Foreign Affairs

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 5th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie. I join others in thanking my noble friend the Foreign Secretary and the ministerial team in the Foreign Office for the impact they are bringing to British foreign policy. We have been asked to keep it short. I want to make just two points.

The first is about the increasingly turbulent and risk-laden era in which we live and which shows no sign of abating—on the contrary. The social and economic disturbance that western societies, and others, are encountering as the result of the major technological revolution we are undergoing is compounded by aggressive challenge from ideological competitors. It has been said, as a result, that we are in a pre-war situation. That description certainly has the effect of waking people up to the dangers of the highly unstable situation we now confront. It also recalls, perhaps with some justice, the folly of delay, producing the inadequate responses which characterised the 1930s.

However, I do not think it wise to talk about a pre-war world. The use of the term pre-war implies that we are on a treadmill to war, but this is the case only if we allow it to happen, and we must not do so. We need to build our defences, increase our capacity to deter our enemies and opponents, and convince them of the seriousness of our purpose and our resolve to prevent war. That is not appeasement; it is the opposite and, as others have said, it involves spending more money on defence now.

That brings me to my second point. In this House, and I think more widely in this country, we understand the supreme importance for our own security of a victorious Ukraine. We know that Russia does not need to succeed in her maximal ambition of controlling the whole of Ukrainian territory to deprive Ukrainians of the integration into the western economy and institutions that they wish and to create an indefinite and not so frozen conflict in the middle of our continent. I cannot imagine much more dangerous than that.

Although I have great respect for the judgment of the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, I disagree rather strongly with the notion that it would be good to accept a so-called armistice in the middle of Europe. It would demonstrate that we had lost control of events, and we cannot allow that to happen. It would certainly invite third parties to take advantage of our demonstration of weakness—Taiwan springs to mind.

It is good to learn from the press—and I hope it is true—that the Government are discussing with European partners how to aid Ukraine should the American arms package not pass Congress. I would like to take that a little further. I think the time has come when contingency planning could and should go further. I hope the Foreign Secretary will tell me that his department has started to think about what should happen when the war ends. Sadly, that is not going to be soon and, sadly, the longer the war, the more profound the consequences are likely to be.

That is a very good reason for thinking about the consequences. You might say that that is an ex-planner speaking but, if one recalls, during the Second World War—and fortunately we are not in a global war; I trust we will never get there—thinking about where the world was heading that we wanted to create started very early. It is not too soon to think about where we want to be at the end of the war.

There is another reason, which is that if you want to take measures during the course of a war you need to be very clear that as a result you are not going to engage in actions that you will regret subsequently, which, with the wisdom of hindsight, you should have realised would have worked to your disadvantage. The sanction money is a good example. We will need to get how we handle that right so that we are not put in a difficult position when it comes to the end of the conflict. I could cite other examples.

I do not want to take the argument any further and my point, in any case, is a general one. It is not too early to go beyond the slogan of supporting Ukraine whatever it takes—which is what we have been saying—to thinking through what our post-war aims ought to be and how to realise them. It may be argued that disagreement will arise out of this and it is a risky thing to do but I would argue that hiding from an unavoidable agenda would be a bigger mistake.

Ukraine

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Friday 26th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton. I particularly note his correct, salutary remarks about Russia’s ability. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Camoys, and welcome him to our Benches; his excellent maiden speech was much welcomed by the House.

In our previous discussion of Ukraine, about a year ago, I recall a number of us saying—and I was among them—that Ukraine’s security was our security and that its war was our war. I think the references at that time were largely to European security. We could see that the basis on which the security of our continent had been established after the end of the Cold War was being torn up.

I want to focus my remarks on what has happened since. It seems to me that the process of stripping away some of the previous assumptions about the basis on which we were operating continues. There seems to be a wider way in which the military stalemate in Ukraine is now gradually creeping into the basis of our wider political relations. Let me give an example. As we know, since neither of the two combatants wishes to compromise—Ukraine, in my view, with very good reason—the conflict is of indefinite duration; there is no visible end in sight. It has also become—this is my point—one of the main drivers in reshaping power relationships in an increasingly antagonistic post-globalised world.

Riding on the back of existing fissures in international relations, Russia is consolidating relationships with fellow outlaws, notably Iran and North Korea, and is seeking to recruit countries such as the BRICS—the so-called global South—into becoming supporters that lend their co-operation in return for cut-price energy. So the intended effect of western economic sanctions on Russia, which was to isolate the country politically and disable it economically, is having the unintended—and certainly unwanted—effect of mobilising new political camps in the world and new trading patterns, and is underpinning Russia’s transition to an ever-tighter autocracy, with an economy run on a footing designed to maximise Russia’s ability to outlast the West’s commitment to Ukraine and thereby win the war.

As the Minister said, we are in it for the long haul. We must deny Putin his expectations. However, one can see in this that the shape of the international background against which we are operating is also changing. Part, though not all, of it is a direct result of the war that is taking place. I congratulate the Government on the steady and purposeful leadership that they have given in relation to the war in Ukraine. It has been noticed widely and has beneficially affected the behaviour of other allies. It has also helped ensure the continued flow of arms and materiel to Ukraine.

There is no doubt that 2024 will be a key year. It is worrying that there is so much doubt about the consistency of American support. I do not entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord McDonald, about Trump, but I do think that the anxiety about his likely policy is a shadow cast forward on our ability to inspire confidence in the tightness and solidity of western support and, therefore, of Ukraine’s long-term capabilities. The UK must continue to make the case for supporting Ukraine and campaign against what seem to me to be two wrong-headed arguments. The first is that only China counts and Ukraine does not matter. But China will of course seek to draw important conclusions, in particular for Taiwan, from the way it sees the US handle and treat its dependent friends. The second myth is that modern weapons must be withheld from Ukraine for fear of escalation, when this policy increasingly risks defeat for Ukraine.

We also need a somewhat broader political strategy. In saying this, I acknowledge that the Minister’s speech betrayed a good deal of thinking about the longer term. What concerns me is that I do not think that, together, the western democracies are yet developing strategies of a kind that will serve for the long term and could be described as being “all-weather” in nature. I will give an example. Are we going to sit back and watch Russian and Chinese efforts to peel off the global South gather pace, or will we actively support the institutions of the liberal international order? That requires a policy with many facets and will be an important part of depriving Russia of the international support it seeks to develop in order to underpin its view of the way the world should go. It is clear that it is not just concentrating on Ukraine but developing a broad underpinning for a long-term strategy where the West has become the enemy. We have to face up to these changes.

I will make one last point. There has been comment in the past couple of days about needing to be ready for war. Preventing war is certainly about deterrence and deterrence is about being credibly ready to fight. We certainly need to spend more money on defence—the House is united on that, I think; I hope that the Government understand this and will act—but I am worried about us talking about being in a pre-war situation, as though we were on tram tracks towards the unavoidable destination called war. I do not think that this is wise. We need to develop what I described as “all-weather” strategies, precisely not to appease but to win the battle. But that means taking measures that will allow us success on the one hand and the avoidance of war on the other.

So, although this situation is different from the Cold War, those of us who are old enough will remember when we developed the so-called twin-track approach. On the one hand, we offered greater co-operation, on terms; on the other, we maintained with steady determination the defence of our assets and national interests. We need similar policies now. It is a time for clarity on our long-term aims, the capabilities that we need to develop to defend them and the risks that we are prepared to take in order to realise our long-term interests.