United Kingdom Internal Market Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness McIntosh of Hudnall
Main Page: Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is welcome that the Government, in the shape of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, have got up today and made some concessions to the position articulated in this House in Committee. We all welcome that, but he has not gone far enough. In Amendment 15 in particular, what he describes as imposing additional processes on government would actually be very valuable—particularly in the present political context, in which the Government have thrown a lot of doubt on their commitment to the devolution settlement.
In that context, I endorse the speech of my new Labour colleague, my noble friend Lady Clark. A serious political crisis is looming on the devolution question and, in everything we do, we have to behave with enormous sensitivity to the fact that that is a realistic prospect before us. Therefore, I do not see Amendment 15 as nitpicking, in the way that the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, described it; I see it as strengthening the principle that the Government have already conceded.
As a federalist and someone who believes in a federal Britain, I believe that this is an inadequate response to the devolution problem. I rather agree with the noble Lord, Lord Empey, when he says that we should have an arrangement where none of the four nations of Britain can veto a proposal that the other three agree with. I do not believe that England can always exercise that veto through the United Kingdom Parliament—that is what we have to change. If we are to keep the United Kingdom together, I believe that we have to think of new arrangements where decisions are made by a United Kingdom council that properly represents the nations, and, I hope, the regions and cities of England as well. That is a personal point about where I think we should be going.
Therefore, I do not see this as a particularly radical amendment that will address the present growing concerns about the devolution settlement. None the less, it is a sensible amendment, which I support, and I hope very much that my Front-Bench colleague, my noble friend Lady Hayter, will divide the House on it, unless we hear in the Minister’s response that the Government will make a significant move in its direction.
It seems to me that the merit of this amendment is that, by saying that the Secretary of State “must” seek consent, it puts on the face of the Bill the argument that disagreement should be the exception and that we should go into this with all sides—particularly the UK Government—determined to reach consent. Where there is no agreement, to win consent for that decision it is very important that there is a requirement for an explanation of how it is consistent with the devolution settlement, where the principle that the Government have set out is that the devolved Assemblies and Parliaments will have more, not less, powers as a result of withdrawal from the EU. In that explanation, the Government would have to demonstrate why that was so. They have already listened to some extent but I very much hope that they will listen more to what those of us on this side of the House have said, and that the Minister will indicate that he might go further.
The noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, has withdrawn, so I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie.
My Lords, this has been a very constructive and interesting debate, which I think needs to be developed further.
We have all welcomed that the Government have softened their position in relation to the Bill and to consultation, and I think that that is genuinely the case. Certainly, up until this point, they had given the impression that, although they had produced the Bill in a hurry and not consulted on it, they were going to drive it through without any consideration of amendments. However, I think that they have now become aware of the degree of resistance towards the whole of the Bill and, in particular, towards the implications for devolution.
My Lords, I am sure that noble Lords will be happy to know that I can be brief, because of course I set out the Government’s position on these matters in my opening remarks. However, to summarise, we feel that we have set out a comprehensive package of changes to the delegated powers in the Bill to address many of the concerns that have been raised about the role of the devolved Administrations. Of course, it is always a great regret for me to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, but I have to say that on these matters I am able to go no further.
Devolved Administration consultation is now required by legislation prior to any use of the key powers in Parts 1 and 2. The Secretary of State will also be conducting a thorough review of the exercise and effectiveness of each of these powers within five years, which again will require consultation with the devolved Administrations. Our approach will ensure a high degree of transparency and scrutiny and will guarantee devolved Administration involvement whenever the powers are used or, indeed, reviewed. The alternative approaches proposed in the group would, in my view, overcomplicate these very clear commitments.
I shall reply briefly to the questions that were put to me. In response, first, to the noble Lord, Lord Hain, I can confirm that the policy statement he referred to is accurate. With regard to his second question, the design of the Bill is different from the EU single market because the Government’s approach does not simply copy out EU rules, and that means that the constraints under which we operate are different.
The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, asked about the procedure for consultation. The Bill now requires that consultation should occur as a matter of fact before Ministers exercise their delegated powers. As is normal for such legislation, it does not spell out in great detail how this must be achieved, but we will engage with the devolved Administrations as part of the process of normal policy development such as, for example, sharing draft SIs and publications and co-operating on public-facing events wherever that is possible, and then in any case more formally before a decision is made.
The noble Lord, Lord Morrow, asked why we should consult with the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland. I can tell him that the reference to the department is consistent with the precedent of the Northern Ireland devolution settlement. Finally, perhaps I may confirm yet again to the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, that I will urgently seek to facilitate a meeting for her and the interested parties that she requested.
With those commitments and answers to the, I hope that noble Lords will feel able to support the Government’s approach to this matter.
My Lords, I have received two requests to ask the Minister a short question. They are from the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering.
Briefly, my Lords, a question has been raised in the House on a number of occasions: why are Welsh and Scottish Ministers referred to, but a Northern Ireland department is referred to? The reason is that, since 1921, power is devolved in Northern Ireland to the department, not to the Minister. The role of the Minister is to direct and control the department, but the department can still function without a Minister. It is a quirk that goes back 100 years, but it is there.
The noble Lord, Lord Morrow, made a relevant point. I do not know what the Minister means by “consistent with the devolution settlement”, because nothing in the settlement that I am aware of determines that this particular department is responsible. But, if you want a plural, because “Ministers” are referred to in the plural in Scotland and Wales, the only collective equivalent in Northern Ireland is the Executive—or, to meet the point made by the noble Lord, you could say, “Northern Ireland departments as appropriate”. But the reason for the difference is historic; it is not an error, as some people thought in the past. It is consistent with the fact that powers are devolved to the department and not to the Minister.
My Lords, I inform the House that, if Amendment 17 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 18 because of pre-emption.
My Lords, I am moving very carefully through these amendments on the grounds that I might get something wrong, but I believe that the next amendment is Amendment 19.
Amendment 19
My Lords, as Amendment 21 was debated earlier, I should perhaps make it clear that it would leave out Clause 10, as amended, and insert a new clause. The question is that Amendment 21 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion shall say, “Content,” and to the contrary, “Not content”. I think I heard that the Contents have it, but I can give the House one more chance on this if it would like. No? Then this amendment is agreed to.
We now move to the group beginning with Amendment 22. I remind noble Lords that Members other than the mover and the Minister may speak only once and that short questions of elucidation are discouraged. Anyone wishing to press this amendment or the other in this group to a Division should make this clear in debate.
Amendment 22
My Lords, I have one request to ask a question of the Minister, from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her thorough response. When she comes to read Hansard, perhaps she could reflect on the point that the General Teaching Council for Scotland, the regulatory body, now also includes college lecturers. Perhaps she would reflect on the point that it is the regulatory body, rather than the type of teaching that the registers are responsible for. I am sure that there is no intention to have an anomaly, but I would be most grateful if she could look at this.
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 39. I remind noble Lords that Members, other than the mover and the Minister, may speak only once and that short questions of elucidation are discouraged. Anyone wishing to press this, or anything else in this group, to a Division should make that clear in debate.
Clause 19: Direct discrimination in the regulation of services
Amendment 39
We come to Amendment 42. I should inform the House that, if Amendment 42 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 43 or 44.
Amendment 42
Amendments 43 and 44 have been pre-empted.
I remind noble Lords that Members other than the mover and the Minister may speak only once and that short questions of elucidation are discouraged. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division should make that clear in the debate.
Clause 29: Objective and general functions
Amendment 52
My Lords, I am glad that the Government have moved a little on matters relating to the CMA and the IOM, but it is not quite far enough. I support Amendment 54. The Government have opted to give the CMA a central role. They could have opted to use not the CMA, but a whole new body created to cover this essential work that would have fully understood the world of devolved politics. They have chosen not to do so, although, to be fair, they have certainly moved on the IOM.
The consequence is that the Government lay the CMA open to criticism that it is simply unaware of the detailed issues that might concern devolved Governments. If the CMA had a nominee from each of the three devolved Governments it would avoid finding itself in a whole new world, as seen through the prism of Cardiff, Edinburgh and Belfast. This is an amendment to save the CMA from getting into an almighty and unnecessary tangle—or, as we would say in Welsh, since we are all quoting from Celtic languages tonight, into a smonach. I suspect that the CMA has not a clue what a smonach is; I rest my case. Amendment 59 is merely a consequential provision to deal with occasional vacancies on the CMA’s board, so I support that also.
The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has withdrawn from the debate, so the next speaker is the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie.
This is another group of amendments where the Government have made concessions, which is welcome because it demonstrates that they are listening in ways that, frankly, at early stages of the Bill did not appear to be the case. However, I think that all speakers so far made the point that we face a consequence of the Government’s proposal to locate the office for the internal market in the CMA. That is the fundamental issue.
I have signed the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and I am grateful to him for introducing it in such systematic detail. Obviously, it is designed to take account of how the Government are changing the role of the Competition and Markets Authority. I detect from the mood of Ministers that there is a slight resentment in saying that we really should not be thinking of a UK-wide devolved composition for the CMA because that is not what it was set up to do—which was fair when it was set up, but it is no longer fair. It is now absolutely clear that the Government should recognise either that the office for the internal market should be a separate, stand-alone body—in which case it absolutely should have representation from the devolved Administrations, which the Government’s own amendments clearly acknowledge—or that they are fundamentally changing the character of the CMA, which requires its constitution to be fundamentally changed.
I have said repeatedly in contributions to the debate on the Bill that I am unconvinced of the case for it. Even where there is a case—I can see that some issues may require legislation—it is very much a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Indeed, it anticipates problems that might never arise but creates all kinds of problems and suspicions in the process.
If the Government go down this route, the CMA, operating with the OIM, could take decisions that will clearly have a direct effect on the effective powers of the devolved legislatures, allowing it to overrule laws that have been passed by local consent. Even if there was no suspicion of the Government’s intent—and I am sorry to say that there is intense suspicion—there is real concern about unintended negative consequences through a lack of understanding, or knowledge of sentiment or factual evidence, in any or all of the devolved areas.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister for the Government’s amendments in this group, which are very welcome. However, I will focus on Amendment 54, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. Any chairman of a board, whether it is a public or private company or a public body, will say that the most important thing about the board is getting a balance of skills and experience on it. In addition, nowadays, most boards feel the need to achieve a degree of diversity, generally expressed in terms of sex and race.
Putting together a balanced board is a complex task, and trade-offs often have to be made between the different characteristics that the different candidates can bring. The more that seats on the board are allocated to particular sources or interests, the more difficult it is to achieve balance. In something like the CMA, the board is not there to bring representative interests to bear; it is there to make sure that the CMA is run properly, so it should have people who can understand whether it is achieving its objectives or running itself effectively. Those are the most important characteristics.
If one has direct appointment to a public body such as the CMA, that can actually unbalance a board—you could end up with a lack of certain skills or experience, or an overrepresentation of certain commercial backgrounds, for example. When you have a single appointor, which in the case of the CMA is the Secretary of State, the challenge of getting a balance can be worked out between the Secretary of State, his department and the chairman of the relevant body. That is what happens in most public bodies. By taking away some of the appointments, you just make that process much more difficult to achieve.
I continue to believe, despite what noble Lords said earlier, that direct appointment by the devolved Administrations will inevitably be political, because they will be seen as representatives. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, used the word “representatives” when he introduced this amendment earlier. A representative is never completely independent if he or she feels the need to represent.
One of the changes made by the Scotland Act 2016 was direct appointment to the board of Ofcom, and that was followed by similar legislation for Wales and Northern Ireland. I was deputy chairman of Ofcom at the time, so I understand the impact that that can have on board balance—but I do not want to talk about that beyond what I have already said about the difficulties in managing a board when direct appointments are made.
I would like to draw attention to Section 65 of the Scotland Act 2016, where the devolved Administrations were allowed to appoint a member directly. However, that appointment had to be made in consultation with the Secretary of State, which allowed one avenue for conversation to try to make sure that some degree of orderly balance was maintained in relation to the appointments. Amendment 54 does not even go so far as to recognise that precedent, and it is a very extreme action to be taken in relation to the CMA. I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, will not press his amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, has withdrawn, so I call the next speaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson.
My Lords, I am pleased to see some amendments from the Government in this group. It may be the start of a little bit of emotional intelligence on the Government’s part, to see the damage that has been done to trust and confidence between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations on this issue.
However, on its own, government Amendment 55, for example, is too weak, in saying that in order to be appointed to the OIM panel, all you need is knowledge of the internal market in the different countries of the UK. That implies to me that anyone who worked, for example, for Tesco—I am not picking on Tesco; other supermarkets are available—in its London head office would, of course, know that there are different markets in different parts of the UK. However, they would not have the depth of knowledge to understand, for example, the importance of signage in the Welsh language in different parts of Wales or the difference in marketing approach required in different parts of Northern Ireland, bearing in mind the history of those parts. It is a subtle business, and it needs strength and understanding in depth.
The truth is that the OIM is being shoehorned into the CMA simply because the Government have made a promise that they are not going to create any more such bodies. They can go ahead saying, hand on heart, that the CMA is the body and the OIM is simply an arm of it—no new body has been created. But, to be honest, it is not a neat and natural fit.
Amendment 56 goes a little way towards seeking the consent of the devolved Administrations to an appointment, but it still leaves all the cards in the Government’s hand. Taken alongside Amendment 57, it makes it clear that if the devolved Administrations withhold agreement, after one month the Government can go ahead anyway—yet they might be withholding agreement for a very good and clear reason. I urge the Minister to look again at the stronger amendments, Amendments 54 and 59, tabled in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. If the Government mean what they say about genuinely wanting to respect the devolved Administrations and treat them with respect, what harm do the Government think it would do to allow them to appoint one board member each? The Government’s response is that it would make the CMA political. That in itself portrays the fact that the Government have a political approach of their own to this problem.
In conclusion, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out, UK government Ministers are in fact—[Inaudible]—and then they change hats to become Ministers of the UK. This is a problem, and if anyone does not understand that that is a problem, it underlines a lack of understanding and experience of devolution. Anyone who had that experience and understanding would realise that the Government must give a little bit more to satisfy trust among the different Governments of the UK.