UK Telecommunications

Debate between Baroness Morgan of Cotes and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem

Tuesday 28th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for the Statement and begin by declaring an interest: I was a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee when the security implications of Huawei’s involvement in these matters were first identified. I should confess that my attitude is still to a large extent conditioned by what we found then.

I do not share the enthusiasm of the noble Baroness for the compromises which have been announced, in particular since I spent two days last week in the United States. Any question of us being at odds with the US, and indeed other members of the Five Eyes, is something that we should not contemplate with anything other than great concern. The United States is of course our closest ally when it comes to intelligence, and I wonder to what extent account has been taken of the very strong expressions against our involvement that have come from the White House down. It has been said that the US will not share intelligence. By its very nature, we will not know what intelligence it will choose not to share—and, for all we know, such a failure may have considerable implications for the safety and the interests of this country.

Nothing that has been said or that I have read excludes in all circumstances the possibility of the risk that Huawei might be forced by the Chinese Government to exploit its position. Indeed, as has already been said, it is under something of a legal obligation to do so. I make that assertion without qualification because I am bound to say that were we in a situation where the positions were reversed and found ourselves with the kind of opportunities that a company acting on our behalf might have in a foreign nation and the national interests of the United Kingdom were at stake, we would undoubtedly seek to bring pressure on that company. That cannot be ignored.

Undertakings are frequently given, but we all know that, on many occasions, undertakings have a very short lifetime. They can be given and they can be conveniently forgotten. Throughout the discussion I have been asking this question: would the Chinese Government admit BT to such a sensitive opportunity as the United Kingdom is about to enlarge to Huawei? I doubt very much that they would.

I will conclude by saying this. It is an entirely laudable ambition to seek to extend broadband throughout the United Kingdom, but I hope that national security is not being sacrificed to that ambition.

[Baroness Morgan of Cotes]

I thank both noble Lords for their comments. Quite a lot of points have been raised and I am conscious that other noble Lords want to speak, so I shall try to deal with them quickly. The noble Lord asked when the legislation would be ready. Of course, it has not been possible to prepare the legislation until the decision made today by the National Security Council, but we are all very conscious of the need to legislate early. What today’s announcement means is that the National Cyber Security Centre is able to issue guidance to providers. Until now we have not had the ability, other than by asking nicely, to say, “Please do not use more than a certain percentage of high-risk vendor equipment in your networks”. The NCSC will be able to issue that guidance and that will by confirmed by legislation, which, as the noble Lord said, will provide for a legal enforcement mechanism by the regulator.

As both noble Lords have hinted, I am absolutely certain that noble Lords and Members of the other place will appreciate that this is a very complex decision, a point I touched on in the Answer to the Urgent Question that I repeated yesterday. There are undoubtedly concerns across the House—from Members of all backgrounds, regardless of which committees they have sat on—about the decision taken. People have different reasons for feeling that way.

The noble Lord mentioned the rollout of 5G and the speed; it is happening quickly and accelerating. Again, that is part of the reason for needing to take this step today: to be able to say to providers that there is a percentage above which they must not go on the edge of that rollout of 5G networks for high-risk vendors. I said in my Statement and reiterate that through market diversification we absolutely want to reduce the reliance on high-risk vendors over time. We want to get to a position in which we do not have to use a high-risk vendor in our telecoms network. That also ties in with the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, who mentioned home-grown capability. The reality is that this is a market failure that we are dealing with. Although we have many excellent telecoms companies in this country, we do not have those that are making this equipment in such a world-leading way. As part of the diversification strategy, we therefore need to increase dramatically the amount of funding support we give to the research and development of companies in countries that we tend to work with and consider our allies, as well as the UK, to help plug this gap.

We know more about Huawei thanks to the actions taken over the years. Huawei started to be in our networks from 2006. In a way, the high-risk vendor test is perhaps not about meeting the criteria but about not meeting them. If the company does not meet them —in the sense that it operates in a system in which the Government expect companies or individuals to act in accordance with their wishes—that means the high-risk vendor test has not been met, so it is a high-risk vendor. Of course, the work of our services and the advice given to the National Security Council by the services is very much evidence-based.

The noble Lord, Lord Campbell, mentioned the Intelligence and Security Committee. I was struck yesterday when a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee in the previous Parliament said in the other place that he felt the risks with Huawei could be mitigated. Perhaps it depends on the evidence and inquiries that different Members have been involved with.

In relation to the Five Eyes relationship, the Prime Minister has spoken to President Trump. A number of us have been engaged in discussions with US counterparts over the last few months, and of course account has been taken of everything they have raised with us, but—because of our experience with Huawei and where we are on 4G and 5G—the view is taken that we are able to mitigate these risks. That is the advice we have had. I said in my remarks that today’s decision does not affect our ability to share sensitive intelligence data over highly secure networks both within the UK and with our partners, including the Five Eyes.

As I said in my Statement, it is not possible to exclude all risks in relation to telecoms. Cybersecurity and malicious cyberactivity are a 21st-century danger to all countries. That does not mean we should not have sophisticated telecoms networks and 5G networks. It means we have to be realistic about the risks and how we mitigate them. Finally, I absolutely assure the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, that in no way would this Government ever compromise national security, even for the very worthy goal of making sure that people in this country have access to broadband.