Care Bill [HL]

Baroness Northover Excerpts

Monday 29th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, we understand and respect the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Patel of Bradford, to achieve the best that he possibly can for people with severe mental disorders and pay tribute to his many achievements in the mental health field over many years. We are indeed, as he said, on the same side. We recognise the special vulnerability of this group, and I listened very carefully to what he said.

The Government’s view is that our proposed definition of aftercare services meets the objective of providing clarity on the duty to ensure such provision. That will give greater certainty to those needing or providing aftercare so that it can be provided when it is needed. The inclusion of a definition of aftercare services followed a recommendation by the Law Commission that aftercare services should be defined in accordance with a two-limbed definition from the Mwanza case. This case law defined the services to mean services necessary to meet a need arising from the person’s mental disorder and aimed at reducing the likelihood of the person’s readmission to hospital for further treatment of the disorder.

The Government’s definition of aftercare services builds on the definition recommended by the Law Commission. That was the starting point for the definition. We accepted the recommendation of the Law Commission as a sensible starting point, but we have gone further. The clause now clarifies that the Section 117 duty requires services to be provided to meet needs arising from or related to the person's mental disorder, as well as reducing the risk that the person’s mental condition could deteriorate, requiring their readmission to hospital.

Following public consultation, the Government expanded the proposed definition to put it in the Bill in what we feel is a much improved form. The noble Lord’s amendment omits the first limb of the Government’s definition while making changes to the second. In particular, his amendment weakens the connection between the services required to be provided under Section 117—I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, that we are fully committed to continuing those—and the specific needs linked to a mental disorder, meaning that the scope of the definition would be unclear.

The Government are concerned that this amendment may confuse rather than clarify the circumstances in which aftercare services should be provided. That would run counter to the purpose of introducing a new definition. If there are disputes over the aftercare services to be provided, the wait that some people would have to endure before the aftercare services would be in place to enable them to leave hospital could be prolonged, something which the noble Lord wants to avoid. In our view, given that it omits the criterion that services must have the purpose of,

“meeting a need arising from or related to the mental disorder of the person concerned”—

I can assure the noble Lord that the definite article does not simply mean something singular but encompasses the plural as well, something to which he briefly referred—the amendment is likely to give rise to more disputes and administrative uncertainty than would be the case with the clause as it stands. Examples of disputes arising under the current Section 117, with no definition, highlight why a statutory definition will add clarity. As highlighted by the Law Commission, having no definition means that the interpretation is left to case law, which has provided varying interpretations.

Nothing in Clause 68 will change the guidance in chapter 27 of the code of practice. It covers housing, employment counselling, and cultural and spiritual needs. The professionals involved include mental health professionals, GPs, employment experts, independent advocates and others. The proposed definition sets out the essential elements and requirements for services to fall within Section 117. The Government do not wish to be more prescriptive as aftercare services should be agreed by health and social care professionals as guided by the code. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord. This has to be done, of course, in the light of each patient’s particular needs.

Finally, the current clause introduces a purpose for Section 117 services to reduce the risk of deterioration in a person’s mental condition, which the noble Lord’s amendment leaves out. I found myself looking at his examples as he went through them. I could not see that they would be excluded by the definition in the Bill, so we see no compelling reason to alter the definition of aftercare from what has been proposed, which is based on research and consultation by the Law Commission and the Government. Perhaps I should propose to the noble Lord that we meet between now and the Report stage to discuss his concerns and make sure that they are not well founded. I am very happy to take this forward and see whether we can involve my honourable friend Norman Lamb in those discussions. I hope that, on the basis of this response, the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Patel of Bradford]

I suppose the only bit of that I was pleased about was the proposal that we should meet. Unfortunately, I disagree with everything the Minister has said. The Law Society, the Mental Health Lawyers Association, Mind, and the Care and Support Alliance—an alliance of over 70 organisations—agree with me that the Mwanza case is completely unique and off the wall. It concerned someone who was sectioned nine years ago and had nothing to do with Section 117 services, but his lawyers were trying to use that as a basis to get free accommodation.

[Baroness Northover]

Does the noble Lord accept what I have just said: that it was doubt over cases like that which led the Law Commission to come up with a recommendation that there should be a definition as a starting point for where the Government would then take this?

[Lord Patel of Bradford]

I still have a problem because the definition is very clear, as the noble Baroness has said. It is about being related to “the mental disorder”. I know that the Minister said that this is standard legislative language and that it is not intended to be a singular disorder, but I disagree. First, the definition does not give us a sense that aftercare should be holistic and thus in line with the underlying well-being principle. Secondly, the use of the definitive article in “the mental disorder” is completely out of keeping with the Mental Health Act. I can give a couple of examples from some of the trigger sections of the 1983 Act. Section 1 of that Act defines mental disorder but Sections 2 and 3, which refer to mental disorder, have no definite article. The wording is completely separate from that of the Mental Health Act, so officials should go back to the drawing board and look at it a bit more carefully. It is very unclear and it poses huge legal arguments, as people will say that this is about “a mental disorder”.

[Baroness Northover]

Under the Interpretation Act 1978, words in the singular may include the plural.

[Lord Patel of Bradford]

I completely agree that legally that is what it means, but the 1983 Act does not use the word “the” in front of “mental disorder” in any of its important trigger sections. What is important is that it is not in keeping with the 1983 Act at all. Moreover, we have already seen local authorities trying to use this case. We should be dictating what happens. I am not sure whether the judge in that case—I do not know if I should be saying this—was by any stretch a mental health expert. I think he was a family court judge, so it was completely different. The Stennett case, which was appealed to the House of Lords, clearly stated a definition that was very different from this. We should not be dictated to by that; Parliament should dictate. The Bill will dictate what aftercare services are.

I am prepared to look at the definition I have crafted and without doubt there might be something that we can improve on. However, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that this is crucial because it is the only piece of statutory provision we have to make sure that statutory health services, the voluntary sector and social services work together. Time after time over the past 30 years local authorities have used any opportunity they can not to provide Section 117 aftercare services. It goes to legal action and then they back off. Why do it when we can resolve this? We do not need the first bit that says “the mental disorder”. Why introduce that level of doubt? We are on the same side and we can move forward on this, and we do not need to introduce any doubt. I am pleased that we have something to think about and to work together on and I am sure that between us, as we did last time, we will come to an amicable conclusion. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Northover]

105A: Clause 69, page 57, line 7, at end insert—
“( ) In its application to an adult who is residing in any other premises because a requirement to do so has been imposed on the adult as a condition of the grant of bail in criminal proceedings, this Part has effect as if references to being ordinarily resident in an area were references to being resident in premises in that area for that reason.”

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, the Government have tabled a number of amendments in relation to prisons to help clarify the interface between local adult safeguarding boards and prisons. This group of government amendments serves two purposes. Amendments 129 to 136 further clarify the relationship between prisons, approved premises and local safeguarding adults boards. Obviously prisons and approved premises retain a duty of care towards and responsibility for the safety of all their detainees. Mechanisms are already in place to hold them to account if there are concerns about the care or safety of prisoners.

Prisons have their own safeguarding procedures, so we believe that it should be left to local discretion to determine whether it is appropriate for a governor or other prison staff to become members, rather than a statutory duty. This is the intention of the first part of subsection (7), which we believe should remain. As such, local safeguarding boards will not conduct inquiries or serious case reviews in relation to incidents occurring while someone is in prison or approved premises with care and support needs. However, we want there to be open dialogue between prisons and approved premises and local safeguarding adults boards so that the prisons and approved premises receive the information and advice which the board can provide for the benefit of prisoners and residents. This would not be possible with the draft clause as it stands. It is therefore our intention that safeguarding adults boards will be free to invite governors or other prison officers to sit on the board and, whether or not a member, governors, directors or controllers of prisons will be able to approach a safeguarding adults board to ask for advice and guidance in improving their safeguarding arrangements. I hope I have made the Government’s position in relation to prisons and safeguarding clear through these proposed government amendments.

I now turn to the remaining government amendments to Clause 69, Amendments 129 and 137 to 141, which clarify other matters. They make clear that a temporary absence from prison or approved premises will lead to someone continuing to be treated as detained in prison or residing in approved premises or other bail addresses for the purposes of this clause. The amendments also ensure that the rule in subsections (1) and (2), regarding which local authority is responsible for an individual’s care and support needs, applies to people bailed to addresses other than approved premises. Finally, the amendments remove the paragraphs which deem that once an individual has been sentenced to prison they are to be treated as detained in prison for the purposes of this clause. On reflection, the Government believe that these deeming provisions are not necessary. That also removes the unintended consequence that those given a suspended sentence would be treated as detained.

I now turn to government Amendments 105V and 105T. These would implement the recommendations set out by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its first report of Session 2013-14 in respect of regulations under Clause 22(2)(b), Clause 49(10), Clause 50(1) and (4) and Clause 59(2). The committee recommended that regulations made under Clause 22(2)(b) should require the affirmative procedure and that regulations for the remainder should require the affirmative procedure on the first exercise of the powers. We are happy to accept these recommendations and I beg to move.

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[Baroness Wheeler]

My Lords, this is largely a group of government technical amendments, interspersed with amendments from noble Lords probing important aspects. On Clause 69, my noble friend Lord Patel’s Amendments 105AA and 105CA would ensure that local authority safeguarding inquiries do apply to adults in bail accommodation and, in respect of Safeguarding Adults Boards, would enable prison governors or other prison staff to be members of the board.

Government Amendments 105B and 105D address those issues. On safeguarding inquiries, the Government’s proposal to allow SABs to provide advice and assistance to persons in bail accommodation is a compromise. My noble friend has argued that that is not good enough and we strongly support that view. How can local authorities have premises in their areas where abuse or neglect could occur and not have a duty to conduct a safeguarding inquiry?

On prison governors being members of Safeguarding Adults Boards, my noble friend is exploring ways in which governors and prison staff can best participate in and learn about the board’s role and work. I look forward to the Minister’s response on how she thinks the Government’s amendments best facilitate this.

The remaining Clause 69 government amendments include a number of tidying-up measures which we support to reduce the burden on local authorities, such as clarifying local authority ordinary residence rules in relation to bail accommodation, explicitly exempting prisons and bail accommodation from local authority safeguarding adults reviews, and minor technical amendments to change the general language relating to the clause.

Under Clause 71 and Amendment 105Q from the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, we return again to the Secretary of State’s powers in relation to local authorities and NHS bodies. Both the noble Baroness and my noble friend Lord Touhig make a strong case for statutory guidance previously in place to continue to apply under the new legislation until the Secretary of State declares otherwise. The noble Lord and noble Baroness, as usual, speak strongly on autism and the Autism Act being embedded in the new legislation. However, there is a wider issue of ensuring that the Secretary of State retains ultimate responsibility, arguably more important than ever with the tendency of our current Secretary of State to hover above it all and act as if everybody else is responsible but him.

Amendment 105R of the noble Lord, Lord Low, to Clause 72 seeks to prevent a local authority from being able to delegate functions on its behalf under this part of the Bill. He is right to be cautious about how the local authority powers under this clause are used. I look forward to the Minister’s response to the amendment.

Finally, under government Amendment 105V in this group, I again raise an issue that I spoke of during last week’s safeguarding debate on the provider failure provisions under Clauses 47 to 49, designed to address responsibilities and actions in any future provider collapse, such as we saw most recently with Southern Cross residential care homes. The Lords Delegated Powers Committee expressed concern at the Bill’s failure to define what is meant by both “business failure” and “market failure”. Although I got an answer in passing in the following debate when the noble Earl the Minister responded to a question about provider failure from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, I would appreciate the Minister explaining today in more detail why the Government have chosen regulations to address these two issues, which are fundamental to the operation of the provider failure provisions of the Bill, rather than include the definitions in the Bill.

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for tabling the other amendments in this group on these very important issues. On the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Patel of Bradford, we agree that a person with care and support needs should be protected against abuse or neglect wherever they are. As I have already set out, prison governors and directors have in place procedures to follow in response to allegations of abuse or neglect. Governors and directors will provide assurance to the National Offender Management Service and Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons, through their inspection regimes, that those procedures and their implementation provide similar protection to that available in the community. The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman will investigate individual complaints and incidents. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, that the Ministry of Justice and the NOMS have acknowledged that there is a need for improved directions to the Prison Service and probation trusts in this area. They will be working with officials from the Department of Health and stakeholders to develop instructions and guidance that will give clarity about the roles and responsibilities of the Prison Service and probation trusts in safeguarding adults in their care. In addition, prison governors and other prison staff will be able to approach their local Safeguarding Adults Board for advice and assistance in improving their arrangements. The MoJ was, of course, fully consulted on the provisions relating to prisons in the Bill and will be working with the Department of Health and NOMS to develop detailed guidance so that people who are concerned about the safeguarding issue will know exactly how to raise it and get advice on how to approach it. The MoJ is fully involved in the development of all parts of this clause.

The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, also raised the issue of a statutory obligation on the senior management of prisons to take responsibility for the care and support needs of prisoners. The governor or, in the case of contracted prisons, the director, has the primary duty of care for prisoners and is the appropriate first point for reporting concerns. There is an investigations procedure in place for cases in which prisoners suffer significant harm. Prisons are monitored by a range of inspectorates, including the CQC.

[Lord Patel of Bradford]

I just want to get this point on record and then perhaps we can come back to it. I understand that prisons have a whole range of safeguarding measures in place. When there is a real problem that a prison has not resolved, why can a local authority not have an inquiry for a person who is vulnerable and at risk? That is my first question. If somebody is in approved premises, such as a bail hostel, and living in the community like anybody else, and they have been abused or are neglected or at serious risk, why should a local authority not have an obligation to have a safeguarding inquiry? I just cannot fathom why such a person would be excluded.

[Baroness Northover]

The point is that if local authorities must also conduct inquiries in prisons and approved premises, we run the risk of duplicating inquiries. Prison governors and directors have the primary responsibility for preventing abuse or neglect of prisoners with care and support needs. Prison governors already have a duty to care for and safeguard prisoners. If we duplicate this responsibility, we run the risk that the lack of clarity will mean that safeguarding concerns fall between agencies. Noble Lords will be extremely familiar with how this has happened in the past in other sectors. Therefore, a decision has to be made as to where the expertise is and where the primary responsibility is. The decision made in discussions with the MoJ and NOMS is that the primary responsibility is with the prisons. We have to make sure that they carry forward that responsibility. Obviously, they will draw on advice in the way that I described, but we need to make sure that there is one body with ultimate responsibility.

We agree that prison staff should have access to local safeguarding expertise if, in their particular circumstances, it would be useful, so we agree that the second half of the subsection, from the second “officer” onwards, should be removed. However, because prisons have their own safeguarding procedures, we believe that it should be left to local discretion to determine whether it is appropriate for a governor or other prison staff to become members of safeguarding boards rather than a statutory duty. That is the intention of the first part of subsection (7).

I now turn to Amendment 105Q, in the name of my noble friend Lady Browning and the noble Lord, Lord Touhig. It raises important issues about how future statutory guidance will be issued under the Bill and how it may interact with existing guidance. The noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, also asked about this. We intend to develop a single, consolidated bank of guidance for local authorities covering all their care and support functions under this part of the Bill. We will replace all existing guidance that covers this territory to remove the potential for future misunderstanding. Current statutory guidance for local authorities is issued under Section 7 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970. Future guidance on adult care and support will be issued under Clause 71 of the Bill. The amendment also proposes to require a consistent application of the definition of an “NHS body”. We agree, of course, that definitions must be clear and consistent in guidance and regulations and we will keep this in mind in drafting regulations and guidance to ensure that key terminology and definitions are consistent. I can assure the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, that guidance remains in place until it is superseded by new guidance.

My noble friend Lady Browning and the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, referred to guidance for people with autism. As they said, unlike other statutory guidance related to care and support, this is issued under a specific requirement included in the Autism Act 2009. I can assure noble Lords that it is not our intention to repeal these provisions by this Bill. The duty to issue guidance on autism will continue. I hope noble Lords are reassured by that.

I now turn to Amendment 105R, to which the noble Lord, Lord Low, spoke. The Government believe it is right to allow local authorities the flexibility to delegate their care and support functions to third parties. However, when a local authority chooses to delegate any of its care and support functions, this must not be a way of relieving itself of its responsibilities for how those functions are carried out. This clause does not absolve the local authority of its legal obligations with respect to care and support functions. However, we believe it is necessary that, when a local authority arranges with a third party to carry out a public function, the local authority should have contractual recourse against that third party for breach of contract. Subsection (7)(a) ensures that this is the case. It is not a limitation of the local authority’s ultimate responsibility for the performance of its functions.

The noble Lord, Lord Low, asked to be reassured about the application of the Human Rights Act. I can assure him that the Human Rights Act applies to the discharge of public functions, so even when a local authority delegates its public function to a third party, that function must still be carried out in a way that complies with the Human Rights Act. Local authorities retain legal responsibility for anything done or not done by the third party when carrying out the function. It follows that any failure to carry out the function in a way that is compliant with the Human Rights Act will be considered a failure by the local authority. We do not think that this needs to be specified in law as it is covered. The function must be carried out in a way that is compliant with the Act. By specifically referencing the Human Rights Act in legislation there is a risk that this could imply that the Human Rights Act does not apply in relation to various other pieces of legislation where it is not specifically referenced. I hope that the noble Lord is reassured.

[Lord Low of Dalston]

Can I just make sure—does that mean that the third party to whom the care function may be delegated is also liable under such legislation as the Human Rights Act?

[Baroness Northover]

What I have written here is that when the local authority delegates a public function to a third party, the function must be carried out in a way that is consistent with the Human Rights Act. It appears—I will clarify for the noble Lord if it is not the case—that the local authority has to abide by the Human Rights Act, but clearly, if it delegates something to a third party, which does not adhere to it, the third party is not adhering to its obligations to the local authority. By that device, the Human Rights Act would end up having an effect on what those third parties could do, even if they were not themselves directly responsible. However, I will clarify that if I am wrong.

[Lord Low of Dalston]

I am very grateful for that further clarification. It is reassuring to hear that the third party is under an obligation to carry out its functions in a manner that is compliant with the Human Rights Act. However, it would offer further reassurance if we were told that there was a remedy against the third party to which the function was delegated as well as against the local authority. I appreciate what the noble Baroness has said about a remedy against the local authority. However, as appeared when we talked about the application of human rights legislation a week ago, for remedies to have a practical effect so far as third parties carrying out delegated responsibilities are concerned, it is desirable—this was the view of the Joint Committee—that there should be a remedy against the third party to which responsibilities were delegated as well as against the local authority. In this instance that is, if I may put it this way, little more than a backstop. The remedy bites much more effectively if it can be seen to bite on the third party, to whom the responsibilities are delegated, and not just on the local authority. I hope that that further clarification of my point will make it easier for the noble Baroness to come back to me when she has looked into the matter further.

[Baroness Northover]

I will certainly write to the noble Lord and spell it out. Given the local authority’s responsibility for complying with the Human Rights Act, it is very unlikely that it would form a contract with a third party without ensuring that it knows that it will need to carry out whatever responsibility has been passed to that third party in the light of the Human Rights Act, otherwise the local authority will end up in court. I will write to the noble Lord in detail to explain how this operates.

The noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, asked why the Government have chosen regulations to address the issues relating to provider failures. There is no simple definition of business failure and—we have some very interesting handwriting here; it is worse than a doctor’s. My best bet is to write to the noble Baroness.

To return to summing up on this group of amendments, I hope that I have reassured noble Lords about their amendments in this group, that they will feel able to withdraw their amendments, and that I have persuaded noble Lords that the government amendments I have outlined here should be accepted.

Amendment 105A agreed.

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[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, that was a pretty persuasive case, to which I hope the noble Baroness will be sympathetic. The noble Lord made the particular point that early intervention will lead to better outcomes. That could be a message that relates to this Bill as a whole. The noble Baroness knows that we were not able to have our debate on services for deaf people last week because of the lateness of the hour. I wonder whether, between now and Report, she would be prepared to write to me about how she thinks this Bill might specifically relate to deaf people. Clearly, some of the issues the noble Lord has raised are apposite to deaf people in terms of early identification and assessment. I would not expect her to answer that point today, but it would be extremely helpful if she were able to write to me on it in advance of us coming back to the QSD in the early autumn.

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Low, for his amendment. It raises some important issues. He emphasises that local authorities need to follow up those who have been newly certified as sight-impaired or severely sight-impaired in a timely manner where they have indicated that they wish to be registered or to have an assessment of their needs for care and support. Indeed, we have great sympathy with his concerns. We accept that people who have acquired a visual impairment should have an early opportunity to have access to information and advice so that they can adapt to their situation as quickly as possible and obtain any aids and support that will help them to manage their lives better.

As we have discussed, Clause 4 requires local authorities to make available universal information and advice on care and support, which will of course be relevant here. But people who lose their sight suddenly can also need more time to come to terms with their loss and engage with the support that might be available to them. If that is the case, it might be more appropriate to have a greater degree of flexibility around the timescales for when that support is offered or re-offered. Individuals differ in the way that they respond. We therefore believe that it would be better if the detail of this was covered in guidance, as it is for deaf-blind people, rather than in the Bill or in the regulations. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, there may well be a parallel here for deaf people, I am happy to write to him in answer to his questions.

Covering this in guidance would allow greater flexibility to update and adapt the arrangements. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Low, that officials intend to work closely with the RNIB and other stakeholders to ensure that the guidance is as comprehensive as possible. He is absolutely right that the person needs to be at the heart of that guidance. In the light of what I have said to both noble Lords, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Low, will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Low of Dalston]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for her response, and also to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, for his support. On what the noble Baroness had to say, I am very glad to hear that the Government propose to work with RNIB on refreshing the guidance. That will be very welcome. On that basis, I shall certainly want to withdraw the amendment. However, I would like to make a couple of points. The noble Baroness drew a parallel between the guidance on visual impairment and that for deaf-blind people. The Law Commission was in favour of upgrading the guidance for deaf-blind people to regulation status. Perhaps when the Government look at that question in respect of deaf-blindness and vision impairment, they may like to revisit it and consider whether guidance or regulations are the best vehicle.

I agree about flexibility, but the fact that somebody may need longer to adapt to sight loss or may need help for longer simply argues, to me, that they need help longer, not that they do not need prompt intervention. Even if you are going to need longer, or take longer to adapt to sight loss, you probably still require prompt intervention and early contact from the local authority to determine as quickly as possible what your needs are to put in place as quickly as possible what is appropriate to be put in place quickly, and to put in place what is needed over a longer time period as and when required.

With those observations, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I return to this subject yet again, having discussed it every time it has come before your Lordships’ House. I take a very different view of this proposal not because I wish in any way to denigrate people who care, but because a fundamental flaw and a serious danger lurk within it. Let us remember that it originally came from organisations such as the Christian Institute, as part of its continuing campaign against civil partnerships and same-sex marriage. It is not a proposal which emanated from the carers’ movement. I have spent 15 years in this House discussing various pieces of legislation which apply to carers. This did not arise. This has never arisen from the carers. It is very much part of a different campaign.

The proposal equates two fundamentally different sorts of relationship: those entered into freely and voluntarily as adults, and consanguine, family relationships. Those two types of relationship have always been treated differently in law, for very good reason. You cannot choose your family, you are born into it. You have relationships with people in that family which are wholly different, and your obligations to those people are wholly different, from those in the families which you create. That is why you do it. Also, you cannot leave a family into which you are born in the same way that you can divorce a partner to whom you are married.

That is important because behind this lie two key questions. First, if there are several siblings, how do you choose which two people enter into the relationship and benefit? Secondly and more importantly—the question which the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has not answered although the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, and I have put it every time this issue has arisen—how do you stop weaker members of the family being put under duress and compelled to protect the family property by stronger ones? Within that lies the potential for gross and horrible abuse.

I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has weakened her proposal this time by asking for no more than a review. If there is a review and report which does not address that issue, it will have done the citizens of this country a disservice. I hope that at that stage, if not now, we can put an end to this campaign.

Carers already have recognition in ways that matter. We have carer’s allowance. We have attendance allowance. We have all sorts of things which recognise the particular status of carers without tying them into relationships around property which are very difficult to disentangle. If this is a way of dealing with the inequities of inheritance tax, so be it, but it is one containing dangers which should be appreciated before we go ahead with it.

[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for tabling this amendment. This would place a duty on the Secretary of State to arrange a review of legal and financial rights and obligations of adult carers, adults they care for and codependent adult family members who share a house, with a view to considering the establishment of a specific legal status for such people that would include rights and obligations arising at death of one of the adults concerned.

The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and my noble friend Lady Hooper emphasised the human side of this challenge, and of course one sympathises with the cases that they mention. Noble Lords will remember that we had an extensive debate recently on these issues both for the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill, and in 2004 for the Civil Partnership Bill, as my noble friend Lady Barker has set out. In the recent debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, sought to include carers and cohabitees in the proposed review of civil partnerships. We had some debate then about the Government’s support for carers. The point was also made that this was in essence a tax point.

I note that during the debate we recently had, the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, said that, having studied the Care Bill, she had not seen in it a hook on which to hang such a review. We believe that interpretation was correct. Such a review would be enormously complex and range much further than the provision of care and support.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, stated in Committee on the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill, inheritance advantages on death would need to be balanced by responsibilities and financial dependencies during lifetime. There would need to be a fundamental root and branch review of social security and pensions policy and the provision of means-tested benefits, as well as a review of rights and obligations on death. Such questions about legal rights and responsibilities, arising from specific family relationships and friendships, are not related to the subject matter of the Care Bill. Nor do they fall within the responsibilities of the Secretary of State for Health. Indeed, Carers UK has said that forming some kind of formal legal relationship between a carer and the person they care for is not the right way to solve the challenges that carers currently face, a point that my noble friend Lady Barker has emphasised.

Parents, children and siblings already have a legally recognised relationship to each other that affords certain rights—for example, in the laws of intestacy. The Government, of course, value the contribution of carers in supporting family members and friends, recognising that they may often be caring for many years. That is why the Care Bill provides for significant improvements for carers in terms of offering them support in their caring role and in having a life of their own alongside caring. The noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, in Committee on 3 July, said of the attention given to carers in the Bill:

“In the history of the carers’ movement, with which I have been associated for nearly 30 years, it is truly the most significant development that we have seen”.—[Official Report, 3/7/13; col. 1311.]

She said today that it is all she could have dreamed of in terms of the rights of carers. The noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, said that it is one of the best Bills we have seen in a long time. New and simplified assessment procedures will focus on the impact of caring on individual carers and families, on how to support carers to look after their own health and well-being and on the outcomes carers wish to achieve in their day-to-day life, including employment.

We also intend to provide carers with similar rights to support as those for whom they care. This new duty has been warmly welcomed as providing parity of esteem with those who need care and support. They will, of course, benefit from other provisions within the Bill, including the provisions that a local authority must promote an individual’s well-being in all decisions made with and about them and the requirements on what local authority information and advice services should include so that people understand how the care and support system works, what services are available locally, and how to access those services. The cap on eligible care costs will help to reassure everyone that they have a level of protection if they or members of their family have the most serious needs and incur very high care costs. I hope that I have reassured the noble Baroness of our support for carers.