Artificial Light and Noise: Effects on Human Health (Science and Technology Committee Report)

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Thursday 9th May 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, I thank our chair for her excellent leadership in our examination of policy on light and noise as they affect human health; it has been exemplified by the exposition and presentation she has just given us on the committee’s conclusions. I also echo what she said about the outstanding work done by the staff in preparing the report.

We were not equally happy about the Government’s reaction to our report. The report sought to put policy on a more substantial footing than exists at the moment, with some, frankly, fairly modest recommendations for more research, greater involvement of experts and the updating of policy goals and guidance. Those recommendations are not without any financial consequence, obviously, but they were modest in scope. However, as our chair said, they were met by a pretty negative response, which was also distressingly dismissive in tone and lacking in ambition. The Government’s reply of last December leaves the impression that, where shortcomings exist, the priority to be accorded to them is not great enough to merit much action. We are quite aware that these pollutants are not the most important thing that the Government face. Nevertheless, this is one of those cases where a small amount of action can improve a situation and prevent it getting worse without a great extension of government activity or expenditure.

One of the difficulties pointed out by our chair is that many of the noise generation issues—and, indeed, some of the lighting issues—lie outside the direct purview of the lead department, Defra. They fall under the Department for Transport or local government, or elsewhere in government. We would like to see Defra seek to engage them and assert its co-ordinating role, which is rather dormant at the moment. This is despite the fact that, in its reply, the department acknowledged that, second only to poor health quality, noise is an environmental cause of ill health, increasing the risk of cardiovascular and metabolic disease. The costs of those will not be borne by Defra but they do increase the national bill for health, which the taxpayer has to bear. So, lack of action is not neutral in its effects. Contributing to bringing down the adverse impact of noise should be a priority for Defra; this implies also that the department will work with the UKHSA to fill the gaps in our knowledge that the department accepts exist.

Other members of the committee will cover our conclusions relating to noise. In my remaining time, I will focus on the effects of light, of which our understanding, as others have noted, is even less well developed than that of the effects of noise pollution. The reasons are fairly obvious, but our lesser knowledge does not justify lighting not being treated as a nuisance, when it was recognised as potentially being so as long ago as 1990. Relatively little has happened since then. In 2010, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution made recommendations on minimising light pollution, but many of those have remained either unimplemented or only partially implemented. The Minister, Rebecca Pow, told us in her evidence that

“there was not enough evidence to do anything to change the way we regulate”.

Subsequent policy statements have taken different positions. Policy statement 23 of the National Planning Policy Framework removed lighting from the context of the environmental improvement plan, which failed to mention it—whereas the 25-year environment plan included it. That is part of the background to the committee’s comment that policy is confused.

Since the 1990s, artificial light at night has become ever more pervasive and the night sky harder to see. Cheaper LED lighting has increased the pace and brilliance of illumination. A lot of that is popular, but glare on roads from car headlights is becoming an active source of disruption and complaint from drivers. It has long been clear that light can influence circadian rhythms and disrupt sleep, but exactly how and to what extent are less clear. That is why we recommended that, as UKHSA has no explicit team focusing on the effects of light, the work should continue and that it needs to move beyond the laboratory to investigate more realistic light exposure patterns relating to human behaviour so as to provide a better evidence base for mitigation policies.

In her evidence, the Minister acknowledged that, while policy had not evolved much in recent years, the situation was changing. She said that a national policy statement on light, to parallel that on noise, was

“certainly something that could potentially be considered”.

The department’s response of December, however, contains the following statement:

“Significant gaps in our understanding of the effects of artificial light would need to be addressed to inform a Light Policy Statement for England”.


The response argued that a more immediate priority should be to identify the most important knowledge gaps and to prioritise the research to fill them. There is no disagreement on our part that research is needed, but, as our chair has said, the department rejected our recommendation, relating to core evidence, that a standard methodology be developed for tracking, monitoring and reporting on light pollution. It did so on the grounds that technical data issues would need to be resolved by developing the necessary techniques to do this. In other words, valid evidence could not be collected because the department did not know how to do it. I very much hope that the department’s intention to hold a round table of experts to

“identify the most significant gaps in evidence; areas where the most value could be provided to public health; and options for how government can facilitate and potentially coordinate new research”

will be the start of the development of the techniques necessary to collect relevant evidence that could underpin valid research on the impact of artificial lighting. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm this.

The department said it did not agree that creating a body of independent experts to give advice would be useful—a surprising statement—as this would “reduce flexibility”, and it commented that “one-size-fits-all guidance” from government on lighting standards would not be useful for professionals. I do not think the committee suggested that or would regard it as sensible. Indeed, when you look at the scene, the professionals have provided quite a lot of the movement, guidance and development on controlling light pollution—more so in many respects than government action. I hope the Minister will agree that, when the department defends its action on the basis of existing policies being followed by various government agencies in different spheres, this, although useful, does not cover the ground adequately.

In the Minister’s letter of 17 April, the Lighting Liaison Group is said to be considering how a UK lighting strategy might look. On the face of it, this is a helpful step forward. I hope its exploration of the possibility of accessible guidance on light pollution for local authorities and their planners to deal with statutory nuisances and develop best practice will result in the creation of such guidance and its implementation by government. The key question is whether “considering” doing it means that the Government will actually do something about it. It would be helpful to hear from the Minister whether that is the case. Can the involvement of the UKHSA, which was mentioned, be interpreted as an earnest of the department’s commitment to reducing the impact on health of unwanted lighting?

Finally, it is good to hear that departmental officials are pursuing the possibility of links with relevant officials in other European countries to investigate best practice there. More ambitious research appears to be happening among some of our neighbours, and evidence given to the committee suggests that investigating it could be profitable. I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

Foreign Affairs

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 5th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie. I join others in thanking my noble friend the Foreign Secretary and the ministerial team in the Foreign Office for the impact they are bringing to British foreign policy. We have been asked to keep it short. I want to make just two points.

The first is about the increasingly turbulent and risk-laden era in which we live and which shows no sign of abating—on the contrary. The social and economic disturbance that western societies, and others, are encountering as the result of the major technological revolution we are undergoing is compounded by aggressive challenge from ideological competitors. It has been said, as a result, that we are in a pre-war situation. That description certainly has the effect of waking people up to the dangers of the highly unstable situation we now confront. It also recalls, perhaps with some justice, the folly of delay, producing the inadequate responses which characterised the 1930s.

However, I do not think it wise to talk about a pre-war world. The use of the term pre-war implies that we are on a treadmill to war, but this is the case only if we allow it to happen, and we must not do so. We need to build our defences, increase our capacity to deter our enemies and opponents, and convince them of the seriousness of our purpose and our resolve to prevent war. That is not appeasement; it is the opposite and, as others have said, it involves spending more money on defence now.

That brings me to my second point. In this House, and I think more widely in this country, we understand the supreme importance for our own security of a victorious Ukraine. We know that Russia does not need to succeed in her maximal ambition of controlling the whole of Ukrainian territory to deprive Ukrainians of the integration into the western economy and institutions that they wish and to create an indefinite and not so frozen conflict in the middle of our continent. I cannot imagine much more dangerous than that.

Although I have great respect for the judgment of the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, I disagree rather strongly with the notion that it would be good to accept a so-called armistice in the middle of Europe. It would demonstrate that we had lost control of events, and we cannot allow that to happen. It would certainly invite third parties to take advantage of our demonstration of weakness—Taiwan springs to mind.

It is good to learn from the press—and I hope it is true—that the Government are discussing with European partners how to aid Ukraine should the American arms package not pass Congress. I would like to take that a little further. I think the time has come when contingency planning could and should go further. I hope the Foreign Secretary will tell me that his department has started to think about what should happen when the war ends. Sadly, that is not going to be soon and, sadly, the longer the war, the more profound the consequences are likely to be.

That is a very good reason for thinking about the consequences. You might say that that is an ex-planner speaking but, if one recalls, during the Second World War—and fortunately we are not in a global war; I trust we will never get there—thinking about where the world was heading that we wanted to create started very early. It is not too soon to think about where we want to be at the end of the war.

There is another reason, which is that if you want to take measures during the course of a war you need to be very clear that as a result you are not going to engage in actions that you will regret subsequently, which, with the wisdom of hindsight, you should have realised would have worked to your disadvantage. The sanction money is a good example. We will need to get how we handle that right so that we are not put in a difficult position when it comes to the end of the conflict. I could cite other examples.

I do not want to take the argument any further and my point, in any case, is a general one. It is not too early to go beyond the slogan of supporting Ukraine whatever it takes—which is what we have been saying—to thinking through what our post-war aims ought to be and how to realise them. It may be argued that disagreement will arise out of this and it is a risky thing to do but I would argue that hiding from an unavoidable agenda would be a bigger mistake.

Ukraine

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Friday 26th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton. I particularly note his correct, salutary remarks about Russia’s ability. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Camoys, and welcome him to our Benches; his excellent maiden speech was much welcomed by the House.

In our previous discussion of Ukraine, about a year ago, I recall a number of us saying—and I was among them—that Ukraine’s security was our security and that its war was our war. I think the references at that time were largely to European security. We could see that the basis on which the security of our continent had been established after the end of the Cold War was being torn up.

I want to focus my remarks on what has happened since. It seems to me that the process of stripping away some of the previous assumptions about the basis on which we were operating continues. There seems to be a wider way in which the military stalemate in Ukraine is now gradually creeping into the basis of our wider political relations. Let me give an example. As we know, since neither of the two combatants wishes to compromise—Ukraine, in my view, with very good reason—the conflict is of indefinite duration; there is no visible end in sight. It has also become—this is my point—one of the main drivers in reshaping power relationships in an increasingly antagonistic post-globalised world.

Riding on the back of existing fissures in international relations, Russia is consolidating relationships with fellow outlaws, notably Iran and North Korea, and is seeking to recruit countries such as the BRICS—the so-called global South—into becoming supporters that lend their co-operation in return for cut-price energy. So the intended effect of western economic sanctions on Russia, which was to isolate the country politically and disable it economically, is having the unintended—and certainly unwanted—effect of mobilising new political camps in the world and new trading patterns, and is underpinning Russia’s transition to an ever-tighter autocracy, with an economy run on a footing designed to maximise Russia’s ability to outlast the West’s commitment to Ukraine and thereby win the war.

As the Minister said, we are in it for the long haul. We must deny Putin his expectations. However, one can see in this that the shape of the international background against which we are operating is also changing. Part, though not all, of it is a direct result of the war that is taking place. I congratulate the Government on the steady and purposeful leadership that they have given in relation to the war in Ukraine. It has been noticed widely and has beneficially affected the behaviour of other allies. It has also helped ensure the continued flow of arms and materiel to Ukraine.

There is no doubt that 2024 will be a key year. It is worrying that there is so much doubt about the consistency of American support. I do not entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord McDonald, about Trump, but I do think that the anxiety about his likely policy is a shadow cast forward on our ability to inspire confidence in the tightness and solidity of western support and, therefore, of Ukraine’s long-term capabilities. The UK must continue to make the case for supporting Ukraine and campaign against what seem to me to be two wrong-headed arguments. The first is that only China counts and Ukraine does not matter. But China will of course seek to draw important conclusions, in particular for Taiwan, from the way it sees the US handle and treat its dependent friends. The second myth is that modern weapons must be withheld from Ukraine for fear of escalation, when this policy increasingly risks defeat for Ukraine.

We also need a somewhat broader political strategy. In saying this, I acknowledge that the Minister’s speech betrayed a good deal of thinking about the longer term. What concerns me is that I do not think that, together, the western democracies are yet developing strategies of a kind that will serve for the long term and could be described as being “all-weather” in nature. I will give an example. Are we going to sit back and watch Russian and Chinese efforts to peel off the global South gather pace, or will we actively support the institutions of the liberal international order? That requires a policy with many facets and will be an important part of depriving Russia of the international support it seeks to develop in order to underpin its view of the way the world should go. It is clear that it is not just concentrating on Ukraine but developing a broad underpinning for a long-term strategy where the West has become the enemy. We have to face up to these changes.

I will make one last point. There has been comment in the past couple of days about needing to be ready for war. Preventing war is certainly about deterrence and deterrence is about being credibly ready to fight. We certainly need to spend more money on defence—the House is united on that, I think; I hope that the Government understand this and will act—but I am worried about us talking about being in a pre-war situation, as though we were on tram tracks towards the unavoidable destination called war. I do not think that this is wise. We need to develop what I described as “all-weather” strategies, precisely not to appease but to win the battle. But that means taking measures that will allow us success on the one hand and the avoidance of war on the other.

So, although this situation is different from the Cold War, those of us who are old enough will remember when we developed the so-called twin-track approach. On the one hand, we offered greater co-operation, on terms; on the other, we maintained with steady determination the defence of our assets and national interests. We need similar policies now. It is a time for clarity on our long-term aims, the capabilities that we need to develop to defend them and the risks that we are prepared to take in order to realise our long-term interests.

Daesh in Syria and Iraq

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 16th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

Yes, extreme caution is indeed exercised. The noble Lord was right to return to that theme. We were able to provide extra technical help with the Reaper that we provided so that there is surveillance overhead. The noble Lord is absolutely right: it is not effective to get intelligence on the ground—it puts people at too much risk. Intelligence is sought from surveillance overhead. We are also able to provide technical help from weaponry that can target very closely. The target was described to me, when the firing takes place, as being the size of a small dining table.

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

Can my noble friend the Minister say a little more about the extremely welcome news that the UK has set up a coalition communications cell and, in particular, about who else might be participating? Given that the activities and communications of Daesh are particularly professional, can she say whether, on our side, we are employing professional broadcasters? In particular, are we getting local voices to participate in spreading the messages that we need to put across?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

With my noble friend’s distinguished background in the field of cyber and intelligence generally, I know that she will not expect me to give information even if I had it. I certainly would not wish to do so and have it in Hansard. I can assure her that, when looking at the work we do in the communications cell across the field, we are engaging the brightest and the best across all ages and backgrounds. She is right to say that Daesh has proved itself extremely smart in the sphere of communications. We can be smarter, it is true, but we also need to be committed to continuing the fight for a long period and that is something that this Government are prepared to do.

Iran: Nuclear Deal

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 15th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, as I think I explained in the Statement, the number of centrifuges is dramatically reduced, as is fissile material. What we have aimed at in this agreement is that Iran should still be able to have a civil need for use of reactors but not a military one. That is what we believe has been achieved. As for whether Iran can break out quickly, and the time between it being noticed and reported that something is going wrong and action being taken—how long it would take between a request from the IAEA to get access and being able to insist on access—it would typically take about 21 days between demand and access. There is, then, a very clear process that has to be followed, which I am happy to discuss with the noble Baroness in detail outside the Chamber, given the time available. Of course, the breakout period cannot be achieved except in a period of over a year. We have time to prevent breakout into a future with Iran having a nuclear weapon. It will not happen.

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the agreement, which is obviously the fruit of a great deal of extremely hard work and hard negotiation. I think that most noble Lords will agree with me that the proof of its adequacy will be in implementation. This is one of those agreements where the words are fine but it is the actions that follow that will really matter. I hope that all parties to it, particularly the European parties, will be robust in checking any backsliding. One worry of those who would like to see this agreement succeed is that somehow Iran will be allowed to get away with things along the line and the robust reaction will not take place because it is all too difficult and unpalatable. I seek some reassurance on robustness.

My other point, alluded to by the noble Baroness who spoke previously, is on verification. Surely, this agreement depends crucially on adequate verification, and I worry that there seems to be an ability on Iran’s part not only to challenge but to block verification proceedings. There seems to be a road through which they will be able to prevent the IAEA providing us with the necessary reassurances. How can we ensure that this joint commission, to which I gather such issues will be referred, can cut through something like that? How can we get round Iran blocking something by language and words, and get it to fall into line?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

We get round language and words by having the ability to have a snap-back on sanctions within the United Nations at any time, and the EU and the United States can do so themselves with their sanctions. My noble friend is right, however, to ask about the process. The joint commission makes its decision by consensus. Obviously, it can do it by majority. What I can say, of course, is that it is important that Iran is on that joint commission so that it can engage with and respond to any suspected issues of non-performance. It can represent its interests in the same way as all other members of the joint commission. But the fact is that if there is a disagreement over whether something is a serious breach, or if Iran were unwise enough to block the IAEA access to which my noble friend refers, it is still possible for the sanctions to be snapped back. That is the prize that Iran has sought: that there should be an end to sanctions. The prize that we have sought has been to make sure that this world does not face a nuclear weapon-holding state in Iran. I think that the prize for Iran and the prize for the rest of the world has been achieved.

EU and Russia (EUC Report)

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 24th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, I join other noble Lords in congratulating the committee on an excellent report and add my voice to those who have paid tribute to the first-class contribution to our debate from the noble Earl, Lord Oxford and Asquith.

Recent contributors to this debate have emphasised that Russia has legitimate interests. There is no argument about that, but the question in my mind is whether President Putin is a respectable and representative bearer of those interests and whether he deserves the kind of co-operation and regard that I think all of us would like to give to the Russian state. My reluctant conclusion—the evidence seems to me to bear this out—is that it is very difficult to deal with this man on terms that one would regard as honest and straight- forward. He has a track record of oppressing his neighbours. There is no good reason, and no provocation from the West, that could justify what happened in Georgia and the proclamation of the so-called independence of the enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for which, I might say, we simply gave him a rap on the knuckles.

He has developed, not just in theory but in action, doctrines of spheres of influence. You can argue about their legitimacy, but the fact is that he has used them to oppress his neighbours and to override the sovereign rights of inhabitants of other countries. He has arrogated to himself the right to protect Russian-speakers irrespective of their citizenship. He has a track record of fairly aggressive activity.

At home, he has shown himself to be a very revisionist authoritarian. He has suppressed domestic opposition, built up military force and drummed up a nationalist agenda which now provides the background against which he can maintain his domestic popularity. He has not concealed this. I do not disagree with those who say that we should nevertheless have regard to Russian interests, but we must do something more effective than we have done so far about his preferred methodology of pursuing his agenda: propaganda, subversive activity in neighbouring countries and skilfully devised irregular military action which is carefully calibrated not to trigger any specific article of the Washington treaty. As a result, we have found it very difficult to deal with him.

He has obviously been encouraged by the inability of NATO Governments to devise a credible response. I say to those who think that the wise thing to do would be now to rule out NATO membership for either Georgia or Ukraine that they should think of two things: first, the destabilising effect that that statement would have in those countries, which also have interests in the matter; secondly, would Putin really regard this as fair dealing? I think he would regard it as an immense prize, enabling him to gobble up these countries even more effectively. I would be against any such declaration. It is a separate issue whether we pursue actively their membership of NATO and I would certainly not be in favour of that in the present circumstances.

We have to recognise that Putin has demonstrated determination that Ukraine should not be allowed to move westwards—it is part of the area that he wants to keep under his control and in which he can actively interfere. We have been proposing that the possibility of European Union membership should be available to Ukraine. Not only does Putin oppose Ukraine’s membership of NATO, it is increasingly clear that he does not like the implications of an association agreement or of membership of the European Union. I do not think that we can allow those policies or attitudes to stand. The Ukrainians have a right to fashion their own destiny.

As a result of the present situation, we face some fairly unattractive choices. Obviously, one of them is a result of what has happened in eastern Ukraine—to match force with force. That would be disproportionately risky and I would not support it at all. But I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that we should actively consider the sale of weapons that will increase the defensive capability of the Ukrainians. I cannot see why they should be put in a position where they are outgunned and outmanoeuvred by separatist forces in part of the country.

These are all calculated risks. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, also mentioned something that I very strongly agree with; that is, the consequences of the failure of the Budapest memorandum. That has very wide consequences for those who wish to promote, as I would like to see it, a reduction in nuclear proliferation and, indeed, encouraging countries to go non-nuclear. What conclusions do you draw if the result of giving up your nuclear weapons is to be invaded?

The Kiev Government face a difficult task, politically and psychologically. Ukraine has not been a successful country so far and they are now faced with the extraordinarily difficult task of fulfilling their side of the Minsk agreement, which demands that they do certain things, without having full control over the situation on the ground or much certainty that anything liberalising that they do will actually bear fruit. But they have to make the effort and it should be a high priority of western policy, including of our own country, to help them in this task. The Government’s initiative in proposing a good governance fund is excellent, although it will need resources from other countries and a much wider effort on the part of EU member states, along with international agencies, to accelerate the economic development of Ukraine.

Finally, what about future policy towards Russia? We do need one, as the noble Lord, Lord Soley, rightly said. We need to keep open the door to a more constructive relationship in a post-Putin world—I fear it is going to be a post-Putin world—and, as far as we can, we should try to prevent the spread of antagonism into other areas of policy. We have a strong interest in not having overspill but we must signal the unacceptability of current Russian policy in Europe. I agree that sanctions are not an end in themselves and will not do the whole job but I do not think that we can do anything but continue to signal our disapproval and they have to stay in place, at least until the fulfilment of the Minsk agreement. I hope this will be on time, although I admit that I am not optimistic.

We need to learn some lessons. We need to work against the Russian hardliners, as was said yesterday, projecting our understanding of the world and our values in a sophisticated and well resourced information strategy, which the European Union ought to engage in. We ought to do something about defence. The decisions taken recently by NATO at the Wales summit are a beginning but they are only a beginning, and it is right that we included cyberattack as coming within the purview of Article 5. We need more rapid implementation than we are getting at the moment and NATO needs to revive its almost defunct military planning capability. We need to look at security in the round.

The most recent UK national security strategy did not have European security as a focus. That has to change. European security and the defence of our dependent territories are surely the meat and potatoes of British defence and foreign policy, and we must not allow other threats to our security—I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Soley; they are not equally deadly—to distract us from the importance of ensuring the security of our own continent. Of course, there is a wider scope to this in the fringes of our continent, which are also increasingly in flames. The capabilities we need cannot be realised for less than the 2% undertaking to NATO. I hope that the Government will stop messing about on this subject, which damages their credibility and undermines the confidence that our allies have in this country.