Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
Main Page: Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Royall of Blaisdon's debates with the Home Office
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 7 and 8 standing in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Rosser and Lord Tunnicliffe.
As all noble Lords will be aware, Chapter 1 of the Bill relates to the destruction, retention and use of fingerprints. For me, this is one of the most important parts of the Bill. As we agreed at Second Reading, there is a difficult balance to be struck between protecting people’s freedoms from police or government interference and protecting their freedom not to become victims of interference or violence from criminals or terrorists. These balances should be guided by evidence and by an assessment of risk and not by liberal or libertarian ideology. The changes proposed by the Government go too far in restricting the use of fingerprints and DNA profiles, and will make it harder for the police to solve and prevent serious crimes. It will also make their work more bureaucratic.
Amendment 1 would ensure that Chapter 1 took effect only after an evidence-based study had been completed analysing the risk of offending following an arrest which did not lead to a conviction of at least six years. The Minister may well tell me that such an evidence-based study would take too long. However, if such a study leads to saving lives, I for one strongly suggest that the time will be well spent. Why is this so important? It is important because the evidence base used by the Government to inform their decision to reduce the period of retention of DNA and fingerprint profiles is extremely weak. If we get this wrong, the implications for victims will be huge. There are countless examples of people who were arrested and not convicted but whose DNA retention was critical in catching them and convicting them of rape or murder at a later date. This is particularly important in relation to rape cases.
As the Minister will know, rape cases have not only a notoriously low conviction rate but a notoriously low charge rate. That is because the trauma for the victim is so great and because of problems with evidence. Many perpetrators of serious sexual crimes are not brought to justice for their first offence. In about 70 per cent of cases in which a rape suspect is arrested, there is no charge. According to Home Office papers, in cases where there is no charge, DNA will be kept in only very limited circumstances so that in many cases the DNA will be destroyed even though it might be critical in catching a repeat offender for a nasty and violent sexual offence.
The Minister will know that a considerable number of cases have been solved because of DNA. Kensley Larrier was arrested in 2002 for the possession of an offensive weapon. The case never reached court, but two years later he raped someone and was found because of a DNA match. Lee and Stephen Ainsby raped and kidnapped a 17 year-old girl in Barnsley. Lee Ainsby’s DNA was found years later in a case review. It had been taken because he had been arrested for being drunk and disorderly. Under the proposed system the DNA would not have been kept. Without that DNA those two men would still be free and justice for that young girl would not have been done. Abdul Azad was arrested for violent disorder in Birmingham in February 2005 but released without charge. In July 2005 he raped someone in Stafford and was identified only because the police had his DNA. The senior investigating officer for the case said:
“We would never have caught him had his DNA not already been on the database—he didn’t even live locally so we had no intelligence leads either”.
Case after case would have been much harder for the police to solve under the new rules. The Minister may well cite the S and Marper decision by the ECHR that blanket retention and storage of DNA and fingerprints contravenes Article 8 of ECHR. My Government responded with an extensive evidence-led consultation. However, the ECHR decision also recognised the importance of the retention of DNA in fingerprint profiles for individuals who have been arrested and/or charged but not convicted. It is the state’s primary duty to protect citizens’ fundamental rights to life, liberty and security under Articles 2 and 5. The ECHR objection was based on the blanket and indiscriminate approach to retention. Therefore, the argument is about minimising risk to the public of individuals committing an offence in the future and balancing that risk management against considerations of privacy. Evidence-led risk analysis was done two years ago by the Home Office which concluded that the effective length of the retention of DNA profiles was six years for both those arrested and/or charged for a serious offence, and for a minor offence. Conservatives were so convinced by this evidence that they voted in favour of its conclusions on a six-year retention limit contained in the Crime and Security Act 2010 when the noble Lord and his party were in opposition.
Was that not part of the wash-up process, and was it not an improvement on the existing regime when it could be kept indefinitely? We were bringing it down to six years.
My Lords, as I explained, because we looked at the evidence we did indeed bring it down to six years. If the noble Lord looked at that evidence it would show that six years is the appropriate amount of time for DNA evidence to be kept.
Following the election, based on no new evidence, the Government announced that they would legislate to adopt the protections of the Scottish model. It was based on no evidence but was simply a judgment of the appropriate balance. A review of the Scottish system by Professor Fraser one year after it was introduced assessed the success only of the current system and did not compare whether a longer retention period would be beneficial or whether retention for three years was detrimental to solving serious crimes. The Government persist in seeking to apply the Scottish model in England and Wales when all the evidence and strong police advice from both sides of the border is that Scotland should instead apply the model of England and Wales. Scotland’s rape conviction rate is less than half that of England and Wales. The DNA database in Scotland is far less effective in solving crime than that in England and Wales. In 2009-10 a DNA profile loaded on to the DNA database in England and Wales had an 18 per cent higher chance of finding a match than was the case in Scotland. That is evidence that our system in England and Wales is far preferable and much more efficient and effective than the system in Scotland.
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness. She mentioned 23,000 offences. Do they include minor offences?
My Lords, I would like to be able to answer the noble Lord but I regret that I cannot. I will come back to him in writing.
The statistics and the lack of evidence for the Government’s proposals mean that Amendment 1 is essential.
I turn to Amendments 7 and 8, in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Rosser. Persons arrested for or charged with a qualifying serious offence should have their DNA and fingerprints stored for six years. This replicates the provisions of the Crime and Security Act 2010, which was passed by Parliament but never brought into force. The six-year limit is based on Home Office analysis and reflects a proportionate response to the ECHR decision. As I mentioned earlier, the three-year figure comes from the Scottish model, which was based on no analysis of risk to public security. That is why Amendments 2 and 3 are essential. They will ensure a six-year rather than a three-year limit for the retention of DNA and fingerprints. I beg to move.
My Lords, I strongly support the amendment moved by my noble friend. As noble Lords will know, I have some experience in dealing with crime from the years when I held office in government. Two things became very clear during that period. The first was the enormous value of DNA in solving serious crime. Time and time again, cases came before me involving DNA, including a number of cases that came from the so-called cold cases review, which involved investigating crimes from a number of years before. There were some remarkable discoveries—for example, the so-called Sheffield shoe rapist who was discovered, some 20 years after he had committed, I think, four rapes, two attempted rapes and probably many more, as a result of a match to DNA from his sister who had been arrested, I think, for a driving offence. That would never have come to light but for the cold cases review and if that DNA had not been retained. It is not simply a case of bringing those who deserve it to justice; it is also a question of protecting others from that person. Those who have been convicted, particularly of such serious offences, as a result of DNA are at least off the streets and therefore less likely to cause harm to women, in particular. That is the second point I want to underline.
My noble friend rightly made the point that there is no more important series of cases for DNA evidence than serious sexual crimes, rape and other offences against women. That is the second thing that I discovered in my time. These are difficult cases to deal with and to convict on, but they cause huge anxiety, shame and sorrow. The great tragedy is when they do not result in a satisfactory result. I am therefore extremely worried about the Government’s proposal to remove without a proper evidential base evidence that could be used in just such cases. In the light of what my noble friend said, this change should not take place until and unless there is clear, convincing evidence that it is not going to put more people at risk or leave more criminals on the streets. For that reason, I strongly support this amendment and the other two amendments in this group.
Sorry, but I do not accept that. I refer the noble Baroness to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Dear, that we are in the early days of knowing what DNA can and might achieve in the future. We are offering a very large amount of information to be stored in that DNA. I find that idea scary. Obviously some noble Lords, such as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, do not; indeed, they positively welcome it. On this, there will have to be a philosophical divide between the noble Lord and myself.
For the reasons that I have given, I would certainly not support the amendment and I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, will feel able to withdraw it because I do not think it would command the support of the House.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response and to all noble Lords who have participated in this short but excellent debate. I do not really understand what the Minister is saying about the wash-up. He seems to imply that if a Bill is agreed to in the wash-up, it does not have as much authority as other Bills.
My Lords, I was not saying that at all, though sometimes Bills are rushed through without quite the same scrutiny that they normally deserve. The noble Baroness was trying to imply that that Act had the full support of the Official Opposition. My point was that, yes, we signed up to it because it was an improvement on what was there before, but we still felt that it did not go far enough in that it left the term at six years. We are proposing something different: three years, with the possible extension of another two years.
I am grateful to the Minister.
The noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, talked about the culture of society. He is right to do so. From our discussion today, it is clear that there is a fine line between the preservation of the freedom and privacy of individuals and the protection of citizens from crime and the delivery of justice, and there is a clear discrepancy in that balance. My Benches believe in protecting the freedom of citizens to be protected from crime and the freedom of victims of crime to see their assailants brought to justice. That is the side of that fine line that we fall on. That is the culture in which I wish to live. I wish people to be protected from crime and I wish assailants to be brought to justice so that the victims of crime have proper justice.
The noble Lords, Lord Dear and Lord Condon, spoke of advances in science, which are very important. I respectfully suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Condon, that the very fact that there are such fantastic advances in science, and the fact that our country leads in DNA technology, should perhaps make us think that now is not a good time to reduce the length of time for which our DNA is kept precisely because science may enable us to make better use of those samples in the future.
My noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith and the noble Lord, Lord Condon, talked about the value of DNA in solving serious crimes, including in the review of cold cases. I agree with them. The Minister spoke of the excellent report of the noble Baroness, Lady Stern. I certainly welcome all the recommendations that she made, which will make a difference to convictions for rape if they are implemented. However, those convictions will be added to if we are able to retain DNA; even more perpetrators will be brought to justice.
My noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours and others are absolutely right when they talk about having their finger on the pulse. That is not to say that we as legislators should follow our citizens in every way; we have a duty to lead. However, in this instance the citizens of our country who believe that they gain better protection from the longer retention of DNA are absolutely right. That is certainly the case in the Forest of Dean, where I come from.
Yes, the Government certainly have an obligation to ensure that individuals are protected from unjustified interference, but they also have an obligation to protect people from crime and to deliver justice for the victims of horrific crimes. With their proposals in Chapter 1, the Government are abrogating their responsibility in these areas. The balance that we have all been talking about this afternoon is important and, in this instance, the Government have got the balance wrong.
I will withdraw my amendment but I will read the debate thoroughly in Hansard. I have to say that it is my intention to bring something back on Report. The noble Lord assumes that, were I to do so, I would not have the votes of the House behind me but we shall see. It is extremely important that the citizens of our country see that we take this issue seriously. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment, and for the explanation from the noble Lord, Lord Dear. I think that it demonstrates that there is potential confusion in this part of the Bill. The noble Baroness asked about cold cases. I understand the difficulty described by the noble Lord, Lord Dear, in saying whether or not a case has been concluded. However, if in subsection (2) we are saying that,
“material may be retained until the conclusion”,
we need to be a little more specific. The noble Lord talked about the practicalities but also the philosophical nature of these issues. Philosophy is a great thing but when it comes to legislation perhaps it needs to be a little more specific.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee for moving her amendment. It relates to the briefing from the Information Commissioner that was circulated prior to the Committee stage. He expressed some concern that the reference in Clause 2 to the conclusion of the investigation was too open-ended.
I am sure that we would all wish the police to be able to conclude every investigation swiftly with either a conviction or conclusion that no crime has been committed. But, we would all acknowledge that in reality that is not the case, as the noble Lord, Lord Dear, has explained. There will often be cases when it is impossible to identify a suspect immediately and when evidence must be retained for a significant period in the hope of identifying a suspect in the future. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, referred to cold cases. The case that comes to my mind is the one that has recently been reopened on the murder of Stephen Lawrence.
Evidence, including biometric material, must be retained in these circumstances to enable comparison with the suspect and, for example, to ensure that the suspect’s legal team can examine and probe all the previous police lines of inquiry. If all evidence is not retained in such circumstances, the suspect identified later will be able to argue to the court that the destruction of such material would render it impossible for him to receive a fair trial. In such circumstances, even if Amendment 5 were to be made to the Bill, a chief officer would be unable to certify an investigation as complete, which is I think what the noble Lord, Lord Dear, was referring to. In addition, where it is possible for the police to conclude an investigation the introduction of such a certification requirement for all investigations would impose a new bureaucratic process on the police that would be both unnecessary and, when aggregated across the number of investigations conducted, costly. The illustration given by the noble Lord, Lord Dear, makes that quite clear.
For the reasons I have given, we are unable to accept Amendment 5, and I therefore ask my noble friend to consider withdrawing it.
My Lords, the government amendments brought in at the Report stage of this Bill in the House of Commons stipulate that DNA and fingerprint profiles from individuals arrested but not charged with a serious offence could be retained only with the permission of the biometrics commissioner on the condition that the alleged victim is aged under 18, a vulnerable adult, associated with the alleged perpetrator or necessary to assist in the prevention or detection of crime. The effect of that is that many individuals who are arrested for a serious offence will not have their DNA retained at all.
From the definition given in government Amendment 11, it looks as though the Government are setting a higher burden of proof and imposing a greater administrative burden on police, which will have a dissuasive effect on the retention of DNA for serious offences. A false distinction is potentially being made between the risk associated with those arrested and those arrested and charged. As we discussed earlier, rape cases have chronically low charge and conviction rates. The amendment could therefore have an impact on the safety of women. I listened to the reasons which the Minister gave for introducing the new definition, but it would appear to be tighter. I therefore seek an assurance from her that the new definition will include victims in women’s refuges and sheltered housing, and rape victims.
I do not fully understand the purpose behind the amendment, nor do I understand which individuals, if any, the Government wish to exclude through the definition. I do not understand why the definition that we already have cannot be used. I suggest that the definition of a “vulnerable adult” should be common to all legislation, because that is the proper way for us as legislators to act. It is both logical and makes sense to citizens who have to deal with the legislation. I am wholly in favour of common definitions. If we are talking about vulnerable adults in one Bill, we should have the same definition in another. I do not accept that the new definition as put forward by the Minister in this amendment is necessary or desirable.
My Lords, perhaps I may build briefly on those comments because lurking in them was the question that I was going to ask. I suppose that I had better declare an interest, in that, whatever definition is used, I am a vulnerable old person, so it probably makes no difference to me.
The question is: does the Bill change the definition in the 2006 Act? On the basis of what the Minister was just saying, it leaves one definition in that Act and puts another in this Act. I think that it is very odd that we should have two definitions of vulnerable persons, whether adult, children or any other category of person. If a definition is right for one purpose, I cannot see why it is not right for another.
My Lords, let me try to explain a little further. We are trying to ensure that, when we refer to “vulnerable adult” in the context of those who are the victims of crime, we are clear about the people who have been affected by the crime against them. Later on in the Bill, in a different context, the term “vulnerable adult” is deployed differently, because it relates to regulated activity and what access a person might have in terms of the activity being carried out at that time. The amendment tries to make sure that, in this context, we define “vulnerable adult” as the person who is the victim, rather than trying to define it in terms of what activity might be used against them, which occurs later in the Bill. I might have to write further to the noble Baroness.
Perhaps I may add that those seeking refuge from an abusive relationship would be covered by the third limb of new Section 63G(2); that is, by being associated with the suspect. However, given the nature of the questions that the noble Baroness has asked and the sensitivity of the topic—I would not want to give anybody the wrong impression about it—it would probably be best for me to come back to her in writing.
My Lords, before we go to a vote, I respectfully suggest that the noble Baroness considers withdrawing the amendment and bringing it back on Report. I do not wish to vote against it but I should like further confirmation that the people who should be covered by this definition of “vulnerable adult” are properly considered and covered by it.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I think, on reflection, that that would be the right course. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, my amendment deals with informed consent. It would provide that a person is not considered to have consented to the taking of material without having been fully informed of its potential use and retention. I am hoping that the Minister will tell me that this is not necessary because that happens and will happen. If I am correct in that assumption, I look forward to hearing on what basis the information is given, but if I am not correct, I look forward to assurances regarding how that will be put in place. I beg to move.
My Lords, I do not wish to return to our earlier discussion about the desirability of a voluntary or mandatory DNA database. However, I seek an assurance from the Minister, pursuant to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that citizens will still be able to give their DNA voluntarily should they so wish. I know that my right honourable friend David Blunkett did so to show that the DNA database was not something to be feared and that there was no stigma related to it. Listening to the debates in the Chamber this afternoon, I feel even more strongly about the retention of DNA now than I did before. I might well go along to a police station and voluntarily give my DNA.
My Lords, this is quite an important principle. I notice that when it comes to cautions and reprimands, particularly reprimands, the police certainly do not warn youngsters of the full implications of accepting one. They do not realise that it is a plea of guilt to a criminal offence, which will stay on their record for certain purposes throughout their life. In fact, I have discovered that even some solicitors in the county courts do not realise that. Therefore, it is important that the police have a duty to advise people properly of the full implications of these things, partly so that the police realise them as well. I support this amendment.
My Lords, I do not know whether I can bring light to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, but I will see what I can manage. I will speak to my noble friend’s amendments and, because they have been grouped together, in due course speak to the government amendments in my name—Amendments 24 to 37.
My noble friend helpfully set out her views on the provisions in Schedule 1 in respect of the retention of material taken as a result of a Schedule 7 examination. Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 is a national security border power that enables examining officers to stop, search and question a person at a port or in a border area to determine whether they are someone who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, without reasonable suspicion that they are so concerned. Given that most major terrorist plots have involved individuals travelling across international borders to plan and prepare their attacks, it is only right that the police are given appropriate powers to examine persons, including through the taking and retention of biometric material—in this context, in order to identify and disrupt such individuals.
Imposing a requirement to arrest an individual for terrorism offences as a condition for retention and use of material taken under these powers, would fundamentally undermine their use as a means to identify those involved in terrorist activity and to gather intelligence. Such intelligence can provide vital contributions towards wider intelligence-based investigations in respect of national security. Terrorism investigations are, by their very nature, long and complex, and at the end of a Schedule 7 examination it may not be immediately apparent that an arrest is appropriate.
Attaching a requirement for arrest would furthermore offer no additional safeguards. The Bill already provides safeguards for material taken from a person detained under Schedule 7. There is a defined retention period of six months, which is considerably shorter than the three years’ retention period that applies where a person has been arrested for a terrorist offence under Section 41 of the 2000 Act. The new biometric commissioner will also have a general oversight role in respect of the retention and use of biometric material taken under Schedule 7.
I hope that that helps partially to explain matters to the noble and learned Lord and reassures my noble friend that the provisions in the Bill are transparent and will provide strong protection against unnecessary retention of material taken from individuals detained under Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act.
Turning now to the governance arrangements for the DNA databases, the subject of Amendment 41, I think it is important to note that all DNA material retained by the police will as a result of the Bill be subject to comprehensive regulation, irrespective of the databases on which it is held. Indeed, although the overwhelming majority of DNA information retained by the police will continue to be held on the National DNA Database, where this is not the case, such material will be subject to the requirements of the regimes set out in the Bill, and covered by all the relevant safeguards.
Regarding the counterterrorism database, only DNA profiles obtained by the police in relation to national security—including counterterrorism investigations—will be held on the database. It has already, in effect, been placed on a statutory footing by virtue of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which provides for all material not otherwise subject to statutory restriction, and is already overseen by the National DNA Strategy Board in respect of compliance with agreed national standards and protocols.
The Forensic Science Regulator is also closely involved in ensuring that DNA analysis and validation meet acceptable standards, as he is with the National DNA Database. In addition, we should not forget the new biometrics commissioner’s general oversight function under Clause 20. If the commissioner had concerns about the governance arrangements, I am confident that he or she would not be reticent in bringing such concerns to the attention of the Home Secretary.
Perhaps I may briefly address the government amendments, starting with Amendments 24 to 28. These address three separate matters. First, Amendments 24 to 28 to Part 3 of Schedule 1 are intended to clarify the application and scope of the provisions for the retention and destruction of biometric material to which Section 18 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 applies. Section 18 mostly covers biometric material acquired covertly and material supplied by overseas authorities.
The Government are clear that material obtained under Section 18 of the 2008 Act should be subject to a clear and robust regime for the destruction and retention of such material. As such, we have proposed limiting retention to three years—on the basis of a national security determination extendable for renewable two-year periods—after which it must be destroyed.
However, the proposed destruction requirements in Section 18 are not expressly limited to material obtained from known persons. We are concerned that this will lead to anonymous material and, in particular, material taken from crime scenes, having to be destroyed at the three-year point. Indeed, as currently drafted the Bill requires just that. This unintended consequence would result in the destruction of material before the police were able to identify the individual to whom it belonged, complete an investigation of an offence—potentially compromising prosecutions in the process—or make a case for its retention on national security grounds. For these reasons, the amendments are designed to prevent the automatic and premature destruction after three years of anonymous and unidentified crime scene material obtained by the police.
We do not consider that anonymous material or material taken from a crime scene—where it is also anonymous—should be subject to the same destruction requirements as material obtained from known individuals. Rather, it should still be possible for the police and other law enforcement authorities to retain such material indefinitely. However, we recognise that not all crime scene material will be anonymous in nature and as such want to make clear that where there is provision for indefinite retention of unidentified material, once identified, such material will be subject to the same retention and destruction requirements of material where the identity of its owner is known on acquisition.
Amendment 26 will exclude from Section 18 of the Counter-Terrorism Act material taken under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, as it will become shortly. This is consistent with the exclusion of other existing statutory regimes from the scope of Section 18 to avoid enacting overlapping and conflicting provisions. We consider that all these amendments enhance the provisions in Schedule 1 by making clear how they are intended to operate.
Amendment 29 would omit paragraphs 6(4) and 7 from Schedule 1 to the Bill. Those paragraphs, which contain provisions in respect of the retention and use of biometric material in Scotland for national security purposes have, in effect, been made redundant by the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2011, which itself gave effect to the changes that those provisions would have made. Simply put, the provisions are no longer needed and can therefore be removed from the Bill. There are three consequential amendments to Clause 113 and Schedule 10 which we will need to come back to later in the passage of the Bill.
Finally, Amendments 30 to 37 to Parts 7 and 8 of Schedule 1 extend the list of purposes to which material taken under the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 and held pursuant to a national security determination may be used. They further ensure that the order-making powers conferred on the Secretary of State to amend the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order applies in respect of provisions regarding a transferred matter where it is ancillary to an excepted or reserved matter.
Amendments 30 to 33 provide that the purposes for which material retained pursuant to a national security determination which was taken under the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order may be used are the same as for the rest of the UK. That is, that such material can be used for the prevention and detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or for identification purposes, in addition to that for national security and terrorist investigations.
Amendments 34 to 37 are technical amendments. They amend the Secretary of State’s order-making powers so that the Secretary of State is able to make provision in respect of transferred matters where such provision is ancillary to excepted or reserved matters.
I apologise for taking so much time on those government amendments, but I hope that my noble friend will be content with the explanation I have given of her Amendments 41 and 23. I hope that she will feel able to withdraw her amendment, and I will move mine in their proper place.
My Lords, forgive my intervening at this stage. I am grateful to the Minister for his response to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. From what I heard of his response, I think that I would agree with him that her amendments should not be pressed, but I imagine that they are probing amendments.
As I mentioned earlier this afternoon, I intend to bring forward amendments on Report relating both to a period during which evidence can be collected before the Government’s proposals were introduced and to the period for which DNA samples and fingerprints could be retained—for six years rather than three years. If my amendments are accepted, a consequential amendment will be required to subsection (6) proposed in government Amendment 28, but that is for a later stage. For the moment, I am content to accept the noble Lord’s amendments.
I thank my noble friend for the clear way in which he addressed my concerns. I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that as soon as he got to his feet, I thought to myself, “I hope I will never get to court and meet someone like him”, because I think I would just throw my hands up in horror and plead guilty, regardless of how innocent I was. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.