Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill

Debate between Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall and Lord Moylan

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to continue my minute and curious search for means by which the Bill might achieve some noticeable change. I notice I am grouped with an amendment from my noble friend Lord Willetts which appears to be there to ensure no such change is actually achieved in practice or cultural outcomes, so I think we are well matched. I will continue on this hunt for the prospect of change. In this case, I am not suggesting we amend any other legislation or duty, so noble Lords resistant to change will have to find different arguments to respond to me.

This amendment would amend not existing legislation but the text of the Bill. In new Section A3, the

“Duty to promote the importance of freedom of speech and academic freedom”


is defined in a manner which is pleasing to the Government. It simply says that it is there to promote

“freedom of speech within the law, and … academic freedom for academic staff of registered higher education providers … in the provision of higher education”.

This is insufficiently clear on which duty is being imposed on universities that does not exist already.

Amendment 31, which I have put forward, specifies what we expect universities to do as a result of the passage of the Bill into law. I will not read out everything it says, but it is there to

“eliminate unlawful interference with freedom of speech within the law and academic freedom … promote and prioritise the particular importance of freedom of speech … promote and prioritise the academic freedom of academic staff … and … foster a culture of free thought and”

open markets—sorry, “open-mindedness”. There is nothing wrong with promoting open markets either, but as it happens that is not the wording of this amendment. I am attempting to make clear what it is that we expect universities to do as a result of this duty to promote academic freedom, which the Government agree should exist but have defined in a manner which leaves the whole thing completely open.

There is an acid test to apply to this, which is the case of Dr Kathleen Stock. I do not know her, and I know nothing of her case that I have not read in public sources, so I am not making a special plea on her behalf. I am simply taking the story as emblematic. In her case, the university—I think it is fair to say—did not do some of the things it should have done to protect her and her rights. That could easily still be the case, especially with the amount of time that universities will have to spend on the astonishingly complex calibration of duties and obligations, which are apparently going to remain wholly unamended by this Bill. It has let her down.

The acid test is whether this clause would have protected a reputable academic from losing her post after expressing views which were objected to on essentially ideological grounds. My view is that, as drafted, it would not. The amendment I am moving would and I hope the Government will be able to explain why it should not be adopted when what they are doing is clearly not enough. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, I should notify the Committee that, if this amendment is agreed to, I will be unable to call Amendments 32 or 33 owing to pre-emption.