25th Anniversary of the World Wide Web

Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O’Neill of Bengarve (CB)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Lane-Fox for introducing what must be a central topic for all of us. She also asked the right question: what sort of world wide web do we want? There are also the questions of what sort of web we can have and have now.

We are probably living in the twilight of the cyber-romantics who think that zero regulation of everything online is the way we should head. We obviously are not in that situation. The effective and enriching use of the web is life-transforming but depends on the right sort of legislation and regulation in the right places. If we doubt that, we have to think, just for a moment, about all the online shopping that people do and what it has taken for people to have a reasonable degree of confidence about entering that world. Of course, there are other worlds about which they do not have that confidence.

The area of greatest worry to a lot of people is online privacy and surveillance. However, it is odd that they feel it is okay for the Amazons, Googles and others to have their private data but somehow not okay for Governments to have it. That proposition will need to be tested down the route. Commercial power is not negligible.

I should like to ask the Minister some limited questions on privacy. We are, as we know, facing a new data protection regulation, which, if it comes through the process in Brussels, will spread across the entire European Union and ostensibly aims to protect privacy more by raising the standards for consent. Will it do that or will it protect fictions of privacy by allowing fictions of consent to count as legitimating? Do Her Majesty’s Government have a view on that?

I should also like to ask the Minister a question about anonymity. This is a matter of some disagreement. Some people think that online anonymity is highly desirable. They note, of course, that it protects the spamster, the scamster and the cyberbully but feel that that issue should be settled at another level. However, knowing that we are anonymous is, to be sure, liberating but often in dangerous ways. In serious situations, we stand by our words, and free communication depends upon being able to judge what the other party says.

We have heard a good deal in this debate about the merits of transparency. I do not believe that transparency is a sufficient, ethical ideal for online communication. It is a remedy for secrecy but is not sufficient for communication, which is surely what matters, online as much as face to face—being able to judge what others are saying and what they are doing in saying it. Are they, for example, promising something or threatening something? We need to be able to judge not just speech content but speech acts. This can be frustrated in many ways, and I ask the Minister whether he thinks that there are things that we need to do to limit online anonymity in order to protect the future possibilities of online communication.

International Women’s Day

Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve Excerpts

Thursday 7th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O’Neill of Bengarve]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission. Since so much of what the commission does bears on the topics of today’s debate, I feel multiply interested, in every sense of the word. I am very grateful to the Minister for instituting this debate and for its length, which enables us to say a little bit more. Like many other noble Lords, I admired the right reverend prelate’s maiden speech; it reminded us of how deep some of these issues go.

International Women’s Day is always a time to reflect on the rights of women, proclaimed, of course, in the 18th century—as the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, reminded us—but secured only very gradually across many decades in many different countries, in many different legislatures and by the action of many different people. We should remember in all this that the rights of women are not to be contrasted with the rights of men; they are rights that today, as earlier, are claimed and defended in the name of our common humanity. They are affirmed in some of the great documents of the modern world: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950.

Earlier today at Question Time, there was reference to the question of whether the United Kingdom might withdraw from the European convention. I will just observe that the irritation that people express is often directed at the court, not at the convention. If we had a British Bill of human rights, I am pretty convinced that it would contain the same rights that are in the European convention, but of course we might lose touch with some of the necessary jurisprudence for interpreting those rights if we made such a shift.

However, we must all admit, and there have been many illustrations of this point, that the extension of rights to women is a very long-fought battle. It is a battle in which many countries have entered reservations, sometimes in order to afford additional protection to women—in matters such as night work, pregnancy or military service—but sometimes to differentiate the rights of men and women in areas such as family law, inheritance or succession. Hence the complexity of the process by which the United Nations has gradually inched the issue of women’s rights forward.

Despite continuing disputes about some of these reservations, though, the most remarkable thing is the progress that has been made in recognising the rights of women and girls, not merely—and proudly—in this country but across virtually every country in the world. There are, of course, still horrifying cases in which the rights of women are systematically ignored, where legislation does not restrict forced marriage or domestic violence, genital mutilation or—unmentioned so far but as serious as any of these—forced child-bearing. The deepened recognition and protection of women’s rights is one of the most profound social transformations of the past century, and it is to be greatly welcomed.

It is very easy to miss the profundity and scope of that transformation if one concentrates only on the human rights declarations and conventions. Human rights documents, in the nature of the case, set out certain aspirations. They seem lofty and abstract. The realisation of women’s rights is another matter, for rights are indeed no more than rhetoric if we do not secure the counterpart obligations. This fundamental point about rights was made with great elegance and accuracy by Clement Attlee, speaking in Scarborough in 1951. He asked,

“what kind of society do you want? We know the kind of society we want. We want a society of free men and women—free from poverty, free from fear, able to develop to the full their faculties in co-operation with their fellows, everyone giving and having the opportunity to give service to the community, everyone regarding his own private interest in the light of the interest of others, and of the community; a society bound together by rights and obligations, rights bringing obligations, obligations fulfilled bringing rights; a society free from gross inequalities and yet not regimented nor uniform”.

That statement has stood the test of 70 years very well. The phrase,

“rights bringing obligations, obligations fulfilled bringing rights”,

gives us a sense of what women’s rights are really about. I do not mean that we should focus once again on obligations or duties at the expense of rights, but we should acknowledge the indispensable interdependence of rights and obligations. Rights without duties are indeed mere rhetoric. Women’s rights are not going to be realised by proclamation—although proclamation has its point and there is a time for it—but rather by respect for and fulfilment of the corresponding obligations. These obligations are rather too often identified with securing legislation in each jurisdiction that enforces respect for the obligations necessary to secure and observe others’ rights. However, we now know that it requires more than legislation, legislation by itself is not enough to secure respect for rights. There is a tendency to imagine that in the case of human rights, all obligations lie with states. That is patently mistaken. Often, obligations lie with individuals and with the institutions of civil society, and the role of states and of legislation in particular is to back up and secure the performance of obligations, when that is the right way to secure respect for rights.

This point was clearly recognised in the 2011 report that has been referred to repeatedly today: Women on Boards. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Abersoch, noted that quotas risk leading to tokenism, but that substantial change could be achieved by companies focusing on the robust, commercial reasons for seeking diversity on boards. Why do you need someone who will clone your own views and experience? That is the very person you do not need. Diversity nearly always has good effects.

I finish by asking the Minister two questions. First, how well is the public service progressing in taking steps to encourage the appointment of a reasonable proportion of women to senior posts, and to the boards to which it makes appointments? Secondly, our progress in securing and supporting women’s rights is monitored under CEDAW, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The seventh periodic review of UK performance under CEDAW is now under way, and the UK Government will be discussing its progress in Geneva in July. Will the Minister undertake to secure a debate on progress, or lack of it, on these issues in your Lordships’ House?

Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill

Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve Excerpts

Monday 4th March 2013 Lords Chamber

One issue which struck me is the time it has taken to achieve the steps towards equality of opportunity that we already have, and how long we will need to complete the task. This clearly indicates to us that we need every form of additional commitment to let us achieve it. A tiny example is Business in the Community, which has played an important role in lots of ways. It set up a committee looking into this subject, called Opportunity 2000. Surprise, surprise, a little further on, guess what it decided to change the name to? Opportunity Now. That is what we need: opportunity now to achieve this with all the added bits of legislation. There is clearly no time and no need to get rid of this clause. It would be quite absurd, and I say to the noble Baroness responsible for replying that she will need to use her considerable influence on her Government to achieve what we all want. She will have to do it because it would be quite absurd to resist the opinions that we have heard and the excellent background to what has been said.

[Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve]

My Lords, I begin by declaring an interest as the chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission. I have appreciated the arguments made on this by many noble Lords, including many noble friends. I can say only a limited amount from the position that I occupy, but I should at least remind your Lordships of the position that the commission has taken on the removal of Section 3. This is not a new position since I became chair, but one that was already taken when my predecessor Trevor Phillips chaired the commission. It is summarised in one sentence. It is not a sentence of high enthusiasm, but it states the balance of the issues. It says,

“on balance, the Commission concludes that the changes currently proposed are unlikely to have a significant adverse impact on its work”.

That is partly because other sections still preserve the wider duties, but it is also because the very task of an equality and human rights body is, by its nature, aspirational. That is to say, nobody goes into this domain without profound aspirations for respecting the human rights of each and every one of us in this country and their equal treatment.

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, I am greatly honoured to follow the lead offered by the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, and all the speeches that have been made today. When you are on the Front Bench, it is always easy to put your name to amendments but on this occasion I felt that it was very important that the Government heard the voices of the Back Benches of your Lordships’ House. I felt—as has been proved to be the case—that people would feel passionately that the Government are in the wrong place and that Section 3 should not be removed.

I have two questions for the Minister. The first partly follows the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill. It concerns the recent briefing from the EHRC, which states that, on the one hand,

“that the inclusion in its founding legislation of a unifying principle to bridge equality and human rights is important”,

but that, on the other hand, perhaps the answer to the dilemma of Section 3 would be a simpler purpose clause which described the commission,

“as the national expert on equality and human rights”,

and the strategic regulator for equality. It is not quite the poetic and aspirational language in the current legislation. Do the Government regard this intervention at this stage of the Bill as helpful or not?

I think that it muddies the water quite considerably. It adds force to the argument put by the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell. Let us be clear, the Government started by wanting to delete the section completely for reasons which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has demolished. However, if they want to change it and if the EHRC is suggesting that it should be changed, this is surely not the place to do so. This has to be a matter of great consideration and discussion among all the different organisations and across both Houses of Parliament. That was the import we gave Section 3 at the beginning in 2006. I suggest that the latest intervention by the EHRC on this matter serves only to underline the case that we should not go down the route proposed by the Government.

My second question is why does not one single stakeholder organisation—I apologise for that phrase, but I cannot find a better one—agree with the noble Baroness and her Government? Why does she think that Sir Bob Hepple has given the advice that he has about Section 3? Has she had discussions in the past month with the bodies which care about this matter? If so, what is the outcome of those discussions? Given that the Government are in absolutely no doubt that all these organisations are concerned about this and do not want this change to happen, have the Government had discussions with them? Have any discussions influenced their position? I hope that their position will be that they will accept this amendment. Certainly, from these Benches, we are adamantly opposed to the deletion of Section 3. If the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, decides to test the opinion of the House, we will be with her.

--- Later in debate ---

The review will explore the impact of the duty in terms of costs, burdens and benefits, and recommend what changes, if any, would ensure better equality outcomes in a non-bureaucratic way. The review is being overseen by an independent steering group, chaired by Rob Hayward, who, among other things, is a trustee of Central YMCA and an adviser to the Terrence Higgins Trust. The steering group is made up of senior figures with experience in public sector delivery, including the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, in her capacity as the chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission.

[Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve]

I have observer status; I am not a member of the working party.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her clarification, and I am sorry if I misrepresented her position on the steering group.

The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and my noble friend Lady Hussein-Ece referred to the membership of the steering group. I say clearly that its members have been selected because of their experience and knowledge around these issues, and it is not intended at all to be a politically representative body. The steering group represents the main delivery public sectors of policing, education, health, local and central government. It can use their expertise to shape the scope of the evidence-gathering and develop the final recommendations. As the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said, we have extended the timetable to June from the previous announced date of the end of April at the request of the chair and the steering group to help to ensure that the review and its recommendations are robust.

The evidence-gathering for the review began in January and includes a series of round tables, involving a wide variety of experts, to gather evidence on how the duty is operating. The first round table involved voluntary and community sector organisations such as the Equality and Diversity Forum, the Stephen Lawrence Trust and Age UK. The second involved lawyers from across the public sector. A further six round tables are planned, including with inspectorates, private sector contractors and senior decision-makers. The work will include site visits to public bodies, for example to a police force or a school, to examine the experiences of different individuals within an organisation. The work will also include the commissioning of qualitative research, which will be conducted independently—as is always the case in these matters—through a series of in-depth interviews with public bodies. We will be inviting evidence from organisations and individuals about the operation of the duty, which should provide insight about public bodies’ experiences of working with the duty. We are also analysing written evidence in the form of existing literature, case law and international comparisons. We are therefore approaching this review with an open mind and gathering evidence from numerous sources to get a comprehensive picture of how the duty operates in practice.

The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, asked how we would respond once the work is complete and the steering group produces its report. As I am sure she would expect me to say, it is far too early for me to speculate on how we will respond. However, given that we have set up the review and given it the remit to roam and consult as widely as it is doing, we will clearly take the report seriously and are looking forward to receiving it.

The equality duty and supporting regulations provide sufficient safeguards for holding public bodies to account, and introducing a further legal requirement for an equality impact assessment will not add anything material. Furthermore, the timing is not right when we are taking stock of how the current legislation is operating in practice. As I have said before and to make absolutely clear, this is a review of how that responsibility is operating, not whether public bodies should have due regard for equality. I hope that I have been able to give the noble Baroness more information about the review, and I am grateful for that opportunity.

Leveson Inquiry

Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve Excerpts

Friday 11th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve]

My Lords, we owe Lord Justice Leveson a very great debt. His is not merely a sophisticated, integrated and well argued report, but it has been conducted in the most difficult circumstances, in which he was not able to comment on a great deal of the relevant evidence because of the number of cases that are or will be sub judice. In effect, he had to do his prospective task before his retrospective task. It is a matter of consummate skill that he succeeded in that.

At the end of that, it is remarkable that we have the degree of agreement that we already find. Listening to the debate today, we can see that there is an enormous level of agreement about the “what” and a great deal less about the “how”. I will talk about a small part of the “what”, as I think it, too, deserves some attention. I first declare a few interests. I have spent my life writing on political philosophy, in the last decade on media freedoms and other human rights, and I chair the Equality and Human Rights Commission. I am also among those who think that statutory backing for a recognition body will be needed, but I will not argue the case for that now in order to concentrate on the question of “what”.

Which standards matter? Let me take the most obvious one, and the one central to the former Press Complaints Commission code: accuracy in reporting matters. We can see that that matters for all of us as citizens. We often hear suggestions that that is all very nice but journalists have to work very fast—unlike the rest of us—so a certain amount of inaccuracy is inevitable and excusable. If the demand were that journalists achieve total accuracy, that might be a partial excuse, but of course the demand is to attempt accuracy and to take appropriate precautions and remedies when accuracy is not achieved. If we assume that the demand is to achieve total accuracy then, because the standard is too high, it is likely to be treated with contempt. I suggest that that has happened. The very demand for accuracy central to the PCC code has been seen as marginal—an aspiration, but practical people can disregard it. I think that they cannot in a democracy.

If the aim is to attempt accuracy, feasible requirements can be stated with some clarity and do not limit media freedom of expression. Attempting accuracy is basically a matter of respecting readers, listeners and viewers by giving them some means to check media claims. Of course, not every reader of a story will have an interest in checking or the time to do so. But at present all too often they have no option but to accept or reject what is said and perhaps then demonstrate that they are not gullible by adopting a certain blanket cynicism about those claims. Better remedies are available that work by requiring better media process, which makes media claims assessable by others, and not by regulating content. That is what journalism in a democracy should aim for, and it would not be that hard.

Here are some examples. Where money has been paid to obtain content, this should be stated. You do not necessarily have to state who paid, but state that it is paid-for content. If the agents of celebs have certain content placed in a newspaper for money, that is surely relevant to assessing the story. Where content has been donated, this should be stated. Where a report on a company is just a lightly done-over press release, do not readers deserve to know? Where money has been received, it should also be stated. Consumer journalism is rife with examples in which it is in effect advertising, but that is not declared. I was struck by the points of comparison with advertising standards made by the noble Lord, Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank. That seems quite pertinent to me: anything that is paid-for content should be recognisable as such, and that goes for financial and consumer journalism, with its lovely holidays and so on.

Where journalists, editors and programme makers have relevant interests, they should declare them. Where they have conflicts of interest, they should make them plain and appropriate measures should be taken. Where there is no reason to hide sources, they should be made public, as good journalists have always done. Where inaccurate content is published, its correction should be swift and equally visible, with apologies if those are called for. Where there is a reason to hide some sources, the evidence for a public interest defence should be assembled and, if necessary, used. Those are not impossible requirements; they are quite manageable.

I have another point which is also quite relevant. Some have said that what has happened is that new technologies have made it harder for the media to reach certain standards, or perhaps easier to violate them. Perhaps that contributed to the descent of some journalism into disgraceful habits. However, new technologies can also be part of the remedies. The information for making media content assessable by improving media process can be provided online, cheaply and easily. I believe that it would greatly improve the standards of journalism if these simple changes in process were secured.

In my last minute, I finish with a brief comment on media plurality. Concentration of media power is not in the interest of citizens; it is only in the interests of those who concentrate it. We should be clear that there are no arguments from rights of freedom of expression to suggest that we should be indifferent about the concentration of power, and that the break-up of media monopolies, or oligopolies, protects rather than damages freedom of expression. Consideration of concentration of power is quite separate from other aspects of media regulation.

One aspect of media plurality is peculiarly difficult at present in this country. Many current proprietors of national newspapers are not citizens of this country; some are citizens and not taxpayers. They do not share our future or our fate, which is really quite problematic. In replying to this debate, I wonder whether the Minister would be willing to say something about the steps that Her Majesty’s Government would take in the event that the Murdoch enterprises decided on a fire sale of their UK newspaper assets and the new owners were, say, either Chinese or Qatari citizens. Is there anything that the Government think they would be able to do? We already have many overseas, non-taxpaying owners. Would it be acceptable that the national press is entirely overseas based and owned?