Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lawlor and Baroness Cash

Committee stage
Friday 16th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

My Lords, I support this group of amendments for a specific reason. I tried to ask the Minister this question during their closing speech last week, but there was not time. The Equality and Human Rights Commission gave evidence at the Select Committee—I declare an interest that at the time I was a commissioner, but am no longer—in writing and orally, expressing grave concern about the adequacy of the equality impact assessment. The points coming up in support of this group raise real questions around this.

I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to say when we will see addressed the gaps identified in that evidence given by Alasdair Henderson, a commissioner at the EHRC, and in a follow-up letter written to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, identifying specifically where the EHRC was concerned. When will we see a follow-up to that? It seems to me that many of the points in this and subsequent groups are about the vulnerabilities of individuals because of certain protected characteristics and the lack of protection for them. The EHRC has expressed no position on this Bill but is very concerned about it. I think the same applies to many Members of this House. We need answers to these questions to inform this debate fully.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 40 and 59. The changes I propose may seem puzzling or pedantic, but, when dealing with legislation about life and death, every word matters. My amendments aim to bring the same care for language to subsections (2) and (3) as is used in subsection (1), which sets out that only if the conditions in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) are met then assistance to end a person’s life, in accordance with Clauses 8 to 30, may be provided. If any of these conditions is not met then the action is subject to the existing criminal provisions of the Suicide Act 1961.

As they now stand, subsections (2) and (3) do not set out conditions in this way. Rather, they describe other parts of the Bill. Clause 1(2) is framed as an observation about Clauses 8 to 30, and Clause 1(3) apparently sets out a geographical marker for the certain steps provided for elsewhere in the Bill that “must be taken”. Subsection (2) therefore seems entirely redundant, since it purports merely to note what is said elsewhere. Subsection (3) is puzzling. Is the “must” a mistake or should it be “may only”?

Perhaps more important than such redundancy, inelegance and imprecision in drafting is that, in their present form, subsections (2) and (3) do not deprive those who act in contravention of the paragraphs they contain of the protection of the law from assisting suicide. They fail to make it explicit that this remains prohibited and punishable unless it meets subsections (2)(a), (2)(b), (3)(a) and (3)(b). My amendments would remove this perhaps unintentional looseness—the sponsor may wish to comment on the intentionality or otherwise—by making it explicit that assistance to end a person’s life may not be provided unless subsections (2)(a), (2)(b), (3)(a) and (3)(b) are all met.