Ukraine

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Friday 26th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Jones (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton. I particularly note his correct, salutary remarks about Russia’s ability. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Camoys, and welcome him to our Benches; his excellent maiden speech was much welcomed by the House.

In our previous discussion of Ukraine, about a year ago, I recall a number of us saying—and I was among them—that Ukraine’s security was our security and that its war was our war. I think the references at that time were largely to European security. We could see that the basis on which the security of our continent had been established after the end of the Cold War was being torn up.

I want to focus my remarks on what has happened since. It seems to me that the process of stripping away some of the previous assumptions about the basis on which we were operating continues. There seems to be a wider way in which the military stalemate in Ukraine is now gradually creeping into the basis of our wider political relations. Let me give an example. As we know, since neither of the two combatants wishes to compromise—Ukraine, in my view, with very good reason—the conflict is of indefinite duration; there is no visible end in sight. It has also become—this is my point—one of the main drivers in reshaping power relationships in an increasingly antagonistic post-globalised world.

Riding on the back of existing fissures in international relations, Russia is consolidating relationships with fellow outlaws, notably Iran and North Korea, and is seeking to recruit countries such as the BRICS—the so-called global South—into becoming supporters that lend their co-operation in return for cut-price energy. So the intended effect of western economic sanctions on Russia, which was to isolate the country politically and disable it economically, is having the unintended—and certainly unwanted—effect of mobilising new political camps in the world and new trading patterns, and is underpinning Russia’s transition to an ever-tighter autocracy, with an economy run on a footing designed to maximise Russia’s ability to outlast the West’s commitment to Ukraine and thereby win the war.

As the Minister said, we are in it for the long haul. We must deny Putin his expectations. However, one can see in this that the shape of the international background against which we are operating is also changing. Part, though not all, of it is a direct result of the war that is taking place. I congratulate the Government on the steady and purposeful leadership that they have given in relation to the war in Ukraine. It has been noticed widely and has beneficially affected the behaviour of other allies. It has also helped ensure the continued flow of arms and materiel to Ukraine.

There is no doubt that 2024 will be a key year. It is worrying that there is so much doubt about the consistency of American support. I do not entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord McDonald, about Trump, but I do think that the anxiety about his likely policy is a shadow cast forward on our ability to inspire confidence in the tightness and solidity of western support and, therefore, of Ukraine’s long-term capabilities. The UK must continue to make the case for supporting Ukraine and campaign against what seem to me to be two wrong-headed arguments. The first is that only China counts and Ukraine does not matter. But China will of course seek to draw important conclusions, in particular for Taiwan, from the way it sees the US handle and treat its dependent friends. The second myth is that modern weapons must be withheld from Ukraine for fear of escalation, when this policy increasingly risks defeat for Ukraine.

We also need a somewhat broader political strategy. In saying this, I acknowledge that the Minister’s speech betrayed a good deal of thinking about the longer term. What concerns me is that I do not think that, together, the western democracies are yet developing strategies of a kind that will serve for the long term and could be described as being “all-weather” in nature. I will give an example. Are we going to sit back and watch Russian and Chinese efforts to peel off the global South gather pace, or will we actively support the institutions of the liberal international order? That requires a policy with many facets and will be an important part of depriving Russia of the international support it seeks to develop in order to underpin its view of the way the world should go. It is clear that it is not just concentrating on Ukraine but developing a broad underpinning for a long-term strategy where the West has become the enemy. We have to face up to these changes.

I will make one last point. There has been comment in the past couple of days about needing to be ready for war. Preventing war is certainly about deterrence and deterrence is about being credibly ready to fight. We certainly need to spend more money on defence—the House is united on that, I think; I hope that the Government understand this and will act—but I am worried about us talking about being in a pre-war situation, as though we were on tram tracks towards the unavoidable destination called war. I do not think that this is wise. We need to develop what I described as “all-weather” strategies, precisely not to appease but to win the battle. But that means taking measures that will allow us success on the one hand and the avoidance of war on the other.

So, although this situation is different from the Cold War, those of us who are old enough will remember when we developed the so-called twin-track approach. On the one hand, we offered greater co-operation, on terms; on the other, we maintained with steady determination the defence of our assets and national interests. We need similar policies now. It is a time for clarity on our long-term aims, the capabilities that we need to develop to defend them and the risks that we are prepared to take in order to realise our long-term interests.