National Security (State Threats) Bill

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Barrow. I agree with his comments. Like him, I welcome the Bill, and, like him, I think we have been waiting a long time for it. It is not just that it seems to have taken the Government a long time to get going on the issue; it is that real life affects those who are at risk, not only the Jewish community but certainly and definitely that community, so we need to get on with this legislation, and I am therefore among those who do not support further delay.

The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—for me, they introduce a new element, but one that quite clearly has real force—require us to try to get a balance between, on the one hand, contact with organisations of which we deeply disapprove and whose activities are malign, but for purposes that serve our interests and which are for the general good, and, on the other, not creating loopholes by inventing, if I can put it that way, motives that would lead to the courts excusing their conduct. It is not difficult to see that a defence could make it quite difficult for the prosecution to land its point if there is an argument in court about motivation and it has to prove that it was for a prohibited purpose. One thing that we need to concentrate on in the short time we have is getting some careful drafting into the legislation to get the balance right.

The Minister said, and I see his point, that he could not guarantee that this legislation would actually lead to the proscription of the IRGC. All I can say is that, in the real world, if it does not lead to that, there is something very wrong. I would expect to see that happen. We do live, I think, in the real world, not in one that is composed of nicer situations than actually prevail.

On the prohibited purpose requirement, as I say, it is obvious that we need careful drafting, but that applies also to the provision on prosecution regarding the risk of people planning activities in this country for malign activity abroad. Again, it is not difficult to see that, unless it is possible to land the point, the defence will have quite a good time arguing about motive. When this legislation is passed, we must not get into a situation where it turns out to be a great deal less effective than it should have been because we put into it clauses that enabled the defence of these individuals to make a monkey, if I can put it that way, of the legislation that we put in place.

Finally, I think it was my noble friend Lord Pickles who made an important point about future-proofing. We should try to include in this legislation individuals who are not directed by or acting under the influence of an organisation but who are themselves motivated to support state organisations, so that we can also convict them. If one looks at current terrorist activity, it is very clear that the self-motivated individual is a feature of the threat scene. It is important that we should try to include people acting on their own authority in this legislation. It is an important Bill. I support getting it through but I hope we will not do this at the expense of getting the provisions and the balance of the legislation right.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure again to follow my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, whose amendment I agree with. I will speak to my Amendments 361 through 364, which are, as he rightly put, companions to the intent of his Amendment 360.

In simple terms we have an opportunity to change the law to benefit our cyber professionals and everything that they do to keep us safe, often—rightly and understandably—in the shadows. They deserve not only our respect but our support, and this is one small way we can support them.

I would also like to put on record my thanks and congratulations to CyberUp. It is an effective campaign because it has taken an issue, understood it at its essence and been clear, consistent and proportionate in its campaigning. It has not only been campaigning around the difficulties but offering practical and proportionate solutions. It is the very model of what a campaigning organisation should be.

We are told that 2026 is going to be the year smart glasses really take off—we will see. In 2007, the iPhone was launched. Yet the Computer Misuse Act still sits comfortably, dustily, fustily out of date on the statute book since 1990, a year when 0.5% of us UKers were online.

What has happened in the intervening 35 and a half years? Has that 0.5% doubled, trebled, increased tenfold or twentyfold? What was 0.5% in 1990 has moved on to 98.7% of the UK being online in 2025. That percentage alone should be enough to make the case for the need to urgently update the Computer Misuse Act. That Act came into being to address the issue of attacks on telephone exchanges. If the Government, or any polling organisation, went on to the streets of our country and asked anybody under the age of that of your Lordships about a telephone exchange, they might get some interesting results, but none of any benefit to the issues that we are discussing. It would be the greatest understatement to say that things have moved on since 1990.

There is a case for change, which the previous Government and this Government have largely accepted. Since 2021, work has been done on reviewing this issue, yet still we await any legislative change. What we are talking about is incredibly straightforward: giving a legal defence to legitimate cyber activities that is clear, concise, precise and proportionate.

The CMA being so chronically out of date would be a good enough reason to update it, but it is not just out of date, it is doing harm—harm to our cyber professionals, who, as I have already mentioned, do so much to keep us safe; harm to the security of our nation; and harm to the UK cyber industry.

I will share some numbers. There are 36.77 million reasons to make a change, because there have been 36.77 million cyber attacks on UK businesses and charities. There are another 27 billion reasons to make this change, because cyber attacks cost UK businesses and our economy £27 billion—not in total but year on year. Since 2021, when these various reviews began, £27 billion has been taken out of our economy year on year.

The changes in these amendments would bring the legal clarity and certainty required by our cyber professionals. If we look at other parts of the Bill, we can see where legal defences and clarity around public interest are being brought in. That would be completely analogous with what we are suggesting here with the Computer Misuse Act.

We are falling behind in terms of security, societal and economic benefits. The United States, France, Germany, Israel, Belgium and more countries already have a more appropriate regime than we do in the United Kingdom. The Government talk about growth, and quite right too. We already have a £13 billion cyber industry in this country. This change could unlock growth in the region of £3 billion, as well as in skills, training, jobs and careers, just by dint of making this very straightforward, clear, concise and proportionate change.

Dan Jarvis—partly in another place and largely at the Financial Times summit on 5 December last year—acknowledged this issue, stating that he understood the points behind it and that it was a priority for the Home Office. I therefore ask the Minister: is this a key, pressing and urgent priority? I suggest that it should be one of the Home Office’s top priorities. To that end, will the Minister agree to meet me and other colleagues across your Lordships’ House to update us on exactly where the Home Office’s thinking is, and where and when it is looking to make this change?

We have the ideal opportunity with this Bill. The time is now. In many ways, we are well overdue for the time being now. I ask the Minister: if not this Bill, what Bill? If not now, when?

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, especially Amendments 360 and 362, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Holmes.

Like others, I welcome that the Government appear to have seen value in the introduction of a statutory defence for cyber security researchers. I hope that this will result in the updating of the Computer Misuse Act, for which, like others, I have been campaigning for about a decade. When it was passed, that Act was perfectly valid, but the market conditions, which have been described by colleagues, were extraordinarily different. As my noble friend Lord Holmes has rightly said, the Act is now not just neutral in the scene but actively doing damage to our national security.

The Act prevents or discourages those professionals whose work lies in researching things such as vulnerabilities in the system or threat intelligence from doing that work, because of the possibility of finding themselves in trouble with the law. It is therefore very important that we organise ourselves so that such challenges, if they exist, can be defended against as they come forward, and that the activities of our professionals can be both supported and encouraged.

I hope that, in drafting the legislation, the Government will ensure that they cover all aspects of this particular difficulty—not just vulnerabilities in the system but particularly threat intelligence, which, if we think about it for a moment, is becoming increasingly important. We need to know what is wrong with the system, and we need to know it early and before it is capable of doing real damage in each case.

This is an important amendment. When he replies, can the Minister give an assurance that the amendments that the Government will bring forward, I hope, will cover both the question of vulnerabilities and the issue of threat intelligence?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for tabling the amendments in this group.

To start with Amendment 360, I welcome the noble Lord’s aims. When a crime is detected or prevented, it is a sensible principle that the individual responsible for detection or prevention should not be punished. That said, the amendment is perhaps too wide in its scope. It mentions nothing of proportionality, which leads me to worry that it could end up being used as a defence for an individual who has committed a far greater crime than that which they claim to have been preventing. Similarly, “public interest” is broad and undefined, and I would appreciate it if the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, could clarify what would fall under this defence.

Fighting Fraud (Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee Report)

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Friday 30th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak in the gap. I was not a member of the committee, and I will be brief in dealing with one point in particular. This is an important report that is extremely thorough in dealing with the alarming rise in the level of fraud in this country. It is no exaggeration to say that hundreds of millions of pounds is involved, both in the economy and in individual financial situations, and misery is caused to those who become victims of it. It is good to hear that the Security Minister is taking the report’s proposals seriously.

The point I want to focus on, which features in the report, is the need to reform the Computer Misuse Act. If it were reformed, that would add effectively to the armoury of measures that we need to deal with the growth in fraud. The Act was an early piece of legislation in the field of cybersecurity—I would say it was one of the foundational pieces—and, not surprisingly, in some respects it is out of date. The report says, in terms, that its review “cannot be delayed further”. It was about a year ago, if not rather longer, that my noble friend, the then Minister of State in the Home Office, indicated to me in response to a question that our hopes that there could be action perhaps would be realised. I have to say that it still has not happened; it certainly has not resulted in any draft legislation.

One may ask why it matters. There are a number of reasons, but the one that is relevant to this report is that we need a statutory defence in this country to protect cybersecurity researchers from prosecution. Those researchers are potentially part of the mechanism that could track criminals down, but our law is unclear on the legality of their being able to do this and engage in the kind of ethical hacking that they would need to in order to get at the roots of the criminal activity. Such hacking is not happening on anything like the scale that could be helpful, and is possible, if the necessary legal cover were given.

The Government said in their response to the report:

“The government is consulting on a number of new powers for law enforcement agencies to enhance their ability to investigate and prevent cybercrime. In addition, further work is needed on the issue of defences, which will be taken forward through engagement with stakeholders”.


That is correct, but this is the situation that prevailed when I last raised the issue, which was, as I said, at least a year ago. The pace of consultation seems to be excessively leisurely. I plead with the Government to get on with modernising that useful but outdated Act. Compared with the scope and complexity of some recent legislation, it is a comparatively simple task—perhaps that is why it is taking a back seat. If the Act were modernised, it really would be capable of making a useful contribution to the reduction of fraud in the UK, which I think this House agrees is an important task which we should be getting on with.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, I return to the subject of the Investigatory Powers Bill. I support the Bill, which I believe to be strongly in the national interest. The threats against which we need this legal base for our collective protection are, sadly, of indefinite duration and, as other noble Lords have said, the situation is getting more complex, difficult and dangerous and we need the protection of the law behind us. Having said that, at the same time it is very welcome that the legislation will include further protections and safeguards that do not exist at present. That gives reassurance and helps produce the balance that we need in legislation for the future. Finally, it is important to remember that we need to get the Bill through as we have a statute on the books only until the end of the year.

The current Bill is the product of pre-legislative consultation and scrutiny in the other place, with plenty of debate and amendment. It has undoubtedly been improved for that. We should take notice of the fact that a great deal of work has been done there. It is, I think, well balanced and been made more proportionate in the course of that debate and a lot of progress has been made on contentious issues. While the House should give it the serious scrutiny that it deserves, which is one of our jobs, I hope that we can refrain from reopening issues where the other place has already done a good job. We do not need a degree of perfectionism that simply rewrites legislation in a slightly different way when the result we have already attained is good.

The Government have accepted an overarching statement of the privacy protections. That is very important and in the Bill. They have also either given or promised protections for sensitive data sources, Members of Parliament, journalistic sources, legally privileged materials and trade union activities. All of those add to the credibility of the Bill and clearly delineate where the powers apply and where exceptions have to be treated with great care.

There is also the increase in the double lock on forms of warrant, and I believe that any Home Secretary would be putting him or herself in considerable jeopardy were he or she to try to ignore the factual review of the judicial commissioner, so one really cannot argue that the power of the judicial commissioner that has already been put in place is inadequate.

My noble friend has indicated that more government amendments will be introduced as a result of debate in the other place, and our debates here will be made a good deal easier by that welcome development. We should pay tribute to the quality of debate in the other House that has led us to be able to advance the Bill in this House at an early stage.

Many noble Lords have rightly said that the Bill mostly brings together existing powers in one place, but there are some new ones, and one of them is access to internet connection records—so-called ICRs—including, as others have said, in relation to VoIP. The Government describe that power as crucial and I very strongly agree. It is necessary for us to have this technical capability. It is also an example of where previous legislation on the statute book was out of date because of technical developments. The point made by other noble Lords about the need to have legislation that enables us to deal with future technical development is important. Future-proofing is difficult; it is not easily done; but we should not pass legislation that prevents us coping with new situations. Taking a sensible stance on future-proofing is important.

I am sure that we will debate the ICR legislation carefully, and it is right that we should do so. There is the question of the authorisation regime and whether it is tight enough, and we need to know exactly what data can legitimately be regarded as forming an ICR. These are all issues that we need to look at. Among other things, service providers need to know precisely what they have to store. An important point is also to have clarity in the Bill itself over what constitutes third-party data.

I have had plenty of lobbying letters, as I am sure other noble Lords have, which raise some important issues that we will want to look at. Some of the points I have had have certainly been overegged, but in the letters I have had the service providers have generally taken a very intelligent and constructive interest in the Bill. Most of them say they welcome it, and very often they propose quite sensible ideas. Quite a lot of it focuses on whether it is right and adequate simply to have some of these safeguards spelt out in a code of practice or whether they should be in the Bill. In general I tend towards wanting to put the safeguards in the Bill.

I will say just a word about bulk powers. There is widespread questioning of why the British Government consider these powers so essential when other Governments do not think them necessary. We need to look at that carefully. My noble friend Lord King gave us some of the reasons why the Government may well be right. One does not have to believe in the erroneous assertion that collection of bulk material constitutes bulk surveillance—it does not. On the other hand, we need to be cautious about collecting a vast amount of data, which covers large numbers of individuals who are not necessarily involved. However, we do not live in a world where prior intelligence is so good that it is obvious that we can totally dispense with bulk collection in favour of targeted collection. The point is obvious. For me, the question is much more about how many categories of bulk collection are justified in the national interest. The Government have provided an operational case, and I look forward to the view and the assessment that Mr David Anderson will put forward in his forthcoming report, which will be very important to the House.

Finally, I will address something that has not been mentioned in the debate so far, which is the question of information that is outside the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom but which the agencies may need. It is quite possible—in fact, I would say that it was quite probable—that quite a lot of cases will involve data located outside the UK jurisdiction. Once the Bill has been agreed, it will give a considerable degree of confidence in UK standards of authorisation, transparency and oversight of data collection, and will lay a good base for international agreements with like-minded Governments, which would permit UK requests to be directly made to companies rather than through Governments in different jurisdictions. That will be an advance on having to rely on mutual legal assistance agreements. On this issue, I hope that we will build in the Bill a base for the international agreements that have been proposed by Sir Nigel Sheinwald as a way forward, as that will be a constructive and rapid way forward to getting the kind of information the agencies need. It is no good the agencies asking for something which turns up three months later after a legal haggle instead of being able to get at it in a timely way.

This is important legislation, and I hope that, notwithstanding the turbulence in our national politics that we have just been discussing, we will be able to apply ourselves and get it on to the statute book in good time.

Investigatory Powers

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 8th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, the Anderson report is a landmark in the national discussion on this important issue. It is written with the most extraordinary clarity. There would be very few people in this House who did not learn something from this report. It supports the substance of the Government’s role in maintaining the security of this country and its population, while at the same time making recommendations that, if implemented, will alter the current legislative framework and procedures in important ways. It raises many issues and asks many questions, some of which it answers while others remain unresolved. I suggest that what we have in front of us is the beginning of the process rather than the end.

There is one area in which the ground for the Government is very firm. As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, said, the report accepts—takes for granted in a sense—the need for and legitimacy of bulk collection of communications data, subject to calling for important new safeguards. I will come to those in a minute. Those who argue that that should be outlawed have not provided an answer to the crucial question of how initial leads can be generated to form the basis of more targeted subsequent investigation. Indeed, I would argue that the power to collect data in bulk is becoming more, not less, important as people engaged in criminal activity—I include terrorism in this—move towards the use of different media and the dark web, as mentioned by my noble friend Lord King.

Legislation needs to cover all types of data. It is not clear to me that Anderson is absolutely explicit on that point. The growing use of encryption is a major challenge, telling us something else important, which my noble friend Lord King also mentioned. Security and law enforcement agencies must remain technically capable as well as legally empowered to protect the public.

If the Government could carry out their protective functions without the support of the public, without resort to the co-operation of communications providers, and without the help of the security industry, on whose technical capabilities they increasingly depend as in-house government R&D withers, it could perhaps struggle on broadly within the existing legal and procedural framework. However, I do not think that would be politically wise or provide the basis for the external technical and political support on which the Government are increasingly dependent in carrying out their security functions.

The debate in the other place focused on two issues: the generally accepted need for public trust and, within that, the legitimate authority for issuing warrants—on which opinion was divided, as I see it is in this House. I wish to explore some of the implications of these issues, rather than spending time on rehearsing arguments so well expressed elsewhere about the threat we face—which is very great and growing—and our need to respond to it. Suffice it to say that public trust is essential and much more likely to be retained by greater openness and additional safeguards on the powers needed by the Government. I agree with the way Anderson moves the debate on that issue, and therefore I do not think the Government can hang on to the status quo—not that I think they are minded so to do. The present uncertainties about the factual position—this is where Anderson is partial—and about the straightforwardness of some procedures employed by the security and law enforcement agencies have bred a certain miasma of suspicion, which will not go away without a certain degree of change. I hope that the Government recognise that; I think they do.

This matter, and the suspicions that have been generated, bear on the issue of warranting. However, before I come to that, I want to mention some issues which so far have been less aired in this debate. There are broadly two ways in which intrusive powers can be exercised by the Government: either with service providers’ co-operation or on a non-collaborative basis, with probed access to the network and increased surveillance. It is clear that, to be fully effective in providing protection, the Government need access to both routes. At the moment, they increasingly have to rely on the non-collaborative route in the absence of sufficient assistance from service providers, which, if they chose to offer it, could provide vital help with such matters as encryption and transnational services. In referring to service providers, I include also the new media operators.

The problem is that in the absence of judicially authorised warrants, service providers’ current reluctance to collaborate with the Government is likely only to increase. The protection that the Government are able to afford the public, even with the help of the security industry, is therefore likely to diminish. This is a real rub. One could argue perfectly legitimately—as Members of this House have—that the warranting function is essentially political. One could equally argue that it is ultimately judicial. In fact, I think it is a mixed competence. We have to consider the practical implications of our position. We cannot ignore that the way in which these decisions are taken, whether judicial or political, will be neutral when it comes to the assistance that the Government need from outside sources. That includes foreign Governments.

I therefore incline towards the notion that we will have to have a very strong judicial element in the warranting system. I also reckon that we will need mutual legal assistance agreements; I do not see how else we are to get help with these issues from organisations that lie beyond our territorial jurisdiction. Those agreements will be difficult to negotiate in the absence of a judicial element in warranting.

I do not want to dwell on this, but if the Government decide to accept the recommendation of setting up a new body, to which David Anderson has given the acronym ISIC, it would be right to give it the status, resources and trained staff that would enable it to provide both a first-class service to the Government 24/7—that will be necessary if we go down that route—and confidence to the public. It would be an error to provide a grudging, underpowered ISIC.

The other element in this game is that the Government are increasingly dependent on outside players to carry out their functions and to protect the nation. The active and willing participation of the security industry is also essential in maintaining government capability against a threat that, as I said earlier, is constantly increasing and throwing up technical challenges. We have to understand, for reputational and other reasons, that the security industry also needs a clear and accepted legal framework to work in. The issue is not quite the same as dealing with foreign Governments, but the industry is keenly interested in the reputational angle of the relationship that it must have with government. We need a relationship with the security industry that addresses the need for capability gaps to be filled now and in future. There is an issue of how we devise legislation that allows us to keep pace with technology while ensuring public trust in how those capabilities are used.

The Anderson report contains some not entirely justified strong language about the failure of government to make the case for the retention of third-party data. I do not quite share his indignation on this subject. I do not read this stricture, as some commentators seem to have done, as meaning that no case can be made. I take the view that no adequate case has yet been made, although it should be before legislation is embarked on. I agree in the sense that we need a national consultative process. We need to talk to each other more about this. We need to get to the bottom of our differences and to discuss all the angles. The sooner we do so the better. As my noble friend Lord King rightly remarked, there is, for obvious reasons, no time to lose; I do not need to labour that point.

The Government should not be frightened of leading such a national consultation and debate. The public are not foolish about the danger that we face. They know that powers are needed by government to provide security. They emphatically do not want to know about technique, and they do not want others who should not know about technique to know about it. But they do want to be able to understand where the limits to those powers that will be exercised will lie, and to be confident that the disciplines are in place to keep the system honest.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2015 Lords Chamber

Finally, I say to my noble friend Lord Carlisle that I do not believe that there is agreement on the extent of the capability gap in government. My noble friend Lord Blencathra, who, once again, has given a most impressive speech, said that the committee did not get any cogent explanation from officials. My understanding is that there still is not an agreement, so we do not even know the target that it is proposed to hit. Until there is such an agreement, essentially that is delaying any sensible proposal on communications data.

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harrison of Haringey, said that there is a danger of people being cynical about this legislation. It is also a danger that people will be cynical if, having been warned of an increasing threat and the growing capability gap, the then Government fail to take action. It has a danger of casting doubt on the seriousness of the warnings. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also raised a series of objections to what is being proposed today. I entirely agree with him that the legislation when it comes forward will not provide a complete answer. It certainly will not because technically it is not possible for it to do so. There is no doubt that we will need international co-operation. He is also right about the importance of Nigel Sheinwald’s mission.

Encryption undoubtedly makes the task a great deal more difficult and we will not get around some of it. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is also right to say that it is a long-term task. However, I do not conclude that that is an argument for delay—rather the contrary—nor is the argument that because we cannot do everything we should do nothing.

I am unhappy with the situation at which we have arrived and it is clear that we shall not make progress today. However, data communications are central to our future capability in counterterrorism. It is an important matter and we should not engage in further delays. I am unhappy that the Government could not find a way of producing legislation that we could have looked at seriously. They could have found a way had they wished to but, if they are not going to, I hope that whichever Government come to power after the election will honour the commitment to priority and that early and good legislation will be passed.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, we had a full, thorough and interesting debate on this issue last week, as we have had today. When the noble Lord, Lord King, suggested that he had been criticised for bringing it forward, he will recall that my criticism is that we have not had enough opportunity to discuss legislation on this issue over the past two and a half years.

Last week’s debate was, in some ways, a Second Reading, which was a sensible approach to take. This is a controversial and complex issue. These are detailed amendments—18 amendments over 14 pages—and there is a lot to consider and discuss. It is highly unusual to have amendments on an issue such as this introduced at the Committee stage of a semi fast-tracked Bill that has already been through the Commons. It is for that reason that I felt it was sensible to have the kind of debate that we had last week. We are now talking more about the detail.

I strongly object to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Blair. He described the debate today and the political debates as the art of the preposterous and suggested that there was some kind of cosy arrangement or deal between the Front Benches. If he has read my comments or heard them in the debate last week when we discussed this, he will know that we were clear in our views on these specific amendments. Nothing has changed and his comments contrast sharply with those of the other noble Lords whose names are on the amendment. No other noble Lords, from all parties or none, have cast any doubt on the willingness and determination across your Lordships’ House to tackle terrorism and on the need to constantly keep under review the proposals and provisions we have in place. We have made our position clear and the suggestion that there is no good reason to oppose these proposed new clauses is incorrect and unfounded.

I do not want to repeat all the comments I made—it is not necessary—but I reiterate that I understand why noble Lords have brought these amendments forward for debate. When the Government published their draft data communications Bill it was, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seriously criticised by the Joint Committee of both Houses set up by the Government as defective in many ways. We went into the details of that last week and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, has raised some of those issues today. Basically, it was far too broad, a point made also by the noble Lord, Lord West, lacked safeguards and inadequate penalties for abuse in some areas, and serious concerns were also raised about the accuracy of information and the costings of the draft legislation. The Government accepted that criticism.

I hear a telephone ringing. That will be the Home Secretary phoning the noble Lord, Lord King.

However, we now understand that, although there may not be a new draft Bill, there are drafted amended clauses to the Bill. However, they have never been presented to Parliament and we have never seen any further detail or evidence of them. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, agreed—he has not seen anything either. I said to the Minister last week that it would be helpful if not only the noble Lord, Lord King, had seen them but also the Official Opposition, who may be in position to legislate on these issues in government.

The Government have never sought to introduce an amended Bill. They have brought forward the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, which was fast-tracked last summer, and the clauses in this Bill. When DRIPA was debated, all parties agreed to our proposal that there should be a full and thorough investigation and report on this issue by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and that this should be on a statutory footing. In the two and a half years since that report, there has not been a wider debate or a fuller public consultation, a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, on the new proposals.

The Government have never sought the views of Parliament on the proposals they have picked up on following the report of the Joint Committee but now, just prior to an election, they have said that they want to revisit the issue after the election. What has happened in the past two and half years? Why has this issue not been brought forward? Both the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister have said that something has to be done to address changes in technology and how this is used, but legislation, debate and any proposals have to be far more specific than “something has to be done”.

A statement to the effect that we will have to return to these issues later in the year after the general election is not a particularly dramatic pledge. Any Government will have to do so. We made clear our commitment to that in the last debate. It is why we insisted that David Anderson’s report should be produced prior to the election. DRIPA expires in December 2016. New legislation not only needs to be debated before then but needs to be in place and operational. It is a matter of the highest priority for any Government who take office, and David Anderson’s report will be crucial. He will have presented his report in May.

The public are entitled to expect both security and protection of liberty. They are not mutually exclusive unless we take both to an absolute position on either side, but we do not. We seek to balance both those objectives and the public expect us to bring our good judgment from an informed position. In many ways, the debate around these kinds of amendments is best addressed in your Lordships’ House. It has the experience, the expertise, the commitment and the interest of noble Lords to provide the probing and scrutiny needed to fully examine these amendments and to consider the changes needed.

However, today we are asked to consider them without the opportunity to make other amendments or any significant changes and without the kind of scrutiny that your Lordships’ House is used to providing. The amendments are largely based on the ones that were so heavily criticised—a criticism accepted by the Government—and then withdrawn. I do not know whether noble Lords see the irony in this that I do. It is not unheard of for the House of Commons to pass flawed, inadequate legislation because when it gets to the House of Lords, “They will sort it out up there”. It happened with this Bill in regard to judicial oversight in Part 1. Ministers asked MPs in the other place to reject our amendment on judicial oversight on the ground that they would table something and sort it out when it got to the House of Lords. This is the first time I have been aware of the House of Lords being asked to pass defective legislation so that the House of Commons can then sort it out. I hope it will not be a trend.

I appreciate the comments about there being two months left of this Parliament. It remains open to the Government—as it always has over the past two and a half years— to provide the detail, the evidence and the time but it appears now that the changes to the Bill are not ready.

I thank the noble Lords, Lord King and Lord West, for their courtesy in discussing their amendments and sharing their views with me. However, most of the changes they have made and the proposals they have put forward do not address the criticisms made by the Joint Committee. I appreciate the point about organisations having access—I agree with it—but limiting the purpose of the Bill to national security and serious crime was not criticised by the Joint Committee. It thought its purposes—to save life, for example—were justifiable.

I also note that those proposing the amendments may have expected greater co-operation from the Government and to have sight of the work previously undertaken on the draft Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, raised that issue, as did the noble Lord, Lord King. However, that has not been the case. The noble Lord, Lord King, made clear that the Government consider that further work is needed—that this had not been a priority for the Government. Moreover, noble Lords have had these discussions with the Home Office and possibly the Home Secretary, and they have far greater access to security information than we do as Her Majesty’s Opposition. Given the quote from the Home Secretary used by the noble Lord, Lord King, did he also ask why this has not been a priority if she considers the threat to be that great?

My noble friend Lord Harris made a powerful speech in which he said that we govern by consent, but in the two and a half years that the report has laid on the table gathering dust, we have not had an opportunity to have the public debate that would ensure that we have public consent and approval for any measures which are brought forward on data communications and retention.

We know that legislation in this area has to be kept up to date, it has to be necessary, and it has to be proportionate. Following the election in just a few months’ time, when David Anderson has reported and we will have had the report from the Intelligence and Security Committee, there is a time imperative to replace DRIPA and to ensure that our legislation is fit for purpose. We will have to consider new legislation. It may be that some of the provisions in the draft Bill and the suggestions in the report of the Joint Committee are already being outpaced by the advance of technological change—given the time lag we have already had over the past two and half years. But what is clear is that we will need an evidence-based approach from the Government. We will need to explain to and engage the wider public in the debate, and your Lordships’ House will have to scrutinise any proposed legislation to ensure that it addresses both the security issues and those of public liberty. The proposals must do just what they are intended to do—we have often debated their workability—and they have to be proportionate and necessary. We will debate exactly what the provisions would do and their impact.

However, that is not what we are being asked to do today. We are being asked to support these specific, flawed amendments with no guarantee that the Government will provide any additional time in the House of Commons for them to be debated in full. No doubt the Government delay has wasted time, but these amendments do not resolve that. I am grateful to all the noble Lords who have put them forward because we have been given the opportunity to hold two very good debates on both the principles and the substance. However, if the amendments are put to the vote today, I regret that on the information we have, we will be unable to support them.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead]

If I may say so, it was the case during my three years as a Minister. It was very different, of course, from the time of the IRA, which we had completely and thoroughly penetrated.

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Paddick]

I am sorry, but I have not yet finished, noble Lords will be alarmed to hear.

Noble Lords have said that there is a gap in the capability of the security services and the police in terms of getting similar intelligence that they get from cell site analysis at the moment using mobile phones. My understanding is that the emergency legislation that this House passed towards the end of last year and the measures contained in this Bill, unamended, help to bridge that gap. Intelligence on who is communicating with whom at what time and where can be secured using the IP address provisions contained in the Bill, without the proposed amendments. I am not technically advanced enough to say whether that is the case; perhaps the Minister will be able to tell us whether, or to what extent, the gap that has been identified by other noble Lords will be filled by the Bill as it stands.

The noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, talked about the significance of communications data. Again, my understanding is that the legislation, as put forward by the Government, is designed to fill that gap.

The noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, then spoke about how the draft Communications Data Bill was kicked into touch for political reasons. If the noble Lord means a balance being achieved between human rights—the right to privacy and a private life—and the powers being given to the security services and the police, I would say that that is an absolutely legitimate political reason.

On mass surveillance, if we are talking about internet service providers retaining web logs and information about every website visited by every individual based in the UK, so that the information can subsequently be accessed in a targeted way by the police and the security services, are we saying, if we accept these amendments, that that can be done simply by the security services or the police providing some legitimate reason why they want to access that information—without any judicial intervention or a judge deciding that there is a legitimate reason to access that data? Are we saying that that is what we want and accept?

People have made fun of the fact that the security services are not going to access where people have done their online shopping. But who in this House believed, when they passed the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, that the police would use that power to establish the identity of confidential press sources? If we pass this very broad legislation, how can we say that there will not be some reason found in the future for the police or the security services to use the legislation in a way we never intended for it to be used?

If noble Lords think that I am being party political, that is a matter for them. I was a police officer for 30 years. I encountered terrorism on a second-hand, rather than first-hand, basis. Unless we have the right balance between rights to privacy and powers for the police and security services, large swathes of communities in this country will no longer co-operate with the police and the security services. That will be an even greater loss of intelligence than any gap that currently exists in the powers of the police and the security services.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the House faces three choices. The first would be not to accept these amendments and not replace them with anything else—in other words, do nothing. I think that the “do nothing” option is the worst that we could possibly follow. In the current situation it is not possible to argue that we do not face growing danger as a result of declining capability against the background of a growing threat. It seems to me that we have a duty to respond to that. I think it a pity that the Government have not brought forward their own amendments on this, but they have not done so yet. I believe that doing something is what this House ought to do. I commend those who have brought forward these amendments.

The other two options are: follow these amendments and vote them into law—it would then be important to accompany them with a sunset clause—or wait for the Government to bring forward something else. That choice depends on the Government’s intentions. It would be preferable for us to be able to vote on something more refined and which incorporated more of the work done by the Joint Committee. I have not been privy to any of the legislation as redrafted. The draft data communications legislation has remained with its poor reputation as a result of the Government not having indicated what they might do to refine the powers therein.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My noble friend the Minister has set out the background to this, sadly, justified Bill, which relates to the change in the increased terrorist threat to this country. One of the main features of the threat that we now face is the geographical proximity of the conflict that it has generated and the ease with which jihadis leave the United Kingdom and travel by many routes to participate in fighting, and then return.

I am distressed to find myself in such strong disagreement with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, first in his aspersions on the motives of the Prime Minister but also in his assessment of the situation. There is nil indication at the moment that the conflict that we now see raging in Syria and Iraq, which inspires jihadi terrorism and enables jihadis to be trained in military technique, is going to end soon. On the contrary, the real danger is that it will both spread and intensify before ending. The threat has increased and is in great danger of increasing still further. So it is illusory to imagine that we are simply dealing with 250 people who may yet return; there is constant traffic backwards and forwards and, if we do not seek to disrupt it and do so with effect, that number will increase. The situation is not static, or one that lacks extreme danger.

What is being proposed in these powers to intercept people’s travel? The police will be authorised to act, on the basis of reasonable suspicion of an intention on the part of an individual to participate in terrorism abroad, to retain the passport concerned, initially for no more than 14 days without judicial sanction, until the purpose of the journey has been established. It will not permit the detention of these individuals. It will also give power to bar foreign nationals who are reasonably suspected of participation in terrorism from re-entering, and it will enable the control, through a temporary exclusion order, of re-entry of nationals, permitting a decision to be taken on whether they should be prosecuted if sufficient evidence exists or put into some kind of monitored programme if that evidence does not.

A lot will depend on the skill with which the power is used and its terms, and I join those who wish to see sufficient safeguards. The devil in much counterterrorism legislation lies in the detail, and I hope that the Minister will be able to give us more detail on how these processes should eventuate. What will actually happen when these interceptions are made? Then we can understand in human terms what is likely to happen. On the decision arrived at as to whether these are people who have to face some kind of criminal charge or can and should be put into a programme, and which of those verdicts it is—I think that there will be many more who fall into the second category—those involved, and the Muslim community in this country that it will affect, must feel that it is a route to fair treatment and reasonable justice.

We should always be cautious about legislating in a heightened atmosphere generated by a major outrage, although the tone of the debate in this House this afternoon has been singularly sober and not excited. Paris did show us one thing, of which we should take note—that the individuals concerned used military training acquired in the Yemen to kill people on the streets of France. The people of this country will not be very forgiving if effective ways in which to disrupt terrorists who have been trained to kill should be available but are denied to the authorities and this country then suffers some kind of jihadi outrage.

I am aware of the apprehensions of noble Lords about the exercise of these powers and I look forward to what the Minister is going to say in Committee about safeguards. Adequate safeguards will greatly help the swift passage of this legislation through the House. I do not personally think that permanent exclusion orders are sustainable. On the other hand, I do not accept the notion, which is contained, I think, in a Liberty document, that we can somehow rely on jihadis to self-notify their intention to return. Nor do I entirely understand why—I think I am right in saying this—the Joint Committee on Human Rights has suggested that passports should not be removed, even temporarily. An international travel document is not a right and certainly not an absolute one. Those who plead for balance in our legislation must also bear in mind the right to security of the community at large.

The Bill deals with a number of other powers and, given the way the evening is moving on, I am going to be selective about them. I regret that the relocation power is necessary. I was part of the Government which modified the control regime and instituted TPIMs. I regarded that as an advance in our civil liberties, but it obviously has to be consistent with the safety of us all together. I regret that it is necessary to reinstate the relocation powers now, but I accept the judgment of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Mr Anderson, and I note the points that have just been made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown.

What has not attracted attention in the debate so far are the provisions relating to airline and other forms of transport “authority to carry”. These proposed powers are also important and, I fear, necessary. Al-Qaeda has a known obsession with spectacular massacres and one of their favourites is bringing down aircraft through the terrorist activity of people who are on board. They have attempted this a number of times, fortunately only once successfully, and that is why we take our shoes off. However, it remains an aim of a revived AQ. Our services being in a position to inspect the detail of a passenger list in advance of the take-off of an aircraft is, frankly, a small price to pay in terms of the intrusion into individual privacy. What price privacy if the whole plane-load of several hundred people goes down? I hope that the European Court of Justice, which is not helpful on this issue, will have the sense not to strike down such a provision. One of the points made by Turkish authorities in relation to the massacre in Paris was that they were given no advance warning of the presence on the flight to Istanbul of the wanted woman accomplice and so they let her through. Such a provision on authority to carry would, if widely accepted, materially increase the safety of international airline travel. The least we can do is ensure an increase in safety of travel to the UK.

There are other powers in the Bill which touch on data retention and Prevent policies, which this House is going to examine in detail in Committee. That is the right thing for us to do and, as I said a moment ago, the provision of detail from the Minister will be very helpful. The creation of a Privacy and Civil Liberties Board is an important innovation which I hope will increase confidence in our ability to strike the balance between privacy, civil rights and security. I had not heard, and do not believe, that this is designed to displace the independent reviewer. I would certainly be distressed if that were the case but I do not think it is, because the contribution he makes is extraordinarily invaluable. I hope that it will be a mechanism which strengthens his hand and which enables us at all times, not only when we are legislating but in the subsequent implementation of legislation, to ensure that a balance continues to be struck.

I look forward to the following maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, and to the later maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington. I hope that at the conclusion of this debate the House will signify its support for the Bill’s objectives and principles, and that it will achieve a rapid passage through this House.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Monday 9th May 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved By

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

That it be an instruction to the Committee of the Whole House to which the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill has been committed that they consider the bill in the following order:

Clause 1, Schedule 1, Clause 2, Schedule 2, Clause 3, Schedule 3, Clause 4, Schedule 4, Clauses 5 to 26, Schedule 5, Clauses 27 and 28, Schedule 6, Clauses 29 to 31, Schedule 7, Clauses 32 to 38, Schedule 8, Clauses 39 to 57, Schedule 9, Clauses 58 to 76, Schedule 10, Clauses 77 to 89, Schedule 11, Clause 90, Schedule 12, Clause 91, Schedule 13, Clauses 92 to 96, Schedule 14, Clauses 97 to 99, Schedule 15, Clause 100, Schedule 16, Clauses 101 to 152, Schedule 17, Clauses 153 to 159.

Motion agreed.

Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Sandwich]

I came in to say only a word in support of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. I am very concerned about these rules going through without discussion. As the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, said, this is a water-under-the-bridge debate; we do not have time to have any impact. I have read the Merits Committee report and note the committee's disappointment about the lack of information all over the place. The Government are proposing major changes to the Immigration Rules which under the previous Government and the one before would have been the subject of serious debate— I have taken part in many of those debates.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and I went to a meeting this evening at which we heard reports of the Government’s hesitation about a proposed new convention on domestic labour. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, in the earlier EU debate, said that the Government were reluctant about the EU directive on trafficking. The Government, whether it is in the Department for Work and Pensions or the Home Office, must pay careful attention to their international reputation in all these categories and, above all, ensure that the proposals are given the fullest public attention before they come into effect. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has already emphasised, these are sensitive issues. We must not have immigration policy by stealth.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Neville-Jones)]

My Lords, a number of points have been made in this debate, which inevitably I suppose has evolved into a discussion on the operation of policy. I am not in a position to answer all the questions that were raised, some of which were quite detailed, but I shall do my best, and I promise to write to noble Lords on other points if I am not able to cover them.

The issue at hand is whether the Government should have published a more comprehensive analysis of the outcomes of the consultation. The Merits Committee, to which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, referred, felt that the evidence published with the report was not adequate, and the Government take serious note of what the committee has said. However, I should like to begin my reply by putting the matter into context. I confess to being a little surprised that the noble Lord has brought forward this Motion, given the Opposition’s record in this area. Perhaps I may give an example or two.

In March 2010, the previous Government made significant changes to tier 4—they said they were significant—concerning the student route. Despite taking the views of key partners, they did not publish any formal explanation of the findings. In March 2009, they also made stringent changes to tier 1 concerning the general and post-study categories, and tightened the resident labour market test. On that occasion, the Government did not undertake any consultation and consequently could not set out any employers’ views because no views were sought, so I do not think that that is much evidence of policy-based evidence, which we have been told this evening is so important. In March 2006, following consultation, the previous Government published their policy for a points-based system, which we are following, branding it as,

“the most significant change to managed migration in the last 40 years”.

Again, the noble Lord has just said how important it is to base this policy on evidence and to make that evidence available. However, I think that the House will note that the previous Government did not publish the 517 consultation responses that they received at the time. I am not going to continue in this vein but it would be remiss of me not to expose double standards. Frankly, I think that it is a bit of a case of pots and kettles.

What have this Government done? We have gone to some lengths to set out our findings. The process began on 28 June last year, when the consultation paper was published. As has been said, we received more than 3,000 replies, and officials also spoke to 1,500 employers during the consultation period. That is a considerable volume of paper and consultation, and it was studied very carefully. My colleague, the Minister for Immigration, launched the Home Office research report entitled The Migrant Journey. This report, drawing on all the consultation, provides for the first time a great deal of useful evidence about migrants’ behaviour and their pathways to settlement. As the Minister said at the launch, the information showed that we needed to look harder at who can qualify in both the work and study categories to make sure that we attract the right people. I think that this country should be about attracting the brightest and best people. In November last year, the Home Secretary made a speech to business leaders setting out the Government’s broad objectives and strategy. She referred to the evidence that we received and how we would be acting on it. In November, she made a full Statement to the House setting out the details and giving figures on the basis of which the decision had been informed.