals is that the quality of first decisions has progressively deteriorated, as shown by the steady increase in the proportion of successful appeals. Another is that, as successive reports of chief inspectors have revealed, many refusals are not to do with a mistake by the applicant but a mistake by the ECO, or because applicants had to submit additional material, the need for which they could not have anticipated at the time of the original application.
Mrs N, who lives in Beirut, where she is the carer of her 89 year-old mother, has been here a dozen times in the past decade and has had no difficulty getting visas to visit her husband, a Londoner who is a close friend of mine. Now she has been refused a family visit because, they say, she has insufficient ties to Lebanon. This is one example of the way in which applications are being refused on the basis of failure to supply information, the need for which the applicant could not have anticipated. The agency dealing with applications for family visits in Beirut now wants a doctor’s certificate and bank statements from the applicant’s mother, documents that have never been required in the past. The Minister turned that sort of situation around and said that 63% of the appeals lost by the UKBA were the result of new evidence introduced at appeal stage. One way in which to reduce the number would be for the UKBA to make it clear exactly what information it wants in the explanatory notes that it sends to family visit applicants.
In 2011, the UKBA chief inspector, as he was then, looked at entry clearance decisions where there is currently no right of appeal. He found that the ECO had not properly considered the evidence in one-third of the 1,500-odd cases examined and, in a further 14% of the sample, it was not possible to determine from the file whether the evidence had been properly examined. In 16% of the cases, the refusal was based on failure,
“to provide information which”,
the applicant,
“could not have been aware”,
was required,
“at the time of making their application”.
When an ECO wrongly impugns an applicant’s integrity in the reason for refusal, if the applicant is not able to clear his or her name it may well be relied on to refuse any future application whether for a family visa or some other type of visa, whether in an application to the UK or some other country. In some circumstances the previous allegation by the ECO will require any future visa application to be refused for up to 10 years—for instance, when the ECO alleges that the applicant has made a false statement in his or her application. Among the reasons given for refusal of family visit applications are that the applicant is not genuinely seeking entry as a visitor only or is not intending to leave the UK at the end of the visit. Refusals may also include reasons impugning the character of the applicant, such as that she has made a false statement in her application. Any false statement would require the application to be refused. The right of appeal, at which family members appear and can give oral evidence, is essential to afford a proper opportunity to answer allegations as to the integrity of the applicant or her relations.
If your Lordships approve Clause 24, it will normally be possible to challenge these refusals only by way of judicial review or administrative review, a process internal to the UKBA, introduced in 2008 to replace the full right of appeal against refusal of entry clearance in student and worker visa cases dealt with under the points-based system. That involves a review by an entry clearance manager of the decision by the ECO, a procedure which means, as David Winnick MP observed in the Home Affairs Select Committee, that the UK is “judge and jury” in its own cause. The chief inspector, in his global review, looked at 475 such internal reviews and found that in 30% of the cases the entry clearance manager failed to pick up on poor decision-making by the ECO. He was explicit in finding that the internal review system is not working effectively.
The Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 required the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a report on the effect of removing the full right of appeal in points-based system entry clearance cases. That report, in March 2011, was by the UKBA itself and was therefore not independent. It sets out what is expected of entry clearance managers in conducting reviews whereas the chief inspector’s findings show that, in many cases, those expectations are not met. The report argues that it is reasonable to substitute an internal review for the right of appeal in points-based system cases and emphasis is placed on the context of the new, more objective and transparent process of making decisions under the points-based system.
The points-based system has not resulted in an objective and transparent process as intended but even if it had, it would not be an argument for applying internal reviews to the entirely different process of deciding on family visits. There is no suggestion that family visit visas are to be decided on criteria in relation to which scope for subjective decision-making is removed. The defects of the internal review system would therefore be intensified if applied to family visit refusals.
The Labour Party made the restoration of appeal rights a manifesto commitment in 1997, and when it implemented that undertaking in 2000 my right honourable friend Simon Hughes said:
“The Conservative Government … abolished the right of those who had applied for visas to enter this country to appeal against rejection. That caused widespread disapproval, dissatisfaction and anger. Understandably, the Labour Opposition, like the Liberal Democrats, were committed to restoring the right of appeal”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/11/00; col. 109.]
This feeling was shared on all sides of another place and of this House. The late Lord Newton of Braintree was among many who emphasised the importance of family members in the UK being able to attend an independent tribunal to address implicit or explicit allegations as to the integrity of the would-be visitor or the family members. My friend the late Earl Russell, in his inimitable way, related a 17th century anecdote to illustrate a point about family relationships and the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, speaking from the Conservative Front Bench, criticised the restoration of appeal rights in family visit cases only on the grounds that fees were to be payable which would mean that there would not be many appeals.
Last Tuesday, the noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, drew attention to the latest report of the chief inspector of the Border Agency on visa applications. Mr Vine points out that on entry clearance decisions as a whole ECOs had not considered the evidence properly in 33% of cases, and that rose to 37% for Africa and to 50% for the region covering the Gulf, Iran and Pakistan. The poorest performing posts on the use of evidence were Abu Dhabi, Abuja, Moscow and New Delhi and these same posts were the worst on failure to seek initial information as well. Three of them were among the five worst posts on the retention of documentation. The Government say that a right of appeal is to be retained on race discrimination and/or human rights grounds against the refusal of a family visit visa. Section 84(1)(e) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 permits as a ground of appeal that a decision is,
“not in accordance with the law”,
which includes a ground of race discrimination on an appeal, but unlike the specific race discrimination ground that had resided in Section 84(1)(b), it is only applicable when a full right of appeal is available. Reference to the Race Relations Act 1976 was removed from Section 84(1)(b) on 5 April 2011 by the Equality Act 2010 (Public Authorities and Consequential and Supplementary Amendments) Order 2011 and no substitute was included in its place. I hope that my noble kinsman, when he comes to reply, can give me an assurance that an amendment will be introduced to remedy this problem on Report.
In conclusion, the reasons advanced for Clause 24 are those given in the UKBA consultation document Family Migration: A Consultation in July 2011; namely, assertions about the use of new evidence in a sample of 363 determinations in family visit appeals that it had considered. ILPA put the following questions to the UK Border Agency regarding this sample:
“Of the allowed appeals, was the new evidence produced, evidence that is clearly required on the application form or website?”,
and:
“Of the allowed appeals, was any contact made by the entry clearance officer making the decision with the applicant to request that the evidence be supplied?”.
The UK Border Agency’s response to each of these questions was:
“The information requested was not collated when the sampling was carried out”.
Lord Henley
My Lords, without knowing more about the sort of cases that my noble friend refers to, I do not think that I can respond to him at this stage. The more general point, and the reason for bringing this clause forward, is that we feel that many of the applications can be dealt with by a new application and so the process of a right of appeal is not the right way forward. We are bringing it into line with other parts of the immigration system. In the main, we have found that so many appeals have been on the basis of new information. This is a more appropriate way of dealing with it.
Lord Avebury
My Lords, I dread to think of how many occasions I have sat here and listened to Ministers from the Front Bench saying that they will make amends for the all the criticisms that have come from the chief inspectors of the UK Border Agency or their predecessors; yet on the next occasion we debate precisely the same thing. It is with some reluctance that one accepts the assurances that the Minister has given that the Government are going to sort out the UK Border Agency so that fewer false decisions are made. I am sure that he has been told by the officials that they have this matter in hand but the benefit of past experience shows us that we cannot rely on that.
In relation to the suggestion made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, that there should be some mechanism whereby, if the entry certificate officer needs some further information that the applicant could not possibly have known would be required on his original application, that should not be the cause of a refusal but of a communication from the ECO to the applicant to say exactly what kind of information is needed and that that would be considered in making the decision. There is no such mechanism at the moment and I am not satisfied that the assurances the Minister has given, that he will look at the proposal, are sufficient. My suggestion is that we could perhaps think about this before Report and come back to it then, to hear further from the Minister about what progress he has been able to make on my noble friend Lady Hamwee’s suggestion.
Even so, there remains a problem: that the applicant has a black mark against them in the Home Office records, which may have deleterious effects on any further application that he makes. When he comes to make another visit and officers look up what happened in the past, they will see that he has had a refusal. In the case that I mentioned of Mrs N in Beirut, who made a number of visits to her husband in London, no problem was ever encountered. It was rather like the case cited by my noble friend Lord Hussain. Quite simply, they granted the entry certificate. She came to visit her husband in London and went back to Beirut afterwards, for the very simple reason that she had an 89-year-old mother there for whom she is the primary carer, as I explained. That was known—it must be on the files—yet on this occasion, after she has been from Beirut to London perhaps a dozen times without any problem, suddenly she was refused.
Mrs N’s solicitor advised her not only to put in a fresh application, which my noble friend thinks is the ultimate solution, but to appeal because she does not want a stain to appear on her record. That is not going to vanish. There is no way in which you can rub off a record of a refusal, except by means of an appeal. Although people may be able to get permission more quickly to come here by putting in a fresh application, as my noble friend says, that application will have to be considered in the light of the fact that there is a record of a refusal. It is less likely that that person will be able to come here in future. The solution that my noble friend has suggested is not the answer and I say again that we will have to return to this on Report, when I hope we can make some further progress on it. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Avebury
“Immigration appeals: race discrimination grounds
In the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, in section 84(1)(b), after “Race Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1997” insert “or relates to section 115 of the Equality Act 2010 in relation to the protected characteristic identified in section 9 of that Act”.”
Lord Avebury
My Lords, the specific race discrimination ground of appeal in immigration cases now relates only to Northern Ireland. The 2002 Act continues to allow an immigration judge to find an immigration decision to be unlawful by reason of race or other unlawful discrimination, because Section 84(1)(e) provides a ground of appeal,
“that the decision is otherwise not in accordance with the law”,
but only where he or she has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in the first place.
The importance of the specific race discrimination ground of appeal is that it is one of two statutory grounds that generally preserve an appeal right that would otherwise be precluded by the 2002 Act. Thus, in the various and complex sections restricting appeal rights in that Act, the following general formula is repeated several times: that the relevant restriction,
“does not prevent the bringing of an appeal on either or both of the grounds referred to in section 84(1)(b) and (c)”.
This general formula previously preserved the right of appeal against an immigration decision, where the would-be appellant sought to challenge the immigration decision on race discrimination or human rights grounds. This has particular relevance to Clause 24 of the Bill, by which it is intended to remove the right of appeal against the refusal of a family visit visa. The provisions that Clause 24 amends will continue to retain the general formula intended to preserve a right of appeal on race discrimination or human rights grounds. Preserving the right of appeal on those grounds is clearly intended, as is stated by paragraph 373 of the Explanatory Notes. It was also made clear on the UK Border Agency website when the Bill was first published, as well as in a more recent announcement on that website concerning changes to remove the right of appeal for aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews and cousins against a refusal of a family visit visa.
However, the omission of the relevant words in Section 84(1)(b) undermines all this. The general formula now preserves appeal rights only where the appeal is brought on human rights grounds in England and Wales or Scotland, and on both race discrimination and human rights grounds in Northern Ireland. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association has raised this with the Home Office, and it has been confirmed that this was not intended. ILPA informs us that the Home Office is looking at how best to remedy the omission, and we hope that it can be done while this Bill is in progress. Ideally, the Government will be able to say how and by when this omission is to be corrected in answer to this amendment, and we would then expect to see it implemented on Report.
The events that led to the inadvertent omission of the specific race discrimination ground of appeal highlight once again the notorious complexity of immigration law, including the highly complex statutory appeal provisions. We have just enacted the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, in the face of widespread concern both within and outside Parliament about the removal of legal aid in areas such as immigration, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said on the last day of debate in the House of Lords before enactment,
“will hit hardest the weakest and most impoverished sections of our society, often on complex questions of law such as are raised by immigration law”.—[Official Report, 25/4/12; col. 1797.]
If the Government cannot even foresee the consequences for the statutory immigration appeals scheme when they draft legislation with an impact on that scheme, they can hardly expect individuals without legal advice or representation to understand the rules and to know what appeal rights they still have, if any. I beg to move.
Lord Henley
My Lords, my noble kinsman has spotted something, and it will be suitable for me to intervene at this stage and save ourselves a debate. As he has explained, Amendment 148B is intended to reinstate a right of appeal against an immigration decision on race relations grounds. Such a right of appeal existed prior to the commencement of the Equality Act 2010, but many noble Lords will remember that the latter stages of that Act were rushed through rather fast in the run-up to the election, and that right was inadvertently removed by the consequential amendments made under that Act. That might encourage us to think more carefully about the wash-up process in the future because of the mistakes that can creep in.
The Government’s stated policy remains that there should be a right of appeal on race relations grounds, and we agree that this appeal right should be reinstated. My noble kinsman asked how we can do that. We do not apparently need primary legislation to rectify this problem as we could effect the necessary change through secondary legislation made under the Equality Act 2010, a point that has been recognised by the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association in its briefing on this amendment.
I am happy to give a commitment that the problem will be rectified and to explore further over the summer —my noble kinsman will be aware that we have quite a few months before we get to Report—how best this might be achieved. In light of this reassurance, I hope that he will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Avebury
“Immigration appeals: asylum and humanitarian protection
In the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, in section 83(1)(b) omit the words from “Kingdom” to the end.”
Lord Avebury
I shall speak also to Amendment 148D. Section 83 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 currently provides that a person may appeal to the tribunal against the rejection of his asylum claim where,
“he has been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for a period exceeding one year (or for periods exceeding one year in aggregate)”.
This amendment would extend the right of appeal against refusal of asylum in any case where the Secretary of State had granted the person leave to enter or remain for whatever period. Asylum seekers who are not granted leave to enter or remain when refused asylum have a right of appeal under the provisions of Section 83(1), thus currently it is only asylum seekers who are granted leave to enter or remain for 12 months or less who are unable to appeal when refused asylum.
Where an asylum seeker is refused, there are various reasons why he or she might none the less be granted leave to enter or remain for a limited period. For example, a person refused asylum may be granted humanitarian protection because it is accepted that he or she is at risk of serious harm if returned to his or her country of origin, but it is not accepted that that harm is for a refugee convention reason—that is to say that the harm is not,
“for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”—
or because it is accepted that his or her removal would constitute an unlawful interference with his or her private or family life. Grants of leave on either basis would normally be for more than 12 months. In these situations, Section 83 provides a right of appeal against the asylum refusal.
The group of asylum seekers most affected by the 12-month stipulation in Section 83(1)(b) is unaccompanied children. Unaccompanied children refused asylum are often granted discretionary leave on the basis that there are no adequate reception arrangements in their country of origin to which they could be returned. Discretionary leave granted to an unaccompanied child on this basis is granted for whichever is the shorter period of three years or until he or she is aged 17 and a half. Thus an unaccompanied child aged 16 and a half or over at the time of being refused asylum will not be granted discretionary leave of sufficient length to allow him or her to appeal against the refusal of asylum. He or she will have to wait until his or her discretionary leave is nearing its expiry and apply for an extension of the discretionary leave. If that extension is refused or granted for a period that when added to the period in the original grant comes to more than 12 months, he or she can appeal against the refusal of asylum.
This has serious implications for such a child. First, in many cases the UKBA does not decide an application for an extension of discretionary leave for many months, or sometimes years, after the application is made, so a child age 16 and a half when originally refused asylum may be well into adulthood before he or she is provided any opportunity of bringing an appeal against the refusal of asylum. Delay in establishing refugee status can cause substantial harm to the child’s welfare and development over and above the ongoing uncertainty as to the child’s longer term future. For example, children and young people with only discretionary leave to remain rather than refugee leave may have difficulty accessing further or higher education or accessing financial support for this purpose. Generally, unaccompanied children and young people awaiting a decision on their application for an extension of discretionary leave may have difficulties accessing a range of entitlements because, while in law they continue to have discretionary leave, the document by which that leave is given will show it to have expired.
Secondly, changes in circumstances as regards the child or his or her country of origin may mean it is more difficult or not possible to now succeed on appeal. This is because in an asylum appeal the issue for the immigration judge is not whether a person was a refugee when he or she originally claimed or was refused asylum, but whether the person is now at risk of persecution. For example, the child wrongly refused asylum but at risk of being recruited as a child soldier may be unable to establish his or her asylum claim by being denied a right of appeal until after he or she has ceased to be a child. Additionally, a child, like any other person, will normally be best able to recall events and give evidence in an appeal the closer in time the appeal is to those events.
Thirdly, provisions and guidance designed to protect a child’s interests in immigration procedures, including appeals, will be unavailable during procedures that take place after the child reaches adulthood. These provisions and guidance include judicial guidance on dealing with child applicants and witnesses, UK Border Agency guidance on dealing with children and Legal Services Commission guidance on availability of legal aid. The protections stipulate that particular care is needed in taking evidence from a child, that children are not to be detained and that a child should not be left without legal representation at appeal.
In the light of these considerations, the current provision acts contrary to the UK’s international and domestic obligations to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. It is contrary to the children’s best interests and hence to Article 3 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Given that the provision overwhelmingly acts to prejudice children, it is contrary to Article 2 of the convention as being discriminatory in practice on grounds of age and a person being a child.
I turn to Amendment 148D. Section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 empowers the Secretary of State to prevent an asylum seeker or person making a human rights claim from exercising a right of appeal before his or her departure, voluntary or enforced, from the UK. The provision is often referred to as a non-suspensive appeals provision because ordinarily where an asylum or human rights claim was made by a person in the UK, the power to remove a person from the UK is suspended while he or she may bring or is pursuing an appeal.
When Section 94 was first debated by your Lordships in July 2002, the late Lord Archer of Sandwell asked:
“How many basic principles can be brought into contempt in 65 lines?”.
Having noted that succeeding on an asylum or human rights appeal after one has been removed from the UK may simply be too late, he cautioned:
“Once the claimant has passed out of the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, we have no control over what happens to him”.
He also highlighted the great difficulties presented in trying to exercise one’s appeal from outside the country, including in particular where,
“the outcome may—usually does—depend on the assessment”,
by the immigration judge,
“of the applicant's evidence … and … to a substantial degree on seeing and hearing the witness”.—[Official Report, 23/7/02; cols. 344-45.]
The amendment removes the presumption of safety contained in Section 94(8) where the Secretary of State intends to remove the person to what she claims is a safe third country—not the person’s country of origin—and where she says the person will not suffer any human rights abuse and where she has issued a certificate under Section 94(7).
Lord Henley
My Lords, I will deal with the amendments in the same order as my noble kinsman did. Amendment 148C would create a right of appeal whenever someone is refused asylum but is granted any form of leave. It would also have the effect of providing for multiple rights of appeal against the refusal of asylum for a group of cases where no right currently exists, as there will be a right of appeal every time a fresh grant of leave is given. That is possibly an undesirable position.
The original purpose of Section 83 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which, again, the noble Baroness will well remember, was to provide a right of appeal where an asylum application has been refused but the applicant was granted more than 12 months’ leave. Normally when a claim for asylum is refused, there is a right of appeal against the subsequent removal from the UK rather than against the refusal of asylum itself. The appellant can raise asylum grounds as part of that appeal against his removal. However, where someone has been refused asylum but granted leave of less than 12 months, removal directions will not be set and therefore no appeal right arises. In these cases, the short duration of the leave necessarily means that the case will be considered again quickly, reducing the need for an appeal. Where there are no grounds to grant asylum but there are other valid reasons why someone cannot return to their home country, another form of immigration leave is sometimes granted. If leave is granted for more than 12 months, Section 83 of the 2002 Act provides for a right of appeal against the refusal of asylum.
Amendment 148C would remove the 12-month restriction and would create a right of appeal against the refusal of asylum, even where a short period of leave is granted. It is not unusual for these short periods of leave to be extended more than once, and recent case law means that the amendment would create a right of appeal against the earlier refusal of asylum every time further leave was granted. If a decision to remove the applicant from the UK was ultimately taken, a separate right of appeal would arise against that decision. The amendment would possibly undermine the intention of the existing asylum appeals framework, which aims to prevent multiple, fruitless appeals being used to prolong someone’s time in the United Kingdom, often at significant cost to the taxpayer.
My noble kinsman and the noble Baroness asked about the impact on children, particularly unaccompanied children, who are refused asylum. They are normally granted leave until they reach the age of 17 and a half. The 12-month restriction therefore means that some unaccompanied children will be refused asylum and granted less than 12 months’ leave, which means that they do not get an appeal right under Section 83 of the 2002 Act. Those children may not have their asylum considered by a court for more than a year after they first claimed asylum. That is an unfortunate consequence of the otherwise very sensible 12-month restriction, and I can assure my noble kinsman that we will review our policies concerning the length of leave granted to children to ensure that there are no unintended consequences of the sort that he and the noble Baroness implied.
Amendment 148D concerns the Secretary of State’s powers to certify, under Section 94(7) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, that removing a person to a safe third country will not breach his or her human rights. The effect of the certificate in such cases is that an appeal can be brought out of country only after that person has been removed. This provision is designed to prevent spurious appeals being used to delay removal in hopeless cases. When determining whether such persons may be removed, the third country must be a place from which the person will not be sent to another country other than in accordance with the refugee convention; we want to make that clear. If the certificate is challenged by judicial review, the court is required to regard the third country as one where the person’s rights under the refugee convention will not be breached. I believe, therefore, that Amendment 148D is unnecessary because the courts are already able to consider whether the person’s human rights may be breached by way of judicial review challenging the issue of that certificate. Once the person has been removed to the third country, an appeal may be brought and refugee convention issues can be considered. In light of that assurance, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendments.
Lord Avebury
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble kinsman for what he has said about Amendment 148C. I look forward to hearing further from him, perhaps on Report, about the results of the policy review on the length of permission granted for a child and the effects of an appeal being heard after the child has reached the age of adulthood. I hope that I may take it, from what he said, that we will be able to have a more concrete idea of what the Government propose to do to remedy the situation before Report. If legislation is required to remedy it, we must not miss the opportunity presented by the Bill.
On Amendment 148D, the question of whether we need changes in the statute to cope with the cases that I have mentioned, where it was found that the presumption was not justified, is a matter on which I need to take further legal advice, so I will not pursue the matter any further at this point but may well return to it on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Avebury
“Appeal in progress
In the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, in section 99(1), omit “96(1) or (2)”.”
Lord Avebury
My Lords, under Sections 96 to 99 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the Secretary of State may issue a certificate causing a properly initiated and extant appeal before the First-tier Tribunal, Immigration and Asylum Chamber, or onward appeal against a decision of that chamber, to be summarily terminated. The cases dealt with in Sections 97 and 98 concern matters of national security or certain cases where the Secretary of State has certified that a person’s presence in the UK is, or would not be, conducive to the public good, and these amendments do not affect those provisions.
Section 96(1) and (2) concern situations where the Secretary of State asserts that the subject matter a person now relies upon could and should have been raised in previous appeal proceedings. However, the Secretary of State’s opportunity to make such an assertion and issue a certificate to exclude a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal is when she is making her decision in relation to the subject matter, not after she has rejected it and an appeal initiated. Indeed, Section 96 expressly recognises this. Section 96(7) states:
“A certificate under subsection (1) or (2) shall have no effect in relation to an appeal instituted before the certificate is issued”.
Section 99 was commenced on 1 April 2003 by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (Commencement No. 4) Order. Section 96, however, was later revised and Section 96(7) inserted on 1 October 2004 by the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (Commencement No. 1) Order 2004. However, when this revision was made, Section 99 was not amended so as to reflect the change introduced under the 2004 Act. The ineffective and erroneous part of Section 99, which the amendment seeks to remove, is another example highlighting the degree of complexity in the statutory immigration appeals provisions. I beg to move.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I can be very brief on this, as the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, explained his amendment in great detail. My understanding from the briefing that I received is that this proposal would be a modest tidying and simplification of what the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association said was a highly complex statutory appeals process. On that basis, it appears to be a tidying-up amendment, but it would be helpful to know whether the Minister shares that view or whether he believes that it represents a significant change. My legal knowledge is not great enough, but I would like to hear the other side of it, and if it is just a simplification and tidying-up I hope that the Government would agree to it.
Lord Henley
My noble friend is absolutely correct. It is always difficult to make sure that any law is understandable to the ordinary man or woman in the street or the ordinary man or woman on the Clapham omnibus. It is obviously, as our noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill put it, sometimes difficult to make the law intelligible to even the extraordinary lawyers let alone the ordinary ones. We try to make sure that it is as intelligible as possible but, as I think my noble friend Lord Lester is aware, even with some of the simplest laws one lawyer will take one view and another will take another view. These matters are often argued in the courts at some considerable length. We try to do what we can to make things as simple as possible. I hoped that this would be a very short amendment, and I hope that the reassurance that I offered to my noble kinsman will be sufficient for him to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Avebury
The important thing is that my noble kinsman has agreed to tidy up Section 99 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. I am most grateful to him for that assurance and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Avebury
“(4) This section does not apply if—
(a) the person concerned is stateless, (b) the person concerned has previously made an asylum claim or a human rights claim and been granted leave on that basis, or(c) the person concerned asserts in his or her grounds of appeal an asylum claim or a human rights claim.”
Lord Avebury
My Lords, in moving Amendment 148F, I will speak also to Amendments 148G, 149A and Clause 25 stand part.
Clause 25 is unjust and oppressive. It is contrary to the principles underpinning a fair trial. It applies where the Secretary of State cancels or curtails a person’s leave to be in the UK while that person is outside the UK, using the power in Section 82(2)(e) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. If the Secretary of State certifies that the decision is or was taken wholly or partly on the grounds that it is no longer conducive to the public good for the person to have leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, the person will be precluded from exercising any right of appeal from within the UK. Even when the person has returned to the UK and launched an appeal before the certificate is issued, Clause 25(4) means that when the Secretary of State issues the certificate, the appeal will lapse and the person will be excluded from any right of appeal until he or she has again left the UK.
That persons are outside the UK when their leave is cancelled is not an unhappy accident; it is a result of the policy of waiting until a person is outside the country to serve the decision to cancel their leave. A person whose leave is cancelled is normally entitled to an in-country appeal against the decision to take away their leave, as well as the continuation of their leave on the same terms and conditions during the period within which an appeal can be brought and, if they do appeal, while the appeal is pending. The Home Office took the view that a person who was outside the country at the time when the leave was cancelled was not entitled to an in-country appeal. The courts held that as a matter of statutory construction, a person’s leave continues on the same terms and conditions during the 10-day period within which an in-country appeal can be brought and that they must be given the opportunity to return to the UK to launch the appeal within this time limit. If the person does not take that opportunity, they do not have an in-country right of appeal, but if they do, they have such a right and their leave continues until that appeal is finally determined. It is this ruling that Clause 25 would reverse.
Why should the Secretary of State use the information she holds about a person’s whereabouts to cancel their leave when they are out of the country and thus dictate whether or not they have an in-country right of appeal? That one party to litigation can control whether the other party has an in-country right of appeal offends against the principles of fairness. Why should one person have an in-country right of appeal and another, who has received the very same immigration decision, not do so just because one of them happened to have left the UK for a few days at the time the decision was served? There is no rational basis for the differential treatment.
The case of MK illustrates the oppressive nature of Clause 25. He was a recognised refugee and lived in the UK for several years with his wife and daughters. A European arrest warrant was issued for his arrest in connection with terrorism-related activities. Extradition to Italy was sought. His challenge to extradition failed. It was accepted in the course of the extradition proceedings that he was at risk of torture in Tunisia, his country of nationality. No real risk was seen that Italy would refoule him to Tunisia. MK’s wife and daughters, his dependants, remained at home in the UK.
MK was tried in Italy and acquitted of all charges except one, relating to the procurement of a false travel document, which all agreed did not relate to terrorist activities. He was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment but had already served that time on remand. Nevertheless, he continued to be held in immigration detention in Italy against his return to the country of his nationality, Tunisia, because a request was immediately made by the Italian police for his expulsion there. What had been considered unthinkable by the court in the UK extradition hearings was actually happening.
MK told the Italian authorities that he was a refugee and they took steps to determine whether he could be returned to the UK, his country of refuge. Meanwhile, the European Court of Human Rights intervened at MK’s request, indicating to Italy that under rule 39 of the rules of court he should not be returned to Tunisia. Seven days later, the Secretary of State wrote to MK’s solicitors in the UK that she had decided to revoke his refugee status and had also decided to cancel his indefinite leave to remain on the grounds that his exclusion from the UK would be conducive to the public good. MK’s solicitors lodged an appeal within the time limits applicable. It was argued by the Secretary of State that she was under no obligation to facilitate his return so that he could exercise an in-country right of appeal. The judge disagreed, concluding that the proper construction of Section 3D of the Immigration Act 1971 was that leave was extended for the 10 days that would enable the individual wishing to do so to make arrangements to return to the UK to pursue the appeal against the cancellation.
MK’s case is chilling but it is far from as bad as it could be. He knew of the decisions taken against him. They were not simply sitting on the mat undiscovered but served on him as a matter of law, which provides that a decision is deemed to be served two days after delivery to a person’s last known address. He had at all times the benefit of lawyers on the record ready to act in the UK, overseas and at the level of the European Court of Human Rights to protect him. He had challenged his extradition in the UK prior to its execution and thus had findings of fact as to the risk of torture in Tunisia. He was extradited to a country that is party to the European Convention on Human Rights, being thus able to benefit from an intervention by the European Court of Human Rights, designed to prevent onward refoulement from Italy.
MK lodged an appeal before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, and also had a claim involving asylum matters, on both of which grounds, even after the coming into effect of the LASPO Act 2012, he would continue to be eligible for legal aid. It is not difficult to imagine cases to which Clause 25 will apply when the facts are very different and the risks enormously increased.
In MK, the Secretary of State accepted that there are advantages in being present in the UK to pursue an appeal. The Court of Appeal in that case described the right to an in-country appeal as “valuable”. It is difficult to pursue an appeal that turns on your character when you cannot appear in person before the court. It is difficult to find and work with legal representatives to bring an appeal if you are outside the UK and particularly, as was the case with MK, you are not in your country of nationality but stranded in a third country. It can be costly. Under the LASPO Act those who come before the SIAC or who claim asylum continue to be eligible for legal aid for their appeal, but those who are heard before ordinary tribunals and who make no claim for asylum will not.
If a person does return to the UK to appeal, they submit to the UK’s powers. They can be prosecuted for any criminal offence they have committed. The Home Secretary loses none of her powers of administrative detention under the immigration Acts. The person gains the advantage of continuing leave to be in the UK but at a price. The only reason for wanting to be in the UK to challenge the decision is that a person thinks that they have a chance of winning.
On Amendment 148F, I draw noble Lords’ attention to the concerns expressed by the UNHCR. It has exercised its good offices for many persons recognised as refugees by the UK but who, having left the country temporarily for personal reasons, found themselves unable to return here. They can turn only to us, as it was the UK that granted them international protection. The UNHCR says that if they are now to be deprived of the right to return to the UK to challenge a decision to cancel or curtail their leave to enter or remain in the UK, this would increase their vulnerability and leave them at a risk of refoulement. Amendment 148F addresses this concern by disapplying Clause 25 to stateless persons, refugees and persons granted humanitarian protection, and persons who challenge the cancellation of their leave on the basis that it would breach their rights under the UN convention relating to the status of refugees.
The UNHCR refers specifically to new Section 97B or the NIA Act, which deprives a person of his normal in-country right of appeal if the Secretary of State deems him to be a person whose presence in the UK is not conducive to the public good. The 1951 convention and its 1967 protocol list exhaustively the means by which a person can have their refugee status abrogated, and these do not include the procedure of the kind specified in proposed new Section 97B. The UNHCR says that a UK refugee labelled as “non-conducive to the public good” while he is out of the country should be able to return here and challenge the decision before the courts. The same principle should apply to stateless persons. The reduction, if not eradication, of statelessness is a shared responsibility of states. As was demonstrated at a conference to mark the 50th anniversary of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness organised jointly by the UNHCR and the Parliamentary Human Rights Group last December, the UK has effectively assumed responsibility for many different stateless communities, such as the Kuwaiti Bidoon, altogether numbering thousands of people, by granting them leave to remain and ultimately, after a lapse of years, UK citizenship.
Lord Avebury
My Lords, we will not quarrel about the priority of tabling subsection (4) and I express my gratitude to my noble kinsman for agreeing that that provision should be deleted. With regard to the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, about the criteria for declaring a person non-conducive to the public good, of course they do not have to be stated. It is the Secretary of State’s right to make such a declaration without explanation and no appeal can be mounted against that because the individual concerned has no knowledge of the reasons why that order was made in the first place. The power to declare somebody non-conducive to the public good is a very draconian power and it is a pity we have to invoke it without giving the target any legal right of challenge.
On Amendment 148F, I am not sure that my noble kinsman fully addressed the concerns that were expressed by the UNHCR, which, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Judd, have to be taken very seriously indeed, because they are the guardians of the people who are concerned by this amendment. As the noble Lord suggested, we will probably have to return to this matter on Report. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Avebury
“Immigration and nationality appeals from the Upper Tribunal
Section 13(6) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (right of appeal to Court of Appeal etc.) does not apply in relation to immigration and nationality appeals from the Upper Tribunal.”
Lord Avebury
My Lords, in moving Amendment 149B, I shall also discuss Amendment 149C. These are alternative amendments reducing the impact of the additional and highly restrictive requirement to show an important point of principle or practice, or some other compelling reason, in immigration and nationality appeals from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal. This additional requirement is referred to as the “second-tier appeals test”. The second of the two alternatives I have tabled is narrower, removing this test in asylum and human rights appeals but not other immigration appeals.
The second-tier appeals test was introduced by Section 13(6) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 for certain appeals from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal. During the passage of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill in 2009, your Lordships voted through amendments to prevent the test applying to immigration and nationality appeals. This amendment derives from the wording of the amendment originally tabled by my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill, QC, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, QC, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and subsequently adopted by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and the late Lord Kingsland as part of a wider amendment concerning the Upper Tribunal. The Joint Committee on Human Rights had concurred with the legal opinion of Sir Richard Buxton, a recently retired Lord Justice of Appeal in the Court of Appeal, that the introduction of such restrictions might not be compatible with the UK’s international obligations.
The same considerations apply now as they did then, and there is a new factor. The increased rotation of judges under the Crime and Courts Bill will mean that there are more judges in the Upper Tribunal who are not immersed in these cases making asylum and immigration decisions, and they will be without the supervision of the Court of Appeal if the clause is unamended. At the moment, we continue to see the higher courts engaged on these issues. There are some poor tribunal decisions but, to be fair, this is an incredibly complex, difficult and fast-moving area of the law. The tribunal judges sitting from time to time in the immigration and asylum chambers of the tribunal may be excellent tribunal judges. However, they are not infallible, and the effect of the LASPO Act 2012, whether directly, in immigration, or indirectly, in asylum, will be that more appellants are unrepresented.
Among the concerns expressed in 2009 was the impact of the second-tier appeals test in potentially excluding appeals to the Court of Appeal where the individuals faced removal in breach of the refugee convention and their human rights as a result of errors of law by the tribunal. Ministers gave assurances in both Houses that these sorts of cases would be the ones that could be expected to meet the test. Phil Woolas said,
“the test would not stop cases that raise important issues concerning human rights or asylum being granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/7/09; col. 210.]
There were other soothing comments, of which I will cite only one, made by the current Immigration Minister, Damian Green, who said:
“The widespread feeling is that Home Office failings must not be compensated for by a lessening of appeal rights in those complex cases that involve human rights issues or constitutional principles, and that the inadequate handling of judicial reviews by an untested tribunal risks increasing the work load of the supervising court, the Court of Appeal, and reducing supervision at the Home Office”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/07/09; col. 212.]
Those assurances have proved to be ephemeral following the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of PR (Sri Lanka). The Court of Appeal considered the ministerial assurances given in 2009, concluding that,
“it would be wrong in principle”,
to be constrained by those assurances and, in applying the second-tier appeals test, refused permission to appeal in each of the three asylum cases before the court. In one of those cases the appellant had been detained and tortured in Sri Lanka. Applying the test, the Court of Appeal concluded:
“The claimed risks are, unhappily, in no way exceptional in this jurisdiction, and not in themselves such as to require the attention of the Court of Appeal”.
In another of the three cases, the judge identified an error of law in the failure of the tribunals below to correctly apply country guidance in respect of Zimbabwe asylum claims, but concluded that the test none the less precluded any appeal to the court. In the last of the three cases, Lord Justice Pitchford found the reasoning of the tribunals below to be, “obscure and contradictory” and such as to give rise to a real prospect of success on the appeal if permission had been granted.
In the case of JD (Congo), however, the Court of Appeal granted JD permission to appeal on the basis that there was an error of law in the Upper Tribunal’s conclusion that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law, but the UT’s criticisms of the FTT’s decision amount to no more than a disagreement as to the proportionality of removal. The consequences of removal for JD and his partner were acknowledged to be very severe.
Taken together, these two judgments show that asylum and other human rights cases are neither exempt from the test, nor grounds in themselves to meet the test. That an error could lead to a person being returned to a country where he or she may be tortured will not necessarily mean that the test is met, as in the case of PR (Sri Lanka).
There are other significant conclusions to be drawn from these cases, as the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association emphasised in its briefing for your Lordships on these amendments. I hope that my noble kinsman has had an opportunity of considering them carefully in making up his mind as to how to respond this afternoon.
In conclusion, leaving aside all the complexities of the second-tier appeals test, which have preoccupied the Court of Appeal, it has been shown that without Amendment 149B, or at least Amendment 149C, we shall be in breach of our obligations under both the refugee convention and the ECHR and that we have been warned by no less an authority than the UNHCR itself. I beg to move.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, we are again grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, for the detail with which he explained his amendment. I think that these are amendments drafted by the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association. As I understand the noble Lord, they are alternative amendments. The first removes the requirement to show an important point of principle or practice, or some other compelling reason, in immigration and nationality appeals from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal: that is known as the second-tier appeals test. The second, if I understand it correctly, is a lesser amendment and would apply to all immigration and nationality appeals concerning asylum and human rights. The noble Lord indicates that I do understand correctly.
The noble Lord referred to the impact the second-tier appeals test has had and I would like to hear the response of the noble Baroness, Lady Northover. There were some serious points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. If the Government are opposing the amendment, we need to understand their case for doing so, including their views on the impact this would have if implemented and the reasons and evidence used to justify holding those views. It would be helpful to hear from the noble Baroness. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has made a detailed and interesting case and there must be some justification if the Government are not going to accept the amendments.
Baroness Northover
My Lords, Amendment 149B, tabled by my noble friend Lord Avebury, seeks to remove immigration and nationality appeals from the provisions in Section 13(6) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Similarly, Amendment 149C seeks to remove a narrower class of appeals—those which relate to the refugee convention or the European Convention on Human Rights—from the provisions in that section. Section 13(6) of the 2007 Act enables the Lord Chancellor to set out, by order, the test which applications have to meet for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the Upper Tribunal. That order-making power has been exercised so that where a party seeks permission to appeal on a point of law against a decision of the Upper Tribunal, the second-tier appeals test will be applied, as noble Lords have said. That test requires that in order to grant permission, the Upper Tribunal or Court of Appeal has to consider that the proposed appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice, or that there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear the appeal.
The Government, like the courts themselves, fully appreciate the gravity of the subject of these appeals. Amendment 149C is concerned with appeals of the most serious kind, where the claim may be that if the appellant is returned home they may face torture or even death. Such cases undoubtedly deserve what has been called anxious scrutiny. In the Government’s view, that is what the system currently provides. At present, if a person makes a claim to asylum in the United Kingdom, for example, and that claim is rejected, he or she can appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. If that tribunal dismisses the appeal, there is a right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Alternatively, if the appeal is allowed, the UK Border Agency may appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
Both the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal are composed of judges who are experts in this most sensitive of subjects. Therefore, if the Upper Tribunal rejects the appeal, it seems right to the Government that the test to take the matter to a third judicial body should be high. The courts have been clear that there is no case for saying that the UK would be in breach of its international obligations if appeals from the Upper Tribunal are available only in these circumstances. At present, all appeals from the various jurisdictions of the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal are considered under the second-tier appeals test. That same test, under the Access to Justice Act 1999, also applies where there is an appeal against a decision of the High Court and where the latter was acting in its appellate capacity.
The Government believe that the same level of consideration should be given to all types of appeals, even to the sorts of cases with which Amendment 149C is concerned. One reason for this is that not all claims which are made are substantiated when they are put to the test. The second-tier appeals test gives judges appropriate control over the cases that reach the Court of Appeal. Removing this test could cause the Court of Appeal to be inundated with cases that may not justify their consideration. This would cause delays in the provision of justice for the whole range of decisions that are brought to the Court of Appeal and put further pressure on the judicial resources available to that court.
The courts have made a number of important judgments recently that help to clarify the application of the test for cases seeking permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal in the immigration and asylum context. For instance, if a person maintains in their application for permission to appeal that they will be persecuted if they are returned home, that will be a matter which the Upper Tribunal can consider in determining whether the “some other compelling reason” limb of Section 13(6), is met in reference to the second-tier appeals test. If it refuses permission, it is open to the appellant to apply direct to the Court of Appeal for permission.
There is no doubt that the class of cases dealt with by Amendment 149C can be both complex and of the utmost importance. It is our belief that the current structure, including applying the second-tier appeals test in appeals from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal, is the right one. That was of course the position of those who are now the Opposition when they were in government, as they argued the case then. As we consider that the case is not made out to change the test for the most serious kinds of cases—and as we also heard the other day from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, in defence of the Upper Tribunal’s track record in what has happened since this was debated a few years back—it follows that we do not accept that that test should be removed for the wider category of cases covered by Amendment 149B. I therefore urge my noble friend to withdraw this amendment.
Lord Avebury
I cannot say that I am not disappointed by that reply, because, as I said initially, there have been cases where people at very serious risk of torture have not been allowed to appeal to the Court of Appeal. For example, in the case that I mentioned of PR (Sri Lanka), the individual had been tortured in Sri Lanka and that was acknowledged by the courts but not deemed to be sufficient reason for the second-tier appeal test to have been satisfied. There have been conflicting decisions by the courts on the second-tier appeal. The only safe thing would be to ensure that where considerations of human rights are involved, as they were in the case of PR, the right of appeal to the Upper Court should be retained and the second-tier appeal test should be modified in the manner that I suggested. However, since my noble friend has suggested that we defer this matter until Report—
Baroness Northover
Perhaps I might point out to my noble friend that it is not the case that the second-tier appeals test does not allow for materially wrong decisions to be challenged by the Court of Appeal and that in the JD (Congo) case, three of the four appellants seeking permission were granted it. The immigration and asylum chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal have been set up specifically to deal with these kinds of matters. My noble friend mentioned the complexity and sensitivity of these kinds of cases, and I should have answered by addressing that point.
Lord Avebury
I mentioned the case of JD (Congo) in my first speech—I have it in front of me—and I accept that in that case, the second-tier appeals test was found to have been met. However, there are other cases in which the circumstances were equally compelling and where that test has not been met. It was in the hope that we would clear up that ambiguity in how the second-tier appeals test is interpreted that I tabled my amendment. As I was about to say, we will have to reflect on this and perhaps come back to it on Report. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.