(11 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this may by no means be exact, but when the Abortion Act became law many years ago, it was quickly recognised that doctors, particularly obstetricians, who were of a particular religious faith, might well have a serious objection to carrying out abortion on ethical grounds. That was even if, on complete medical advice and investigation, patients had been shown to have fulfilled all the criteria established by law. Some could have argued that those refusing to conduct abortions were not fulfilling their terms and conditions of service within the National Health Service. That argument was not widely used, but on the other hand it was quickly recognised by the doctors’ regulatory authority, the General Medical Council, that it was proper for doctors of that particular religious persuasion, who had an immensely powerful objection to carrying out abortion, to be able to refuse to do so on religious and ethical grounds. However, they were advised that in those circumstances they should do their best to see that the individual in question who had fulfilled all the conditions set down by law should be referred to another consultant who might be willing to carry out that procedure.
To the best of my knowledge, registrars who are public servants do not have a regulatory authority. It may be argued that those who refuse to carry out and register a single-sex marriage on religious or conscientious grounds do not fulfil their existing terms and conditions of service. This is a simple amendment. It protects those registrars at present in post who object to carrying out single-sex marriages on powerful conscientious grounds. Once they have retired, the issue will no longer be with us. All registrars appointed in future will recognise that the terms of this law on single-sex marriage apply to them and they will not have the right to object on grounds of conscience. This amendment protects the ones who are at present in post and we should strongly support it.
My Lords, it is distasteful to equate what happened in the Abortion Act with what we are dealing with here, which is two people coming together to formalise their loving relationship under law. We are talking about two completely different things. We are accustomed in this House to legislating on the basis of evidence. We have heard no evidence that this amendment is needed. I am sure that if registrars out there wanted this amendment they would have been flushed out by now. We have heard evidence to the contrary. The National Panel for Registration thinks that this is neither necessary nor desirable. This is another attempt to undermine the status of marriage being created by this Bill and which I support.
I really do think that my noble friend has to withdraw that. I have fought in favour of same-sex marriage the whole way through. I am not trying to undermine it. I am standing up for toleration. Toleration, even if it is for two people, is worth while.
I accept what my noble friend says about his position, but I do not think it is the position of those who put forward the amendment.
My Lords, I want to draw to the attention of the House something which has not been mentioned so far in all these debates. I listened with great care when the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, introduced the amendment. She drew the attention of the House to subsection (7) of the amendment:
“Nothing in subsection (6) shall affect the duty of a relevant registrar to carry out any other duties and responsibilities of his employment”.
Registrars do not just officiate at weddings. They register births and deaths. If this amendment were passed, it would mean that for a generation we would continue to have acting as registrars people who could not bring themselves to extend the full respect and dignity to same-sex relationships that they do to others.
It may be the case that it is wrong to ask them to perform what is, in the end, not a religious ceremony in any way but a public ceremony. However, to me it is utterly intolerable that a gay person going to register the death of their partner in life should have to do so in the presence of somebody who cannot bring themselves to extend the respect to them that they would to anybody else.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am pleased to support Amendment 16, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege. As a former teacher, I am well aware that for many years the law has respected the conscientious objection rights of atheist teachers, who are not required to officiate at religious assemblies or to teach RE if they do not wish to do so. This respect for conscience in the workplace is despite the fact that, first, teachers are public servants, paid for by the taxpayer, and secondly, that religious assemblies and RE are public services. I have to say that this is absolutely right. Imagine living in a country, the laws of which were such that they would say to atheist teachers, “You must be willing to officiate at a religious assembly or lose your job and your livelihood”. That would be totally wrong.
The truth is that if the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill is introduced unamended, far from creating the difficult precedent that the Minister in the other place suggests, we would be departing from an important liberal democratic precedent that makes it plain that there is space for different people, with different beliefs and identities, to be employed in the public sector.
I am well aware of the national registration panel’s briefing, which we have heard about this evening. In response, I should like to make two points. First, it does not seem very well connected to registrars. It is clear from the judgment in the Ladele case that there are a number of local authorities that make use of the fact that they do not have to designate all registrars as both marriage and civil partnership registrars precisely because conscientious objection is a concern for at least some registrars. I find it very strange that the panel seems unaware of, or is at least unwilling to acknowledge, this practice.
It is very important to remember that when, in 2005, your Lordships’ House scrutinised what was then the Civil Partnership Bill, the flexibility arising from the dual designation system was apparent and an expectation of reasonable accommodation in practice was expressed by the Labour Minister at the time, which was in sharp contrast to the Conservative Minister today. On 13 July 2005, the late Earl Ferrers said to the then Minister, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland:
“Is the noble Baroness saying that, although we must have tolerance, understanding and everything like that given the fact that other people have views different from ours, a registrar who holds certain beliefs, feels that they cannot carry out that part of their duty and says so will not be threatened with dismissal? As I understand it, they can be, for not doing their work. That is just as intolerable and non-understanding as the other way round”.
To this, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, said:
“There are the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations, which should preserve the opportunity for those who work to adhere to those religious beliefs. When many public functions are performed, there are a number of people of different beliefs, orientation and structures who can fill the place … Those who manage such situations sensibly if there is a conscientious genuine belief usually make alternative practical arrangements so that there is not embarrassment for the people who come forward for the service, and so that there is not the struggle of conscience for the person who legitimately wants to carry out a good job. Usually, both can be accommodated. In terms of delivery of a service in accordance with the law, public authorities must be able to make provision to enable the law of this land to be enforced”.—[Official Report, 13/7/05; col.1154.]
Secondly, I am disturbed that the panel brushes aside the hugely important issue of conscientious objection on the basis of administrative complexity. This is a very small price to pay for upholding our liberal democratic traditions. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, did not take this view of reasonable accommodation and although Islington Council deliberately choose not to with respect to Lillian Ladele, the fact that other local authorities have satisfactorily provided reasonable accommodation suggests to me that it is eminently possible.
The marriage Bill before us today, however, presents a much worse threat to freedom of conscience than the Civil Partnership Act. The truth is that, although there was nothing in the Civil Partnership Act to stop local authorities like Islington insisting that all registrars were designated as both marriage and civil partnership registrars, the fact that local authorities do not have to do this means that there is potential for adopting a more enlightened approach. This has clearly happened in some areas, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, rather suggested it should. There will, however, be no scope for this in relation to the marriage Bill because people will continue to be designated simply as marriage registrars. There will not be an option of being designated as a different-sex marriage registrar or a same-sex marriage registrar. In effect, the line adopted by Islington, with no potential for reasonable accommodation, will be extended right across the board.
The national panel for registrars may not be bothered about conscience but I believe that we, as part of the Parliament of a leading liberal democracy, have a duty to be bothered. I submit that the marriage Bill would be dangerously illiberal without Amendment 16, and I commend it to the Committee.
My Lords, I shall be brief because I am sure that we want to hear from the Front Benches fairly soon. I have been slightly disturbed by this debate, in part because one of the precedents that has been used to support this conscience objection is abortion. To try to equate the conscience provisions allowed in respect of abortion with those that might be put in place for civil marriage is to compare chalk and cheese. It is very inappropriate to try to do that.
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness and take up more time but I do not think that any of us is equating. The point we are making is that legislation already exists for conscience on principle and religious belief. That is the point. There is no equating.
I completely understand that but the examples given are relatively few. One of them is abortion and it is very different from same-sex marriage, which concerns two people who love each other wishing to formalise their relationship. We cannot compare that with the circumstances that led to the law allowing conscience objections in relation to abortion.
Similarly, we are not talking about teachers dealing with the law of the land. Teachers have been given a conscience opt-out in relation to something that is not the law of the land. If the Bill is passed, as I hope it will be, it will become the law of the land and same-sex marriage will become part of the law of the land, and public servants should, in general, be required to comply with the law of the land.
I understand what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and my noble friend Lady Berridge said in relation to the Joint Committee on Human Rights—there might be a need for transitional provisions—but I cannot see that there is a need for the provision put forward by my noble friend Lady Cumberlege. I am not sure that a transitional provision is needed. It will depend on whether a number of people are genuinely affected by this, and I do not think that we have conclusive evidence of that. We have heard that in the past some local authorities have made arrangements on a transitional basis with those who have had problems in applying the law in relation to civil partnerships, but it may well be that we can achieve any transitional issues that arise through non-legislative means. Putting something in the Bill would seem to elevate the fact of same-sex marriage to something way beyond where it needs to be, when it is, as I said, simply about two people who want to formalise their relationship in accordance with the law of the land.
My Lords, I have listened to this debate with some concern because we have heard references to conscience in a space in which conscience may not belong at all. We have heard about shades of grey in this debate; this evening, we have had shades of brown. I strongly agreed with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, when he referred to the judiciary. What occurs in these situations? Things may have changed a little since the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, was Lord Chancellor. Perhaps in those days county court judges in Welshpool, Caernarfon or Lambeth were able to pick and choose their way through cases they liked or did not like. However, if I may respectfully say so, the reality is that a judge is a very senior form of public official who hears the case that is presented before him by an often hard-pressed and unsympathetic listing officer. It is form of appointment, as a doctor’s appointment might be.
Equally, if somebody wishes to enter into a civil marriage, what qualifications are needed? They have to establish that they are 16 or over, free to marry and not closely related. There is no issue of conscience involved in that. Then they have to make a convenient appointment to attend before the registrar who, like a judge hearing a case, happens to be on duty on that day. They have to produce some documents—it is a bit like opening a bank account—including their passports, birth certificates and a utility bill or bank statement. Once the appointment has been made with those documents, they attend and there is no liturgy whatever. They are required to exchange promises if they are marrying, but there is no set form. Of course, the registrar helps out if required but they can write their own promises and exchange them quickly and informally. Where is the conscience aspect of this? The registrar is simply a public official providing the statutory facility to enter on a register the names of two people who wish to be married. That is the beginning and end of it. It could not be more different from going to see a vicar, priest, rabbi or imam to seek a marriage founded on a religious belief.
I have huge respect for my noble friend Lady Cumberlege and it is with great regret that I disagree with her so profoundly. However, on this subject, I think we are allowing this debate to trespass into an area in which it does not belong. I urge your Lordships to reject this amendment accordingly.