Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Tuesday 5th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I begin with a thank you. My noble friend Lord Sharkey and I—I know that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, will speak for himself, as he always does so well—very much appreciated the opportunity to meet the Minister, the Economic Secretary and key staff to talk in detail about this statutory instrument. I completely concur with the comments of the Treasury Select Committee that these are sweeping powers which, under normal circumstances, I do not think anybody, in any part of this House, would dream of granting to a regulator. However, under the circumstances we would face in a no-deal scenario, it seems vital that the regulator has the ability to mitigate a crisis cliff edge for key parts of the financial services industry.

I note that in the guidance published by the Bank of England and the FCA last Friday, they will be attempting to limit the transitional period, as the Minister said, to 15 months, so that firms will manage within that 15-month period to go from where we are now, essentially—let us call it scenario A—to life outside the EU in a no-deal scenario, which we will call scenario B. It would give them some 15 months, typically, but with the capacity to extend that to two years if necessary. Also, the Bank of England has made exceptions for the bail-in rules, the stay in resolution rules and the FSCS rules, all of which relate closely to financial stability. We appreciate that it would be very hard to provide any transitional time for those rules and their consequences, but does the Minister have any comment to make around the significance of deciding on those three exemptions? Can he confirm that, if we were to have no deal and find ourselves in that reality and the regulators decided that the situation was better managed by finding some flexibility around these three rules, the regulator has given away the capacity to do so? Or does it retain an opportunity to change its mind and provide some mechanism for adjustment? One would hope that that was not necessary. Across the credit rating agency assessments, we will get only a 12-month extension, though I think all of us recognise that that is probably not problematic for any of the players.

In our discussion, as the Minister indicated, we asked for more frequent reporting than just 12 months from now. It seemed a bit like closing the stable door after the horse has bolted to wait for that period. We very much appreciate that the Treasury and the regulators have agreed that they can update us every six months: that is exceedingly helpful. We also appreciate the description that the Minister gave when he had to make a correction, which we perfectly accept is a very minor correction. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, picked up the fact that the complexity here is extraordinary. It is very hard to predict, very hard to track and very hard to play through the scenarios and understand exactly how each needs to be handled, certainly in advance. So I think we might find ourselves trying to take advantage of the offer from the regulators of specific discussions if a particular issue arises. I am grateful again that the Minister has had a conversation with the regulators that led them to say that that will be open to us: it is exceedingly welcome.

This underscores the point of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, about the extent to which, given all this complexity, there might be some way to provide some mapping of exactly what is happening where—what is moving and what is changing. That is a big ask at the moment, I understand, but if there could be some thought around that, it would be very useful, not just to this House and the other place but to the industry, which I am sure must be struggling with all this, although it very much appreciates the detailed engagement it has had with the Treasury, with Ministers and with the regulators. If we move to a practice of mapping under such circumstances, that might be a healthier environment to get to. It was one of our asks of the Minister that he felt he could not commit to at this point.

Our second ask was for some specific examples. My noble friend Lord Sharkey is unable to be here. He was particularly concerned to work through some specific examples in his head, so he may come back to ask for something more detailed. I particularly appreciated that the Minister gave an example of an issue that, as he knows, has exercised me: how do we manage the fact that our major financial institutions have significant exposure to EU and EEA assets and will incur higher capital ratios because they will no longer have preferred status if we leave on a no-deal basis? I was very glad that he gave us that particular example.

We very much hope that we do not have to use this, and it would be exceedingly helpful to know that we are not going to have no deal, because despite all the preparation that I understand is being done with real concentration and thought, it does not deal with the fact that there is going to be an almighty problem. I can see firms—all of them, though they are competitors—in different stages, different states with different micro-problems, all of which regulators are trying to manage so that there is no knock-on effect on financial stability or to the economy. It is going to be an extraordinarily difficult situation to manage, and anything we can do to make sure it does not happen will be extremely useful. If I can encourage anyone in this House to take no deal off the table, let me use this opportunity to do so.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I feel the need to start with my standard speech about how much I object to being here processing statutory instruments for a no-deal situation. I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, in her dislike of such a situation and the chaos that will prevail. Having said that, I am forced to say nice things about the Government and, indeed, about the Lib Dem Front Bench in this whole affair. The Treasury SIs we have passed so far have, to a large extent, despite some of the speeches, been fairly non-controversial. What I have been looking for all the way through are attempts by the Treasury or the Government to smuggle through policy changes, which they promised not to do in the original legislation, and I must say that, broadly speaking, I think the Treasury has not sought to smuggle through any of significance. However, the result of that is that our debates have been rather dry.

This SI was quite shocking on initial reading. Part 7 has such sweeping powers, with no formal parliamentary involvement, that I thought—and we spoke to our colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench about this—that we really had to take it very seriously. I once again repeat my thanks to the Liberal Democrats for coming along on this and to the Government for the positive way in which they have reacted. For the record, I will briefly run over our concerns and note that they have been largely covered in the speech made by the Minister. We were first concerned about the limitations in the power in Part 7; there is a time limit of two years, and it is important to emphasise that that limitation is not just for making directions—rather, directions must cease within two years of exit day. That is fairly clear from reading the document.

It is more difficult to grasp the scope. One of the useful things we discussed at our meeting with John Glen, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, was scope. Scope is difficult to get into words, and we thank the Minister for the detailed examples in his speech, which will, we hope, be useful for practitioners in understanding it. In particular, we had some concerns over whether it might be used in crisis circumstances, and received a very strong assurance that separate legislation would be used in such circumstances.

I come finally to the lack of any parliamentary involvement in the process. This was clearly also the concern of the Treasury Select Committee; being a big, powerful committee, using its own mechanisms, it can rapidly draw Ministers to account. It did that with the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, and got assurances from him, as I understand it, that whenever the power was used to create a direction it would be advised. Clearly, it was then able to summon a Minister to hold the Government to account on its use. We did not have such a parallel situation, so we asked, and then got this assurance in the speech, that whenever such a notification went to the Treasury Select Committee, a copy would come to representatives on both our Front Bench and the Liberal Democrats’. The second part of that, in a sense, was an assurance that we would get access. I do not mean to suggest the Minister is not an important person, but at the end of the day his interest is in DfID. He simply speaks for the Treasury here. It was good that the Economic Secretary to the Treasury said that he would make himself available to answer any of our questions about how the power had been used. That was very reassuring.

Embedded deep in the SI and the Explanatory Memorandum is the fact that certain directions may have to be secret. We were concerned that when any organisation has the option of making something secret it tends to do so. We would like to know when and for what reasons that is used. That was also acknowledged in the speech. Clearly this has to be post facto—obviously it has to be when it is no longer embarrassing—but it is important that the use of this power is fully understood.

Lastly, we felt that 12-monthly reports on a power that was going to last for only two years would be insufficient. Assuming it is for the previous 12 months, the report takes a couple of months to write and so on, and then you are half way through the second year. The acceptance of six-monthly reports is extremely welcome. I repeat my thanks to the Government for co-operating in the way they did; it has allowed us to create a mechanism for an involvement of this House in the use of this power and, with those conditions attached, we accept the logic that says it is necessary.

[Lord Bates]

I thank my noble friend Lady McIntosh, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for their contributions and engagement through this whole process. I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lady McIntosh for participating in the debate and for opening it up with some perspectives on this. She said it was unclear what the post-exit requirements for derivatives were. We have made several onshoring SIs relevant to trading and issuing of derivatives already. I think we are currently up to SI number 40. Within that batch of 40, there were some specifically on that. I will certainly write to my noble friend to explain exactly how this regime will operate post exit.

She also asked about the direction of the transitional power. The power is available to regulators for two years from exit. It is then for the regulators to propose appropriate delay or phasing in of requirements within the two-year period. She also asked about the impact assessment—I applaud her for her scrutiny in getting to that level of detail in the specific tables. Let me populate some of the information from them. As outlined in the impact assessment, while the overall familiarisation costs were estimated at £110 million, the cost per firm was estimated at £1,900. The number of firms affected was based on the fact that FiSMA applies to all firms regulated by the PRA and FCA, which amounts to approximately 58,000 firms. It is also estimated that there will be an additional 1,200 firms entering into the temporary permissions regime, which then brings the total to 59,200. While FiSMA applies to all firms regulated by the PRA and FCA, many of the effects of this SI result from the loss of passporting rights at exit. I note that the remarks she made were drawn from considerable experience of how hard-fought those rights were. Of course, that is a consequence of decisions taken ultimately by the British people. This means that changes made by the SI will, in terms of the number of firms affected, predominantly affect those 1,200 firms entering the temporary permissions regime.

Moving to the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, I again thank her for her input on this. She asked whether we could map all the onshoring changes. She made that request at the meeting with the Economic Secretary to the Treasury. Although we recognised that there were some challenges in doing just that, we felt that it was a very reasonable request when we met last week. I can confirm that we are working on this and will be in touch, I hope with a positive mapping exercise to share with her.

[Baroness Kramer]

I thank the Minister; that is good and welcome news.

[Lord Bates]

I am very happy to do that. I should also say that all these changes are being made because of the quite brilliant Economic Secretary to the Treasury, John Glen. He is an outstanding Economic Secretary, and takes his duties very seriously. As a more senior person, I find it encouraging to see young Ministers who are so diligent in the way they engage with Parliament and the department. He is an example to others in how he does it. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, found a polite way of saying that he found it refreshing to be talking to the butcher, not the block. I absolutely get the point, and he could not be engaging with a better metaphorical butcher in this regard.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked me to comment on the significance of the Bank of England exemptions regarding the FSCS rules. The regulators have judged that bringing in these requirements immediately is important for the financial stability. The Treasury was consulted and agrees with this. We do not anticipate that this will change.

On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, on the use of unpublished directions, on which again, we had a substantial and useful discussion, it should be stressed that the Treasury and the regulators would want to avoid unpublished directions as the power is to be used broadly across a large range of firms. Unpublished directions would not be effective—as I read that out I thought that the noble Lord was ahead of us in that he was not asking for the unpublished directions but was rather seeking an engagement on matters after the fact. I certainly know that the Economic Secretary is taking that seriously.

I thank noble Lords again for their engagement on this, particularly my noble friend Lady McIntosh. I also thank the Opposition and Lib Dem Benches for the constructive way in which they have engaged with the Government on this, as a result producing a better outcome for regulation.

Brexit: Economic Impact

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Wednesday 20th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I do not accept that, as the noble Lord would anticipate. There are reasons to be positive about the UK’s prospects, particularly if we leave with a deal. The analysis showed the severely negative impact that no deal would have on the UK economy, which is why we want to avoid it at all costs and why a responsible approach from the Opposition, if they care about the economy and jobs, would be to support the deal.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the November analysis demonstrated that every scenario would be hugely damaging to the UK economy; it said that no deal would be worse but that the other options were significantly awful. That raises the question of why the Labour Party is not openly opposing Brexit at this point. The deal modelled here, which the Minister presents as though it were the Government’s, is in fact the Chequers deal, which had within it “max fac” and therefore assumed absolutely no friction in trade between the UK and the EU. That option is no longer on the table. The backstop was part of the analysis as well. We therefore have never at any point seen numbers that represent the deal currently being negotiated by the Prime Minister. Does the Minister not agree that it is a disgrace that MPs will be asked to vote on that deal without ever having seen the analysis of its impact on our economy in the immediate present, the near future and the long term?

[Lord Bates]

I do not accept that. We produced that analysis, which ran to some 83 pages. The noble Baroness says that we did not produce analysis. It was the proposal for the backstop in the withdrawal agreement that was rejected very clearly in the other place in the first meaningful vote. In all other aspects of what we seek to achieve, we want to see maximum facilitation and trade. That is what the Prime Minister is working tirelessly to secure with our European partners.

Equivalence Determinations for Financial Services and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Monday 18th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Perhaps I could explain to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that one reason why so many of us are making comments and expressing concerns about procedure, including about the impact assessment and the limitation on what we can do with statutory instruments—we cannot amend or change them—is because the whole process pales greatly in comparison to the equivalent process available to us as we dealt with these fundamental issues as EU members. Then, we were framing the overarching directive that set the context through extensive and transparent consultation and scrutiny, via a process in the European Parliament and the European Council. Typically, we then engaged our regulators for the final stretch, but in the context of all that work in discussion and negotiation. One of the reasons for London’s great success is that it was able to shape so much of that discussion in the way it thought appropriate, bringing all its experience to the table. That is what made it Europe’s premier financial centre and the great global financial centre it is today, all of which it achieved in the context of EU membership.

[Lord Lilley]

The noble Baroness makes an important point but one that deflects a little from reality. When I was a Treasury Minister, I had to negotiate things in Europe. I suppose we had a certain influence, but at no point did the House get involved much, rightly or wrongly. She should not create an ideal world that did not exist.

[Baroness Kramer]

I accept fully that this House did not get involved, but I do not consider democracy as having only one locus. Our Members of the European Parliament were democratically elected as democratic representatives. The Ministers we sent to Councils engaged with democratic representatives. I do not think that this process happens in only one place. It seemed to me that as a consequence of that representation, we had real importance. Now, we face two situations—

[Lord Lilley]

The point being made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, and others is that we should not leave that process to Ministers. The noble Baroness seems to be saying that our doing so in the past was jolly good because they defended our interests.

[Baroness Kramer]

Well, we also had MEPs, for whom I have great respect, and engaged broadly in the process.

One of my problems is that the equivalence SI we are dealing with today essentially puts, for the next 12 months, all relevant decisions on whether we remain equivalent or, as the EU makes changes, become equivalent in any new area into the hands of the Treasury alone. Not only does that not engage this House—I suppose you could consider the Chancellor to be involved—but it represents the most disengagement we have ever had at an absolutely critical time. If we leave the EU, how we behave on equivalence in the coming months will shape the context of any negotiation on the economic future of the UK, this being its most important economic sector and a major contributor to taxes and jobs. It is pivotal to the economy, yet the Treasury alone will make many of these key decisions. All we have for context are the comments in the political declaration. I will not repeat discussions we had earlier today, but those comments are exceedingly limited and give very little sense of direction.

To make matters almost worse, it is quite clear in the SI that, beyond that period, future decisions will be made through negative SIs—not through some policy framework in this House, engagement with your Lordships in broad debate or extensive consultation, but through the negative procedure. That will make it even harder for us to be engaged in the process. I can tell the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that all the Brexit issues we are dealing with lead to the massive democratic deficit of great concern to many of us.

[Lord Deben]

Did the noble Baroness notice that my noble friend said, “I think we may have had influence”? Is it not true that we have been at the centre of these discussions and that the European Union is much more transparent and open when it comes to them than the British Government have ever been—certainly more so than the Government now propose to be under these statutory instruments?

[Baroness Kramer]

I can only agree. We have major transparency problems. I am working on the Trade Bill; it is unconscionable that we do not have available to us information that the EU would not only put automatically on a website but constantly report back on, with discussion between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament.

Let us set that aside so I can move on with this particular instrument. I reinforce the concerns about the impact assessment. I must say that the consolidated impact assessment discussed by my noble friend Lord Sharkey contains three pages dedicated exclusively to this SI—I am sure that the Minister will point that out—but anyone who cares to read it will discover that, although it is usefully descriptive, telling us a bit more about the instrument, what used to happen in the EU and what will happen under this instrument, it cannot be called three pages of impact assessment. It does not even attempt to monetise the impact and give us a sense of the costs and the value of the benefits—that is beyond it—and it never deals with the risks in any way. Never in my commercial life have I seen impact assessments that did not assess risk—but these do not even begin to do so.

That is very disappointing, particularly for the businesses which will be picking this up. They want to make sure that this SI goes through, because anything that reduces uncertainty in any area where there is not a cliff edge will be of great value to the relevant businesses—but, my goodness, they would have welcomed something much richer in terms of the discussion to give them some forward vision rather than one that just deals with the very short period of time that will immediately follow departure under a no-deal scenario. I find that very frustrating and a real weakness in the way in which impact assessments are being dealt with here.

That takes me to perhaps the last issue that I will address, which was touched on to some degree by my noble friend Lady Bowles. There is very little discussion in any of this about what I call reciprocity. In order for equivalence for the industry to be able to function without any kind of cliff edge in no deal, not only does the UK need to provide equivalence but the EU needs to grant equivalence as well. In many instances it has not done so, but it may do so in the future. My interpretation is that at the moment it is doing so only in areas where it thinks that not granting equivalence would cause financial instability, rather than looking at broader market access issues.

I take this as a real shot across the bows that we need to take on board, framing the EU intent as to where it will take future negotiations in this area. That is important and I am rather concerned that the Government do not deal with those kinds of issues in this impact assessment, because an honest discussion of that is crucial for businesses as they use the product and everything that we are printing to try to understand what the context is going forward. It has made me feel very gloomy that we will see a much more fragmented set of financial services. I am sure that London will remain a crucial global centre, but I can see the way in which the pattern is developing. It will have some very significant rivals that will take away very significant pieces of business. Over the long term that has real consequences for the UK.

In all that we have here there is one last issue which perhaps the Minister would address, because it could be my deficiency in reading all of this. At the moment we know that third countries operate, as it were, within the EU because the EU has granted them equivalence. As I understand it, the UK will be granting identical equivalence under this SI for the day that we leave if it is a no-deal scenario. But I am unclear about how many of those third countries are granting us reciprocal equivalence. Not only do we have questions about in which areas the EU is granting us third-country equivalence, I am not clear where we stand, for example, in terms of the US. Will we be granting the US equivalence using exactly the same pattern as that of the EU currently? It is not clear whether the US is granting us equivalence and on what terms—and that is just one of the many different countries with which we have built up a kind of network through mutual equivalence that has been established over the years.

Equivalence is extraordinarily complex. It is not a matter of a simple one-hour discussion about four or five easy to understand factors. It is exceedingly complex, it often comes with conditions and it may be limited in a whole variety of ways such as by time and by content. It may have many issues attached to it, and therefore negotiating new equivalence arrangements from scratch would concern me a great deal. I say that in particular because of what we have seen with some of the trade deals, where Liam Fox was absolutely confident that we could take existing trade deals between the EU and the 71 other countries with whom we had free trade agreements and roll them over. He has now been woken to the fact that most of those countries see this as an ideal opportunity to improve their position and to renegotiate. It has become a much slower, much more difficult and much more complex process. I want to try to understand where we are with our equivalence agreements, because potentially the situation is exactly the same. It is very different having an equivalence agreement to have access to the market in the UK from having access to a market of 500 million people. I do not know how many of these equivalence agreements are in play.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall be brief on this instrument and brief to the point of extinction on some of the others. I wish I thought that that would have any significant impact on the length of the debates we are going to have, but I fear that my brevity may be somewhat wasted tonight.

Every time we look at a bunch of these instruments, I hope to be forgiven for making the simple, formal statement that I regret being here doing these SIs. Her Majesty’s Government should rule out no deal. The Prime Minister is behaving irresponsibly in not doing so, but unfortunately no deal seems increasingly possible. From my limited understanding of history, most bad things that have taken place were by accident. Unfortunately we have a Government who are playing a game of chicken and hoping that the EU will blink first without realising that one of the outcomes of a game of chicken is mutual disaster. Accordingly, we will not obstruct Her Majesty’s Government’s legislation in preparing for no deal because it is a genuine probability. It was good that at least one speaker in the debate—I think that it was the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull—pointed out that industry needs these SIs in order to get on with its business.

Virtually all the Treasury SIs have three parts. They tend to transfer functions, to transfer references, and to have a little policy where a decision has to be made if it is not self-evident where the status quo lies. This SI is similar. Its substance is set out in Regulation 2(1), which states:

“The Treasury may, by direction”,


and so on. In the Explanatory Memorandum there is a very important statement on this power:

“It provides ministers with a temporary power, for up to twelve months after exit day, to make equivalence directions and exemption directions for the EU and EEA member states. This power is intended to be used only in cases where it is necessary to make equivalence decisions for the EU and EEA member states quickly and efficiently to support UK market activity and the continuity of cross-border business”.


Unfortunately, nowhere in the SI is that assurance made. There is no limitation on the powers in the statutory instrument itself. As a minimum I hope that the Minister will repeat the essence of what is in the Explanatory Memorandum and assure us that this power is designed to be very limited. As I understand it, the power can be and in fact will be used after exit day. What I would value is if the Minister could explain the parliamentary process that will be associated with it because, so far as I can see, it boils down to nothing. I assume it just boils down to a Written Ministerial Statement. I hope that he can give us some more comfort that whenever this power is used, we will know about it and that he will be making a statement of some kind.

Finally, towards the end of Regulation 2—one usually runs out of energy before one gets to the end of these—paragraph (6) states:

“The power of the Treasury under paragraph (1) includes the power to revoke or vary an equivalence direction at any time”.


Could the Minister make it clear whether that paragraph dies after 12 months, like the power in paragraph (1)? The power to revoke or vary an equivalence direction—which seems almost as powerful as the power to create a direction—is pretty important and should die at the same time as the power in Regulation 2(1).

I will not make any other general comments, other than to note that all the SIs this evening, as far as I can tell, do not have reciprocity. The whole issue of the negative impact that leaving without an agreement brings is that there is no reciprocity. All we can do is create the rules that allow us to make the move towards the EU, and we have to hope the EU sees the sense in making reciprocal powers. This is just one more reason why crashing out of the EU is a thoroughly stupid thing to do.

[Lord Bates]

We could probably start with agreement across the House in saying that that is certainly something the Government do not want to happen. There is a very easy way for the noble Lord to ensure that that does not happen: to ensure that his colleagues support the deal before the House. This would then be unnecessary. This is not in any shape or form an objective this Government relish. It is a possibility that any prudent Government must prepare for. That is its status—nothing more, nothing less.

Given that we are going to be in for five substantial debates tonight, I will set one thing in context at the beginning. I will not cover some of the points, because I know they will come up in later debates, so I will try to not test the patience of the House by repeating answers five times to five different SIs. I will try to keep them as concise as possible so we can move through them at some pace.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, as the official spokesman for the Liberal Democrats and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, as the official spokesman for the Opposition, for stating their intent to let this legislation go through, because they recognise that—whatever their concerns—there is a greater concern to ensure that there is a functional statute book in the unlikely event of no deal. I recognise that responsible approach, and I am sure it will be welcomed by the industry. The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, spoke from that perspective.

I want to put this on record, because I think it is really important. In their presentations the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, set out brilliantly and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, set out extremely well—and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey—the outstanding work that the Parliament and the Commission did in regulation. The UK has been a leader, an influencer and a shaper of regulation. It really has been a good process. Every single one of the SIs we are dealing with through this entire process has gone through that scrutiny. We are not dealing with something that has never been thought of before; this already exists and has been subject to scrutiny—not only in the Parliament but, let us not forget, in another important group that does incredible work in this House: the European Union Committee and its six sub-committees. They scrutinise all the regulations and directives that come out. Then we had the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, in which we said—because it included a revocation of the European Communities Act 1972—that we needed to bring a lot on to the statute book. That is what we are doing: bringing on SIs, directives and regulations from the EU that have been subject to scrutiny by a UK Minister, the European Parliament and your Lordships’ House in the sub-committees, at the instruction of Section 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. Many of us recall the long and painful process of that working its way through the House. I looked it up: we spent 10 hours on Section 8, which gives us the powers and sets up the process we are now following.

The idea is sometimes presented that somehow what we are doing here is bringing onshore a whole load of stuff that we have never prepared for and that industry has not had any clue about dealing with. Industry is working with it, and we are now bringing it onshore. The process by which we deal with new regulations in future—the point made by the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Leigh—is something we need to look at. What we are doing at the moment is bringing across what is already in existence and has already been considered through a rigorous process, and putting it on the UK statute book.

[Baroness Kramer]

Perhaps this is my misunderstanding, but as I read the SI I did not have the understanding that the Treasury, following exit day with no deal, would be able to act only in exact accordance with the pre-existing rules established under European directives but that it could make fresh and new decisions to revoke, effectively amend or make new decisions for a 12-month period; a process would appear at some point in that time that was not Treasury-only, but it would be structured around a negative SI. I thought that was part of this whole package.

[Lord Bates]

The powers the Treasury will have are the powers the Commission currently has. The Commission cannot have them because we will have left the EU without a deal. Somebody therefore has to have them, and it goes to the Treasury because that is the equivalent body. Where the European markets authority was the regulator, that is transferred to the regulator here. We are simply doing all the things the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has said at least two dozen times when we have discussed these points. He looks to see if we are actually following the rules as set down in Section 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. That is what we are doing. We are not making substantial policy changes, just correcting deficiencies and making fixes. The noble Baroness is absolutely right; that is the process.

[Baroness Kramer]

I accept what the Minister says. The Treasury in effect becomes the Commission, but without the checks and balances that normally exist on the Commission because we do not have the democratic process. That is the only point I am trying to make.

[Lord Bates]

I know the noble Baroness is seeking to make a point, but the Treasury does have a representative in your Lordships’ House. I know the noble Lord, Lord Deben, thinks, with the Chief Whip present, that I will be here today, gone tomorrow. That may well be the case.

Official Listing of Securities, Prospectus and Transparency (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Monday 18th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Distinguished lawyers.

[The Earl of Kinnoull]

Yes, I am sorry, we have now decided that they are distinguished lawyers—and others of the huge number of advisory people in London who help people get access to capital. There were a lot of notes in November and more in December, and what is interesting is that they have all been positive on this SI. So I am not sure what a full consultation would have produced in excess of the current SI. Anyway, that is what we have, and I very much hope that it too will sail through shortly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

This is a separate debate. The noble Lord is moving his amendment, expressing regret from your Lordships’ House that there has been no consultation with industry on this measure. That is what his amendment says, as my noble friend Lord Bridges pointed out. I am not trying to raise the temperature to the same level as perhaps existed earlier in the Chamber; I am trying to maintain it at a level where we are focusing on the legitimate scrutiny which the noble Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, are applying to this process. My noble friend Lord Bridges talked about UK Finance; I was about to quote TheCityUK.

[Baroness Kramer]

I thank the Minister but he is rapidly losing me. Had the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, not raised it just now, I would not have known that we are about to give approval for the issuance in the UK of Venezuelan sovereign bonds. That may not have been of particular interest to TheCityUK or UK Finance because of the way in which they look at the world, but I suggest that, had we had a 12-week public consultation, somebody would have come in with that information, which might have been of great interest to this House and created some pressure on government to re-examine that provision and clause. While industry bodies are crucial, there are many other stakeholders with an interest which by necessity have apparently been excluded from this process so far. Underscoring their importance is the issue in front of us today.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

To allow the House to make progress on this, I will seek some advice on that point.

[Baroness Kramer]

Is there any hope that there might be some in-flight information on this? I had understood, from listening to this debate, that this is not a rollover of the current rules; it is a way to make the rules more palatable—presumably to many of the Brexit community—by saying, “We will recognise that EEA state organisations do not have to use prospectuses, but don’t worry, we’re not treating them as special, we’re now going to allow it for every other country, even if they don’t have equivalence”. That is a policy shift. All I am saying is that a consultation would surely have surfaced that issue and the Government would have dealt with it in a different way.

Benchmarks (Amendment and Transitional Provision) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Monday 18th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

My Lords, the same issues basically apply on this regulation as on the last and I am not going to repeat the arguments. However, I would like to ask the noble Lord a question about the impact assessment which is published alongside the instrument. The costs in respect of this benchmark regulation, although considerable for each individual firm at £520, are less considerable overall because it is a much smaller number of firms. However, the footnotes to the impact assessment say:

“This refers to the current number of approved benchmark administrators. Given the regime is not yet fully in force, we expect this number may increase”.


Can the Minister give some indication of what level the number is expected to increase to? Again, I am not familiar with this sector and I do not know whether we are talking about it increasing by dozens or hundreds. However, I would like to get some sense of whether the total burden which this regulation alone is going to impose on the sector is in the thousands of pounds or the millions of pounds. It would be useful to have the figures. I would be grateful if the noble Lord could tell us what the estimate is, as the new benchmarks regime comes into place, of how these numbers will increase, so that we can put on the record a more accurate sense of what the actual burden is going to be.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I have a really serious question that I want to put to the Minister. I am concerned that one of the effects of this SI—I am not going to oppose it because I think that we have no choice but to allow it through—is to separate ESMA from the UK regulators of benchmarks administered in the UK. In this House and elsewhere, and I am sure that I have said it myself, we frequently talk about the excellence of UK regulators, but I am afraid that the history of the UK regulation of benchmarks is one where we frankly have to hang our heads in shame. The Libor scandal, which was finally exposed six or seven years ago, had clearly been a scandal in play for at least a decade. It represented a prolonged period in which Libor particularly, but other benchmarks as well, was being manipulated by the banks to achieve particular outcomes.

The regulator did not identify the problem and, when the regulators decided that they must act after much of this was exposed—primarily by US regulators and in the US media—found that at the time it was not even illegal to manipulate a benchmark in the UK. Consequently, the regulators were pretty powerless. I think that a couple of people have been brought to account, but very few of those who were engaged in or knew about this process—and certainly not the raft of senior management that benefited from the exceptional profits that led to higher pay for chief executives and others, year after year. It was a huge scandal.

Immediately after the scandal was exposed, the United States took the view that the UK regulators were so weak and so essentially complicit in this area that the US itself, particular for any dollar-denominated transactions, should become the locus of benchmarks. Obviously the UK fought back, because it is an iconic role seen as significant to underpinning the UK’s status as a global player in financial services. While I do not know many of the details, I believe that the link to ESMA—the reassurance that there is more than one set of regulator eyes covering the way in which benchmarks have been administrated—has been important in keeping the primary benchmarks in play in London.

I understand that the role of this SI is to say that benchmarks administered in the EU can still be used in the UK—that is almost the sole purpose. But, as I say, I am concerned that the future standing of the UK as the locus of most of the benchmarks used across the globe in nearly every transaction, no matter where that transaction takes place, is potentially undermined by the kind of separation that the Minister has just described. Is he aware of any aggressive moves by the United States to say that the situation is changing? We now have the UK regulator standing alone once again. We certainly hear from the UK a great deal of language about how regulation needs to become lighter touch and should not be so heavy-handed, and how we should be much more inclined to allow greater risk taking and greater profit taking. Will this become the occasion where the United States acts to use its weight, its authority and its legislative force to try to undermine London as a locus? Should there be something in the whole language that surrounds this of an ongoing co-operation and element of supervision that continues to involve ESMA to provide a defence for London in this arena?

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I have a great respect for the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, as I heard him many times answering questions as a Minister. The answers were always clear and a full answer to what he was asked. I also remember his difficult time as a Minister of State in the Department for Education, struggling with the impediments being placed to the implementation of his policy by judicial reviews, which he described in one of his books. But I have listened to a good number of these debates we have been having recently, and I regret to say that I cannot agree with the way in which he approaches this matter. I think that this is all part of the decision to leave the EU that the electorate took, advising Parliament that they wished that to happen.

Industry generally, and the financial industry in particular, is well aware of the situations that may arise as a result of that. Therefore, I would expect representatives to get in touch with the Treasury, for example, if they had any concerns in relation to these instruments. I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, has had any communication from any financial services people as to whether or not they would like him to succeed in his amendment to decline to approve these regulations.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Kinnoull (CB)]

It is a pleasure to follow that stream of logic, with which I agree entirely.

I wish to say two things. The Explanatory Memorandum was published initially on 23 November, so we are now in the 87th day after that. It generated a great deal of comment, which was widely circulated to people who were interested. Again I rang round various people in the course of the past few days and no one has raised any objection to this. In fact, everyone has said how important it is.

In answer partly to what the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, I notice that paragraph 2.6 of the Explanatory Memorandum states:

“Without these provisions, the FCA would not have an effective framework designed to prevent benchmark manipulation in the UK, affecting the integrity and attractiveness of the UK’s financial markets”.


The Explanatory Memorandum is right behind the noble Baroness in her point about the necessity of having the benchmarks properly looked after.

I have looked at a list of all the benchmarks and it is worth saying that many of them have been invented here in London—they are British—and so it is unsurprising that the naughty behaviour took place here and that the skills lie with our own regulators to prevent misbehaviour.

[Baroness Kramer]

Part of the problem is that it was not our regulators that identified years of benchmark manipulation but the US regulator and the US media. We need to be clear about that. Our regulators came in late in the day and only after a huge amount of pressure and exposure.

Secondly, while banks were manipulating Libor and some of the foreign currency exchange rates in order to increase their profits to suit certain circumstances, they were doing it, they thought, quite openly. People were shouting at each other across various trading floors that X would like the benchmark set here and Y bank would prefer it to be set there and whether they could do them a favour. The Bank of England was then implicated in instructing various banks to manipulate the rate at the time of the financial crisis in order to disguise from the wider market how difficult banks were finding it to raise financing. So, rather than reporting the actual rate they were being offered in the market, they were reporting a lower rate to suggest that they were being looked at more favourably; and because the Bank of England saw this as necessary for financial stability, it is itself implicated in some of the manipulation.

One of the concerns that I have that underlies this is that the FCA will be in a position with this SI to be the administrator, but it now becomes the sole administrator rather than one working in partnership with other EU administrators. That could lead to a vulnerability, with the challenge coming not from the EU but from the United States.

[The Earl of Kinnoull]

Thank you for that. I do not want to be the defence attorney for the regulators but the FCA would argue that it did not have the relevant powers beforehand. However, I shall not go there.

Again, this will be the effective framework to enable the FCA to do that work. Without this SI there is no framework.

At the end of the paragraph in the Explanatory Memorandum headed “Why is it being changed?” it states:

“If this instrument were not made, there would be significant market uncertainty among UK and third country providers over whether they would still need to be compliant by 2020, and among users over which benchmark they could lawfully use”.


In other words, it is a complete mess. The size of the markets that are affected by these benchmarks is vast. I am not sure that I quite understand the reasoning behind the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, to decline these regulations. It seems he is trying to take aim at a government process and is actually clobbering the City. I feel that is wrong and I very much hope he will not press his amendment.

Financial Services Contracts (Transitional and Saving Provision) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Monday 11th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bates, for his introduction. Just in case, I will declare my interest as a director of the London Stock Exchange Group plc; obviously, this would not affect the exchange, but I guess that it could be relevant to some of our competitors. Perhaps it would have been useful if we could have had one of those flow diagrams like the ones you make when you are trying to create your algorithm, to see the way through this. I will try to do that in my own little way, but it will have to be with words.

It seems that any passporting firm that provides services at the moment can continue by going into the temporary permissions regime, and then it can either become authorised or can bounce out of that regime because it will not go for a permanent authorisation; that has been contained mainly in things that we have dealt with previously. When we come to this provision, which is quite useful, those that are not intended to continue to be authorised indefinitely can either go into the supervised run-off, which does what it says on the tin in that they continue to be supervised here, or they can go into the contractual run-off, which relies on their home member state because they do not have an entity here. So you go into the supervised one when there is a branch here and you go into the contractual one if you do not have a branch here. That is clear.

However, I wonder what is going on when you might start to yo-yo between one and the other. It says that you can go from the SRO into the CRO; I suppose I could understand that if the branch closed down, so that it was going to be doing it remotely—is that how it is envisaged? What would cause the regulator to move it from the SRO into the CRO? Obviously, if there is a branch and you are in a run-off, there may come a point at which you say, “Hey, I want to close this branch and disappear”—so that seems to be one reason why you might need it. I was not quite clear why you might want to go the other way, from the CRO into the SRO, if there is no entity here to regulate—I cannot see that a branch would be invented. I could not quite understand why one would go in that direction.

Then there seemed to be a carve-out of some of the more important organisations, such as fund managers, trustees and depositories, and I can understand that they have to go into the temporary permissions regime—I agree with that. We are then probably dealing here on the markets side with smaller organisations. However, I was not quite sure how long they could be hanging around for. It says that it could be five years after entry into the regime; then it says that that is whether they enter on exit day or enter after having been in the TPR. So if they have been in the TPR, which is a year but which can keep on being extended, is there an end stop? Could some of these be hanging around for about 10 years, if the TPR was extended a few times and then they went into the SRO and the CRO for another five years? That seems a long time; I would have thought that five years for the combination might have been enough.

I was thinking that when of course I got to the parts such as those on the trade repositories and CCPs, where the PRA is in charge. There it is a much stricter regime, and quite rightly so, because you are looking here at market infrastructure and potentially bigger effects. However, there it will be a non-extendable period of one year or, in the second scenario, if they have been in the temporary permissions previously, the recognition may be adjusted—but, again, it will be no longer than one year. So it looks like they have been thinking around the problem I have related with regard to the market side of things. So that was in sharp contrast. My only concern was for how long as a maximum an organisation could be in the TPR and then in one of the run-off situations, because it does not make that clear.

Apart from that, I have no particular comment, and obviously it seems to be a very sensible provision to have made for the benefit of the stability of business that is going on in the UK. It would be very welcome if we knew that there was reciprocity in the rest of the EU for this, and it would be even better if we did not have to do it at all—but I suppose it is making the best of things in the circumstances.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I have just one quick question to follow on from the comments of my colleague, who is so much better versed in this than me. It struck me that we seem to have one timetable proposed by the FCA and a different one proposed by the PRA, without an awful lot of logic as to why one takes one approach and the other takes another. Are these two regulators working completely independently and sending over their various paragraphs that then get incorporated into the statutory instrument, or is there some coherent framework? If the regulators are not working together, what can we do to make sure that they will? It will be complicated enough for business without trying to work out which regulator is thinking which way. I would assume—I do not know—that some entities find that they face both regulators. Why the difference under the new rules that each regulator is bringing forward?

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, it may have been exhaustion, but when I got to this SI, I concluded that it was all really quite straightforward. Having listened to the previous speeches, I am not so sure.

The SI seems to be summed up in paragraph 2.8, and it seems to me to be about run-offs in various areas. As far as I could see, the promises in paragraph 2.8 were carried through in the references to the various areas.

I, too, have some second-order questions about why the time limits were different, but I must admit that I comforted myself with the sure and certain knowledge that if any of them became in the least bit difficult, the Government would introduce an SI to change them anyway, so I did not overburden myself with that.

Paragraph 12.6 states that an impact assessment will be published alongside the Explanatory Memorandum. It has escaped me if it has, so I should be grateful if the Minister would tell me whether one has been published. If it has, I suppose it is my responsibility to find it; if it has not, a further apology on this matter will be gratefully received.

Finance (No. 3) Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 7th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, this is one of those occasions when much of the work has been done for me by the excellent preceding speeches. If we go back to the Budget that underpins this Finance Bill, I agree completely with the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, that it was not an announcement of the end of austerity; that was some clever PR language. If we look, we can see that it comprised a number of short-term fixes for crises in social security and social care, and a scattering of money for potholes, schools and the police. Past cuts in universal credit from 2015 were only halved, not removed, and further welfare cuts were left in place. Other than for the protected budgets of the NHS, defence and overseas development, every department continues to face cuts of the equivalent of 3% per person up to 2023. Austerity is definitely ongoing; the Budget was not an end of austerity by the greatest stretch of the imagination. Even though core protected areas such as the NHS got additional money, that was a completely lost opportunity to put in a dedicated future source of revenue for the NHS with something like the 1p in the pound that we called for in hypothecated financing for the NHS and social care. There was so much that the Government could have done and nothing like the end of austerity that they advertised.

In that Budget and the Finance Bill I very much support the cuts in the threshold for low-income earners but, as I said at the time, I find it incomprehensible that the threshold has been raised for the kick-in of the higher rate of tax, in effect giving a break to higher-income earners. I do not understand why the Government thought it was either necessary or important, because everyone I have talked to who is going to benefit from that increase in the higher-rate threshold—I suspect that many people in this House know individuals in the same situation—would much rather that funding had gone to help people who are homeless on our streets in extraordinary numbers, or who have been suffering from universal credit. I have friends who have suffered enormously from the five-week hiatus before they get their first payment, practically living on handouts. We have so many fundamental issues in this country that to make a cut such as that at this point in time seems incomprehensible. I even noticed that Westminster Council—a Conservative council if ever there was one—is asking band H ratepayers on a voluntary basis to double the amount of council tax that they pay in order to help homeless people in crisis in Westminster. That basically says to the Government that they have completely misunderstood where the British public are on an issue such as this.

I agree completely with the noble Baroness, Lady Quin, and the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos. The noble Baroness talked about the pall that Brexit hangs over everything. We will undoubtedly have a new Budget and Finance Bill at some point in the near future, no matter what happens, other than a decision not to proceed with Brexit. Whatever form of Brexit that we proceed with, as discussions earlier today made clear, it is having such a wide impact on the economy as a whole that this issue will have to be completely revisited shortly, which makes this debate frustrating because we know that change is coming very rapidly.

I endorse every aspect of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull. I also have the privilege to be a member of the Finance Bill Sub-Committee of the Economic Affairs Committee and to pursue its two investigations into making VAT digital and into the powers of HMRC, and I am glad that there will be an opportunity to debate those in great detail in this House. Because of that, I am not going to add anything more on making VAT digital, other than to say that it is beyond me why HMRC has not understood the plight of SMEs facing the changes that are coming upon them with pretty much no warning, no testing and relatively limited opportunity to even be able to cope. In the long term it is actually a very sensible change, but implementation matters—something that this Government frequently miss—and implementing badly, too early and without proper preparation under- mines even the most sensible of policies.

I shall focus for a couple of minutes on the loan charge. I share what I read as the outrage of the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, on this issue. That outrage is widely felt, with more than 120 Members of the other place—completely cross-party; there is no partisan aspect to this—signing an Early Day Motion in protest, and then the Motion tabled by my colleague in the other place, Sir Edward Davey, to force the Government into reviewing the impact of what they are doing.

People do not entirely understand that the massive impact of the loan charge action by HMRC stems from the move in the UK towards outsourcing. Local government, government departments including HMRC, and public bodies such as the BBC, under pressure, sought to cut their costs by no longer employing people on a range of tasks but outsourcing the work to self-employed contractors. They did not do it because they were going to change the people doing these activities but because they saw there was a tax arbitrage. They would be freed from paying national insurance contributions and those who were self-employed could take advantage of a variety of tax schemes, which meant that they could reduce their hourly rates because they reduced their tax liability. In that way, local government and government departments, including HMRC, the BBC and others, were able to bring down their costs.

It is absolutely outrageous that the Government are now turning on these individuals, who basically had no option but to follow the pattern offered to them in order to continue to work. If you were a social worker, you were made redundant and were told that you could continue to be a social worker, provided that you signed up with one of three agencies and signed the forms it gave you. You could have the same job back on Monday and do the same activity for the same take-home pay. None of those people knew they were being put into some kind of disguised remuneration scheme. The real question is: why did their employers not know this? Consider the IT consultants who work for HMRC; anybody who was not part of one of these loan schemes would price themselves out of the opportunity to win the work. The situation is absolute nonsense.

To me, this is a very good example of a weakness that occurs because Finance Bills are not properly scrutinised in this House. When these schemes were identified as disguised remuneration in 2011, the change—the prohibition, in a sense—was initially to be forward-looking, which makes absolute sense. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, that these schemes were not appropriate and I think we all agree that they should have been brought to an end. However, in 2017, with almost no scrutiny or discussion and with pretty much nobody in the other place realising what they were doing, the change in the language effectively allowed the Government, or HMRC, to behave retrospectively. I know it says this is not retrospective, but I think it is, by any definition.

People are now being told that they owe taxes for the past 20 years, which are all to be paid in one year. If they manage to negotiate a deal, they might have five years to pay. For most, the sums they owe are bigger than their entire income. They certainly do not allow them to continue to pay a mortgage or to eat; many of the people are retired. We are in the most extraordinary circumstances. These are small people and the Government must take this opportunity to take the burden off those folks. According to the Loan Charge Action Group, there are 100,000 ordinary people, who we would know and recognise, who work in our communities, who suddenly find themselves falling foul of this law.

What makes this even more outrageous is that if people appeal against this process and reach the end stage—getting a final notice from HMRC and trying to appeal that—they might find themselves paying not only the back tax or penalty but a 60% surcharge on the penalty. To discourage appeals, if you appeal and lose, you pay HMRC a penalty for having brought the appeal in the first place. This is absolutely outrageous and needs to be fixed, so I hope that everybody here, including those on the Government Front Bench, will put a great deal of pressure on Mel Stride to recognise the problem and deal with it promptly.

Brexit: Outstanding Commitments

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Wednesday 6th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I thoroughly agree with everything the Minister just said: if we do not honour an obligation that we signed up to, we will have difficulty negotiating a sensible deal with the EU. Does he also recognise that the way we handle this is being watched around the globe? If we are seen as people who do not meet obligations—trying to find some technical angle or way to weasel out of a commitment that we have made—we will have no chance of getting future trade agreements of any value.

[Lord Bates]

The noble Baroness is right. We need to remember that our net contribution, because of the way it is calculated, is made up not just of what the UK sends to the European Commission but of what the European Commission sends to the UK. Therefore, there are two parties to this; both are making contributions, and both need to honour their obligations. We believe that the financial settlement does just that.

Trade Bill

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, the hour is late and a large number of amendments are being debated. I shall not touch on more than one or two. I was impressed by the mention by my noble friends Lady McIntosh and Lord Risby of Amendment 48, on the tripartite agreement. I declare an interest because my brother-in-law is a racehorse trainer near Newbury and he is worried that he will not be able to move his staff and horses round Ireland and France as is necessary for his business. I see no reason why this agreement should not be grandfathered through because it existed before the European Union was founded. I fear, as my noble friend Lord Risby also intimated, that the tentacles of the European state have already embraced Ireland and France to such an extent that they will not have the freedom unilaterally to decide to continue the agreement. I hope, though, that our United Kingdom will have such freedom after Brexit but perhaps we can find a way to preserve this tripartite agreement for the future.

It is clear that all of us would like as little disruption to current arrangements as possible, but most of these amendments should not be in this Bill. They have nothing whatever to do with its purpose. I simply wish to comment on Amendment 55, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who has not, I believe, spoken to it. Does she not realise that the City of London has suffered from the imposition of several barriers to trade in financial services as a result of having been forced to implement some new European regulations in recent years, such as parts of MiFID II, AIFMD and others? One of the benefits of Brexit is that the City will be free to adopt proportionate and sensible regulation that will enhance its business in years to come.

Brexit also provides an opportunity for the UK to play an enhanced role in the development of proportionate regulation at the global level, balancing the need to protect the consumer and the environment against the requirement to provide an innovation-friendly environment that will enable us to abandon some of the more cumbersome and restrictive parts of the European regulatory regime to which we have become progressively shackled and which is, in places, more about harmonisation and protectionism than about the genuine protection of consumers.

I shall give one example. I have known the chief executive of a Japanese pharmaceutical company for more than 30 years. He told me that when Brexit came along he was not happy, but he has spent more than $8 million upgrading his European network and is now confident that he will be able to research, manufacture and distribute medicines in both the UK and EU27 after Brexit, just as he does now, on whatever basis we leave. He told me that now that he has spent the money, he would like to see the upside of Brexit. He says that the upside is that he expects us to return to what I believe is a more natural state for this country, in which we will have a less cumbersome regulatory regime that will be more helpful for a life sciences company such as his to innovate in new therapies, new drugs and new medicines. What worries me is that, although we are about to leave the European Union, we will, through this type of amendment, promise to continue to align entirely with EU regulation, which in places relies too much on the precautionary principle, and in that case there will be absolutely no upside to leaving. Therefore, we must have a balance here.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, perhaps it is sensible to come in right after the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, following that invitation. I will try to be brief.

Amendment 55 stands in my name. In the past two and a half years I have been shocked by how little attention has been paid to financial services and to what would happen to our access to the EU 27 in the field of financial services after any Brexit. I do not suppose that I have to rehearse for this Committee the significance of this industry. It accounts for something like 80% of GDP; it pays £76 billion a year in taxes, which support our National Health Service; and it has created 2 million jobs spread over the country. It is absolutely critical but has been very largely ignored. I make a plea to the Government that they should begin to get serious about financial services and understand their significance.

If I were to describe the industry in the UK, it basically breaks into thirds. Financial services range all the way from the smallest fintech companies, through insurance, asset management and banks, right up to the global sector of the London Stock Exchange and the London Clearing House. It is huge and varied, but roughly a third is domestic-facing and relatively untouched by Brexit.

About a third is intensely based on the industry’s EU 27 clientele. About half of that business has already gone or is in the process of leaving, and if anyone speaks to government on a day when they are being honest, basically they do not think that we have much chance of keeping much of that one-third in the UK over the medium term and certainly not over the long term.

We come to the final third, which is absolutely critical and where the decisions made in the coming weeks and months will have a great impact. I refer to the global piece, which one could think of in a way as being bigger than but represented by the London Stock Exchange and the London Clearing House. The future of that final global third has a real question mark hanging over it.

I say to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, that London is a global centre partly due to its long-standing experience and partly due to good regulation, but critical to it is that it is the global financial centre for the euro—the second most significant global currency. That is what underpins London and its global role. Unfortunately, in all finance, where we know that risk exists, the ultimate protection and backstop in a time of risk is liquidity, and for all euro-denominated transactions that source of final liquidity is the European Central Bank. Therefore, from a European perspective, to be exposed to that level of risk, which is in euro trillions, with no ability to control the regulation, monitoring or supervision of a major global financial centre is really serious and significant.

I believe that fundamentally the Government have never looked at this issue from a European perspective and that they completely underestimate the medium and long-term interest in the European Union in pulling back much of that activity to an area where it can regulate, monitor and supervise because it carries the ultimate risk. Suggestions that have come from the City, which have been kicked around in government and in this House, have come largely from a very small Brexiteer think tank. I know the people well and have been to many of their meetings.

[Viscount Trenchard]

I totally agree that the bulk of the settlement of euro-denominated transactions takes place in London but, in a similar way, London is the most important centre for the settlement of offshore dollar-denominated securities—or even renminbi, or yen. That is because London is the leading global financial market in the world. I have not seen any moves by the United States Fed or Japan’s FSA to try to repatriate London’s role in their currency securities.

[Baroness Kramer]

I assure the noble Viscount that from the perspective of the dollar, far more of the transactions clear through New York. It is a bigger market. I know we often say that we are the largest, but if we look at the table comparisons, New York is frankly bigger. Certainly, dollar dominance is exercised through New York. The yen is less of a controversial player, and there are not a lot of renminbi. If anybody thinks that China is going to allow its currency to develop a real global presence and not be regulated, monitored and supervised by the Chinese state, they have missed any understanding of how China works. We are convenient but temporary, and we need to recognise that.

People talk about the growing market, but essentially the global markets function in the dollar, the euro and—in the future—the renminbi. They will not function in small African or South American currencies. Those are not players; they are minor currencies. Sterling is treated by the industry as a minor currency. There are two, and there will be three, major currencies that essentially underpin global activity. At the moment one is dominated by New York and the other by London—and the one dominated by London is the euro.

What worries me is that the think tanks that have been going through this process have an underlying conceit and arrogance, and imagine that somehow we are fundamentally and in the long-term superior, that no one else will have the capabilities that we have, and that in the end, Europe needs us more than we need Europe. But Europe works on a five to 10-year strategy to gradually bring back choice pieces of that industry—and we can see it.

I have a real question for the Minister in all this. The right-wing think tank came up with a solution called “mutual recognition”, which basically required the European Union to change how it made regulation and to change its legal framework completely. The think tank thought that was entirely reasonable. It was irrational, and has been abandoned. The Government have finally recognised that it was complete nonsense. There is now an idea that third-country equivalence could be the mechanism that will apply. However, we all know that third-country equivalence can be cancelled for no reason at 29 days’ notice. That is a very unstable way to provide access for a key industry.

Various attempts have been made, but little thought, effort, discussion or energy has gone into trying to find solutions. I am exceedingly worried about that. Looking at that global sector that I talked about, as I understand it, the European Union has provided an equivalence ruling for the London Clearing House for 12 months only. I am sure that it will extend the ruling beyond that—but it is a message. I understand that, as of this moment, no equivalence has been put in place for the London Stock Exchange. Again, that may come, and it may come very much at the last minute. But there is a deep message in all this. I make a real plea to the Government to take our amendment seriously and to recognise that they will have to get totally engaged and make some real compromises—I suspect around their own red lines. If they do not, they will be making absolutely sure that, over five to 10 years, significant parts of the industry will be sucked back into very capable hands in Frankfurt, Paris and Amsterdam.

This is not an instant crisis, although there may be some areas of instant crisis. But it is an area where the Government need to move now, and not lock themselves into a position from which they will see this industry, not perhaps disappear altogether, but lose its global leadership, when they could, with more intelligence and flexibility, have provided some degree of protection.

[Baroness Hooper (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise for being tail-end Charlie in this discussion—at least, I hope I am. I agree that this is a very important group of amendments. I shall concentrate particularly on Amendment 39 because that is the overarching amendment giving mutual recognition of qualifications, which has been so important for frictionless commercial activities and relationships throughout our membership of the European Union. I trust and hope that the mutual recognition and—dare I say it?—harmonisation to some extent of professional qualifications will be able to continue, to give the continuity to which my noble friend Lord Lansley referred, but also, for example, in the field of education, where university qualifications and degrees have been based on mutual recognition of qualifications and the ability to work in professional fields in more than one country.

My own interest in this is that as a solicitor I went to work in Paris in 1973, a year after we joined the European Community. Although I did not need a carte de travail—a work permit—at that stage, I still needed a carte de séjour, but that was progress. There have always been particular difficulties for the legal profession simply because of the difference between the common-law system and the civil law system. That has led to a different approach to our understanding of what we have been trying to do within the European Community throughout our membership.

I may not be up to speed on all the detail. There may have been discussions, and possibly solutions, about continuing the recognition of professional qualifications, but I am not aware of them. I am surprised that the Law Society, for example, has not provided any briefing in this respect—at least not to me. Still, I would like to hear what the Minister has to say about this. At the next stage of the Bill I would hope that we could be given more certainty about what may happen in future. I am curtailing my remarks because it is a late hour, but I feel that this would be so important, not only to British and Scottish lawyers—I look to my noble friend Lady McIntosh in this respect—but to all the European Union lawyers who have set up offices and are operating in London and other parts of the country, making our commercial activities ever more possible.

Perhaps, as a sort of PS, I might refer to Amendment 48 and the tripartite agreement. I am not sure how this applies to polo ponies. As your Lordships will know, I take a great interest in Latin America and Argentina. Polo ponies are not only from South America and the UK; they have passage rights within the EU. I do not think the tripartite agreement itself applies to polo ponies but I hope that any consideration of this element of the debate could include that important aspect.

Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 29th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, I too refer to my declaration of interest in the Members’ register, which has not changed since I last spoke. Despite my interest, I confess that I had some difficulty understanding all of subsection (1A)(b) of the proposed new section. The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, read out the easy bit. The difficult bit is the words,

“but does not include changes that result in provision whose effect is different in a major way from that of the legislation”.

I think I understand the intent, but I am not sure that the words are exactly as another draftsman might have chosen to put it.

I am today looking for an assurance from the Minister that the adjustments he proposes will allow the Government the flexibility needed: in particular, if there is a restriction on changes that might be significant or major, that these will not bite where change really is needed if we leave the EU with no deal. As the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, has said, this legislation will come into play only if we have left without a deal—which nobody in this House seeks as a primary option—and in those unfortunate circumstances, we might need to be as flexible as possible.

By way of example, in respect of article 2(e) of the prospectus regulation, the alleviations granted by the EU were a compromise designed to suit all member states’ markets, all of which are very much smaller than the UK’s. The Government should adjust these to make them proportionate to the scale of the relevant UK markets. For example, the threshold below which public offers—an area I am particularly interested in—are exempt from the requirement to publish a prospectus, which is a huge cost, has been set at €8 million. By the way, initially it was agreed to be €2 million, then it went up to €5 million without any issues and then it became €8 million. For the UK market alone, a more appropriate level might be, say, £20 million.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, referred to the definition of SME growth markets, which is a very important term. The definition was of course a compromise designed to suit all member states’ markets, and to avoid in some instances classifying members’ entire national stock market as an SME growth market, which would be a bit unfortunate. Perhaps the Government want to adjust this to make it proportionate to the scale of the relevant UK markets, possibly increasing the maximum market capitalisation from €200 million to £500 million.

Outside of article 2(e), I have mentioned at earlier stages of the Bill some issues relating to CSDR settlement discipline which are perhaps inappropriate and, in some cases, highly damaging to the unique, quote-driven liquidity provision of the UK’s SME market. I hope that I have satisfied the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that short selling in those markets is not damaging or dangerous to the UK economy. This would not apply to EU-based dealers, thus putting UK market makers at a competitive disadvantage because it would apply to them.

I hope the Minister can assure me that the Government will retain the power to have the flexibility needed to allow the UK to set its own rules for our financial services market, which is very different from the EU’s. I appreciate that this provision applies only in respect of in-flight rules but it sets the tone, and hereon in we will want to create our own bespoke laws, which may well diverge from the EU’s but will be more appropriate for our market. Rather than just hanging around hoping for some small alleviations in the circumstances of a no-deal Brexit, we really will need to act in a way that suits us in these areas.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful not to be the Minister, who has to respond to my noble friend Lady Bowles and the noble Lord, Lord Leigh. I can see that it is a challenge and I hope that if I talk for a few minutes, it will give the Box a little more time to get notes to him.

I think that the House knows that my underlying question has always been how we draw the line so that we know when it is appropriate for change to be carried through by an SI and when it should come to this House as primary legislation, particularly in this field. What happened in the weeks and months immediately following a no-deal exit would shape whether we were in a position to maintain access to the EU market for our most significant industry—the services sector—and indeed for the economy as a whole. I think that in the changes he has made the Minister has got us to a better place and to a much clearer understanding of the Government’s intent. If he wanted to split the difference, he could say “major or significant” and deal with the problems all in one go.

I want to say how much I appreciate the listening that the Minister did and how much we appreciate the listening, thought and effort that his officials put into responding to the queries and issues that we raised. It gives me the feeling that we in this House, including the Government, are all essentially on the same page in understanding the significance of the period that would follow no deal and how carefully and sensibly we would have to approach regulation in the financial services area because of the potential knock-on impacts and unintended consequences, which could be extraordinarily severe.

With that sense that the Minister understands when an issue should be brought to the House because it is a fundamental change of policy and critical to an underlying key sector of the economy, and when it is an issue that can rightly be dealt with under a statutory instrument, I can say that I am very happy with the changes that have been offered and, again, I thank the Minister for them.

[Lord Bates]

I thank noble Lords for their contributions. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for moving his amendment and giving us the opportunity to comment. I very much concur with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, about how the officials have engaged in this process. I do not know whether it is appropriate to refer to them on the Floor of the House but I will do so anyway. I think that they too found it a very useful interaction. This Bill is beginning its journey through the legislative process in your Lordships’ House, and the ability to shape and craft it so that it will have been improved by the time it leaves this House will make the job of the other place, which has quite a lot on its plate at the moment, a little easier.

I also agree with the tribute paid by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for the work being done by officials and, indeed, by UK Members of the European Parliament and the industry on shaping EU financial regulation over the years to make it effective and proportionate.

I believe that the intent behind the noble Lord’s amendment and behind the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, putting his name to it was to give the Government an opportunity to put further flesh on the bones of what is meant by “major” and “significant”. They will become the new version of “corresponding” and “similar”, which we discussed in Committee. I do not want to hark back to that debate; instead, I shall focus on these key words. I will put some remarks on the record and then turn to the point made by my noble friend Lord Leigh.

It is clearly important that we find a way of limiting this power appropriately, and I am very grateful for the proposal in Amendment 2, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. However, the noble Lord’s amendment could have the unfortunate and unintentional effect of rendering the power and therefore much of the Bill almost unworkable. The reason the Government settled on the term “major” rather than “significant” in drafting this amendment was the greater clarity provided by the term “major”.

--- Later in debate ---

Dig fractionally deeper and there are consent SARs. These are when one of your clients may not be behaving quite as well as he or she should, and you go to the authorities and say, “This is the situation, I want consent to do the transaction”. You are, essentially, running up a very red flag. Last year, with the increase in these consent SARs of 20% to 22,600, 85 per working day, the number of arrests out of that 22,600—clearly, right at the sharp end of everything, that is what the firms are telling the authorities—was 40, covering 28 cases. The money collected—and we are talking about billions flushing through the system here—was £52 million. That system is not delivering. In thanking my noble friend on the Front Bench and supporting this amendment, I hope noble Lords will remember the need to update, to inform, to improve and then to eliminate regulations that no longer have an application.

[Baroness Kramer]

My Lords, with that provocation I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, that perhaps we should look at the quality of enforcement. I would far rather that we had too many warning signs, but captured a large part of the wrongdoing, than missed major wrongdoing because there were so many options where people could avoid early warning signs. I suspect we have an enforcement problem, and often in this House we have heard that echoed. It sits entirely outside what we are dealing with today. For goodness’ sake, let us be very wary of the seductive argument that where we fail to enforce we should not even investigate.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 3, 4 and 5. They are the product of ideas from all parts of the House: from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and particularly from Lib Dem Members. Amendment 4 strikes me as a very important innovation. Other parts of the Administration may want to ponder what should be done here, because while it will all be down to the Government how they use it, it creates a mechanism by which we get will close to being able to amend an SI. Clearly, no great measures are going to fall because we have no great power to influence them and we all know that we are not going to vote on such SIs.

However, to be able to discuss an SI with the Government—obviously not on the Floor of the House but perhaps by approaching Ministers on particular issues—before it is laid would be an important step forward. Proposed new paragraph (b)(ii) and (iii), inserted by Amendment 4, is also important for making how such an SI is generated much more structured. I hope this will give real transparency to SIs, which can at times be very complex. I end by thanking the Minister for his efforts on the Bill and almost by celebrating, for want of a better term, the extent to which we have been able to come to consensus.