Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to open our deliberations on the Financial Services and Markets Bill. I thank the Minister for his constructive engagement so far and I thank noble Lords across the House who have shared their initial views with us. These conversations have been very helpful and have underscored a shared objective: to improve financial services regulation in a way that promotes growth, attracts investment and supports innovation. Although there are differences between us, we all agree on the importance of the financial services industry across the United Kingdom: the contribution it makes to GDP, the 2.5 million jobs it supports and the £110 billion in tax it pays.

However, I think this first group of amendments will challenge the Minister on a very important issue that we will want to address at several points throughout Committee: oversight and parliamentary scrutiny. We have approached this with slightly different amendments, but I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, shares the concern, which also applies to her amendments in group 2.

Clause 1 is short, but it is the gateway provision that introduces Schedule 1. It provides for the repeal and recasting of significant parts of the remaining Consumer Credit Act framework into FCA rules. The reasoning behind this desire for reform, as we said at Second Reading, is broadly understandable. The Treasury’s policy statement on CCA reform says that the current framework is increasingly out of date because it was designed for a paper-based credit market and now sits awkwardly alongside modern regulation. The Government say that the aim is to create a more “agile and proportionate” regime, and we do not disagree with that assessment. Certainly, that is the feedback we have been getting in our discussions with stakeholders.

However, identifying the right problem does not necessarily mean that the Government have chosen the right solution. Their approach has two serious consequences. First, Parliament will lose control and oversight of the core consumer protections currently contained in the CCA. Secondly, we are being asked to approve the repeal of these protections without being able to scrutinise the regime that will replace them. This sets a deeply concerning precedent. The purpose of your Lordships’ House is to scrutinise legislation, challenge the Government, ask questions and ensure that the law is workable, proportionate and effective. Yet there is nothing for us to scrutinise. The Government are dismantling the existing regime without showing Parliament what will take its place.

Both Houses contain a wealth of expertise—much of it is here today—including Members with extensive industry experience, who can identify unintended consequences and suggest more effective solutions. As we have frequently made clear, we want to work constructively with the Government on this Bill, but asking Parliament to surrender its powers to a regulator before it can examine the replacement regime is not meaningful scrutiny and it is not an approach that we can support.

Consumer credit in particular matters because it is woven into the everyday financial lives of millions of people. It allows households to spread the cost of major purchases, manage short-term cash-flow pressures and access funds when they are needed, all of which supports wider economic participation but needs to be done carefully and responsibly. This is a very important area and, as with the other parts of the Bill that delegate power, the Minister must take this opportunity to answer some key questions.

First, which core consumer rights and remedies do the Government intend to keep in primary legislation? By what principle have they decided which protections may safely be moved into the FCA rules? Secondly, when will Parliament be able to see the FCA’s replacement rules in draft? Will these rules be finalised before any repeal of the existing statutory protections is commenced? What transitional arrangements have the Government found? Thirdly, how do the Government intend Parliament to scrutinise future changes once the substance of consumer credit protection sits in the FCA rule book, rather than in statute? Finally, what assessment have the Government made of the effect of these reforms on smaller lenders, brokers and intermediaries, as well as on the availability of credit and related services more broadly? What effect is uncertainty on this point around the future regulatory regime having on economic activity and how much is that costing?

My amendment seeks to re-establish a basic constitutional principle that is being threatened by the Government’s approach in this part of the Bill. Parliament should not be asked to repeal important statutory protections before it knows what will replace them, how the new regime will operate and how it will be held to account. Modernisation and agility are worthwhile objectives, but they cannot justify Parliament legislating in the dark. Before Parliament agrees to transfer such significant powers, the Minister must show us not only that the destination is right but that the safeguards, accountability and route for getting there are right as well. I look forward to the Minister’s response and I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, as this is my first contribution in Committee, I declare my interests as recorded in the register, in particular that I hold listed shares in financial services companies and technology companies that may be affected by the Bill or amendments tabled to it.

I am going to use the opportunity of this first group of amendments to raise the issue of the accountability of the financial services regulators, which, as we have heard, are being given significant regulatory powers. This theme certainly applies to Clause 1 and Schedule 1, because of the vast new powers in relation to consumer credit being given to the FCA, but the theme is pervasive and we will debate it several times in Committee.

I should start by saying that I agree that consumer credit legislation needs a massive overhaul. The current legislation focuses on paperwork and processes. It was written in a pre-digital age and does not have a sophisticated approach to consumers—for example, it does not have the concept of a vulnerable customer. It is crying out for change. Indeed, when we scrutinised the Financial Services and Markets Bill in 2023, I tabled an amendment to give the Treasury significant powers to rewrite the legislation, including the ability to delegate to the FCA. My noble friend Lady Penn, who was the Treasury Minister at the time, convinced me that this was a step too far because of the many significant consultations that were needed. In withdrawing my amendment, I suggested that the extensive consultations sounded to me like an excuse for not making any progress. I am, therefore, supportive of the Government using this Bill as a vehicle to make some progress, although I regret that they still have not completed the task.

That support is qualified by issues that have become apparent since the 2023 Act was passed. At that time, I was a supporter of the FSMA model, which allowed Parliament to determine the overall principles of financial services regulation and left the detail to the regulators. Instead of challenging the huge burden being put on the FSMA model by the 2023 Act, which made provision for the repeal and replacement of retained EU law, a number of us focused on the accountability of the regulators. This was an error. I now believe that we failed to understand fully what that meant for democratic oversight of what the regulators do with the powers that they acquire. We also failed to appreciate the scale of the task of holding the regulators to account.

The FSMA model was set up by FSMA 2000 in an era when the most significant financial services regulation was set by the EU and either applied directly or incorporated by our own legislation. In either event, there was significant oversight through the processes of the European Parliament, particularly ECON, which was chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. In addition, both Houses of Parliament had committees dedicated to oversight of the regulatory outpourings of the EU, and, in the case of your Lordships’ House, we had a Sub-Committee of the EU Select Committee dedicated to financial services.

The FSMA model was not designed to do the heavy lifting that it is now being asked to do, first via the 2023 Act and now via this Bill for consumer credit legislation. I do not advocate scrapping that model but I believe the time is right for re-examining Parliament’s oversight and the accountability of the regulators. The 2023 Bill initially provided for some additional oversight by the Treasury Select Committee in the other place but was amended during its passage to add what is now the Financial Services Regulation Committee of your Lordships’ House. I am a member of that committee, along with several other noble Lords present today, and I currently chair it.

These arrangements were designed to increase the accountability of the regulator, but I have to tell the Committee there remains a significant accountability deficit. Of more importance, committees of Parliament cannot and should not replace democratic oversight of the judgments made by the regulators. That is particularly important when we come to consumer credit law. The arrangement envisaged in the Bill passes to the FSA almost total responsibility for judging the complex balance between consumer protection and the need for innovation and competition in the market. Quite simply, that is not the right answer and Parliament needs more involvement.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has some amendments to Schedule 1 that we will be debating in the next group, and I believe they are designed to alter the balance between Parliament and the regulators. I look forward to that debate, but that measure alone would not be enough because any reasonable approach to modernising consumer credit legislation will still involve significant delegations to the regulators. That is why we need to use the Bill to revisit the mechanisms for the accountability of the regulators.

At a later stage in our Committee, we will be reaching some important amendments designed to tackle that: the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has a provision requiring a periodic independent review of the regulators, and my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley has some amendments dealing with an office of financial regulatory accountability.

These issues of democratic oversight and regulatory accountability are unfinished business, and we must use the opportunity of the Bill to strengthen both and not sleepwalk into a situation where the regulators govern us rather than the other way around. We will be debating the accountability of the regulators again when we get to Clauses 16 and 17, when we reach the accountability amendments that I have just referenced.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I disagree with what my noble friend Lord Blackwell has just said. He has fallen into the trap of believing that an accountability process can be effective within Parliament. The experience that I and my committee have had is that there are limits to what can be achieved in terms of parliamentary accountability. That is one of the reasons why there are other amendments later in this Bill to find other mechanisms for improving accountability.

It is important to differentiate between those areas where Parliament has a right to be democratically involved in the decisions and those areas that can safely be left to the regulators to carry out the detail and to be held accountable for that. It is the balance that we are concerned about. I would probably end up with a different decision on whether certain of the protections in the existing legislation need to be retained as well as on improving the way in which the legislation works by updating it to a modern digital age. There is genuinely a case for looking again at whether the sanctions that exist in the consumer credit legislation are right for today’s world. I believe that some of them are too severe or can be disproportionate to the issues that are involved in practice—for example, minor breaches in relation to enforcement notices.

I would not necessarily end up with the view that what is currently in the legislation must be preserved for all time, but I think that Parliament needs an involvement in some of those key decisions about the parameters of where liability exists and what sort of sanctions can be applied. That is why I think that we must constantly differentiate between democratic oversight and parliamentary accountability. They are complementary but different things.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I speak with diffidence on this matter, as I am not an expert on consumer credit. I have been involved in many cases over the years when consumers have been dissatisfied with the consumer credit arrangements that they have undertaken and have felt that there was a serious breach of contract. I am concerned that we are suggesting here that parliamentary process is the answer to many consumer credit complaints, even though parliamentary process is just about the least living instrument in our possession. It seems that the purpose of Clause 1 and Schedule 1 is to ensure that what is created is a living instrument that will modernise the consumer credit framework—not weaken consumer protection—and will become more effective because it sits in FCA rules rather than in primary legislation. It has been suggested that FCA rules are not subject to the courts, but there is already an elaborate system in place in the FCA rules.

In this debate so far, no one has mentioned the Consumer Duty, an extremely detailed document that has been in existence for three and a half years and that has, in my view, served the FCA well. If you look at the comments from law firms, which one can find all over the internet, the result is that there has been a much more informal resolution of difficulties than relying on the old system before the Consumer Duty was created. Therefore, I believe that FCA rules are part of a living instrument: they are binding, enforceable and subject to consultation and scrutiny. At the end of the day, if someone breaks the law, they are of course subject to the courts as well. That goes without saying and to suggest the contrary would be nonsense.

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Moved by

[Baroness Noakes]

18: Clause 3, page 1, line 21, at end insert—
“(1A) Before making regulations under this section the Treasury must consult persons which provide banking services and such other persons as the Treasury consider may be affected by the regulations.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Treasury to consult banks and others who might be affected by regulations on access to banking services.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 18, I will also speak to my Amendments 19, 20 and 25 in this group; I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for adding his name to them.

We now move on to Clause 3, which gives a very wide power for the Treasury to make pretty well any provision it feels like about providing access to banking services. It is a fact of life that major banks in the UK have been reducing their branch footprints for several years, in response to the massive shift from in-person banking to online and mobile banking. Branch visits have fallen by more than 90% since the 1980s, and debit cards overtook cash transactions in the 2010s. In 2024, only 9% of transactions were made in cash, while 93% of adults used online or mobile banking. At the same time, the activity that banks could conduct safely via branches diminished. Some might think nostalgically of the era of autonomous bank managers making lending decisions and offering investment advice, but those days have been largely risk-managed out of retail banking.

Noble Lords will be aware that the 2023 Act gave the FCA powers to protect access to cash services. I did not think that those powers were necessary, because I could see that cash was definitely on its way out, but I accept that banks have to continue to provide cash until cash-only users drop to an insignificant number. The banks have agreements with the Post Office and have voluntarily signed up to the provision of 350 joint banking hubs that provide not only cash services but, to a more limited extent, the services of community bankers.

I know that some consumer lobby groups have had statutory protections for more than cash services in their sights for some time, but it is far from clear whether more needs to be done beyond the banking hubs, which are still being rolled out. I have never seen a clear exposition of what services are missing, so I have no idea whether they are realistic in terms of continuing provision, hence I am unconvinced about the case for either statutory intervention or further regulatory powers.

The case may be made when the review being undertaken by Mr Richard Lloyd reports, but that is the time for the Government and Parliament to decide whether a statutory remedy is necessary. Frankly, it is bizarre that the Government set up the Lloyd review in the very month when they announced in the King’s Speech that they intended to legislate. Normally, we consider matters then determine whether legislation is necessary, but not in this case. Even if Mr Lloyd’s review finds that further banking services are needed, that does not inevitably lead to the need for further laws. The banking hub arrangements that I referred to are not in existence as a result of the 2023 Act, as the banks had already started to set them up. The banks are generally well aware that they are an essential part of the fabric of our society and that responsibilities go with that.

I turn to my amendments. Amendments 18 and 19 are straightforward. Amendment 18 says that the Treasury would have to consult the banks and anyone else who might be affected before making regulations. I am quite sure that Mr Lloyd will be diligent in discussing the issue of banking service provision with the banks during his review, but that is no substitute for the Treasury itself being required to consult the banks before any regulations are made. Whatever Mr Lloyd’s review concludes, it is the Treasury in the first instance that needs to decide what, if any, burdens to impose on banks, hence it is absolutely necessary that they are consulted. Amendment 19 would require the Treasury to be satisfied that the banking services which might be covered by regulations would not be provided voluntarily. There is no need to create regulatory burdens where the desired outcomes can be achieved by other means.

As I have already said, retail banks are aware of their societal responsibilities; they will also be aware of the Treasury’s power under Clause 3 to require them to do things. Hence it is highly likely that, if Mr Lloyd comes up with reasonable recommendations, there will be a voluntary agreement. That would in effect leave the power in Clause 3 to make regulations in place to make less than reasonable recommendations into law, which is particularly why Amendment 18, which requires consultation, would be essential.

My other amendments in this group, Amendments 20 and 25, are intended to ensure that any use of the regulation-making power in Clause 3 is rooted in the findings of independent reviews. At present, the regulation-making power is unlimited and its only restriction is to have regard to the findings of the Lloyd review. It does not even have to follow the findings of the Lloyd review. That review might make recommendations which the Treasury does not wish to pursue at this time. Amendment 25 would ensure that if the Treasury wished to resuscitate such recommendations at a later date, or indeed to pursue other approaches to the provision of banking services, then it would have to have another independent review to validate the necessity for using the power.

Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, would tie the use of the Clause 3 power to the Lloyd review. I see the rationale for that, but I wonder whether her amendment might ossify the concept of banking service provision into mid-2026. I am sure that the need for in-person banking services will carry on changing long after Mr Lloyd has submitted his report.

I predict that we will end up with only a very small number of bank customers who actually need in-person services. The last thing that we want to do is to make the banks carry on providing them if those services are not generally needed, because the costs would be borne not by the banks but by all bank customers, so we would be shifting burdens from one small set of consumers to another.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, has tabled a Clause 3 stand part notice, with which I have very much sympathy. The Government have stated in the Explanatory Notes, and the Minister repeated at the Dispatch Box at Second Reading, that the Government intend to narrow the power during the Bill’s passage. My own view is that it is unacceptable for the power to leave your Lordships’ House in its current wide form. The Government must narrow the power while we are scrutinising it in your Lordships’ House, since it is unacceptably wide as it stands. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Then I cannot see how they can be narrowed.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister said that they may need the power to change financial services legislation. Since financial services legislation is in the hands of the Treasury, I think we are entitled to a slightly more specific explanation of how the power might be used to change primary legislation. Can he be more specific about which bits of financial services legislation the Treasury will likely use the power for?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

With all these examples, I will have to come back in some detail at a later stage. The idea of narrowing the powers means that we can take into consideration the conversation and debate, while acknowledging that there will be some work to do in the intervening period. We believe we have the time to do that before the Lloyd review comes into play, allowing us to make the amendments necessary.

On Amendment 18, from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I reassure noble Lords that the Treasury engages very regularly with the retail banking sector as part of its policy-making process. In addition to the Treasury’s ongoing regular engagement, the Access to Banking Services review will engage closely with as wide a range of stakeholders as possible, including the industry, consumers, local authorities, small and medium-sized businesses, and trade bodies. Furthermore, if regulations are made under this power to confer functions on the FCA, the Government would expect the regulator to follow its usual processes and to fulfil its statutory duty to consult before it imposes any new requirements.

Amendment 21, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, contains a similar requirement for the Treasury to consult before making any regulations. It would require the Treasury to have regard to other sources of evidence, including the burdens that any regulations would place on banks, and for the Treasury to publish a statement alongside any draft regulation summarising its consideration of the evidence. The review will consider these sources of evidence, and, in considering the review’s recommendations, the Treasury will naturally take into account the impacts on banks and other relevant businesses. If the Treasury brings forward regulations under this clause, it will publish an impact assessment that will consider the impact on firms, as well as the proportionality of regulation.

Similarly, Amendment 23—in the name of my noble friend Lord Sikka and spoken to by my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton—would require the Treasury to have regard to the need for local banking services when making regulations under Clause 3. I reassure my noble friends that the review will consider the need for in-person banking services and the impact on any specific cohorts or demographics. Funding will be considered once the review has identified the scale and nature of the consumer detriment and once the Government have considered how to respond.

Likewise, Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield, seeks to require the Treasury to have regard to several matters relating to the existing provision of banking services, including through banking hubs and the Post Office. The review will consider these sources of evidence when forming its recommendations. On her specific point on the time between bank branch closures and the opening of a banking hub, I reassure her that, if a banking hub is recommended, FCA rules already require banks not to close existing cash-access services, such as branches, until the recommended solution is in place.

Amendments 20 and 25 would require the Treasury to commission further independent reviews if it wishes to make subsequent regulations after first exercising the power in this clause. There is an existing requirement in Clause 3 for the Treasury to have regard to the recommendations of the current review when making regulations. The review was commissioned to bring together proactively the evidence from across the UK and to look at the trajectory for access to in-person banking services, not just the position as it currently stands. If the Government consider it necessary to make further provision in future, they would envisage this to follow the usual process of consultation and impact assessment, beginning from the baseline of evidence provided by the ongoing review. Further wide-ranging independent reviews are likely to be disproportionate.

Amendment 24, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, is similar: it would limit the power to be used only to implement matters arising directly from the independent Access to Banking Services review. As I have made clear, the Government’s intention is for the power to be used to implement the recommendations of the review. However, it is important that the power is not limited solely for this purpose, in case further relevant evidence outside the scope of the review comes to light as Ministers consider the review’s recommendations. The Government should be able to consider all relevant evidence, not just the review itself, before making any regulations.

Amendment 19 would require the power to be used to make regulations only if the relevant banking services would not be provided on a voluntary basis. The Treasury welcomes action taken by industry to support customers and welcomes the voluntary commitments, such as services provided in banking hubs, that the industry has taken forward. The Treasury will consider relevant information in determining any regulations to take forward following this Bill, including any relevant voluntary arrangements already in place.

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I therefore suggest that Clause 3 stand part of the Bill and that the noble Baroness does not press her amendment.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in this debate. A number of noble Lords expressed their views on what kinds of services should be made available, but we have the Lloyd review and we now await its outcome. That may or may not answer questions to all noble Lords’ satisfaction, but at least we will have a starting point.

That brings me to one of the key issues that arise from our debate: sequencing. It is normal to identify a problem, then decide whether legislation is required to deal with it, and then legislate. That has been how we have done business through Parliament for time immemorial. Not just in this case but in other cases as well, the Government are starting to flip that on its head: “Let’s take some powers. Then let’s see if we’ve got a problem and then see if we can use the powers to solve the problem”. That is not responsible legislation.

The Minister acknowledged the breadth of the powers but he has failed to articulate in a way that will satisfy the Committee the reasons or the rationale for having such a broad power. He referred to the DPRRC report, which gave a clear finding. The Minister will find that the House will generally take a lot of persuading not to follow such an explicit finding of the Delegated Powers Committee.

This will not rest here; the Minister will be aware of that. This power is being taken at the wrong time, without sufficient evidence or definition. In consequence of it being taken at the wrong time and without any evidence, it is being drafted in a way that is deeply offensive constitutionally. The only thing I need to say in closing is that we will return to this on Report. I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 18 withdrawn.

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[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, I support Amendment 28, to which I have added my name. As we have heard, the amendment would require the FCA to establish a framework assessing banks’ and building societies’ provision of affordable credit. I spoke at some length at Second Reading on the importance of equal access to credit. I welcome what is already in the Bill, as I did then, but we can and should do more.

We are witnessing a crisis of deepening economic inequality in this country. For the most vulnerable communities, it is worsened by a lack of choice. Struggling to meet their most basic day-to-day needs, long-term financial planning is not an option for many families today. Daily life is a battle to put food on the table and to keep the house warm in winter, though perhaps not today. It is often the most impoverished who are forced to accept riskier loans, to turn to loan sharks—many of those operate in my diocese of Manchester—or to enter credit agreements that they are unable to pay back. In doing so, they find that they are paying a poverty premium, which then exacerbates and ratchets the problem round and round, deepening the financial injustice.

As I said earlier, I am trying to be more overtly religious in my speeches on the Bill today, so I assure the Committee that this is not merely a modern phenomenon. I could point to specific places in the Hebrew and Christian scriptures where specific rules are set out to ban the most egregious practices around unfair credit arrangements—things like extortionate interest charges, or the taking of essential items like protective clothing or workers’ tools as a pledge for credit.

Yet the alternative to unfair credit cannot be no credit but instead must be fair and affordable credit. Across the country, in churches, food banks and charitable organisations, the impact of financial exclusion on human dignity—another important Biblical concept—and well-being is being made apparent. We also see how certain communities are at a particular disadvantage: this includes if you are a migrant without a long-standing credit history, or an adult with little financial literacy, unable to navigate complex financial systems on your own, or a family experiencing living pay cheque to pay cheque—and about 10 years ago we passed the point at which most families in poverty began to be working families, rather than families in which no person is in work. The services that community institutions provide to such communities are essential but are not enough. In order to truly flourish, individuals and households facing financial insecurity need access to credit which gives them choice and independence and creates opportunities for them to become full participants in economic life.

One thing I learned when I worked on responsible investment for the Church of England’s national investment bodies was the phrase “social licence to operate”. That is an important part of this conversation today, though I have not heard it mentioned yet. The banks—not only those which were bailed out so expensively to the taxpayer less than 20 years ago—are required to operate not simply as best turns a profit, but as fits the needs for the society in which they are working. That requires a willingness to provide social goods, not merely the most profitable products to the most eligible customers.

What is set out in Amendment 28 will not only enable us to measure where affordable credit is and is not reaching people but will lay the foundation to make targeted improvements. I am told that the banks already have much of that data and that it is simply a question of making it more available by providing and publishing it. With a clearer understanding of the barriers that minoritised communities face, we can work beyond this Bill toward financial policy which tackles financial exclusion at its very root, creates new opportunities for families in debt, and promotes economic growth on a wider scale.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I support what my noble friend Lord Massey said earlier on these amendments, and in particular on Amendment 28.

When people talk about affordable credit, what they mean is subsidised credit, because the terms on which financial institutions are prepared to advance money to the kinds of individuals and organisations which have been referenced so far are always provided on a risk-adjusted basis. That reflects the likelihood of default and the amount of loss given a default, which drives pricing and causes people to say that they cannot afford the prices at which a product is advanced to them. We must be clear on this: we are saying that some groups in society need to have access to credit at below a risk-adjusted rate. A fairly simple question is whether we think we should impose on banks the requirement to subsidise one way or another—whether through the vehicle of community finance organisations or directly by charging lower non-risk-adjusted rates to certain groups. My answer is that it should not be; the banks already have quite considerable costs imposed on them, such as the banking hubs which we discussed earlier and which would not be set up for pure economic reasons, or the provision of basic bank accounts. There must be a point at which we stop saying that the banks can just provide more things to groups of people who could not otherwise afford access to them, so I am very much opposed to Amendments 28 and 29, which are an unreasonable imposition.

On Amendment 30, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I am very unclear as to how she sees her amendment relating to the consumer duty, which has been in existence only for a couple of years, and the full effect of which we have not yet seen. I assume the noble Baroness is trying to set up an actionable right for consumers, although she is not explicit in saying that. I think that would be taking regulation one step too far. We already have the complicated arrangements of the FCA overseeing consumer requirements with its enforcement powers to set up a parallel ability of giving individual consumers rights of action under a rather ill-defined fiduciary duty, and this amendment would be an unwise addition to the regulatory landscape.