Companies (Directors’ Remuneration Policy and Directors’ Remuneration Report) Regulations 2019

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Wednesday 8th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the content of this statutory instrument is all good stuff, in my view. Greater transparency, enhancement of shareholders’ rights to challenge around remuneration, comparators now with senior executives and average pay within organisations—I would have thought that this was something we would embrace with enthusiasm. Indeed, I hope that the UK was very much engaged in the process of encouraging the shape of this directive. However, it raises a question that I hope the Minister can answer. The directive completed its process through the European Parliament and Council two years ago. The Government expected that we would have left the European Union by this time, yet they had not taken the opportunity to bring forward this statutory instrument and these improvements. They have been forced to do so now because this directive needs to be implemented in regulation by 10 June—and we have not yet left the European Union, so that requirement remains on our shoulders.

I have heard much discussion from the Brexiteer community that Brexit will be an opportunity to set aside regulation, to reduce the burden on companies and to step away from what they consider to be a European view of director and senior executive responsibilities. Is the reason we did not see this statutory instrument earlier because the Government thought we might be able to avoid ever implementing it? I know that the Minister has praised it, but one would have thought that a Government who were enthusiastic about its content would have made sure that it was passed well before the original Brexit departure date. I hope that the Minister will address that, because it will tell us a lot about the Government’s expectation of how, in reality, they will handle regulation post any Brexit.

My second set of questions is around the parts of the directive that are not included in this statutory instrument because they are the responsibility of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Department for Work and Pensions, presumably to introduce through regulation. The Minister also mentioned the Treasury, but I noticed in the briefing we had that one series of rights is the responsibility of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. The other parts of the directive which are not covered by this SI are due to be transposed by 10 June 2019. Does the Minister have every expectation that that date will be met—that the FCA and the others engaged in this are on track to be able to deliver against it? What will happen with the set of shareholders’ rights that do not have to be transposed until 3 September 2020? I am not quite sure what they are, so perhaps the Minister can tell us more; I think it must be the ones that are the responsibility of BEIS. Do the Government intend to make sure that those are transposed or do they intend to discard them on the grounds that they expect that by that date we will no longer be a member of the European Union?

I hope very much that the Minister can help us through this process to enable us to understand why these regulations were not brought to us earlier to ensure that they were part of our statute book at the point of departure from the European Union. Did the Government intend to discard them if they found a way to do so, and if so, what does that tell us about their philosophy and intentions when it comes to issues such as transparency around remuneration for directors and senior executives, and the power of shareholders to be able to challenge?

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument. I can be relatively brief, because most of my points have already been raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and I need only add a couple more things to them. Like her, I was caught immediately by the point at paragraph 2 of the Explanatory Memorandum which explained that this statutory instrument comes from a directive passed on 17 May 2017, and I wondered about the timescale of that.

In addition to the points she made, I point out that the department has a long and distinguished record in looking at directives and regulations that come from the European Union and has always prided itself on the quality of the material brought forward in support of the changes that it wishes to make through an SI, whether it is negative or affirmative. This SI stands out as one that has not been supported by a considerable amount of consultation and debate, and nor is there an impact statement, which I find rather surprising. Perhaps I would not go quite as far as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, in suggesting that there is a devilish plan here behind the work done by the department to try to avoid having to do anything in the hope that it would not be necessary because exit day would be before 10 June. Even so, the department has not covered itself in glory in the sense that, although it is true that the difference between where the UK Government have already got to with legislation and this directive is relatively small, these are not unimportant issues. If the department’s heart was in the wish to ensure that shareholders and indeed wider stakeholders had good information that allowed them to assess the performance of directors and to form a view on the effectiveness or otherwise of the company’s approach to directors’ remuneration and performance, these regulations, on the back of the directive, are in fact important. In a sense, that suggests that more work on and understanding of how boards will operate it would have been useful and helpful.

In introducing this SI, the Minister tried to paint a benign picture of how this was all happening anyway and was in line with where the Government were going. But that conceals a concern which has stemmed not just from anything heard on this side of the House but which has come from the Prime Minister, no less, who said that more has to be done to improve the way in which our limited companies system operates. There has been concern from the Bank of England about the whole question of whether tomorrow’s companies will need to be significantly different in terms of powers and responsibilities: it pointed out the much wider group of people who have an interest in the success or otherwise of a company, not just the shareholders. So there is a context here which has not been addressed by the Minister and I hope that he will comment on it.

To be more specific, we could not have reasonably expected the Government on their own to have brought forward regulations to make sure that in future we require that the remuneration of persons in the role of chief executive officer and any deputy chief executive officer must be reported, even if they are not directors. That is a major change, and it will help considerably to better inform those who judge companies.

On the question of how share-based remuneration is described, detail on vesting periods, deferral and holding periods is often lacking. In future, remuneration policy will have to indicate the duration of directors’ service contracts. Again, that will be useful. The remuneration policy must also set out the decision-making process for determination of review and implementation and all significant changes. These are important matters. They may be trivial in themselves, but, taken together, they will give much more information.

The Minister mentioned the split between fixed and variable remunerations and the question of share options. Share options have been a source of long-term concern to those interested in how companies pay their staff, particularly directors. To have that nailed down now is a really important change.

So those changes in themselves are important. The context within which this happens is of political interest. There is a question about why the regulations have been delayed so that we are doing this in a rush, and there is a worry about not having the wider context around consultation and cost, which suggests that something is not quite working here. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on that.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, I am concerned about the SIs that will presumably be required from DWP on disclosure by asset managers about pension funds. This is also an area of interest, but it would be wrong if the regulations were not in place by 10 June. Can the Minister give us some information on that? Like the noble Baroness, I question how the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy will take forward the provisions requiring further facilitation of shareholders’ rights. It is a longer deadline—3 September 2020—but, again, further information would be helpful.

These matters are important. The statutory instrument is of great interest and I am happy to support it.

Trade Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Swiss Confederation

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Wednesday 1st May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I cannot pretend expertise on trade Bills. We have heard brilliant speeches here today, but I want to raise four issues with the Minister.

The first is services. As the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, explained, financial services is the second largest arena in the services sector. Excluding the treaty on long-term insurance, many other sectors are governed by a number of equivalency agreements between the European Union and Switzerland, many of them designed with the City and the UK market in mind. I am completely unaware of what has happened to those and what the consequences of that could be. I would normally have seen any SIs concerning the financial services sector and I do not recall having seen SIs in this area, so I am quite worried, particularly as all this work was done with the expectation that we would have left the European Union by now and that those would have kicked in.

The second issue I want to pick up on is one that a number of noble Lords have spoken about: accumulation. If I were sitting in the Swiss position and allowing only a three-year period for accumulation triangulation to continue before it came up for review, I would be expressing the expectation that it would take three years for most companies to reorganise their supply chains in order to make accumulation in the triangular mode unnecessary. That would seem to greatly disadvantage the UK in the long run. Does the Minister have a reading on why that particular deadline was put in place?

The third area is mutual recognition agreements. I recognise that only about 10% of trade in goods between the UK and Switzerland is governed currently by mutual recognition agreements, but the continuity agreement basically covers only three-quarters of that. So about £500 million of exports from the UK to Switzerland each year are not covered by the rollover of mutual recognition agreements. Can the Minister tell us what the consequences of that are and whether she thinks that the additional cost of becoming certified in two jurisdictions is de minimis, or whether she sees that trade disappearing or transferring over to the EU? There is nothing here to give us any sense of the impact of that.

The last area that I wanted to pick up on was the authorised economic operator, but from a slightly different angle from that of my colleague. As I look at the document that was helpfully produced in February by the Department for International Trade, it says, interestingly, although most of the trade between the UK and Switzerland is indeed governed by firms which have taken out authorised economic operator status or have been awarded it, that,

“Switzerland applies broadly the same checks to AEO and non-AEO traders”.

I raise this because that coincides with most of the information that I have had from companies, that getting authorised economic operator status is exceedingly expensive, both to get in the first place and then to maintain, and it makes not the slightest difference when you get to a border—you are held up for just as long. Since this is the structure on which so many Brexiteers are building their expectation of how we would deal with the Irish border, will the department look at its own experience and understand that this mechanism does not work well at present and that no one seems to have come forward with any way for it to work efficiently or effectively in the future? It is evident from the department’s own document that this is not an answer to the Irish border problem.

I will make one last comment and then sit down. My attention was originally drawn to this trade deal by the press releases at the time, and I was pleased that they were so positive, as was the press coverage: no disruption in economic and trade relationships between the UK and Switzerland. Yet when I dug into this—which others have done far better and more forensically than me—it was full of holes. I ask for there to be much greater consciousness of giving a full picture when reports are made both to the public and generally to this House. We all understand that these are difficult, but the pretence that they are easy, complete and deliver no change is a poor message to give the companies that will bear the burden of the loss of opportunity and access that is consequent on the shift from the current circumstance to this continuity arrangement.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a very good debate, and, not the first time, your Lordships’ House owes a considerable debt of gratitude to the EU Committee, and in particular to this sub-committee, for the hard work it has done in trying to bring together the arguments, the pluses and the minuses and the difficulties that we face in relation to this agreement. In addition, through this Motion today, my noble friend the chairman has been able to bring forward a much broader context within which we have to think harder about the processes and procedures we will need to have in place if we are not to repeat the mistakes that he has drawn to our attention today.

The regret in the Motion before us today is about the fact that the trade agreement that has been given to Parliament to consider does not have sufficient on services—all the arguments have been made clearly about that. However, in addition to the points about the specificity of services, is there not a slightly bigger worry behind all this? It must have been obvious to those negotiating on our behalf that, even though the figure of 80% of our economy may be different in practice, the relationship we have with Switzerland is based on a substantial volume of services activity.

If we have been unable to agree anything on services in this relationship, what does this say about our future ability to negotiate in a much broader context with all the countries of the EU, if we have to? What about the US and other countries for which our services, although valuable to us, may not stand in the same arrangement? Our failure to do it with a supportive friend—a country that has always been engaged with the UK—raises wider questions and leaves uncomfortable echoes for future arrangements.

When we look at the detail that the committee has pointed out, we see the omissions, changes, adjustments and disapplications. Although what we have today is a substantial document—my goodness it is; if those who have read it right through to the end are not concerned about how it distinguishes between the customs duties that will be applicable for gherkins, fresh or chilled, while aubergines go free, they are not doing their work, and I am glad someone else did it for me because I would have given up at that point, although it is quite late on—surely the issue here is that we are not getting what we think is the complete package. It is just a trade agreement, not the trade agreement that should be there. Therefore, my second worry is that we have been given something which is more to satisfy the vanity of those responsible for the department in relation to the promises given about the ability to do trade deals than it is about the specificity of our exporters and importers in relation to the country of Switzerland. That leaves me a little concerned.

The wider context of this is the question of scrutiny. Others have raised all the points and I do not need to go back through them again. We are still stuck trying to use 19th century resources and processes, relying on the royal prerogative, to try to take forward our treaties, when we need to replace them with a system that engages with the obvious interests in this House and the other place, the wider world and the devolved Administrations, to make sure that we can do something positive with our trade. That concept was debated at length on the Trade Bill, and I shall not go back over the issues. As has been pointed out, that Bill awaits Commons consideration of Lords amendments, but the irony is that if the Commons were willing to accept, at least in part, what has been put forward today—and we are certainly happy to talk about that—we would have a system that would set mandates, require Parliament to be kept abreast of developments and changes in the negotiations and recommend whether Parliament itself should ratify the end conclusion.

The Minister may reflect on the following question when she responds. If our EU Committee—or whatever committee structure is set up in future—had been given the chance to look at the mandate for this trade agreement and given periodic reviews of the discussions and debate and had the power to recommend whether it should be ratified, would we really be in such a mess on this issue as we are?

Trade Bill

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 23rd January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

My Lords, in speaking to Amendment 29 in my name I will also speak briefly to the amendment with which it has been grouped: Amendment 56 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer.

At the forefront of my amendment is whether we should retain the rather disputed separate mechanism for resolving investor settlement disputes—this applies to rollover and new FTAs. The concept of ISDS is not new; it certainly predates us joining the EU in 1972. Over the years, we have had a very large number of trade agreements—some several hundred—which Members of the House will be aware of, and many of these contain clauses under which the ISDS was created. In the early days, it was done with some justification in some countries to try to ensure that investment from third parties—particularly private investment, which was obviously necessary to unlock the activity that was the focus of the trade agreement—could be protected in situations where political issues or other issues intervened. Given that the legal systems in some countries will not be regarded as being as well-developed as in other countries such as ours, it is not unreasonable to therefore concede that some sort of special protection was required. That is really where it came from.

I do not think that there is very much more to say about it, except that our argument is that these ISDS schemes are of a bygone age. They relate to a situation in the world that does not really exist anymore. It certainly does not apply to many of the countries with which we will be creating free trade agreements or rolling over existing arrangements. In so far as they have legal systems that we can respect, there should be no question that we should work with our own legal system and with theirs to reflect any requirement for the need to ensure that parties to the agreement can pursue the establishment of a tribunal and appellate mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes.

I should wait for the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, to introduce her amendment, but in case she has any doubt at all, I do not support where she is coming from. I want to make it very clear that I am not alone in this: the most numerous of the very large number of submissions we received on the Bill were on ISDS. I am sure the Ministers are aware of that. It is worth thinking about the role that civil society more generally will play, but if just about everybody is saying that the Government should move away from these as a model and should think, as the EU is doing, about moving to a system that relies on existing tried and tested systems in the countries, this is something we should bear in mind. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I share one point with the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, on this issue: many of the various systems for investor and trade dispute resolution are broken. A search is on for new, more effective mechanisms to deliver much more satisfactory resolution, particularly as trade arrangements become far more complex and encompassing, and disputes have much greater significance for the global economy.

The Committee will be aware that the WTO’s arbitration system is on the verge of collapse. It relies on a panel that includes a minimum of three judges and a maximum of seven. The panel, through death and retirement, is now down to three. The United States has made it clear that one further death or retirement will mean the end of the WTO’s arbitration mechanism—it will not agree to replace any retired or dying judges. That mechanism is now effectively teetering on the verge.

Many will also have been involved in the debates around TTIP when that was active in this House and will understand that the resolution methods contemplated under it created a great deal of concern that private companies—specifically American companies—would be able to use the mechanism to wade in and counter local law and local decisions. The structure under TTIP relied on arbitration panels chosen specially for the purpose, against which there was no appeal. They were not part of a traditional judicial system.

We do, however, have an example of a system that works exceptionally well for trade resolution: the European Court of Justice, working for the currently 28 members of the European Union. As Trade Minister, when I talked with the Chinese, the Japanese and a number of other countries with which we were trying to build trade relationships, it was very often in the casual relationships that the issue of dispute resolution would come up. They all spoke, with sad envy, of the system we had in the European Union, known to be incorruptible, fair and efficient, and to have judging panels of real intelligence that were then supported by the collective Governments. They kept wistfully saying what a pity it was that, on a global level, there is nothing that mirrors that.

This is why I differ from the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, who is basically saying that a British company with a complaint will go to the British courts, an American company will go to the American courts and a Japanese company will go to the Japanese courts. It would be hard to persuade anybody that they would be justly treated under those circumstances and that there would not be national bias. I can see this becoming an inhibitor to trade. I also believe that on trade issues generally we need to look to international co-operation and shared sovereignty solutions. We need to recognise that, frankly, the best example we have of trade resolution is the ECJ, and see what lessons and mechanisms we can pick out of that. This is relevant in discussing the continuity agreements as well as future agreements. As this House and the Minister will know, the European Union is now making dramatic changes to the way it structures dispute resolution, recognising the problems and criticisms around the existing system.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, referred to the investor-state dispute settlement system. That is largely an ad hoc arbitration system, but it is in many of the EU’s various trade agreements. He will know, or certainly the Minister will know, that the EU is now migrating from that. In CETA, we have an example of the first new version of the European system: the investment court system. It is a permanent standing court with a panel of judges; it is not ad hoc; and it is two-tier, so there is an appeal mechanism. Interestingly, under CETA, the EU and Canada will collectively appoint 15 judges—five from the EU, five from Canada and five third-country nationals—who will hear cases on a rotational basis. It is therefore bringing in a much more multilateral dispute resolution system with a great deal of independence and the opportunity to create a much more broad template. There is an intention to migrate many of the existing EU trade agreements on to this system over the coming years, which is why the continuity arrangements pose real questions that have to be answered. In the continuity arrangements, are we copying over the rather unsatisfactory investor-state dispute settlement system? Are we going to try to migrate? It is going to be difficult. Look at the EU and Canada. You can see that the capacity to create a panel of 15 judges might be a little tricky if you were trying to do it simply between the UK and Canada. I do not know what sort of system the UK is looking at as it tries to establish a continuity agreement with CETA, but we need some answers on all this.

GKN/Melrose Takeover: Update

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Tuesday 27th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made in another place by his right honourable friend the Secretary of State. I think that many Members of your Lordships’ House will think that it is rather troubling and a bit confused towards the end. I shall ask a number of questions in hoping to elucidate that.

GKN is a UK engineering firm, founded in south Wales in 1759, which is now a global engineering business which designs, manufactures and services systems and components for most of the world’s leading aircraft, vehicle and machinery manufacturers. GKN has various defence contracts in Luton, the Isle of Wight and in King’s Norton, including making components for the F35, A400MM, P8, Typhoon, V22, C130, and F22 vehicles. Approximately 58,000 people work in GKN companies and joint ventures in more than 30 countries, including 6,000 here in the UK. It has global sales of £9.4 billion and spends £85 million on R&D in the UK alone. As a percentage of sales, GKN spends about 4% on training, and we are hoping that that will continue.

The motto of the bidder, Melrose, is, “Buy, improve and sell”—in other words, to dismantle a business and then quickly sell each part off. On 8 January, the board of GKN received an unsolicited proposal from Melrose to purchase it; the board of GKN unanimously rejected it, on the grounds that the bid was,

“entirely opportunistic and that the terms fundamentally undervalue the company and its prospects”.

A formal offer from Melrose and various defence documents have been issued since then, and the deal closes this Thursday, 29 March. But despite growing concern it was not until yesterday, Monday 26 March, that the Secretary of State wrote to Melrose to seek the commitments referred to in the Statement and relevant undertakings on a number of key areas. So my first question is: why on earth did it take the Government so long to get involved, and why on earth leave it all so late?

I accept that there are currently strict and limited grounds for ministerial intervention in proposed mergers, in essence where one or more of national security, media plurality and financial stability are engaged. However, the Enterprise Act 2002 powers allow reference on those grounds to the Competition and Markets Authority for four months after the completion of a transaction. Better late than never, perhaps.

In the Statement the Secretary of State said that he would make such an assessment,

“following receipt of advice from the Ministry of Defence and other agencies on the final terms of a bid were it to be successful”.

So my second question is: can the Minister set out the likely timescale for this process, and how it will operate in practice? Will he guarantee to keep the House informed?

The Statement seems to suggest that the reason why the Secretary of State kept a low profile was that he did not want to jeopardise his quasi-judicial role in this takeover battle. If that really is the case, does it not prompt another question? If the Secretary of State for Business is debarred from taking an active interest—and we have to wonder whether that is a sensible position for him to adopt—who in government has the responsibility for looking after our industrial assets, including strategic and defence interests, in this and similar takeovers? I look forward to hearing from the Minister on that subject.

The Secretary of State rightly pointed out in the Statement that in the past some takeovers have had “deleterious” consequences. Presumably that is a reference to the Kraft/Cadbury debacle. He went on to say:

“In my view, this establishes the principle that we expect interests broader than pure shareholder value to be taken into account by directors and”—


this is quite important—

“in the attitude of the Government”.

He lists these as:

“a requirement for directors to have regard to … the interests of the company employees, its business relationship with suppliers, customers and others; and the impact on the community and the environment”.

That is quite wide-ranging, and all very sensible.

All those issues are directly engaged in this proposed takeover. So my fourth question to the Minster is: can he point out how and where these new principles will actually bite? How will they impact in Luton, the Isle of Wight and Norfolk? Will they ensure that the R&D spend continues, that the pensions are secure, and that the training opportunities GKN currently offers will be continued?

Finally, the Statement contains the view of the Secretary of State, as expressed in his letter yesterday to Melrose, that Melrose should set out more clearly its intentions towards wider stakeholders. He specifically requests it to make commitments in a legally binding form. I have to say that if the commitments specified by the Secretary of State were put in legally binding form, that would go a long way towards allowing us to support the Government in this matter. So my fifth question to the Minister is to ask him to confirm that the Government will refer the proposed takeover to the CMA if they have not received, by close of play on Thursday 29 March when the deal closes, legally enforceable commitments from Melrose on the issues that he has adumbrated already.

I repeat that those issues are: maintaining the business headquartered and listed in the UK; maintaining a UK workforce and respecting its employment rights as well as engaging closely with its representatives; continuing to pay tax as a UK taxpayer; continuing to invest in R&D programmes at current levels; investing in the training; treating suppliers well, including prompt payment of suppliers; making arrangements for current and future pensioners that are satisfactory both to trustees and to the Pensions Regulator; greater continuity of ownership of the defence-related businesses; and a commitment relating to the management of any defence contracts. At present only two of these “asks” will be covered by the legally enforceable commitments offered by Melrose to the Takeover Panel, and one of those only partially. The rest are not. I would be grateful if the Minister would reflect on that.

In conclusion, I have to say to the Minister that there cannot be many people in this country who think that the Government have got a grip on this issue. Voluntary agreements will not work, as we know from recent experience. Today’s weak, late and unenforceable assurances from Melrose are insufficient. There should be statutory provisions, not voluntary aspirations. In truth, without them, there is nothing there to assure the workers, the pensioners or the local communities. Nor will voluntary agreements assuage the concerns about the devastating impact that this opportunistic dawn raid will have on our industrial strategy and our national security. Both in this case and in future cases, we surely deserve better.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I want to press the Government a little more on one or two of the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. One of those is the timing of the letter. The Minister will be very much aware that, presumably, it was meant to elicit information and to express some government concerns to be taken into consideration by the shareholders of GKN before they exercise their votes. However, as he will know, many of the shareholders have already declared —and I think he will confirm that a declaration once made cannot be retracted. In addition, the remaining shareholders have largely had all their internal meetings to come to their final decisions, and cannot pull those meetings back together to reconsider in the very brief timeframe of the next 48 hours. Therefore, if this is something other than public relations, will he explain to me how it is meant to inform shareholders, because I do not understand that? Will he especially, in that case, confirm that he still takes the view that the Secretary of State can call in this transaction, in whatever form it goes through, if concerns remain following the vote?

I scanned through the Melrose response very quickly but there seems to be no mention of the 6,000 workers. There are various assurances on other points but I saw no mention of them. Will the Minister comment on that? I am also concerned that all the various declarations seem to have a timeframe of five years. Considering the length of time needed to plan measures such as the industrial strategy and the sustainable relationships that need to be developed in the aerospace, defence and other fields, five years seems an infinitesimal period. Will the Minister explain why that short timeframe apparently reassures him, because I am not sure that it does me?

Does the public interest definition need to be looked at again as it does not mention workers’ rights or pensioners and does not refer to the industrial strategy, which is supposed to have a much more important role now? Airbus, for example, has expressed concerns about a potential new owner, which could undermine the direction in which the Government are trying to take industry in this country.

My last point concerns an issue I do not fully understand. However, the Minister may be able to help me. I understand that many of the shares are held by arbitration houses, and that rather than buying them and paying stamp duty they have them on loan and are exercising them in that format. Is that really appropriate and is it something else we should look at?

Financial Guidance and Claims Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Tuesday 24th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer]

My Lords, I join in thanking the Minister for bringing these amendments forward. I think she recognises that the three existing bodies to be merged all have a reputation for impartiality. Their services are free and she is making it absolutely clear that those vital elements which she respects and appreciates so much in the existing bodies will carry through into the new body. It seems to me that stating it clearly, rather than leaving it to be read and potentially misconstrued, is exceptionally helpful.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for making the statement she did at the Dispatch Box at the start of this debate. We are very appreciative of the acceptance of Amendment 7, which goes with the spirit of the way we have conducted the discussions over the Dispatch Box and in meetings over the period of the Bill. It has been one of the happiest Bills I have been involved in and I have been involved in some very happy Bills. I extend the thanks to the Bill team for their good supportive work. It has been a very good experience all round. This amendment is another example of that, because Members will recall that in Committee the Government’s line was that—although they absolutely agreed that advice, guidance or information given by the new body or by its contracted other bodies must be free at the point of use—they did not think it necessary to amend the Bill. However, over the time we have been talking about it, it has grown on them that there might be an advantage in doing so, for all the reasons my noble friend Lady Drake gave. Having those words at the heart of its mission statement and affecting all the work it does will make it a much better body, so we are very grateful and we support the amendment.

Financial Guidance and Claims Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 19th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a brief amendment and stands on its own, I think primarily to ensure that the next group gets enough focus. We are back to the definition of words, which is obviously going to bedevil us as we go through the Bill. This one is slightly more generic than the others, in the sense that the description we have been given of the task of this new body is that of creating a mixture of direct provision and commissioning. However, sometimes the wording does not seem to match up to that, so the amendment suggests a better form of wording that would leave out “provide” and insert “ensure provision of”. When we look up the dictionary definition of “provide”, we see that it is basically an active verb whose primary meaning is to make available for use or to supply.

As I read it, it is there as an active verb, which means that the body to which it is applied will be doing things—implementing in an active way. Substituting “ensuring provision of” would mean a much greater accent on working with others to make sure that these things happened. The amendment applies to the pensions arrangements referred to in line 19 of page 2. In many cases, the pensions guidance function would be carried out mainly in house, or others would be commissioned to do the work, so it may not be the most appropriate place for the amendment, but we pick up the same idea as we move through the Bill and look at the other aspects of the work of the organisation.

It is a probing amendment at this stage to invite the Minister better to articulate what “provide” means here. We want to know in particular whether commissioning work is envisaged in this limb, whether it involves any direct provision and, if so, what that would be. Can the Minister give some broad breakdown of the balance between those two aspects? I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, that the amendment is possibly sitting in the wrong spot, because the various pension bodies being absorbed into this single body have provided guidance directly. It is advice provided through a commissioning, contractual arrangement, which I am sure everyone intends should remain in place. However, the underlying spirit of the point the noble Lord makes and the request for clarification are important.

I rise to speak merely because the Minister may answer that such issues are covered somewhat in Clause 4. I simply wanted to point out that that clause regularly uses “may”, whereas I think the Government’s intention —and that, I suspect, of many others in this Committee —is that this be a “must”. So, the argument that Clause 4 is the answer to the question raised may not exactly work.

Financial Guidance and Claims Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Kramer and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 19th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

I understand that a note has come at pace with its best advice. It might be sensible to ask for a letter on this point because it is at the heart of not so much the naming game but functions. If advisers of the body will not be able to move seamlessly, however many hot keys they are able to employ, from pensions to general expenditure and back again, it is a different body to the one we are trying to set up. As I understand the situation—this is what I would like to be checked back—it is possible for an individual to be authorised to give advice on both debt and pensions, but the debt advice community has broadly not chosen to go down that route, regarding pensions as needing expertise that would be difficult and expensive to acquire. What the noble Baroness has said is not entirely wrong, but it is not entirely right either.

[Baroness Kramer]

Perhaps I may add to that. Partly this is problematic because individuals receiving the debt advice may not understand that there is no discussion of their pension pot, because the adviser is unable to raise the issue and, therefore, they may not recognise that they are being offered a series of potential solutions within a limited framework that does not make use of the full financial resource that describes essentially who they are and what they have available to them. We use advice only in the regulated sense, but the person listening thinks that it is advice in common terminology, and that is why we end up with the problems that the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, is trying to address.