Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill

Debate between Baroness O'Loan and Baroness Hoey

Report stage
Wednesday 21st June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 13, which is also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, and which simply requires the removal of the word “reasonably” from Clause 5. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is unable to be with us today, but he associates himself with my remarks.

The Government told us that one of the purposes of the Bill is to provide families with information that was not previously available to them, and another is to gather all investigative and review functions within the ICRIR. This was always the proposal under the Stormont House agreement, and I have no difficulty with it, except for the way in which it is done and the immunity clause. But the powers accorded under the Bill do not provide to the ICRIR the access to information that will be necessary to obtain the information that families need, without lengthy judicial reviews and threats of judicial reviews, which have bedevilled inquiries such as the Saville inquiry and, indeed, the Kenova investigation.

In normal criminal investigations, there is a proviso that an investigator will not do anything which would prejudice national security or put someone’s life at risk. There is law that deals with this. The law also provides mechanisms which include a power to recover information, such as the search process when a warrant has been obtained. For example, police will seize all the computers in a house to determine whether the contents of any of them may be relevant to the matter under investigation. Those are general statutory investigation powers. Those charged with criminal investigation also have powers to require the provision of information from agencies and individuals. For example, under Section 17 of the Police Reform Act 2002 there is a simple duty on every chief constable and local policing body to provide information to the IOPC. Similarly, Section 66 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 says:

“The Chief Constable and the Board shall supply the Ombudsman with such information and documents as the Ombudsman may require for the purposes of, or in connection with, the exercise of any of his functions”.


There is no qualification, simply a duty to provide information. However, this Bill as drafted states that a relevant authority

“must make available to the ICRIR such … information … documents, and … other material as the Commissioner for Investigations may reasonably require”.

This provision applies only to information which the ICRIR reasonably requests. Of course, an investigator must always act reasonably and in compliance with the law. However, there is no process for which a chief constable may, for example, say, “No, it’s not reasonable for you to make that request for information”. I had those conversations in the early days of my tenure as Police Ombudsman. I was told, for example, that it was not reasonable for me to ask for sensitive information, such as information held by Special Branch—now the Intelligence Branch. I was able to point to the law, which said that the chief constable

“shall supply the Ombudsman with such information … as the Ombudsman may require”.

That is how it is in criminal investigations. It is not required that the investigator demonstrates the reasonableness of any request for information.

The Minister has said that a requirement that information shall be reasonably required is to be found in other statutes. He cited one, the Finance Act 2008, so I looked it up. Section 113 of and Schedule 36 to the Finance Act 2008 provides that an officer of His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs can require a taxpayer to provide information reasonably requested by the officer for the purposes of collecting a tax debt owed by a taxpayer. There is a big difference in the powers required to collect an unpaid tax debt and those required to investigate a murder, as is evidenced by the current state of the law, which provides necessary protections for privacy in appropriate circumstances under the GDPR and the Data Protection Act, for example, but also empowers criminal investigators to access information. This is the proper working out of UK compliance with its obligations under the Good Friday agreement and the European convention.

If an agency could respond to a request for information by the ICRIR by challenging the reasonableness of that request, there would be inevitable and very lengthy disputes, possibly—indeed probably—involving judicial review, about why what the ICRIR was asking for was reasonable. The reality is that the investigator—the ICRIR in this case—may be in possession of material justifying the reasonableness of the request for information, but that material cannot be disclosed at this particular point in time without compromising the integrity of the investigation. The result is that an agency may be unaware of the material which the investigator holds, but it may be very aware that information which is held by that agency is highly compromising of the agency and may indicate how it came about that, despite an agency, for example, being aware of a proposal to murder someone, it did not intervene to stop that murder. It has happened.

The necessary unqualified powers to compel the production of documentation, especially documentation held by the other agencies, security intelligence services and police intelligence units, will not be available to the ICRIR because of how the Bill is drafted and the definition of sensitive information. The proposed powers to identify and gather information will also be subject to veto by the Secretary of State under the extensive provisions of Clauses 29 and 30. Access to information could be severely curtailed through the exercise of powers conferred on the Secretary of State in this Bill, because it gives the Secretary of State powers to give guidance about how the ICRIR is to identify sensitive information such as that held by police intelligence units and how that information is held and handled, et cetera, and even to create new criminal offences in relation to such matters.

Last year, the European Committee of Ministers exposed serious concerns about the Bill, and the Commissioner for Human Rights has now said that the amendments proposed by the Government do not sufficiently allay those concerns. This emphasised again that it is crucial that the legislation, if progressed and ultimately adopted, is in full compliance with our convention obligations and will enable effective investigation into outstanding cases.

The Committee of Ministers has called on the Government, first, to ensure that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland’s role in the establishment and oversight of the ICRIR is more clearly circumscribed in law, in a manner that ensures that the ICRIR is independent and seen to be independent. Secondly, it has called on them to ensure that the disclosure provisions unambiguously require full disclosure to be given to the ICRIR. Thirdly, it has asked that they ensure that the Bill adequately provides for the participations of victims and their families for transparency and public scrutiny, which is fundamental to Article 2. It has again stressed the importance for the success of any investigative body of gaining the confidence of victims, families of victims and potential witnesses.

I also put my name to Amendment 31 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hain, supported also by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, who has spoken at length about it, as well as the noble Lords, Lord Blair and Lord Murphy. The noble Lord, Lord Hain, is unable to be with us today. I shall support that amendment if a Division is called. I do not think that I need to describe the reasons for it, but I shall say that the National Police Chiefs’ Council has said that the Kenova model could effectively be scaled up for the purposes of the ICRIR.

I regret that I cannot support Amendment 28 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Lords, Lord Bew and Lord Godson, because it requires that, when a family is seeking a review or investigation, they will have to be able to show that, if there is to be a review, and there has previously been an investigation or an inquest, for example, the ICRIR should not decide to grant a review unless there is compelling new evidence. To require a family to provide compelling new evidence would be to deprive them of their Article 2 rights to investigation, in particular in older cases where investigations and inquests were not as thorough or impartial as they are now. It is not the role of a traumatised and bereaved family to gather compelling new evidence. They have neither the powers nor the access to do so. That is the job of the investigator—in this case, the ICRIR.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, with regard to Amendment 28 in the name of myself, the noble Lords, Lord Bew and Lord Godson, I tabled similar in Committee and have changed it to take note of what the Minister then said, deleting the parts that he found objectionable, which related to family requests for reinvestigations. I hope that what remains the Minister will find acceptable, given that the purpose of my amendment to Clause 11 is to ensure that there will not be duplication by the ICRIR in relation to previous investigations, despite what the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, has said, without compelling new evidence. This is the concept that was used in the overseas operation Act, and I cannot understand why it cannot be used in this legislation.

If the previous investigations listed in the amendment, such as those by a public inquiry, HET, or the police services Legacy Investigation Branch are not added to the Bill, thus narrowing the ICRIR’s potential range, I repeat what I said at Committee: namely, that the ICRIR could end up reinvestigating every one of the nearly 4,000 deaths, the cost will be £1 billion at least, not the budgeted £250 million, and the process will last for many years.

Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill

Debate between Baroness O'Loan and Baroness Hoey

Committee stage
Wednesday 29th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

I rise very briefly to say that I do not think anyone could not support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, and indeed all the amendments in this group. We should all abhor the glorification of terrorism, but we have to recognise that it has sometimes come about because of a longer period of sanitising terrorism. As a society in Northern Ireland, we have accepted unrepentant terrorists being able to end up on the Policing Board and other agencies within government. If unrepentant terrorists are given or can achieve such positions, that sends a message out. I understand why this is, given the way our system works in Northern Ireland, but it does not help in telling young people that there is something wrong with terrorism if you can end up in such a position, or in government, without having in any way repented, or said that what happened was wrong, or condemned it.

One other thing which may come up later, either tonight or another time, is that through the definition of a victim in Northern Ireland, we have somehow also sanitised terrorism. The definition of a victim in Northern Ireland can be someone who perpetrated an act and put the bomb wherever it went off. That is just not acceptable. They would not be seen as a victim in the rest of the United Kingdom. So, we have to look ourselves at some ways that we have actually helped to get to a situation where young people now feel that there is absolutely nothing wrong in chanting and singing support for the IRA. Indeed, the First Minister herself said that there was no alternative, and we have then had the threat level going up this week. We have to think that there might be some kind of effect there, with people thinking, “Well, clearly there was no alternative then, so there is obviously still no alternative”. Therefore, we have actually encouraged the sanitisation of terrorism.

I will say one mild thing to my noble friend Lord Brookeborough. Yes, integrated schools are fine, but do not let us go away with this idea that somehow state grammar or secondary schools are not doing their bit. For example, at the state grammar school I went to, Belfast Royal Academy, now nearly 40% of the young people are from a Catholic background. When I was there, there were hardly any young people from Catholic backgrounds but there were a large number of people from a Jewish background. Unfortunately, many of the Jewish people in Northern Ireland left and we have a very small Jewish community now. This idea that a Catholic in a certain area is stopped from going to a state school is just wrong. We have to say that the Catholic Church has a lot to do with this; I do not think there is any point in trying to ignore that. Therefore, integrated schools are fine, but they are much better if they come naturally.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

To place this on the record, does the noble Baroness agree that Catholic schools now have a significant proportion of Protestant pupils as well? This movement of children is dominated and dictated by the quality of the schools.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right; that is happening on all sides of the community. However, if you become an integrated school, you get a lot of extra money. A lot of schools now are becoming integrated—of course they have to sign up to the whole ethos of it. I am just putting in a slight point that integrated education is not this panacea that it somehow gets taken for. Particularly for the diaspora from Northern Ireland in England, that is the sort of thing it gets involved in, calling for integrated education.

The amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, are important and I hope that when we come to the next stage of the Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Caine, will have found a way of getting this into the final Bill.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Baroness O'Loan and Baroness Hoey

Committee stage
Tuesday 22nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendments standing in the name of my noble friend Lady Fox of Buckley and particularly the amendments that I have added my name to. These amendments go to the root of the problem with Clause 9—it is a very blunt instrument, which I think everyone in this House would accept. The amendments tighten up, very importantly, the definition of the phrase “interferes with” in Clause 9, so that it will conform to the principle of legal certainty, and the dictates of freedom of expression. It is very important that, at the moment, it does not distinguish between activities causing harm and activities with which people may disagree —and even disagree very strongly.

These amendments will remedy the obvious problems with how Clause 9 defines “interferes with”. As it currently stands, the definition, I believe, is so broadly worded that it can mean anything to anyone. Not only does that language make the law vague and ambiguous, but it also makes it practically impossible for the police to enforce the law. Phrases such as “seek to influence”, as has been mentioned, “advises”, “persuades” or “informs” can have as many meanings as there are people in the world; these phrases do not draw clear lines of criminality. The wording is so broad that individuals cannot know if their actions cross the threshold of criminal behaviour. With so many interpretations available, how can the police know when the threshold of criminality has been crossed? More to the point, is not the very purpose of freedom of expression and protest to “influence”, “advise”, “persuade” or “inform”?

We must not permit lofty aspirations to interfere with the basic freedoms safeguarded by the right to freedom of expression, nor must we allow a law to be so broad that it encompasses basic activities of everyday life. These amendments will help to properly restrain Clause 9, if it is going ahead in its entirety, so that it achieves its intended aims without running roughshod over the fundamental rights of ordinary citizens.

I emphasise that the Bill, as I understand it, is about public order, yet I believe that this clause is about political opportunism at the expense of fundamental freedoms. It is telling that the clause’s sponsor in the other place, Stella Creasy, voted against the whole Bill on the grounds that it went too far in policing legitimate protest but voted for a clause that introduced sweeping limitations on the right of freedom of expression for a select group of individuals, who often—I accept that there are some who will not—engage in peaceful, passive conduct and, predominantly in certain parts of Northern Ireland, in very deep prayer. There is already a law here to deal with those people who behave in a manner that we would all find abhorrent. I urge noble Lords to support the amendments in my name and those in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, to ensure that Clause 9 goes no further than absolutely necessary.

Briefly, on Amendments 98 and 99 in the name of noble Lord, Lord Farmer, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, identified well that Clause 9’s fundamental deficiency is that it introduces wide-ranging law changes, which would set significant precedents in other areas of the public realm, without demonstrating evidence that such a change is needed based on empirical evidence. The noble Lord has spoken of stepping back and reviewing, and I think he is right. Surely the only responsible course of action for the Minister and the Government is to properly consult on these proposals before introducing such sweeping and, I believe, reckless changes to the law.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, would give the Secretary of State powers to introduce buffer zones around clinics only after a thorough consultation process has taken place and determined that there has been a significant change in the nature of protest since the last review, which took place only in 2018. I remind noble Lords that we have had two years of a pandemic and lockdowns since that review. As we have heard from many other noble Lords, at the time of that review the Home Office found that buffer zones would be disproportionate. At the very least, it is incumbent on Ministers to consult on what has changed since 2018 before introducing sweeping changes to the law in the way that Clause 9 will legislate for; that is very similar to what the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, said.

We do not need this whole Clause 9. However, if we are going to have it, no matter how supportive some Members of this House are of a woman’s right to choose, I believe that this is just not the way to go. In the long term, it will really affect freedom of speech and civil liberties in this country.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I fully support the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble Lords, Lord Farmer and Lord Beith—with the exception of Amendment 99, because this is a matter for primary, not secondary, legislation. Others have addressed various of those amendments, but I will focus on Amendments 98, 92 and 85.

Amendment 98 seems to me a way forward in addressing concerns that do exist about the way in which people exercise their right to freedom of expression in the vicinity of abortion clinics in England and Wales. There has been no review, no consultation and no assessment of the impact of Clause 9, yet it will have a disproportionate effect—as noble Lords have said—by criminalising those who seek to provide in a compassionate manner counsel, support and assistance, including financial assistance, to mothers who fear that they cannot afford to give birth to the baby they are carrying or look after them after birth. Existing laws provide for offences in relation to the harassment of individuals; I spoke of those at Second Reading. We have been provided with no evidence to support the necessity or proportionality of what is proposed in this clause.

Amendment 98 provides for the carrying out of a review. This seems to me a proper manner of contemplating a change in the law, rather than the Bill, which will result in the inability of individuals to bring support to women at a time when they may most need it, in a manner which does not constitute harassment, and which may give a woman the choice and opportunity to give birth to her baby rather than to abort it.

Amendment 92 would maintain the ability to provide information so that women can make informed choices. The use of text and other information about the irreversible step she is about to take is an exercise of the right to freedom of expression. Of course, in the context of abortion, there may be disagreement about the use of some images, but there has been no consideration about how we define what is and is not acceptable. For example, would a leaflet showing a pregnant woman the support she could receive if she continued her pregnancy count as graphic imagery merely because it had a photograph of a baby on it? These are fundamental matters of freedom of expression.