(8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, for calling this debate. I am quite disappointed that so few people are here to speak on such an important issue.
I welcome the Government’s reform to help families resolve disputes faster and protect children from lengthy court cases. The programme of measures allowing separating parents to get information, support and early legal advice will no doubt help parents reach an amicable settlement without going to court. It will also alleviate pressure on family courts and free up time for families who really need the court’s intervention.
One of the most pressing issues facing separating families is the time it takes from when the application is lodged to the first hearing and the subsequent proceedings. Not only are lengthy proceedings detrimental to parents’ relationships but they deeply affect children. Research has consistently shown that children suffer profoundly when their parents’ relationship breaks down. Responsible parents will try to ensure the healthy development of their children, which includes regular contact with both parents and their extended families. Sadly, this is not always the case, and the longer the proceedings, the greater the likelihood of parents becoming entrenched in their position, often egged on by their lawyers, who focus on “winning” rather than resolving the case quickly.
As tensions rise, some parents will, consciously or not, transfer their anger and resentment on to the child. Those children will thus find themselves caught in the middle of an ongoing war between the two people they love and need most. Most children will seek the road of least resistance, and rather than face the consequences of speaking out they will simply become the mouthpiece of that parent.
The process of turning a child against the other parent can happen particularly quickly if the non-resident parent is denied or has limited access to the child. I speak from experience: it took only three and a half months under the father’s exclusive control for my eldest son, aged nine, to greet me with kicks and punches the first time he saw me again in a German court. It is therefore essential that children’s fundamental right to maintain a relationship with both parents is maintained—barring exceptional circumstances, of course, but I am not talking about those.
The longer the non-resident parent is absent, the more the damage to the relationship. Can the Minister therefore consider introducing a time-limit requirement for dealing with family court proceedings similar to the statutory limit of 26 weeks for public case proceedings? Would he consider providing clear guidance on court-ordered interim contact, even if it needs to be supervised to counter the negative effect of delay?
It is also clear that all adults, whether female or male, who are victims of domestic abuse must be protected by law. All claims must be considered, particularly as some can be life-threatening for the victims and even for their children. I applaud the work that has been done not only to highlight this issue but to ensure better protection for victims, many of whom live in fear for their lives.
Fifteen years ago, domestic abuse was raised in only a minority of cases. Today, it is raised in 80% of them. Clearly, these claims lead to lengthy proceedings and to the involvement of the police as well as other agencies, but they also lead to more children finding themselves caught in the middle of serious allegations and counterallegations concerning their parents. Does the Minister believe that this is the result of a more violent society, or is it the positive reflection of victims feeling that they can finally be protected? Might some of those claims be the consequence of the LASPO Act 2012, which removed the right to legal aid in family courts unless there was an allegation of domestic abuse? Or is it simply due to a lack of sanction for making false allegations, which may have become a tactic to deny contact to the non-resident parent? Can the Minister tell the House whether the pathfinder project has resulted in accusations of domestic abuse being dealt with promptly, thus avoiding further trauma to the victims, and whether the pathfinding hearings, in which parents are pitted against each other, have put children under undue pressure?
Cafcass officers are experienced in recognising whether a child’s view is genuine, but can the Minister tell the House whether family court judges have received proper training to recognise whether the “voice of a child” is truly his or hers, and not the result of pressure from one of their parents?
The truth is that children are not necessarily best placed to speak about what is in their best interests. Some will not be able to express their own views, either because they have been coerced, or because they feel guilty, or because they are scared of the consequences of speaking out, while others will be so indoctrinated that they may genuinely believe that they were, for example, sexually abused. While I warmly welcome the Government’s commitment to safeguarding the well-being of children caught in the crossfire of parental discord, I want to put it on the record that parental alienation—the coercive control of children by one parent against the other—does exist. I have raised this in the House several times, and I am not alone in doing so.
Children are vulnerable and can easily be used as weapons, whether by a mother or by a father. Some do so subconsciously, but others do so for their own interest, while it is actually and ultimately the child who pays the price.
I know what I am talking about; I have lived through this experience. Through the charity I have run, I have seen many cases and the long-term consequences on children who have been affected. So please listen to what I have to say, not only to others who think they know best but who feel that it is a vendetta of men versus women. This is about children.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government whether the Probate Department’s recommended wait time for the granting of probate of 10 days is being achieved; and if not, (1) what is the current average waiting time, and (2) what steps they are taking to reduce the delay.
My Lords, there is no recommended wait time to produce a grant of probate. However, despite the unprecedented challenges of the pandemic, average wait times for probate following receipt of the documents required have been maintained at between five and seven weeks. Average waiting times are currently almost one week faster than the yearly average for 2020 and 2021. HMCTS is increasing resources to meet higher demand and to further bring down overall timelines.
I thank my noble friend the Minister for his Answer. Is he aware that, in 2018, His Majesty’s Government promised radical improvements to reduce the number of days that people have to wait to 10 working days? Four years later, in my own experience with a very simple will that considered only a bank account, it took me three months to get a grant of probate. A friend of mine has been waiting for three years and still has not received a reply. Is the Minister aware that the probate department seems to be infected with a virus that causes it to lose information and not be capable of responding to emails, manning its chat room or answering the telephone? Does he agree that, at a time of deep sadness, confusion and disorientation, these claimants should be treated with respect and compassion? As such, will he ensure that probate staff are trained and claimants are kept in touch with regarding the status of their application?
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, this evening. I do so not just because I have attached my name to it, but because I emphatically agree with what it seeks to achieve. Anyone who knows me is aware that I am an advocate for a strong law-and-order approach to crime; for those who break the law, the punishment must fit the crime—which often includes imprisonment. This amendment, however, is trying to protect the dignity of female prisoners.
The female prison estate is currently run as a mixed-sex institution. This is because the Ministry of Justice’s policies permit prisoners of the male sex who identify as transgender and fulfil certain criteria, resulting in them being held alongside vulnerable female prisoners. Some of these prisoners have been convicted of the most serious violent and sexual offences and are biologically male.
It surely follows that women’s prisons should be separate-sex facilities to preserve, as far as reasonably possible, the safety, dignity and privacy of women in prison. Since the Corston report in 2007 it has been acknowledged throughout the criminal justice system that women in prison exhibit patterns of vulnerability that distinguish them both from women in the wider community and from male offenders. It is also worth noting that female offenders report disproportionately high rates of previous experience of violent and sexual abuse, and experience high rates of mental health problems.
Where women in prison have been victims of violent and sexual assault, prison is often the very first time they can be confident that they will be away from their abusers, who are usually men. I strongly contend that, where women in prison have been victims of sexual and violent abuse at the hands of males, the presence of any offender of the male sex may have an inherently traumatising effect, regardless of the nature of the offence committed.
It is the Ministry of Justice policy—namely, The Care and Management of Individuals who are Transgender —that permits prisoners of the male sex to be housed in the female estate. The policy states that all male prisoners who identify as transgender and who are in possession of a gender recognition certificate must be allocated to the female estate. This is irrespective of any conviction, offending history, risk profile or anatomy, including those who are high-risk prisoners and those convicted of violent and sexual offences against women.
I too was going to refer to the judicial review that was brought in March 2021, but the mover of the amendment has adequately covered that, so I will refrain. However, I shall again emphasise one line: while the policies were found not to be unlawful, it should be said again that the judgment acknowledged the negative impact of the policies on women in prison.
Furthermore, there is no requirement under the Gender Recognition Act 2004, if people fulfil certain criteria, for them to have surgery or medical treatment to obtain a GRC. It is a fact, as has already been referred to, that GRCs have been obtained in prison by males convicted of violent and sexual offences who have been transferred to the female prison estate. The latest data available on the number of male-sex prisoners who identify as transgender dates back to 2019, but back then it was 11 in number. I understand that new data will be available to be released, or at least is expected to be released, this month. Forcing women to share accommodation with prisoners of the male sex, particularly where those prisoners have been convicted of violent or sexual offences, arguably engages Article 3 on the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
I urge your Lordships’ House to support this reasoned and sensible amendment, which is clearly intended to respect female prisoners, including their rights and dignity. Not to do so could be interpreted as not caring how female prisoners end up. Indeed, the conditions that they are subjected to could be construed as part of their prison sentence—which of course they are not, and never should be.
My Lords, Amendment 214 seeks to eliminate the risks and dangers to women in prison by the muddled use in legislation of the terms “sex” and “gender”. They are not interchangeable. They have come to mean very different things. Matters have reached such a pitch that I am tempted to paraphrase the 18th-century man of letters Dr Samuel Johnson and say that “Allowing a person with a full set of male genitals the legal right to serve a sentence in a women’s prison is not done well, but you are surprised to find it done at all”. It is, not to put a too fine a point on it, barking mad.
My Lords, I am afraid it is not just the Government who are split on this. With two notable exceptions, rarely have so many noble Barons spoken with such passion and at such length for the dignity of women—and there is nothing wrong with late-flowering feminism. I say that quite sincerely to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who I had the privilege of advising as a young lawyer in the Home Office some years ago now. There is nothing wrong with late-flowering feminism and, indeed, nothing wrong with speaking up for the dignity of all people. I say that as a self-identifying feminist and human rights campaigner.
The debate has ranged widely, which may be fine even at this late hour, but it has ranged beyond the specific issue. Noble Lords have brought up various issues to do with the lexicon and whether people feel that their dignity is lost, or that somehow their femaleness, or their womanhood, is challenged by newcomers, migrants to their sex, et cetera. To get back to the actual issue, life is complicated, prisons are vulnerable spaces and everybody in prison is inherently potentially threatening but also potentially vulnerable. I want to get back to the actual substance of this amendment and what it is trying to address. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that, if he and I were trapped in a lift with a third person—this is just a hypothetical, not an invitation, I promise—and the third person was a cis woman, born a woman, still a woman, always a woman, but none the less a white supremacist with previous convictions as long as your arm for violence against non-white women, I would feel much more threatened by the presence of that offender than by the presence of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. He is looking quizzical, but my point is that the Secretary of State has responsibilities to people in custody, in particular, and to people in vulnerable spaces that cannot be dealt with using the blunt instrument of an amendment like this.
I am not making nit-picking points. I am trying to address points that I think the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, tried to make early on. Forgive me—it is no criticism, but some noble Lords responded subsequently with speeches which were understandably carefully prepared in advance, without the opportunity to hear her rather sensitive and thoughtful setting out of the way in which the Government to date are trying to address their administrative and serious human rights responsibilities to deal with all vulnerable people in prison.
I suggest to the noble Lord that in the hypothetical lift I would be at far greater risk from the white supremacist with previous convictions. This is not a total hypothetical, because this has happened in male prisons where non-white offenders have been murdered by fellow cis males—that being the term for people born and always a man—because of a lack of diligence about the offending and attitudinal profile of a person.
If we really care about people being safe in custody, which we must, this will not be resolved by a blunt instrument. This is not a drafting point or a nit-picking point. In my view, we have too many people—and I suggest too many women—in prison anyway, and we need to pay more attention to who is with whom and how we are taking care of them.
Something like this amendment, which says that your birth sex is always your sex for the purposes of imprisonment and incarceration, would mean that someone born a woman who then went through hormone therapy, possibly more interventionist therapies and even surgery would always be in a women’s prison. That would not necessarily always be the right outcome.
What I am trying to suggest is that, yes, I care about being a woman and, yes, I care about being a feminist, but I am a human first and foremost. I do not hate men. I do not fear all men. I am not a self-loathing cis woman. I believe that in this Committee, perhaps more than anywhere, we should be capable of taking some of the heat out of these sensitive issues, as I think we tried to do in an earlier—I called it historic—debate. Debates about the lexicon and wider dignity, important and heated though they are, will not make women safer and they will not make prisoners safer.
We are talking about men who feel they are women but who have male genitalia being in a women’s prison. We are not talking about men who had operations. We are talking about men who, after being in a prison for several months, might have needs and could attack women. Some of those men are paedophiles and are violent.
I hear the noble Baroness, and I do not call her a late-flowering human rights spokesperson or feminist. I know that when she spoke on another Bill about parental alienation, she very clearly identified and recognised that people of both sexes were capable of this behaviour. Perhaps if she had had the opportunity to listen to the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, before she prepared hers—I make no criticism of that, because we all do it—she would recognise that the Government are already moving quite a long way to deal with these difficult administrative duties of care.
I believe that people of good will and good faith, as I consider this Committee to be, can deal with this without using some of the language that—forgive me— some noble Lords have used repeatedly. Repeatedly calling people one sex even though it is very important to them to be another does not help. This place—this Committee and your Lordships’ House—should not be a place of culture war. This should be a place where we make difficult things a little bit easier because of rational thought and the respect that we pay each other and therefore everyone else.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, like the noble and learned Lord, I shall attempt to be very brief indeed. My understanding of the law is that it should bring about a degree of certainty in society and a degree of reconciliation. I fear that the Bill as it stands does neither: in fact, it does the opposite. It has the perverse impact of making division and intolerance more likely because it points the finger of accusation at people who have done no wrong. As such, it seems to me to be an intrusion too far. The perverse consequence of trying to stamp out hate plays into the hands of the oversensitive and the intolerant, and actually gives strength to those who want to damage others by making outlandish or, indeed, even malicious accusations.
Two weeks ago, we stood in this House paying tribute to Sir David Amess. The Chamber was filled with voices of alarm that social media and everything else had fuelled intolerance and injustice. These provisions might well be misused to pour petrol on those flames. The test of innocent until proven guilty is turned on its head: that is unacceptable. When officialdom is given the power to police the thoughts of the people, it crosses a dangerous line. I have said enough; I said I would be brief, but I am following in the footsteps of some very powerful speeches. I wholeheartedly support these amendments, and I hope that the Government and the Minister are in listening mode.
My Lords, I want to make a point about something that is not directly related, but which I found quite odd. A few weeks ago, I was arrested for speeding. It was the first time in 40 years that I had actually done anything wrong while driving. Interestingly, the notice I received clearly said that the fact that I had no other points on my licence was irrelevant because that would be unfair to others. I do not understand how, if you have been a good guy and have never done anything wrong, that cannot be a positive factor, yet in this Bill we are accusing people and putting them immediately in the negative, even though there is no serious proof. I therefore support the amendment.
My Lords, on behalf of these Benches, I too support these amendments, for all the reasons given by the noble Lords who tabled them. Of course, the principal amendment seeks regulations and lacks specificity. It does not seek to define all the circumstances for retaining, recording, using or disclosing personal data relating to hate crimes or non-criminal hate incidents or otherwise. That is sensible, and it is now for the Government to accept the principles that underly this amendment and come forward with proposals. Of course, I accept the caution which the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, brings to the question of regulations that are unamendable; nevertheless, this is a complex area that needs a complex response.
The principles engaged are important. As the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, pointed out, this amendment is not concerned with established hate crime or in any sense with defending hate crime. It starts from the principle that personal data deserves protection from the arbitrary retention, use and disclosure by the police, enforcement agencies and authorities generally, and the converse principle that disclosure should be subject to the rule of law and to principles of accountability—points made by many in this debate, and briefly but eloquently by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, a few moments ago.
The conduct with which these amendments are concerned is not provably, still less proved, criminal—a point made by many. They seek to control the arbitrary retention, use and disclosure of personal information, based on a subjective perception of a citizen’s motivation, in the absence of solid evidence or proof. It is subjective, one notes, because it is often based on the subjective view of another citizen—no better informed, necessarily, than the citizen about whom the information is then held.
The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, spoke on the basis that subsection (7) was in a different category from the rest of the clause. I prefer the way that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, put it, when he set out the principles that underlay the whole of this amendment. It is not often that I find myself agreeing with almost everybody in the House, including, at one and the same time, the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—but I do. Even on this occasion, although I understand the hesitations voiced by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, she and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, accepted the need for regulation in this area.
The amendment is directed at achieving sensible limitations on the retention, use and disclosure of data to others. This is an area where the Government ought to act and that has become controversial, with the emergence of guidelines that are, frankly, offensive to justice and parliamentary democracy. I therefore invite the Minister—I believe that I speak for the House in doing so—to return to the House with proposals that accept the principles that we have enunciated and will give rise to amendment of the Bill, to its vast improvement.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I also congratulate my noble friend Lady Davidson on her excellent speech, in which she made some excellent points.
This is not an easy debate for any today. My beliefs and conscience have been battered, like those of many other noble Lords, by the onslaught of emails and letters, some handwritten, urging me to support or reject the proposed Bill. All were passionate; some, persuasive; and many, moving. Some doctors cited the Hippocratic oath and the age-old precept “First do no harm”. They also worried about damaging trust between patients and doctors. Many feared that no amount of regulation could safeguard assisted dying from abuse and exploitation, and that, like capital punishment, if a mistake were made, the finality of death made it impossible to rectify.
These are all powerful arguments, but there is another that I find even more convincing. It is that choosing to die, where to die and how to die is an elementary human right, more so when the choice is not between living and dying, but between a dignified death and one in agonising, intolerable suffering.
Like many noble Lords who spoke before me today, I am also influenced in this belief by my personal experience. I speak of the death of my father at the age of 97. He was a proud, honourable man, a veteran of the French navy and a devout Catholic, who led an active and vigorous life. As he moved into advanced old age, his body progressively failed until he found his deathbed in hospital, nearly blind, incontinent and in pain after a fall. Dependent on others—that was the worst. He just wanted to go. Indeed, he had written a letter several years before stating that, as a devout Catholic, should he ever be incapacitated, he would not want to be kept alive. His wish was ignored. When we went to see him the day after he arrived in hospital, we found him with his hands tied in bandages, so that he could no longer try to pull the plug again, as he did the night before, after seeing us. He was so weak he could hardly speak. When I got very close to him, the only words he could say were “Quel supplice”—what torture.
I understand the worries so many noble Lords have. Of course, nothing is perfect, but I would not deny the dignity and humanity of dying to anybody. This is why I wholly support this Bill. As some noble Lords have said, we treat dogs better than human beings. This is not normal. Why are we so obsessed with keeping people alive for so long? I am talking for too long. My mother was 100 when she died and my father was 97, and the last days for both were not pleasant. I support this wonderful Bill.