(1 year, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I first apologise for not having spoken at Second Reading. I speak in support of Amendments 46, 54, 57, 64, 82 and 85 tabled by my noble friends Lord Lilley, Lord Moylan and Lord Trenchard. When effected, they will provide a much-improved basis for regulation. These amendments introduce an additional statutory objective, consistent with the existing objectives—namely, predictability and consistency.
Amendment 85, as we can see, obliges the FCA and PRA to apply common-law techniques of interpretation to regulations. These are to be interpreted in the same way as a court would look at them. That is critical for the promotion of predictability and consistency. Here I speak, as noble Lords know, as a lawyer, not a financier. By Amendment 85, rules of high-level generality will be used by the FCA only to assist in interpreting specific rules, not as stand-alones, as a general principle.
The context of these amendments is important. First, the ombudsman can award as much as £375,000—that is a lot of money—in an individual case and there might be 50 claims. Secondly, its determination is in respect of a vast body of technical rules with which the financial companies have to comply. Thirdly, as we have heard, the ombudsman decides a dispute on the basis of what is “fair and reasonable”, but is under no obligation to be predictable or consistent, nor to explain its reasoning. Indeed, the ombudsman is
“free to make an award different from that which a court applying the law would make”
when applying a rule. Lack of consistency results in unpredictability. We need legal accountability and predictability. We are dealing here with complaints about potentially large sums of money.
Lack of predictability means that firms must build compliance programmes based, in part, on guesswork about how the regulator might react when applying its rulebook. This is particularly so when considering the vaguely drafted rules known as “principles”. To take one example, it will be a principle for there to be a new vague duty to
“act to deliver good outcomes for retail customers”.
That is a rule with a high level of generality, which our amendment will address. It should not stand alone.
To apply such concepts to specific fact situations, without case law precedent, can be contentious. It is hard to challenge the assertions of the regulators as to how their rules are to be applied. Lack of definition in the rules cannot be good for entrepreneurs or for the competitiveness of the United Kingdom. Compliance activity becomes materially inefficient where there is lack of clarity and certainty in drafting and where there is lack of predictability and consistency in application. Costs are driven up; ultimately, the consumer pays.
We seek to introduce a new approach which produces predictability. Having established the principles set out in the amendments in this group, there will follow in later groups the means to give them practical effect through properly conducted adjudications. The gain for all concerned will be consistency and predictability, flowing from having to apply the regulations consistently and in accordance with ordinary legal principles of interpretation. Everyone concerned will know where they stand.
It will be simple, therefore, for the regulator to see whether a regulation is being applied—by adjudication or on appeal by the courts—as it would wish. It can then make changes based on hard evidence. Consumers and financial companies, meanwhile, will know where they stand. We invite my noble friend the Minister to acknowledge the need to incorporate these new objectives and the need for consistent, predictable application of the rules.
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 70 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, because any way that we can reinforce the need for the regulators to be efficient is welcome. I look forward to hearing what she has to say when she speaks to her amendment.
I also have two amendments of my own in this group: Amendments 72 and 77A. Amendment 72 deals with proportionality, which the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, referred to in the discussion on the first group of amendments. My amendment seeks to raise proportionality from a regulatory principle to a general duty. I have to say that I have always found the hierarchy of what the regulators have to follow rather difficult. They have general duties, strategic objectives, operational objectives, secondary objectives and a number of statutory “have regard” duties, which include regulatory principles. On top of that are the so-called recommendations from the Treasury to which they also have to have regard.
The regulatory principles in Section 3B of FSMA are a list of eight motherhood and apple pie things about which I am sure there is little debate, but there should be a debate about whether all or any of them have any practical impact on the way in which regulators behave. For example, one of the principles is that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions, but the FCA’s direction of travel is the opposite. Indeed, I do not think that caveat emptor has any part in the FCA’s thinking. There are other principles on value for money and transparency, but if we thought that they had any impact, we would not have the amendments that we have in today’s Marshalled List.
I am sceptical about regulatory principles not because they are bad things but because they appear to be ineffective. With Amendment 72 I have sought to elevate the proportionality principle, which is one of the eight, into a duty so that it has more meaning in how the PRA and the FCA go about their business. In case anybody has any doubt about whether proportionality concerns are real, I will give a few examples.
The first is PEPs, which we will be debating later in Committee, but, for today, both Houses of Parliament are full of people who have faced wholly disproportionate action by financial services providers. Of course, at the end of the day, it is the financial services firms—the providers—which apply the rules, but the FCA has done nothing of substance to ensure that the firms act in a way that is proportionate. Had it done so, the aggravation that we and, importantly, our family members have had to face would have been considerably reduced. It is obvious that we present no more risk than the general UK population, yet enhanced due diligence is still required—and is often extremely officiously applied.