Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Neville-Rolfe Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 4, leave out subsection (1)
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment, along with another in the name of Baroness Neville-Rolfe, seeks to allow for a debate on the Government’s intentions around a new regime to be laid down in the regulatory rule book in place of that established by the Consumer Credit Act and associated legislation.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to open our deliberations on the Financial Services and Markets Bill. I thank the Minister for his constructive engagement so far and I thank noble Lords across the House who have shared their initial views with us. These conversations have been very helpful and have underscored a shared objective: to improve financial services regulation in a way that promotes growth, attracts investment and supports innovation. Although there are differences between us, we all agree on the importance of the financial services industry across the United Kingdom: the contribution it makes to GDP, the 2.5 million jobs it supports and the £110 billion in tax it pays.

However, I think this first group of amendments will challenge the Minister on a very important issue that we will want to address at several points throughout Committee: oversight and parliamentary scrutiny. We have approached this with slightly different amendments, but I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, shares the concern, which also applies to her amendments in group 2.

Clause 1 is short, but it is the gateway provision that introduces Schedule 1. It provides for the repeal and recasting of significant parts of the remaining Consumer Credit Act framework into FCA rules. The reasoning behind this desire for reform, as we said at Second Reading, is broadly understandable. The Treasury’s policy statement on CCA reform says that the current framework is increasingly out of date because it was designed for a paper-based credit market and now sits awkwardly alongside modern regulation. The Government say that the aim is to create a more “agile and proportionate” regime, and we do not disagree with that assessment. Certainly, that is the feedback we have been getting in our discussions with stakeholders.

However, identifying the right problem does not necessarily mean that the Government have chosen the right solution. Their approach has two serious consequences. First, Parliament will lose control and oversight of the core consumer protections currently contained in the CCA. Secondly, we are being asked to approve the repeal of these protections without being able to scrutinise the regime that will replace them. This sets a deeply concerning precedent. The purpose of your Lordships’ House is to scrutinise legislation, challenge the Government, ask questions and ensure that the law is workable, proportionate and effective. Yet there is nothing for us to scrutinise. The Government are dismantling the existing regime without showing Parliament what will take its place.

Both Houses contain a wealth of expertise—much of it is here today—including Members with extensive industry experience, who can identify unintended consequences and suggest more effective solutions. As we have frequently made clear, we want to work constructively with the Government on this Bill, but asking Parliament to surrender its powers to a regulator before it can examine the replacement regime is not meaningful scrutiny and it is not an approach that we can support.

Consumer credit in particular matters because it is woven into the everyday financial lives of millions of people. It allows households to spread the cost of major purchases, manage short-term cash-flow pressures and access funds when they are needed, all of which supports wider economic participation but needs to be done carefully and responsibly. This is a very important area and, as with the other parts of the Bill that delegate power, the Minister must take this opportunity to answer some key questions.

First, which core consumer rights and remedies do the Government intend to keep in primary legislation? By what principle have they decided which protections may safely be moved into the FCA rules? Secondly, when will Parliament be able to see the FCA’s replacement rules in draft? Will these rules be finalised before any repeal of the existing statutory protections is commenced? What transitional arrangements have the Government found? Thirdly, how do the Government intend Parliament to scrutinise future changes once the substance of consumer credit protection sits in the FCA rule book, rather than in statute? Finally, what assessment have the Government made of the effect of these reforms on smaller lenders, brokers and intermediaries, as well as on the availability of credit and related services more broadly? What effect is uncertainty on this point around the future regulatory regime having on economic activity and how much is that costing?

My amendment seeks to re-establish a basic constitutional principle that is being threatened by the Government’s approach in this part of the Bill. Parliament should not be asked to repeal important statutory protections before it knows what will replace them, how the new regime will operate and how it will be held to account. Modernisation and agility are worthwhile objectives, but they cannot justify Parliament legislating in the dark. Before Parliament agrees to transfer such significant powers, the Minister must show us not only that the destination is right but that the safeguards, accountability and route for getting there are right as well. I look forward to the Minister’s response and I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, as this is my first contribution in Committee, I declare my interests as recorded in the register, in particular that I hold listed shares in financial services companies and technology companies that may be affected by the Bill or amendments tabled to it.

I am going to use the opportunity of this first group of amendments to raise the issue of the accountability of the financial services regulators, which, as we have heard, are being given significant regulatory powers. This theme certainly applies to Clause 1 and Schedule 1, because of the vast new powers in relation to consumer credit being given to the FCA, but the theme is pervasive and we will debate it several times in Committee.

I should start by saying that I agree that consumer credit legislation needs a massive overhaul. The current legislation focuses on paperwork and processes. It was written in a pre-digital age and does not have a sophisticated approach to consumers—for example, it does not have the concept of a vulnerable customer. It is crying out for change. Indeed, when we scrutinised the Financial Services and Markets Bill in 2023, I tabled an amendment to give the Treasury significant powers to rewrite the legislation, including the ability to delegate to the FCA. My noble friend Lady Penn, who was the Treasury Minister at the time, convinced me that this was a step too far because of the many significant consultations that were needed. In withdrawing my amendment, I suggested that the extensive consultations sounded to me like an excuse for not making any progress. I am, therefore, supportive of the Government using this Bill as a vehicle to make some progress, although I regret that they still have not completed the task.

That support is qualified by issues that have become apparent since the 2023 Act was passed. At that time, I was a supporter of the FSMA model, which allowed Parliament to determine the overall principles of financial services regulation and left the detail to the regulators. Instead of challenging the huge burden being put on the FSMA model by the 2023 Act, which made provision for the repeal and replacement of retained EU law, a number of us focused on the accountability of the regulators. This was an error. I now believe that we failed to understand fully what that meant for democratic oversight of what the regulators do with the powers that they acquire. We also failed to appreciate the scale of the task of holding the regulators to account.

The FSMA model was set up by FSMA 2000 in an era when the most significant financial services regulation was set by the EU and either applied directly or incorporated by our own legislation. In either event, there was significant oversight through the processes of the European Parliament, particularly ECON, which was chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. In addition, both Houses of Parliament had committees dedicated to oversight of the regulatory outpourings of the EU, and, in the case of your Lordships’ House, we had a Sub-Committee of the EU Select Committee dedicated to financial services.

The FSMA model was not designed to do the heavy lifting that it is now being asked to do, first via the 2023 Act and now via this Bill for consumer credit legislation. I do not advocate scrapping that model but I believe the time is right for re-examining Parliament’s oversight and the accountability of the regulators. The 2023 Bill initially provided for some additional oversight by the Treasury Select Committee in the other place but was amended during its passage to add what is now the Financial Services Regulation Committee of your Lordships’ House. I am a member of that committee, along with several other noble Lords present today, and I currently chair it.

These arrangements were designed to increase the accountability of the regulator, but I have to tell the Committee there remains a significant accountability deficit. Of more importance, committees of Parliament cannot and should not replace democratic oversight of the judgments made by the regulators. That is particularly important when we come to consumer credit law. The arrangement envisaged in the Bill passes to the FSA almost total responsibility for judging the complex balance between consumer protection and the need for innovation and competition in the market. Quite simply, that is not the right answer and Parliament needs more involvement.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has some amendments to Schedule 1 that we will be debating in the next group, and I believe they are designed to alter the balance between Parliament and the regulators. I look forward to that debate, but that measure alone would not be enough because any reasonable approach to modernising consumer credit legislation will still involve significant delegations to the regulators. That is why we need to use the Bill to revisit the mechanisms for the accountability of the regulators.

At a later stage in our Committee, we will be reaching some important amendments designed to tackle that: the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has a provision requiring a periodic independent review of the regulators, and my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley has some amendments dealing with an office of financial regulatory accountability.

These issues of democratic oversight and regulatory accountability are unfinished business, and we must use the opportunity of the Bill to strengthen both and not sleepwalk into a situation where the regulators govern us rather than the other way around. We will be debating the accountability of the regulators again when we get to Clauses 16 and 17, when we reach the accountability amendments that I have just referenced.

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[The Minister of State, Department for Business and Trade and HM Treasury (Lord Stockwood) (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for the opportunity to set out the Government’s position on this important set of issues and for the constructive nature of the debate so far. Before we start, my interests are set out in the ministerial register. I invest in a number of funds that are regulated by the FCA.

I start by addressing why Clause 1 and Schedule 1 should stand part of the Bill. The case for reform is straightforward. The Consumer Credit Act—the CCA—is more than 50 years old and was enacted long before the creation of the FCA. It no longer delivers as it should for today’s consumers, who engage with modern products in an increasingly digital world. It too often results in people being sent lengthy, complex documents that they do not read, do not understand and cannot use with confidence. It is important to say that one in seven adults has literacy skills at or below those expected of a 9 to 11 year-old and 34% of adults have poor or low levels of numeracy involving financial concepts, yet the CCA regime means that some of the information provided on credit cards requires a far higher reading age.

Debt advice charities have criticised the way in which the CCA requirements often result in borrowers being sent arrears notices even when they have agreed a repayment plan, causing confusion and alarm. To address the point raised by the noble Baroness in her amendments, this demonstrates that it is not just the content of the arrears notices that is the problem but the inflexible legislative triggers that mean they must be sent even when there is no clear purpose and they cause more harm than good. There are many more examples of where the CCA results in poor outcomes for consumers and anachronistic procedures for lenders.

That is why this Bill continues the work that began in 2012 of repealing this outdated legislation so that it can be replaced with updated rules that better meet the needs of consumers and are fit for the digital age. The Government strongly believe that those replacement rules should, in the main, reside in the FCA rulebook, not in primary legislation. The FCA has extensive experience in developing firm-facing rules for retail markets, including mortgages, insurance and investments. Its rule-making approach is underpinned by consultation and consumer testing so that protections remain robust, proportionate and relevant. The FCA’s new rules for buy now, pay later, which come into force next month, demonstrate what a modern, FCA rules-based regime can deliver for consumers.

I have heard the concerns of some noble Lords that the Bill does not set out how the repealed provisions of the CCA should be replaced and that this has been left to the FCA to determine at a future time. While I appreciate that concern, this is entirely consistent with the model of regulation established in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. These provisions sit in the CCA only because this model of regulation did not exist in 1974. Parliament has already vested the FCA with significant responsibilities in this space, objectives that include a primary consumer protection objective, powers to allow it to fulfil its role and a comprehensive system of transparency, governance and oversight.

Parliament will have a key role in scrutinising the FCA as it makes these replacement rules. The FCA is required to advance its objectives through its rules, including its consumer protection objective. The FCA is required to consult, to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on rule changes and to submit copies of those consultations to the relevant parliamentary committees. They include the Financial Services Regulation Committee, ably chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.

The FCA has a comprehensive set of enforcement powers that will help it to ensure compliance with its rules and to act decisively where firms are failing to comply. As well as ensuring that an expert body with the right objectives, powers and resources can fulfil this function, this approach ensures that the rules can adapt as needed in the future to stay current and respond to future trends.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked when Parliament will see the replacement rules and how the transition period might work. The FCA will set out the detail of the new rules through its normal rule-making process. Repeal of legislation will be commenced only once the relevant FCA rules are in place. The Bill contains a power for HMT to allow for an orderly transition. In practice, Parliament, consumer groups and stakeholders will see the FCA rules at consultation stage before the new regime takes effect. I am aware that some noble Lords have tabled amendments to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny further. The Government believe that the current arrangements work effectively, but I look forward to debating them in more detail later. CCA reform is an important opportunity to create a clearer, more flexible and more accessible framework that better reflects today’s consumer credit landscape.

The noble Baroness asked what rights and protections will remain in legislation. Where rights and protections require legislation to work, they will remain in legislation. Criminal offences will remain, so canvassing to minors and doorstep selling will remain in legislation, along with other key protections such as Section 75.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, also asked about the impact on smaller firms, as the FCA replaces parts of the Consumer Credit Act. I can assure her that the aim of the reform is to create a more proportionate set of regulations for all firms, including smaller lenders. Everyone will benefit from this modernised regime.

I hope I have provided the Committee with some assurances that the CCA reforms are vital. I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate and the Minister for his response. I particularly thank my noble friend Lady Noakes, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and my noble friends Lord Goodman and Lord Ranger of Northwood, all of whom, I think, echoed the Opposition’s concern about overdelegation. In fact, I appreciated and enjoyed their interesting historical and contemporary perspectives, which brought the matter to light.

The discussion has demonstrated that the concern at the heart of these amendments extends well beyond the technical details of consumer credit regulation. It concerns a fundamental question about how Parliament performs its constitutional role, particularly when substantial powers are transferred from statute to regulators. I will not repeat all the points made by my noble friend Lady Noakes, but we need to look at Parliament’s oversight. There is a democratic deficit. We will no doubt debate her letter when we come to Clause 17. I noted the support of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, for bottoming out the role of the committee and the points that he made.

We support the objective of modernising the consumer credit framework—I would like to emphasise that—but reform cannot mean that Parliament approves the removal of existing protections without seeing what will replace them. Nor should moving provisions into a regulator’s rulebook place it beyond meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. We will continue to apply these principles throughout our deliberations in this Committee. Wherever the Bill delegates new powers or expands the remit of the Treasury or the regulators, we will be asking the same essential questions. What safeguards will govern the exercise of these powers? Who will be accountable for the decisions taken? How will Parliament examine what is being proposed, assess whether it is working—because follow-up is important too—and intervene where it is not?

There must be a direct relationship between power and accountability, and when the authority, discretion or remit of a regulator is increased, the capacity for effective oversight must increase alongside it. It is constitutionally perverse for an expansion of regulatory power to be accompanied by a weakening of parliamentary scrutiny. The Government repeatedly invoke the need for agility, which I understand, and we recognise the value of a framework that can respond to changing markets and emerging technologies. My noble friend Lord Blackwell warned against the confusing dual responsibility that sometimes exists between the CCA and the courts and regulators, but the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out that it is not as simple as delegating everything to the FCA, which is not a legislator. She was right to warn against automated substitution.

Agility cannot become a proxy for opaqueness and flexibility cannot become an excuse for removing important decisions from democratic oversight. The Government must demonstrate that each transfer of power is not merely convenient but necessary, proportionate and matched by effective accountability. If the Minister is willing to engage with us on this basis, we will do so constructively, but we will continue to challenge any provision that asks Parliament to surrender oversight without first showing how that oversight will be replaced. We will return to this issue on Report, unless we can find a better way of ensuring proper scrutiny, but for now I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

17A: Schedule 1, page 65, line 35, at end insert—
“38A In section 140A (unfair relationships between creditors and debtors), after subsection (4) insert—“(4A) An application under section 140B(2)(a) shall not be made, and no action for an order under section 140B shall be brought, after the expiration of six years from the date on which the relationship between the creditor and the debtor ends.””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would retain the six-year limitation period, running from the end of the creditor-debtor relationship, for applications or actions seeking relief under sections 140A and 140B of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 in respect of an unfair relationship.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, before I turn to the detail of these amendments, I should briefly set the scene. Noble Lords will be aware that last week the Conservative Party announced a new policy in relation to the Financial Ombudsman Service. An amendment on our proposal for an alternative approach, a financial adjudication service, is currently being discussed with the Table Office, and I do not intend to pre-empt that discussion. We will have the opportunity to debate that proposal at a later stage of the Bill.

The clauses before us, by contrast, change the landscape of dispute resolution in financial services in the immediate term. Our policy announcement does not prevent us engaging properly with the provisions before us now. Indeed, it makes it more important that we do so. We want whatever system Parliament agrees on now to work as well as it can. The amendments in this group are concerned with certainty, timeliness and fairness. They are intended to ensure that the framework being created by the Bill does not introduce unnecessary uncertainty for firms, does not allow yet further delay to become embedded in the system and does not create open-ended liabilities or an undesirable degree of retrospection.

I turn first to Amendment 17A, which relates to unfair relationships under Sections 140A and 140B of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. Its purpose is to retain the six-year limitation period running from the end—I emphasise “end”—of the creditor-debtor relationship for applications or actions seeking relief in respect of an unfair relationship. These can of course go back many years. This reflects a concern that has been raised with us following the Supreme Court ruling in THG plc v Zedra Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd, which found that unfair prejudice petitions under Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 are not subject to statutory limitation periods. I appreciate that that judgment arose in a different statutory context, but it has prompted a serious and practical question. Does that reasoning have any implications for applications or actions seeking relief under Sections 140A and 140B of the Consumer Credit Act?

If there is any doubt about the applicable limitation period, the consequences could be significant. Credit agreements, and the relationships arising from them, may have ended many years earlier. Banks and other lenders do not keep records indefinitely. They cannot reasonably be expected to defend claims on the basis of files, communications, systems and decision-making processes from an indefinite period in the past. That is why limitation periods matter. They reflect a basic principle of fairness: that after a certain period evidence may be lost, as memories fade and documents are no longer available. Without a clear time limit, firms could be exposed to open-ended liability and a significant increase in vexatious or speculative claims, often fired up by claims management companies.

Amendment 17A therefore seeks to preserve the existing position that, where relief is sought under Sections 140A and 140B in respect of an unfair relationship, the relevant limitation period should be six years from the date on which the relationship between the creditor and the debtor ends. I would be grateful if the Minister could give some clear answers here. As my noble friend Lady Lawlor said in the previous group, it is important to have predictability. Does the Government’s understanding remain that the six-year period applies? Has the position been affected in any way by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in THG v Zedra? If the Government consider the position is already clear, will the Minister set that out on the record? If there is any doubt, will he commit to preserving the current six-year period?

I turn next to Amendment 36, which concerns referrals from the Financial Ombudsman to the FCA. The Bill creates a new mechanism by which the Financial Ombudsman may refer matters to the FCA where there is an issue of wider significance or where FCA rules may be ambiguous. In principle, that is sensible and an important mechanism, but one of the recurring criticisms of the current system is that firms can find themselves judged against interpretations or expectations that were not clear at the time.

A route for the FCA to provide clarity is therefore welcome. However, that mechanism will work only if it operates at pace. If a complaint is referred to the FCA and then sits there for months, the result will be uncertainty for everyone. The consumer is left waiting, the firm is left with a live and unresolved complaint and the ombudsman cannot proceed. The wider market may be left in doubt about the meaning or application of the rules.

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The Government recognise that it is important for firms to have certainty around historic liabilities, which is why the Bill introduces a 10-year backstop time limit for bringing cases to the FOS. However, the Government are clear that there are some circumstances where such a timeframe is not appropriate. Consumers must have confidence that they will be treated fairly by the financial services sector, and the regulator must have the ability to act decisively in cases where there have been widespread issues. These amendments would undermine this. I therefore ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this brief debate and to the Minister for his response and clarification of THG v Zedra, which I will certainly consider.

My central point is that a redress and complaints system must be fair in operation. It must be capable of delivering justice for consumers, but it must also give firms a reasonable degree of certainty about the liabilities they face, the standards against which they are judged and the timeframes within which matters will be resolved. If we create a system in which liabilities are open-ended, where regulatory redress powers can go beyond ordinary limitation principles, and where referrals can remain unresolved for an indefinite period, I do not think it will produce a better system for consumers.

I agree that we must look after consumers—this is obviously a very important part of consumer law—but I worry that we will produce a slower, more uncertain and more contested system for everyone if we do not get these judgments right. I do not accept a bias towards business, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, suggested. Actually, we are seeing a shift the other way in some of these areas, which is why I have had the representations I have had on these points and why I think is it is very important to find clarity.

I note what my noble friend Lady Altmann said about pensions. The Minister has answered and explained that he sees pensions in a slightly different way. I am not sure what the limitation rules are there.

I hope that the Minister will reflect further on the thrust of these amendments. In particular, I hope that he will consider whether the Government can provide a clearer statutory safeguard on limitation—clarity is certainly important—as well as a firmer timetable for FCA opinions. I worry that just delegating it to the FCA will mean it being in charge of its own timetable. If there were an enormous problem in the financial services industry that required the diversion of staff elsewhere, for example, things could slip, and redress for the consumer could then slip as well.

All of these amendments go in the same direction: towards fair, timely and certain decision-making, with predictability for both consumers and the businesses involved. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 17A withdrawn.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, there seem to have been two themes in today’s discussion; I will address both because I agree with them both.

The first is on whether we value banking hubs. There have been so many voices that say that we value them, but they are calling for a much-improved framework, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Bennett, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. I suspect that there is a universal consensus that we need to think through this issue, which is exactly why the Richard Lloyd review is now anticipated. I think that most people who see the value of banking hubs in their community—most MPs have been asking for banking hubs in their constituencies—very much appreciate the direction of the Lloyd review. On the background and evidence for the need for banking hubs, I will address some of those issues much more when I discuss community development financial institutions in a later group, so I will not repeat all that.

That does not take away from the fact that we have a constitutional issue here. According to its report, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee is very concerned that the problem has not been clearly identified and that a power as extensive as the one provided for here in the Bill severely compromises effective parliamentary scrutiny. The Select Committee asks for the power to be removed from the Bill. I say to the Government that it is important that there will be some real clarity before this hits the Commons—otherwise, this clause will be very much in trouble.

I support banking hubs. I suspect that I will be very pleased when I read the Lloyd review. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. I cannot just say to Parliament that, if it is something that I like, we do not need oversight, scrutiny and a proper process and that we do not need to consider the role of the regulator versus the democratic decision-making that should be happening in Parliament. This is a very good instance where I suspect that I would be very much in favour of the Lloyd review, but I would be very sad if that is not brought before Parliament for discussion, scrutiny and proper oversight. It is unfortunate that the Bill follows a procedure and process that seems to be completely unnecessary and that does not allow for that oversight. Oversight is valid, whether or not you think you will like what the regulator will do.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 21, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Noakes, would ensure that any government intervention in the provision of in-person banking services is evidence-based, proportionate and properly balanced. It would require Ministers to consider not only the needs of consumers but the legitimate commercial reasons why firms may reduce their physical banking provision.

More widely, Clause 3 raises two distinct but closely related concerns. Our amendment speaks to the first: banks do not close branches simply on a whim. Consumer behaviour has changed profoundly, more banking is conducted digitally, and maintaining a physical network carries substantial costs. The Government may decide that wider social considerations justify intervention, but they cannot responsibly make that decision while ignoring the commercial realities facing the firms they intend to regulate.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords across the Committee. I have noted the variety of concerns expressed on this part of the Bill. As noble Lords have heard, my party has announced proposals to remove the Financial Ombudsman Service and replace it with a new financial adjudication service. That proposal is not before the Committee in this group, but we have an agreed amendment; we will have the opportunity to debate it properly at a future stage.

I start by speaking to Amendment 32 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Altrincham. The amendment would retain the existing six-year longstop rather than extending it to 10 years, as Clause 6 would do. As I have already said, I am concerned about this move, albeit for different reasons to some other Peers who have spoken. I accept that there is a balance to be struck here: consumers must have access to proper, effective and fair redress mechanisms. Where a consumer has suffered detriment because of misconduct, poor practice or a failure by a firm, there should be a clear route through which a complaint can be considered and, where appropriate, redress can be provided. However, this does not mean that time limits are unimportant. On the contrary, time limits are an essential part of a fair system. Claims can be heard fairly only when sufficient information is available to both sides to allow them to mount a proper case. That means records, correspondence, product documents, internal decision-making, staff recollections and the wider factual context in which the relevant decision was made.

The further back in time a complaint goes, the more difficult this becomes. Evidence may be incomplete and documents may no longer exist. The people involved may have left the organisation, systems may have changed, products may no longer be offered and the regulatory context may have moved on. A complaint may still be sincerely brought, but the ability of the firm to respond fairly and fully may be materially impaired. That is why limitation periods exist: they reflect the basic principle of justice that, after a certain period, it becomes harder to determine matters fairly and reliably. That principle applies in the courts, and I believe that it should continue to be properly reflected in the ombudsman’s framework. I am concerned that extending the longstop from six years to 10 years risks pushing the system beyond that fair balance.

I have noted the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, in particular his references to pensions and endowment mortgages. I will be interested in the Minister’s response on how those products are dealt with and whether the exemptions are intended to cover that area.

On this occasion, I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey—although we often agree on other matters—because there is a genuine concern in the industry about vexatious or speculative claims. We should not be naive about this. There is a whole claims management industry dedicated to identifying and pursuing potential claims. Some of those claims may be legitimate, and consumers should not be denied redress where redress is due, but others may be weak, opportunistic or based on limited evidence. If the period is extended significantly, the volume of such claims may increase, so firms will have to devote more resource to investigating and defending matters from many years ago.

All this has a cost and makes all concerned more risk-averse, so it becomes more difficult for providers to accept customers at the margin. This matters for not only firms but the wider economy. We cannot stimulate growth, support lending, encourage investment and improve productivity if banks and financial services firms are pouring ever more resources into fighting historic claims, rather than serving customers, lending to businesses, supporting economic activity and innovating. There is a real opportunity cost here.

My noble friend Lord Roborough is unable to be here today, but I understand that his Amendments 38 to 41 are intended to probe whether the reforms in the Bill provide sufficient certainty for regulated firms that, where they have complied with the relevant rules and requirements, the Financial Ombudsman Service will not be able to go substantially beyond that framework in finding fault or imposing redress. This is not to question the proper role of the ombudsman in cases such as car finance commissions, where the courts have confirmed the relevance of undisclosed conflicts of interest; rather, it is to test whether the current “fair and reasonable” jurisdiction risks giving the FOS a quasi-regulatory role, including through inconsistent interpretation, the retrospective application of standards or decisions that go beyond the rules in force at the time. This is the core issue that has been raised time and again: the FOS needs to be reined in, but does the Bill do it?

At the same time, I recognise the number of views on this question. It is for the Minister to show that the proposed changes do not weaken the ability of consumers, including vulnerable consumers—particularly those in serious circumstances, such as terminal illness—to obtain fair redress. I have been told, for example, that there is a variance between companies over acceptance rates in such cases. The Minister might want to look into that.

Serious concerns have been raised. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to this group. My own concern remains that, as drafted, the Bill shifts the balance too far. It extends exposure to firms in a way that may appear consumer-friendly at first sight but risks generating delay, uncertainty and large volumes of contested claims. The six-year longstop strikes the right balance, so why 10 years? What evidence has led the Government to conclude that six years is insufficient? Can the Minister break that down by product or financial services type? What assessment has been made of the impact on firms, on complaint volumes, on the claims management sector and on the resources of the ombudsman itself? How will the Government ensure that extending the longstop does not simply create a larger backlog of older and more difficult cases?

I would be grateful if the Minister could also address the practical point about record-keeping. Do the Government now expect banks and other firms to retain detailed customer records for 10 years in anticipation of potential FOS complaints? If so, what assessment has been made of the cost and operational burden of doing so? I speak as a former company secretary in a large company; I know about the problems in keeping data. Indeed, what about doing it retrospectively?

I hope that the Minister will reflect carefully on the points I have made on the possibility of retaining the six-year longstop. I very much look forward to his response.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, as we have heard today, the Financial Ombudsman Service—the FOS—plays a vital role in providing quick, informal and impartial dispute resolution between customers and their financial services providers. It offers an accessible route for dealing with complaints that is designed to act as an alternative to resolving cases through the courts, which can be costly, lengthy and a process that often does not work for firms and consumers. The Government are clear that an effective ombudsman provides consumers with confidence in our financial services sector and is a key element of an effective system.

The Government’s review of the FOS found that, although the FOS fulfils its role in the majority of cases, in a small but impactful minority of cases, it has acted as a quasi-regulator. That conclusion was supported by the Financial Services Regulation Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in its report, Growing Pains: Clarity and Culture Change Required, which was published in June 2025. It recognised that the FOS’s

“actions have regulatory impacts by creating precedents that the FCA requires firms to follow”,

and that this

“generates an unacceptable level of uncertainty for firms, stakeholders, and investors”.

I want to be clear that the review was not suggesting that the FOS was acting improperly; rather, it concluded that the way in which the legislative framework operates made such issues unavoidable by creating a disconnect between the FCA’s rules and the FOS’s decisions, giving rise to unpredictability and a lack of certainty across the regulatory environment. That unpredictability is damaging for everyone and harms consumers’ confidence in the financial services products and services they rely on, as well as firms’ confidence to invest and innovate in the UK.

There is a large number of amendments before us. I will start with Amendment 31. This proposal would substantially extend the timeframe for bringing complaints to the FOS and would require the FOS to spend even more of its time and resources investigating, considering and attempting to resolve historic cases than it does today. We know from current experience that this would substantially increase costs while delivering comparatively limited increases in redress awarded. Further extending the timeframe beyond 10 years in an open-ended way to accommodate a complainant’s reasonable awareness of an issue would increase uncertainty for firms around historic liabilities, reducing appetite to invest in the UK’s financial services businesses.

The Treasury’s analysis of data from the FOS on historic cases is clear: they are more likely to be withdrawn or abandoned and have lower success rates than the average, often due to limited evidence and information being available. The Government’s analysis concluded that complaints to the FOS that are over 10 years old cost firms, on average, more than £18 million per year in case fees but deliver only £600,000 per year in redress for consumers. This is not a proportionate or balanced approach, nor is it consistent with the FOS’s quick and simple purpose. Extending the timeframes would slow down the FOS’s resolution of cases that are more recent and have a higher chance of being upheld, delaying consumers access to the redress they are owed.

Turning to Amendment 32, the Government considered carefully the options for different time limits to be set in legislation, including a six-year limit, and published their analysis in the impact assessment. Although this is a matter of judgment, the Government concluded that a 10-year time limit would strike the appropriate balance between consumer protection and providing certainty to firms, with a six-year limit resulting in too many people losing access to redress. However, I assure the noble Baroness and the noble Lord that the new limit introduced by the Bill is designed to act as a backstop to the existing limits set in rules made by the FCA. In most cases, the time limit will remain at the existing six years, with the 10-year backstop kicking in for cases where the customer could only reasonably have become aware of the problem at a later date.

On Amendments 33 and 35, the Government agree that, where the cause for complaint may take longer to come to light, such as with pensions, it is important that complaints can continue to be brought to the FOS. This is why the Bill gives the FCA discretion to make exceptions to the time limit in specified circumstances, where it is appropriate to do so. The Government carefully considered their approach to defining these exceptions and determined that the FCA is best equipped to develop proportionate and fair exceptions and to define these in its rules, given the FCA’s supervisory role and oversight of the sector and the level of technical detail that is required for the definitions.

The noble Lord is right to recognise the careful balance needed between ensuring that we do not undermine the certainty that this reform is intended to deliver while maintaining consumers’ trust and confidence that they will have access to redress when things go wrong. The Government are working closely with the FCA as it develops these exceptions and the FCA will set out its proposals in due course.

Amendment 34 relates to cases where there is an ongoing relationship between the consumer and a firm. Some complaints may be about acts or omissions that continue to occur or have effect in the context of an ongoing relationship between a consumer and a firm. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 does not place a restrictive definition on “acts” or “omissions”, so there is no reason why such an ongoing act or omission could not be the basis for a complaint within the time limit. The Government’s reforms in the Bill will not change the FOS’s discretion to identify the act or omission to which a complaint relates for the purposes of applying relevant time limits. It will continue to be for the FOS to make those judgments, based on the circumstances of the case and in line with the rules set by the FCA.

I will now explain the Government’s purpose behind Clause 8 and why it should stand part of the Bill. The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Brixton and Lord Sharkey, asked about the evidence base behind the Government’s policy. The Government’s review found that, in a small but significant minority of cases, the FOS has acted as a quasi-regulator. This means that, in some cases, the FOS has held firms to a standard that is different from those set by the FCA. The majority of responses to the Government’s consultation on the proposals to reform the legislative framework in which the FOS operates were broadly supportive of aligning the FOS’s fair and reasonable test with the FCA rules.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group on the subject of fraud and scams. I have also added my support to the lead amendment, which was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and to which she has just spoken. Most of my amendments arise, at least in part, from the abolition of the PSR and the absorption of its activities into the FCA; I will quickly run through each of them.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has already explained the need for her Amendment 46, which would require the FCA to make rules to ensure that the tech or communications company on whose platform or service the fraud arises is responsible for a proportion of the cost of reimbursing the victims. Whether or not the mechanism in her amendment is the right one, the principle here is obvious. At the moment, it is the banks that must compulsorily fully refund victims of fraud. There is some sense in the banks having to reimburse victims, because almost every fraud goes through some sort of bank account to allow the fraudsters to cash out. It is clear that the mandatory reimbursement requirement has incentivised banks to do more to protect customers. However, we also know that fraud does not originate from banks’ services. According to UK Finance’s latest report, some 66% of scams arise on online services and a further 17% originate via telecoms. Let us be clear: the highest proportion of that arises on Meta platforms.

Despite voluntary charters, this is not improving at all. Your Lordships’ Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, of which I was a member, recognised this in its report nearly four years ago; if the Minister has not read it, I recommend it as some bedtime reading. It said:

“Until all fraud-enabling industries fear significant financial, legal and reputational risk for their failure to prevent fraud, they will not act”.


We were right. Nothing has changed since then to change that conclusion. If anything, matters continue to worsen as technology such as AI starts being used by criminals. It is time that the platforms were at last forced to step up and take financial responsibility for the losses that arise from their platforms, not just leaving it to the banks to pick up the full liability. I say this to the Minister: in your answer, please do not tell us that the Online Safety Act will solve this. It is too limited; it covers only directly paid-for advertising and is unlikely to make much difference.

The Government’s fraud strategy recognises all this. It says that,

“if industry partnership and market incentives alone remain insufficient to drive improvements, the Government will take legislative action within this Parliament”.

This has been going on for years. The voluntary online fraud charter was signed three years ago. Nothing material has improved. Fraud is still around 45% of all crime, and the percentage arising on tech platforms has not fallen; if anything, it has risen. The Bill is the perfect opportunity finally to take action on this and not leave it until thousands more people have fallen victim. We know that tech companies will not take action unless they have to—they continue to prove that—which is why the Government are at last taking action in respect of child protection. This is no different. It is now time to act without further delay.

My Amendment 47 would introduce a requirement for the mandatory reimbursement rules for APP fraud, which came into force in October 2024, to be reviewed after three years of operation. It is unlikely that we got everything right at the first attempt, so a review of how effective they have been in meeting their objectives of protecting consumers and incentivising the banks to improve protections—as well as, importantly, whether there have been any unintended consequences—must make sense.

I have tried to set out in the amendment—I will not go through all the detail—the key matters that were discussed when the requirement was introduced in 2022-23 as the matters that ought to be reviewed. I would have also included the tech platforms, but I did not want to duplicate the amendment that we have just discussed.

I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who sadly is not with us at the moment, on his Amendment 58, which would add specific fraud prevention duties on payment service providers. I also have a lot of sympathy with the principle behind his Amendment 125, which would introduce a financial fraud prevention secondary objective to the FCA, although I caveat that by saying that I am not sure that adding yet more objectives to the regulators is necessarily the right way to go.

My Amendment 59 is designed to ensure that the FCA continues to collate and to publish the fraud data that the PSR has been collating and publishing for the past few years. This has been extremely valuable. It has identified several PSPs that were clearly not taking their fraud prevention duties seriously and led to action being taken against them. The pressure of shining a light on some of the bigger players has clearly incentivised them to step up and improve their systems. The information identifies very clearly which PSPs are protecting their customers best and which are doing it worst, which is important information for consumers when choosing a bank or payment provider.

To give just one example to show the value of this reporting, the last report by the PSR identified that, for every 1 million transactions received by Guavapay, 109,744 were APP scam payments—that is more than 10%. As a result of that information, the company has been forced to close by the FCA. In the meantime, consumers would have been able to see that this was an unsafe operator if the report had been issued in a timely manner—an issue that I will come to in a second.

This reporting was started as a result of efforts by Members of the House during the passage of FSMA 2023, and it followed undertakings by the then Minister. But there are already signs that, since moving the PSR’s activities into the FCA, this has started to slip. As I said, the last report of this nature was for the period up to 7 October 2024, when the mandatory reimbursement requirement was introduced. That was not published until February 2026, some 16 months later. My amendment would add a time limit of three months for the publication of these reports. No further report has been published since, so I hope that the Minister will recognise the value of this reporting, and that he will confirm that it should continue and that this amendment—which does not create any new burdens at all but just continues the status quo—should be accepted.

Amendment 64 would reverse the deletion of Clause 72 from FSMA 2023—it was the clause that introduced the requirement to introduce a mandatory reimbursement requirement. In the Explanatory Memorandum, the Government explain that this is being removed because it has already happened. But Clause 72 does not only introduce the requirement; subsection (9) also includes the ability

“to vary or revoke a relevant requirement”

or

“to impose further relevant requirements”.

So I am not sure that deleting it in full works—that is something to look at. Most importantly, can the Minister confirm that the mandatory reimbursement requirement is intended to continue, even if reviewed and amended in the future—particularly in relation to tech companies, which we have talked about—and that this Bill is not intended to change anything in that respect?

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, for reasons that will become apparent, I start by referring to my register of interests, including my shareholding in Meta.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and my noble friend noble Lord Holmes, who is absent, for bringing forward this important group of amendments. I am sorry that this debate is so late and that the Grand Committee is so thin under the new five-hour arrangements—of which I am not a fan—because, collectively, these amendments raise an important and timely point. As online retail platforms and digital marketplaces become more popular and AI makes fraud easier, there has been a concurrent increase in the risk that people face from online fraud, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

We have seen concerning figures suggesting that Facebook Marketplace is now the single most scammed UK consumer platform. Very large sums are stolen through it every day in the UK, and a very high proportion of UK purchase fraud begins there. We have also seen banks such as Santander taking active steps to block suspected Marketplace transfers to protect customers. Those examples raise very important questions: how easy is it for consumers to obtain redress when they are defrauded in this way? Who holds ultimate responsibility when a fraud is facilitated through an online platform, and how can the regulatory framework ensure that the firms best placed to prevent the fraud have a real incentive to do so? It is also important to consider how changes can be made without introducing new rafts of regulation that put up costs and prices.

Banks and payment service providers have significant responsibilities, and rightly so. They process the payment, have duties to their customers, and have tools available to detect and prevent suspicious transactions. Yet they are often not the place where the fraud originated, and may see only the final payment instruction, by which point much of the harm has already been set in motion. By contrast, technology companies and online marketplaces may be much closer to the source of the problem. They host the listings, provide the communications infrastructure, enable the interaction between buyer and seller, and in many cases have access to data which could help identify suspicious behaviour before money ever leaves a consumer’s account.

Amendment 46 is based on the principle that fraud should be paid for by those best placed to prevent it, not simply those who happen to process the payment at the end of the chain. If platforms know that they may share liability where fraud is facilitated through their systems, they will have a much stronger incentive to identify fraudulent listings, remove scam accounts, improve verification, share data and co-operate with banks and regulators, and indeed help consumers to avoid fraud, as we can do a lot ourselves as consumers. This is not about saying that technology firms should always be liable in every case, nor is it about absolving banks of responsibility. Yet it recognises that the current model may place too much of the burden on one part of the system, while allowing other actors, including very large and profitable tech companies, to avoid the financial consequences of fraud which often begins on their platforms.

The goal should be to stop fraud before it happens, which means better consumer warnings, transaction monitoring, real-time data sharing, and use of technology by all relevant firms. It also means transparency. If particular platforms, channels or types of transaction are consistently associated with fraud, that information should be visible. Sunlight is an important tool of accountability, which is why Amendment 59 is valuable in principle. As the experienced noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has explained, regular publication of data on APP fraud performance, including where fraud originates, would help Parliament, regulators, firms and consumers to understand the real shape of the problem. It would put pressure on firms whose systems are repeatedly linked to fraud to improve their performance.

Before we take a definitive view on these amendments, I would be grateful if the Minister could address several questions. First, what is the Government’s view on the principle of shared liability for APP fraud across the wider ecosystem, including technology companies and online marketplaces? Secondly, is there a place for greater transparency on APP fraud performance? Thirdly, what discussions have the Government had with tech platforms about fraud originating on their services, and what more does the Minister believe those firms should be required to do? Fourthly, does the Minister accept that online platforms should have stronger incentives to prevent fraud where they host the marketplace, the listing or the communication through which the scam takes place? Finally, how do the Government envisage tackling this problem? Do they have plans to introduce legislation on this issue, or do they believe that changes within the existing framework will be sufficient?

APP fraud causes real harm to individuals, families and businesses. It can undermine confidence in digital payments and online commerce, which is increasingly the direction of travel. It also imposes costs on the wider financial system. I recognise that this may go even wider than our Bill, but this is an important group and I look forward to the Minister’s responses, and to seeing how we can improve this important area.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and to noble Lords for tabling these amendments and to all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate. The scale of fraud and the devastating impact of that crime on victims remains a concern for this Government. The Government take the issue of fraud very seriously and are dedicated to protecting the public and businesses from this appalling crime.