Care Bill [HL]

Lord Patel of Bradford Excerpts

Monday 29th July 2013 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Patel of Bradford]

105: Clause 68, page 56, leave out lines 4 to 11 and insert—
““(5) In this section, “after-care services” means services to reduce the likelihood of the person requiring admission to a hospital again for treatment for mental disorder.””

[Lord Patel of Bradford]

My Lords, my amendment affects Clause 68(5), which aims to provide a definition of aftercare services as they relate to Section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983. It was only just over 12 months ago, while debating amendments to the Health and Social Care Bill, that I was concerned about elements of that legislation affecting Section 117, which could have had a detrimental effect on the recovery of mental health patients. So it is a little disappointing that we have to rehearse some of those earlier arguments again today.

I must make it clear from the outset that this is not a probing amendment, nor does it seek assurance or clarification. It is an amendment that I believe is essential, and unless the noble Earl or the noble Baroness can persuade me of a better form of words, they should look to accept it. I will also tell the Minister from the outset that we are on the same side on this issue. We both want the same outcome, which is that this extremely vulnerable group of people covered by Section 117 gets access to all the help and services that it needs.

As the Minister outlined in his speech at Second Reading, the Government have already redrafted the original wording of the clause in response to the many concerns of mental health organisations in the country. However, it is clear to me and to them that we still need to do more to protect and safeguard this essential statutory provision. I apologise if I speak at length on this amendment, but it is essential that I make my case. I will try to be as logical in my arguments as possible; therefore, I will first outline why Section 117 is a unique statutory provision and needs the protection that Parliament intended it to have.

Secondly, I will highlight what the current drafting in the Bill does and why it will result in a detrimental effect. I shall conclude by explaining what I am proposing and why. I have taken time to explore many of the arguments and must thank the Care and Support Alliance, a consortium of more than 70 organisations, including Mind, the national mental health charity, which has been leading the charge on this issue. I also place on record my sincere thanks to members of the Law Society, especially Sophy Miles, the chair of the mental health and disability committee and counsel from the Mental Health Lawyers Association. It is also important that the Minister knows that I have received advice from Nicola Mackintosh, a principal solicitor, who is widely recognised as a national expert in community care, health and mental health law. I have taken seriously all their views on this issue.

First, what is Section 117 of the Mental Health Act all about and why is it unique? As noble Lords will be aware, that section concerns the provision of aftercare services for people who are discharged from hospital treatment after a period of compulsory detention in hospital. Parliament placed a joint duty on health services and local authorities to provide that aftercare. The group of people to whom Section 117 applies are the most vulnerable in the mental health system. They have been detained in hospital for psychiatric treatment following an established diagnosis. There are two groups, one of which is made up of those detained under Section 3 of the Act, and the other of those detained by the criminal justice system for in-patient treatment. It is likely that those in both groups will have had extensive previous contact with psychiatric services and support, which have failed them and been unsuccessful, hence they require longer-term detention for treatment.

These are therefore groups at the highest level of vulnerability because of risks to themselves, including their own health, or others. They are in a special group that has been recognised by Parliament as such. Among the statutory provisions in community care and healthcare law, Section 117 is unique in several respects. First, it relates to the duty owed to a particular individual. Secondly, it arises only in limited circumstances and for a very specific group of people, and is not a target duty. Thirdly, it is a joint duty placed on the relevant health authority and the social services body to work together to provide appropriate aftercare services, free of charge and for as long as necessary, and to sort out the funding between them. The aim has been to ensure that the group of people to whom the duty is owed receives the services at the time that they are needed, thereby avoiding extensive disputes about whether health or social care agencies are responsible.

Exactly which services are provided will depend on the individual’s needs and can vary greatly. The mental health code of practice stipulates for patients:

“As well as meeting their immediate needs for health and social care, after-care should aim to support them in regaining or enhancing their skills, or learning new skills, in order to cope with life outside hospital”.

The code goes on to provide a fairly comprehensive list of factors for professionals to consider when creating an aftercare package. These include patients’ psychological and mental health needs, physical healthcare, daytime activities, appropriate accommodation, assistance in welfare rights and managing financing, social and cultural needs and specific needs arising from drinking alcohol. The services cannot be withdrawn until both the health body and the local authority are satisfied that the patient no longer needs them.

Let me give a real case example. A man was sectioned in 1996 when he was very unwell. Since that time, he has been stable and in receipt of joint supervision and support by the then primary care trust and social services. He lives in a London borough and qualifies for Section 117 aftercare because he was previously detained under the Mental Health Act. He is in a supported placement funded by social services. His social services care co-ordinator decided that he could be discharged from the care home and that there should be a review of the duty under Section 117 to provide aftercare. However, the patient’s psychiatrist strongly opposed this move, stating that his condition was only partially controlled by medication and that he continued to have challenging behaviour as a result of his condition. The psychiatrist strongly believed that the joint duty was still required, as was funding under Section 117, because the patient needed the supervision and safe environment that was provided in the care home. As a result, that duty to the patient has remained and he continues to reside in the care home. This example shows that the effective healthcare being provided to keep the patient stable and safe was directly dependent on the social care. However, social services saw only that he was managing in the supported setting, which led to the suggestion that he should move on, which could have resulted in a deterioration in his health and well-being, and eventually to his being readmitted to hospital. Without the joint duty, a decision could be taken regardless of the views of a patient’s medical team.

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[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, we understand and respect the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Patel of Bradford, to achieve the best that he possibly can for people with severe mental disorders and pay tribute to his many achievements in the mental health field over many years. We are indeed, as he said, on the same side. We recognise the special vulnerability of this group, and I listened very carefully to what he said.

The Government’s view is that our proposed definition of aftercare services meets the objective of providing clarity on the duty to ensure such provision. That will give greater certainty to those needing or providing aftercare so that it can be provided when it is needed. The inclusion of a definition of aftercare services followed a recommendation by the Law Commission that aftercare services should be defined in accordance with a two-limbed definition from the Mwanza case. This case law defined the services to mean services necessary to meet a need arising from the person’s mental disorder and aimed at reducing the likelihood of the person’s readmission to hospital for further treatment of the disorder.

The Government’s definition of aftercare services builds on the definition recommended by the Law Commission. That was the starting point for the definition. We accepted the recommendation of the Law Commission as a sensible starting point, but we have gone further. The clause now clarifies that the Section 117 duty requires services to be provided to meet needs arising from or related to the person's mental disorder, as well as reducing the risk that the person’s mental condition could deteriorate, requiring their readmission to hospital.

Following public consultation, the Government expanded the proposed definition to put it in the Bill in what we feel is a much improved form. The noble Lord’s amendment omits the first limb of the Government’s definition while making changes to the second. In particular, his amendment weakens the connection between the services required to be provided under Section 117—I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, that we are fully committed to continuing those—and the specific needs linked to a mental disorder, meaning that the scope of the definition would be unclear.

The Government are concerned that this amendment may confuse rather than clarify the circumstances in which aftercare services should be provided. That would run counter to the purpose of introducing a new definition. If there are disputes over the aftercare services to be provided, the wait that some people would have to endure before the aftercare services would be in place to enable them to leave hospital could be prolonged, something which the noble Lord wants to avoid. In our view, given that it omits the criterion that services must have the purpose of,

“meeting a need arising from or related to the mental disorder of the person concerned”—

I can assure the noble Lord that the definite article does not simply mean something singular but encompasses the plural as well, something to which he briefly referred—the amendment is likely to give rise to more disputes and administrative uncertainty than would be the case with the clause as it stands. Examples of disputes arising under the current Section 117, with no definition, highlight why a statutory definition will add clarity. As highlighted by the Law Commission, having no definition means that the interpretation is left to case law, which has provided varying interpretations.

Nothing in Clause 68 will change the guidance in chapter 27 of the code of practice. It covers housing, employment counselling, and cultural and spiritual needs. The professionals involved include mental health professionals, GPs, employment experts, independent advocates and others. The proposed definition sets out the essential elements and requirements for services to fall within Section 117. The Government do not wish to be more prescriptive as aftercare services should be agreed by health and social care professionals as guided by the code. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord. This has to be done, of course, in the light of each patient’s particular needs.

Finally, the current clause introduces a purpose for Section 117 services to reduce the risk of deterioration in a person’s mental condition, which the noble Lord’s amendment leaves out. I found myself looking at his examples as he went through them. I could not see that they would be excluded by the definition in the Bill, so we see no compelling reason to alter the definition of aftercare from what has been proposed, which is based on research and consultation by the Law Commission and the Government. Perhaps I should propose to the noble Lord that we meet between now and the Report stage to discuss his concerns and make sure that they are not well founded. I am very happy to take this forward and see whether we can involve my honourable friend Norman Lamb in those discussions. I hope that, on the basis of this response, the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Patel of Bradford]

I suppose the only bit of that I was pleased about was the proposal that we should meet. Unfortunately, I disagree with everything the Minister has said. The Law Society, the Mental Health Lawyers Association, Mind, and the Care and Support Alliance—an alliance of over 70 organisations—agree with me that the Mwanza case is completely unique and off the wall. It concerned someone who was sectioned nine years ago and had nothing to do with Section 117 services, but his lawyers were trying to use that as a basis to get free accommodation.

[Baroness Northover]

Does the noble Lord accept what I have just said: that it was doubt over cases like that which led the Law Commission to come up with a recommendation that there should be a definition as a starting point for where the Government would then take this?

[Lord Patel of Bradford]

I still have a problem because the definition is very clear, as the noble Baroness has said. It is about being related to “the mental disorder”. I know that the Minister said that this is standard legislative language and that it is not intended to be a singular disorder, but I disagree. First, the definition does not give us a sense that aftercare should be holistic and thus in line with the underlying well-being principle. Secondly, the use of the definitive article in “the mental disorder” is completely out of keeping with the Mental Health Act. I can give a couple of examples from some of the trigger sections of the 1983 Act. Section 1 of that Act defines mental disorder but Sections 2 and 3, which refer to mental disorder, have no definite article. The wording is completely separate from that of the Mental Health Act, so officials should go back to the drawing board and look at it a bit more carefully. It is very unclear and it poses huge legal arguments, as people will say that this is about “a mental disorder”.

[Baroness Northover]

Under the Interpretation Act 1978, words in the singular may include the plural.

[Lord Patel of Bradford]

I completely agree that legally that is what it means, but the 1983 Act does not use the word “the” in front of “mental disorder” in any of its important trigger sections. What is important is that it is not in keeping with the 1983 Act at all. Moreover, we have already seen local authorities trying to use this case. We should be dictating what happens. I am not sure whether the judge in that case—I do not know if I should be saying this—was by any stretch a mental health expert. I think he was a family court judge, so it was completely different. The Stennett case, which was appealed to the House of Lords, clearly stated a definition that was very different from this. We should not be dictated to by that; Parliament should dictate. The Bill will dictate what aftercare services are.

I am prepared to look at the definition I have crafted and without doubt there might be something that we can improve on. However, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that this is crucial because it is the only piece of statutory provision we have to make sure that statutory health services, the voluntary sector and social services work together. Time after time over the past 30 years local authorities have used any opportunity they can not to provide Section 117 aftercare services. It goes to legal action and then they back off. Why do it when we can resolve this? We do not need the first bit that says “the mental disorder”. Why introduce that level of doubt? We are on the same side and we can move forward on this, and we do not need to introduce any doubt. I am pleased that we have something to think about and to work together on and I am sure that between us, as we did last time, we will come to an amicable conclusion. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 105 withdrawn.

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[Lord Touhig]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 105Q in my name and in the name of someone I am proud to call a noble friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, who spoke to this amendment so well and eloquently. As law makers, we can be proud of the Autism Act 2009. It was a significant piece of legislation and it is well embedded. I look forward to the review of the autism strategy that the Government are now undertaking. This amendment will ensure that the duties set out in the statutory guidance continue to apply to local authorities and NHS bodies to ensure the ongoing implementation of the Act. There is much wisdom and common sense in this and I hope that the Government will support it.

[Lord Patel of Bradford]

My Lords, I shall speak to my amendments 105AA and 105CA, which affect subsections (6) and (7) of Clause 69. Amendment 105AA ensures that people in prison and those residing in approved premises have the same equivalence of care when it comes to safeguarding inquiries by local authorities under Clause 69(6). Amendment 105CA requires a senior member of the Prison Service to be a member of the safeguarding adults board in the area.

We just have to look at the figures in terms of the vulnerability of people in prison: prison suicide rates are 14 times greater than in the general population; over a third of offenders have self-harmed; many have a huge number of delusional disorders and personality disorders and a great many have drug and alcohol problems. This is all compounded by prisoners struggling to get access to services for a range of reasons, and they are impeded by waiting times and transfers within the prison system. Prisoners with complex needs may have too many different agencies to work with when they are released. Prisoners with such problems are particularly vulnerable, and the characteristics I have outlined are the norm rather than the exception. Providing appropriate care and support can have a significant impact on reoffending and greatly enhance people’s ability to rebuild their lives on release.

However, a huge lack of clarity around the provision of adult social care for prisoners has led to care needs not being addressed or identified, and this in turn has increased the risk of reoffending upon release. I welcome the clarity provided by the Government through this Bill, which places the responsibility for the adult social care of prisoners on the local authority where the prison is located. Clause 69 outlines the responsibilities of local authorities towards people in prison with care and support needs and ensures that they are able to access care and support on a similar basis to those in the community. The Bill confirms local authorities’ responsibilities towards this group by applying core duties to assess and meet needs on the same basis as for other groups.

However, I am concerned that, having made such a significant and welcome commitment to the social care of prisoners, people in prison and people residing in approved premises, which means people living in the community, they are not to receive the same equivalence of care when it comes to safeguarding inquiries by local authorities under Clause 69(6). I am pleased that government Amendment 105A allows safeguarding adults boards to provide advice and assistance to protect all adults in its area, including those in prison and residing in approved premises. This is a significant and positive step forward in helping to protect vulnerable individuals wherever they might be, and aids the support staff who work with them.

However, denying prisoners and people residing in approved premises the benefit of “enquiry by local authority” when safeguarding concerns are raised surely places an already vulnerable group of individuals at even greater risk. The offer of advice or assistance is no substitute for statutory inquiry when safeguarding concerns are raised. “Enquiry by local authority” not only protects the individual, it also helps to shine a light on some of the most hidden corners in our society. It is another tool to help ensure that our prisons are safe both for vulnerable prisoners and for the staff who work with them. An inquiry by the local authority does not duplicate the excellent work undertaken by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons or by the prison itself. It complements and enhances them and, most importantly, it could help to save lives. While the Minister’s amendment is helpful, I feel that it does not go far enough. I would be grateful if she could give us a clear reason why such changes have not been included.

I am also pleased that the Minister has moved forward in enabling governors or prison officers to be members of safeguarding adults boards. I would say that they should be told to be on a board because we know how busy prison officers and staff are. If it happens on a voluntary basis, unfortunately we will get regular lack of attendance; people will not turn up to the meetings. It is important that we get some joint working between prisons and local authorities. Prison staff can learn from safeguarding boards, as they have done in Surrey, which is a fantastic example of prisons working with local authorities. Prison staff benefit from the expertise of social services and local authority safeguarding teams.

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[Baroness Northover]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for tabling the other amendments in this group on these very important issues. On the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Patel of Bradford, we agree that a person with care and support needs should be protected against abuse or neglect wherever they are. As I have already set out, prison governors and directors have in place procedures to follow in response to allegations of abuse or neglect. Governors and directors will provide assurance to the National Offender Management Service and Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons, through their inspection regimes, that those procedures and their implementation provide similar protection to that available in the community. The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman will investigate individual complaints and incidents. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, that the Ministry of Justice and the NOMS have acknowledged that there is a need for improved directions to the Prison Service and probation trusts in this area. They will be working with officials from the Department of Health and stakeholders to develop instructions and guidance that will give clarity about the roles and responsibilities of the Prison Service and probation trusts in safeguarding adults in their care. In addition, prison governors and other prison staff will be able to approach their local Safeguarding Adults Board for advice and assistance in improving their arrangements. The MoJ was, of course, fully consulted on the provisions relating to prisons in the Bill and will be working with the Department of Health and NOMS to develop detailed guidance so that people who are concerned about the safeguarding issue will know exactly how to raise it and get advice on how to approach it. The MoJ is fully involved in the development of all parts of this clause.

The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, also raised the issue of a statutory obligation on the senior management of prisons to take responsibility for the care and support needs of prisoners. The governor or, in the case of contracted prisons, the director, has the primary duty of care for prisoners and is the appropriate first point for reporting concerns. There is an investigations procedure in place for cases in which prisoners suffer significant harm. Prisons are monitored by a range of inspectorates, including the CQC.

[Lord Patel of Bradford]

I just want to get this point on record and then perhaps we can come back to it. I understand that prisons have a whole range of safeguarding measures in place. When there is a real problem that a prison has not resolved, why can a local authority not have an inquiry for a person who is vulnerable and at risk? That is my first question. If somebody is in approved premises, such as a bail hostel, and living in the community like anybody else, and they have been abused or are neglected or at serious risk, why should a local authority not have an obligation to have a safeguarding inquiry? I just cannot fathom why such a person would be excluded.

[Baroness Northover]

The point is that if local authorities must also conduct inquiries in prisons and approved premises, we run the risk of duplicating inquiries. Prison governors and directors have the primary responsibility for preventing abuse or neglect of prisoners with care and support needs. Prison governors already have a duty to care for and safeguard prisoners. If we duplicate this responsibility, we run the risk that the lack of clarity will mean that safeguarding concerns fall between agencies. Noble Lords will be extremely familiar with how this has happened in the past in other sectors. Therefore, a decision has to be made as to where the expertise is and where the primary responsibility is. The decision made in discussions with the MoJ and NOMS is that the primary responsibility is with the prisons. We have to make sure that they carry forward that responsibility. Obviously, they will draw on advice in the way that I described, but we need to make sure that there is one body with ultimate responsibility.

We agree that prison staff should have access to local safeguarding expertise if, in their particular circumstances, it would be useful, so we agree that the second half of the subsection, from the second “officer” onwards, should be removed. However, because prisons have their own safeguarding procedures, we believe that it should be left to local discretion to determine whether it is appropriate for a governor or other prison staff to become members of safeguarding boards rather than a statutory duty. That is the intention of the first part of subsection (7).

I now turn to Amendment 105Q, in the name of my noble friend Lady Browning and the noble Lord, Lord Touhig. It raises important issues about how future statutory guidance will be issued under the Bill and how it may interact with existing guidance. The noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, also asked about this. We intend to develop a single, consolidated bank of guidance for local authorities covering all their care and support functions under this part of the Bill. We will replace all existing guidance that covers this territory to remove the potential for future misunderstanding. Current statutory guidance for local authorities is issued under Section 7 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970. Future guidance on adult care and support will be issued under Clause 71 of the Bill. The amendment also proposes to require a consistent application of the definition of an “NHS body”. We agree, of course, that definitions must be clear and consistent in guidance and regulations and we will keep this in mind in drafting regulations and guidance to ensure that key terminology and definitions are consistent. I can assure the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, that guidance remains in place until it is superseded by new guidance.

My noble friend Lady Browning and the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, referred to guidance for people with autism. As they said, unlike other statutory guidance related to care and support, this is issued under a specific requirement included in the Autism Act 2009. I can assure noble Lords that it is not our intention to repeal these provisions by this Bill. The duty to issue guidance on autism will continue. I hope noble Lords are reassured by that.

I now turn to Amendment 105R, to which the noble Lord, Lord Low, spoke. The Government believe it is right to allow local authorities the flexibility to delegate their care and support functions to third parties. However, when a local authority chooses to delegate any of its care and support functions, this must not be a way of relieving itself of its responsibilities for how those functions are carried out. This clause does not absolve the local authority of its legal obligations with respect to care and support functions. However, we believe it is necessary that, when a local authority arranges with a third party to carry out a public function, the local authority should have contractual recourse against that third party for breach of contract. Subsection (7)(a) ensures that this is the case. It is not a limitation of the local authority’s ultimate responsibility for the performance of its functions.

The noble Lord, Lord Low, asked to be reassured about the application of the Human Rights Act. I can assure him that the Human Rights Act applies to the discharge of public functions, so even when a local authority delegates its public function to a third party, that function must still be carried out in a way that complies with the Human Rights Act. Local authorities retain legal responsibility for anything done or not done by the third party when carrying out the function. It follows that any failure to carry out the function in a way that is compliant with the Human Rights Act will be considered a failure by the local authority. We do not think that this needs to be specified in law as it is covered. The function must be carried out in a way that is compliant with the Act. By specifically referencing the Human Rights Act in legislation there is a risk that this could imply that the Human Rights Act does not apply in relation to various other pieces of legislation where it is not specifically referenced. I hope that the noble Lord is reassured.