Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will make a few comments on amendments in this group and speak particularly to my Amendments 54 and 57. I say very gently that I agree with the other amendments in this group. My noble friend Lady Bowles is looking for consistency in the consultation period. Unless someone has been on the other side of a consultation period—not setting it but trying to respond to it—they may not know that the real-life difficulties of the inconsistency, frankly, are often a barrier, not just an annoyance. Amendment 47A is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and yes, it makes sense to have a payment systems panel on an issue such as this: we need to make sure that a full range of views and experience is taking a look at such a crucial piece of the financial plumbing.

On Amendment 55, I could not understand why ease of use should have been removed from the competition objective. That made no sense if we are thinking about people and consumers. I do not know whether the Government could explain that. I very much support the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. It had struck me but I did not do anything about it and I should have. His Amendment 49 deals with this capacity to exclude digital payment assets from definitions in payment systems, which just seems fundamentally wrong. We are moving in the direction of digital, these are coherent parts of the payment system and it is going to be relevant to the two amendments that I am about to discuss.

My Amendment 54 recognises that we are in a fast-changing world. We are increasingly in a time in which the payment system is made up of many more entities than just the conventional players. New schemes, platforms, exchanges and all kinds of services are coming on stream; these are key and many are digital. Amendment 54 emphasises that the FCA must, in its service-user objective, focus on “consumers”, a much clearer term than “users”. We have seen in the past that consumers get lost in this overall definition of users. It would require the FCA to look at the issues of inclusion, redress, access to cash, choice and interoperability from the perspective of the consumer in this increasingly complex world. As we move forward, many consumers will simply be bemused.

A simple example arose for me when, very recently, I spoke to an American firm planning to offer payroll services in the UK using 100% stablecoin. The firm is very confident that this will be in place shortly after the regulations are approved by the FCA. How does an employee receiving 100% of their salary in stablecoin turn that into cash at an ATM? Obviously, there are huge issues of access to cash, interoperability and who will pay for the necessary software and hardware changes.

Amendment 57 carries on with this theme and picks up an earlier group, addressing the need for all participants in the payment system, including tech companies, to pay their fair share. That is why the definition of “payment system” really matters and should not exclude digital assets. As the payments world changes so significantly, financial inclusion will be a far more complex issue, and it is untenable for the costs of this to fall just on the banks. My amendment makes it clear that every participant across all recognised payment systems must step up: we need a level playing field.

The intent of these really quite simple amendments is to help overcome the incredibly fragmented and confusing payments landscape in the UK, particularly when we look at it from the perspective of the consumer. It is an obstacle course and, frankly, general confusion and fragmentation let overseas entities take advantage of us. I am very troubled that the National Payments Vision of the Bank of England does not have digital assets in scope. The Bank issued its policy announcement on systemic stablecoin on Monday, and it says that its work will be in parallel with the National Payments Vision, but I am still trying to work out why the two are not properly linked together and coherent. There are new players in this field, and some are asserting that we need a single sovereign payments system to respond to core consumer needs and to join up the dots with consumers at its heart. I met the Canadian company Interac, and that is exactly what happens in Canada, so there are international examples, which do not seem to be under consideration in any of the material that I have been looking at.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for bringing forward this group of amendments, which raises several important questions around the future shape of payments regulation once the Payment Systems Regulator is brought within the FCA. I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes for introducing Amendments 47A and 101A with simplicity and clarity; I note the support from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer.

Despite the arguments of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, I do not favour extending the FCA’s service user objective to include consumer redress or access to cash; indeed, I am against a levy for such purposes. In any event, payment system operators do not deal with customers. That is done by financial services firms.

I am more receptive to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on applying the secondary growth and competitiveness objective to the regulation of payment systems. Does the Minister intend to do this? If so, can it be done by the proposed regulations or does it need to go into the Bill? I should add that, as with so much in the Bill, the framework is broad while the substance is left to later regulations. That is a real concern, as it leaves a lacuna in parliamentary accountability.

We have been through the arguments on consumer credit and in-person banking, but I log them again for good order. I want also to address two central themes running through this group: first, the need for proper industry engagement and accountability in regulation-making; and, secondly, the question of whether the new regime is sufficiently clear and future-proofed.

On the first point, we welcome the amendments that seek to strengthen the consultation requirements and ensure adequate time for meaningful industry engagement, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, set out in her Amendment 48. That would have a dual effect. First, it would increase transparency and accountability for regulators. If regulators are required to consult properly, explain their reasoning, engage with those affected and publish clear strategies, we have a better chance of understanding not only what they are doing but why they are doing it. One point that is clearly of concern to other noble Lords is the extent of the discretion afforded to the Treasury in designating and de-designating payment systems.

The second effect is that this would ensure that those affected by regulation have a meaningful opportunity to have some input in our deliberations on the Bill and our discussions with industry. It has become clear that the regulatory environment seems to be planned and developed at some distance from the firms that are expected to comply. New regulations, handbooks and guidance may make sense to the people sitting in the FCA or the PRA, but they do not always make sense to those at the coalface: firms, compliance teams, payment providers and market participants. They have to interpret them to implement them and live with the operational consequences.

In this case, those with an interest go way beyond the regulators’ normal clients. For example, concerns have been expressed by retailers, which are usually quick to spot practical problems. I remember well that, when I was at Tesco, we were introducing the euro into our businesses in Ireland and elsewhere. Because of inadequate consultation, the timing was wrong, with training and IT changes needed during the busy Christmas period—a recipe for cost and chaos.

This is a real problem. If regulation is developed in a silo, away from the experience of market participants, even well-intentioned regulation can become impractical, disproportionate or poorly targeted. We end up with the regulator and the regulated working from different understandings of how the market actually functions. That is why I hope that the Minister will look constructively at the amendments that seek to strengthen consultation, transparency and meaningful engagement both with professional bodies and with market participants. Without proper planning, there will be a risk to growth—and, indeed, to the UK’s reputation on payment systems, which has generally been good.

The second major issue is the question of what exactly is covered by the regime. Is the Bill regulating the market as it exists today or preparing the UK for the market as it will exist in a few years? We will speak about digital finance and digital assets in later groups, but the point is highly relevant here, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned. If the Bill is to modernise and improve regulation, why does it feel in places as though it is being designed for a market that may already be out of date? We have the legal system, the financial services expertise, the markets, the professional services ecosystem and the technology capability to be a world leader, but leadership requires clarity and confidence from the Government and I do not think we are yet seeing enough of either in this Bill.

That brings me to the wider point about accountability and scope, which was raised on Monday. If the PSR’s functions are to be absorbed into the FCA, how will this new regime be properly held to account? How will the Government ensure that payments regulation does not become simply one more area lost within the wider FCA structure? I would be grateful if, in addition to my initial questions about growth, competitiveness and the level of delegation, the Minister could address three points.

First, how will the Government ensure that industry and professional bodies are brought into the regulation-making process early enough for their input to make a meaningful difference? Secondly, how will the Government ensure that the new regime is sufficiently clear and future-proofed to capture new forms of payments and digital finance, rather than regulating for the market of the past? Thirdly, how will the new payments regime be held to account once it sits within the FCA and what mechanisms will exist to ensure that Parliament, industry and consumers can properly scrutinise its operations? A lot of clarity is needed on this part of the Bill, which we of course support in principle. I very much look forward to the Minister’s reply.

--- Later in debate ---

I think this will develop as we get to Report, but my request is that we look at this all over again and say that professional bodies have been doing this very adequately for a long time. It goes along with the maxim, “If it ain’t broke, why are we trying to fix it?”.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will make some comments on the amendments that have been discussed and then speak to the amendments in my name. I have some sympathy with the issues raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and I very much hope that the Minister can clear up this issue of professional privilege and client confidentiality, because it seems to me that it is not in any way interpretable from the legislation or the Explanatory Notes, and it is key.

I also see that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, have tabled Amendment 69A to require a report on the transfer process, which seems very sensible. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has an amendment calling for a review of anti-money laundering and counter- terrorism financing supervision within three years. All those make some sense to me.

I will look particularly at Amendment 64A from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, because it hits part of the problem on the head. It seeks to require more effective intelligence sharing between supervisory authorities. It is that failure of intelligence sharing that many people consider to be the fundamental underlying cause of many of the problems we have today. It is not very clear that the proposals the Government are bringing forward are the easiest way to remedy that. I will say more on that later.

For my amendments in this group, I thank the Chartered Institute of Taxation and the Association of Taxation Technicians for both clarifying issues and proposing legal language. Despite all the steps we have taken over recent years, London remains the global centre of choice for laundering dirty money, whether from crime, sanctions busting or political corruption. Estimates suggest that 40% of all laundered money globally goes through the City of London or the Crown dependencies—up to £325 billion a year. The primacy of the London money laundromat is not an accolade we wish to retain.

Part of the problem has been the fragmentation of oversight by 25 separate public and professional bodies, supervising not just financial institutions but the many enablers, ranging from accountants to solicitors, property agents and service companies. In 2018, the Government set up within the FCA what they hoped would be the answer: the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision, which the noble Lord, Lord Mackinlay, described as the OPBAS—I thought it was an acronym, not an initialism. It was put in place to oversee the 22 professional body supervisors, not the public ones. We need to acknowledge that it has had some real successes, but it has not been as effective as we had hoped. That goes back to the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who is no longer in his place: the primary reason for this, in most people’s opinion, seems to be relatively poor communication and co-operation between OPBAS and the law enforcement agencies. Frankly, I cannot find anything in this Bill that begins to deal with that.

One approach to remedying this situation would have been to have given OPBAS proper resources and more teeth. Instead, the Government have decided that the FCA should take on directly all supervisory responsibility for anti-money laundering and counter- terrorism financing. Many in the professional bodies are very correctly worried that the FCA lacks the expertise and capacity to carry out the role it is being given, which is much more complex than just enforcement.

Many of the firms that the FCA will supervise on these AML issues are small to tiny. The FCA has no significant history of supervising small and tiny firms, and no understanding of the different operations and pressures of these entities or their specialist activities. The firms—this has been one of the strengths of the professional bodies—need compliance support, education, expert helplines, hand-holding and guidance from a supervisor that knows their business model.

My Amendments 65 to 69 should be seen as part of a whole. They are collectively intended to try to tackle that problem, and to clarify and ensure a workable transition process. Amendment 65 addresses education guidance and compliance support. Amendment 66 requires a proper transition timetable. Amendment 67 requires the FCA to have the necessary expertise and experience in tax, accounting, legal services, trust and company service provision—it does not have that at the moment. Amendment 68 requires transparency on supervisory costs and the fees that the FCA will levy. Amendment 69 requires a report in six months on how effective the new anti-money laundering system is.

Frankly, all of that should have been in the Bill, and none of it should be controversial. Once again, we have a situation where the Government seek to pass primary legislation that gives Ministers and regulators a blank sheet of paper to fill in as they wish with secondary legislation. At this point, as far as I can understand— I looked but could not find it—we do not even have a promise to publish the regulations for consultation.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the stand part notice on Clause 14 and Amendment 69A in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Altrincham. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead—whom it is a particular pleasure to welcome to the Committee on this Bill—and to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for bringing forward a number of useful amendments in this group. My noble friend Lord Mackinlay of Richborough is right to summarise the concerns about and nonsenses of the money laundering regulations in general, which we should try to address as part of reform. We certainly support that.

The question we have to ask is whether the Government’s chosen mechanism is sufficiently clear, proportionate and workable. At present, I am concerned that it is not. Clause 14 represents a major structural change, moving front-line AML supervision for professional services from the existing professional body supervisors to the FCA. The Bill will allow FCA supervision of money laundering to be extended to several new areas—to 22 bodies in all, as we have heard, including solicitors, law firms, accountants, trust and company service providers and, in practice, estate agents. Yet, as with so much in this Bill, the framework is broad while the substance is left to later regulations. That is a real concern.

My Amendment 69A seeks to address that in part by requiring the Treasury to report to Parliament on the process for transferring responsibilities under Clause 14. That report would force the Government to set out how the transfer will work in practice, what steps will be taken to manage the transition, how costs will be assessed, how duplication will be avoided and how the FCA will acquire and maintain the necessary sector expertise—all points that have been raised in the debate.

We have heard serious concerns from industry and professional bodies about spiralling costs, duplication and regulatory uncertainty. The Law Society described the proposal as

“a seismic shakeup to how law firms and their AML … obligations are regulated”.

It warned that the change risks diverting

“attention, resources and time from supporting clients and growing their businesses”

towards adapting to a new and uncertain compliance regime. That concern should be taken seriously. The Government and the FCA should be seeking to simplify requirements, reduce duplication and minimise the compliance burden, while maintaining strong safeguards against economic crime.

The risk of duplication is particularly important. Solicitors are already subject to a distinct regulatory framework. They have professional obligations, ethical duties, responsibilities to the court, duties under the rule of law and obligations around client confidentiality and legal professional privilege. If the FCA is now to be added to that landscape as a supervisor, the Government must explain precisely how the new system will avoid overlapping or conflicting expectations.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, I am particularly concerned about sector expertise: if the FCA is to take on these responsibilities, it must have people within it who understand the professions and bodies that they will be supervising. It must understand how law firms operate, how client accounts work, how professional privilege functions and how smaller or high street firms differ from large practices.

Costs are another major concern. I emphasise that small and high street firms are worried that a move to FCA supervision may result in higher fees and new compliance costs. Many of these firms are already under pressure. They serve individuals, families and small businesses in communities across the country. If the effect of this reform is to impose disproportionate new costs on them, it could have real consequences for access to legal services. The FCA does not understand how to deal with thousands and thousands of such firms.

We also need to understand how regional capacity will be maintained. Professional services are not confined to London; it is one of their charms. AML risks and compliance responsibilities exist across the whole country. The existing professional body model has the advantage of sector-specific and, in many cases, locally embedded knowledge.

There is also a specific territorial issue here, as we heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. The Law Society of Scotland has opposed the change and raised concerns about the compatibility of FCA supervision with the regulation of legal services in Scotland. The Government need to explain how these reforms will interact with devolved and existing statutory frameworks, as well as how they will avoid creating a two-track or conflicting regulatory regime. The noble and learned Lord also emphasised the SME issue, which seems to be a particular difficulty in Scotland.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am going to be exceedingly brief. I support the amendments in this group.

My noble friend Lady Bowles has hit on the fundamental reason for my strong opposition, which is the constitutional issue. By chance, I happened to speak to a senior regulator in the financial services sector—I am not going to use their name because it would not be fair to do so—shortly after the Bill came out. We started looking at its clauses, and that person said to me, “Ah, but, in the long-term strategy, we will be able to explain to people in detail why we are doing what we choose to do”. To me, that absolutely summed up the issue as a whole. There was no concept at all that there would be parliamentary insight, parliamentary oversight or engagement; it was simply going to be a much better vehicle to explain to people why certain things that had been identified as necessary were necessary and were going to happen. There was no sense of challenge anywhere at all. That is a really dangerous way for us to move our legislation.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all who have taken part in this short debate. We are sympathetic to the broad purpose of requiring regulators to think strategically, but, if the regulatory strategies are to be meaningful, they must not simply become static documents published every few years then left on the shelf. As my noble friend Lady Noakes said, that is not the way we do it in business. Common practice is for five-year strategies, reviewed annually, and annual plans.

The amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Ashcombe would reduce the strategy period from five years to three years. He is right that markets can change very quickly, as we keep hearing. A five-year strategy risks being set in stone for too long, unless the Minister is able to clarify that the plans will be updated regularly. If not, a shorter period, such as three years, would have real benefits. Perhaps the Minister can explain why the period of five years has been chosen and how he believes the strategies will remain agile and flexible.

I am delighted that the Minister said that he was prepared to accept Amendment 70 on competitiveness and growth. As I have said several times, the growth of the UK financial services sector is key to growth more generally. Regulation should say how the Government—or the regulator—understand that objective, how they are giving effect to it and how their regulatory approach is supporting growth in the market, because the UK has a large and dynamic financial services sector. My noble friend Lady Lawlor emphasised that point, which we should not forget, and we cannot assume that its international position is guaranteed. Regulation has a direct effect on investment, innovation, listings, lending and market depth, as well as on the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do business, so, if regulators are not required to think explicitly about this, the growth objective risks being honoured in theory but neglected in practice.

Amendments 71 and 74 on consultation are very welcome. As we have said in our debates on previous groups, bringing experts into the room in a timely way is a vital part of the regulatory process.

In my view, the boards of regulators have a part to play in the strategic plans, but my recollection is that those engaged in regulated companies were excluded from the non-executive roles on the PRA and the FCA. Is this still the case? My own board experience is that conflicts of interest can be managed. I believe that regulators will benefit from current knowledge from the industry, particularly given these new statutory strategies, the digital changes to which we keep referring and the expansion of the scope of the FCA. I would like to hear from the Minister what the current rules are—perhaps in a letter, as I have not raised this point with him before.

I also support the principle behind Amendments 72 and 75 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. They would require the FCA and the PRA to review their rulebooks and explain how they will simplify or remove rules that are outdated, unnecessary or duplicative. Regulation, as has been said, tends to accumulate. New rules and duties are added, but old rules are not always removed. Guidance, expectations and supervisory practice develop over time. A long-term strategy is not only about what new initiative the regulators want to pursue; it should also be about what the regulator can simplify. If a regular rulebook review is done with a view to making regulation less burdensome, cheaper to operate and supportive of growth, that will be a very positive step.

The amendments on Treasury recommendations also raise a serious question around accountability and regulator independence. There is, of course, a balance to be struck. We do not want day-to-day political interference in regulatory decisions but nor should independent regulators operate without clear strategic accountability to Parliament and the Government of the day, as my noble friend Lord Massey and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, explained better than I can. The Government should explain why the Treasury’s recommendation-making power is framed as it is, why it is limited in the way proposed and how Ministers expect it to operate in practice.

Finally, on the Clause 16 stand part notice, I understand the concerns raised in the debate. The value of that clause will depend entirely on whether the strategies produced are meaningful, responsive and capable of being scrutinised. If they become generic documents with broad statements of aspiration, they will add little. If they provide clear commitments, measurable priorities, proper engagement with growth and competitiveness, and a disciplined approach to reviewing the rulebook, they will be useful.

I very much look forward to a full response from the Minister to the points that have been made.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by explaining the Government’s purpose behind Clause 16 and why it should stand part of the Bill.

The Government have often heard feedback calling for the regulatory system to have an overall long-term strategy with clear goals, where the regulators consider the cumulative impacts of their policies and the interaction between supervision and rule-making. The reforms introduced by Clause 16 are intended to address this feedback and will improve transparency around the regulators’ long-term direction and focus, which the Government consider will support effective oversight and scrutiny of the regulators.

Clause 16 requires the FCA and the PRA each to prepare and publish long-term strategies so that stake- holders, including regulated firms, can better understand the regulators’ approach to the sector, and so that the Government and Parliament fully understand the regulators’ priorities and can more effectively hold them to account on how they are translating their objectives into actions and results. When the Government consulted on this proposal, it received strong support: 83% of respondents supported it and agreed that the regulators taking a more strategic and cohesive approach would benefit the sector by helping firms know what to expect.

I have listened carefully to the concerns raised by noble Lords. However, the Government remain firmly of the view that Clause 16 will support scrutiny. By requiring a clear long-term strategic overview, Clause 16 will help the sector understand and plan more effectively for regulatory initiatives and will help interested parties engage with the regulators at a strategic level. Without Clause 16, there would be no requirement for the regulators to set out, in one place, their long-term priorities and approach in advancing their objectives. The aim of the strategies is to make it easier, not harder, for Parliament and stakeholders to scrutinise whether the regulators’ actions are coherent and aligned with the framework that Parliament has set.

On Amendment 70, the Government agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that the FCA’s secondary international competitiveness and growth objective should be central to the formulation of its long-term strategy. Growth is the number one priority for this Government and the financial services sector, as many have noted, is key to delivering this. The Government always intended the FCA’s long-term strategy to set out its priorities for advancing our international competitiveness and growth objective. We are looking into this point to determine if this is fully clear within the drafting of the clause, and we are open to tabling an amendment on Report should we determine that it is needed. I thank the noble Baroness for bringing this to my attention and commit to keeping her and other noble Lords informed as this consideration progresses.

I turn to Amendments 69B and 73A. The noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked me to explain the Government’s thinking behind the time periods here. The Government have set the length of this strategy as five years because, as has been noted, it is the standard time period for organisational strategies and is very common in the business world, as many noble Lords will appreciate. It also aligns with standard parliamentary terms and therefore the requirement for the Treasury to issue recommendations to the regulators at least once per Parliament. However, the Government recognise that financial services markets can evolve quickly and it is important that the regulators’ strategic documents remain current and useful.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked me how the strategies would be kept under review. The Bill provides flexibility for the regulators to revise or publish a new strategy within the five-year period if circumstances require it, or to publish a strategy for a shorter period of time than five years. If they do the latter, it will need to be with an explanation about why this is appropriate. Five years is therefore a maximum interval, not a requirement to wait five years before making a change. For example, the Bill requires the regulators to consider whether they need to update their strategy or issue a new one whenever new Treasury recommendations are issued. The Government’s view is that this strikes the right balance between providing a long-term, stable framework and allowing regulators to respond when market, economic or regulatory conditions change.

On Amendments 73 and 76, the Government’s approach here is deliberate. The need for the regulators to take account of Treasury recommendations at a strategic level, rather than at the level of general functions, has been carefully considered. Under the new framework, the Treasury’s recommendations to the regulators regarding its economic priorities will inform the development of their strategic priorities. This is aligned with the change to the way that the regulatory principles will be applied, and I hope it demonstrates the Government’s confidence that influencing the regulators’ strategies is an effective mechanism for ensuring that they have an appropriate focus and are performing well.

Further to this, the framework has been carefully designed to ensure that Treasury recommendations are taken fully into account. As I mentioned earlier, regulators must consider updating or producing a new strategy whenever the Treasury sends a new recommendation letter. The regulators will continue to be obliged to respond annually to the Treasury on their actions in response to the recommendations separately from the strategy document. This will support continued transparency and accountability regarding how the regulators are taking government recommendations into account.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I just ask for clarification. The Minister talked about the way in which the Treasury will make recommendations and the regulator must take them into account. I did not hear the word “Parliament” anywhere in that. Where is the capacity for parliamentary recommendations and oversight to make sure that they are taken into account? Or is the purpose of this legislation to make sure that that does not exist?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I think this is part of a broader discussion. I am informed that this takes into account existing practices for how the reviews and overviews take place. Unless we decide, in the following debates, that we need an amendment to provide parliamentary overview, this will apply to the current regulatory framework as the oversight currently exists.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I do not want to get confused about this. My understanding is that this is already existing practice, but I will take this away and write to the noble Baronesses just to confirm that this is exactly correct. We are trying not to defer from the practice as it exists today, but I will write to clarify that.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I just add that the point of the principles is that they are, in effect, Parliament’s recommendations set in law. I am struggling to see how that fits into the question of who can recommend from this point in time.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I will write to the noble Baroness to clarify that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

There is a broad philosophical point being made about trusting the FCA and the regulators. Again, we will come back to this in further debates. It is a view that I understand, and we need to develop this through the process of the debate, but it is definitely not the intention to give them free rein to make laws randomly. I think we will have to come back to that later in Committee, if that is okay.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I ask for some clarification on this complex area. Under Clause 16, new Section 1JZA(7) states:

“A strategy may be revised by publishing a revised version of the strategy”.


Is the Minister confirming that, as it says in the Explanatory Notes, no consultation goes with that revision process?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

That is correct.

Amendments 71 and 74 seek to require the FCA and the PRA, when preparing or revising their long-term strategies, to consult persons they consider would be affected, including those they regulate. The Government have a clear expectation that the regulators’ strategies will be informed by engagement with industry, consumer representatives and other stakeholders. However, adding a statutory consultation requirement could lead to long delays between a new Government setting direction through a recommendation letter and the regulators putting a strategy in place.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Noakes, asked how the Government’s remit will work under the new system. The FCA and the PRA will now be required to have regard to their remit letters when producing or updating long-term strategies. The regulators will continue to be required to respond annually to remit letters, setting out the actions to which they will respond. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked about non-executive directors; I will write to her on that as I do not have the answer to hand.

The accountability of the financial services regulators is clearly an important matter of huge interest to the Committee. I have heard a range of views today on exactly what this should look like, and we will continue to debate this issue in relation to subsequent clauses. However, regardless of views on the wider matters of transparency and accountability, I am confident that the majority will agree that long-term strategies will add to our understanding of the regulators’ strategic priorities and approach, which must be a good thing. I therefore ask that Clause 16 stands part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I hope to keep the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, happy by being very brief. One of the things that came out of the committee’s report was the proliferation of principles and “have regards”, et cetera. It is ripe for a review and an overhaul, and I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I very much suspect that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I would find significant differences in our ideal list of the regulatory principles in Section 3B(1) of FSMA. I will argue in the next group for a “have regard” to the risks of the private credit market to financial stability. In group 8, my colleagues will argue for a “have regard” on sustainability and in group 10 for a “have regard” on financial inclusion.

These are all probing amendments, but they reflect the need for principles to be reviewed, debated and potentially changed by Parliament, so that a review would have input from the regulators and from the Government, but the final decision would rest with Parliament, as it has always done in primary legislation.

To pick up one of the issues that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made about durability, constant churn is unacceptable and would leave the regulators and the financial sector in confusion, and none of us wishes for that. But I think that on the whole, we can look back and say that Parliament has behaved responsibly. Not everybody likes all the principles, but the financial system and the regulators have not had difficulty in delivering, or considering and making sure it is having regard to, those particular principles, particularly when financial stability is at stake.

To me, what underlies all this is the democratic process. I do not believe that principles can be abdicated to a regulator, which is what happens with the Bill—they go off into the long-term strategy. I believe this is for Parliament, and I would very much always support a review. Parliament has that right and that responsibility.

Some of us rather suspect that the removal of the principles to the five-year strategy has been to provide a covert way to diminish the climate change principles. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, whom I respect, would move them through the front door, but for many of us there is a strong suspicion that this is removing them through the back door so that the Government do not get the opprobrium that would follow from groups that are concerned about net zero and climate change. Some in the financial services sector are actually very dedicated to achieving climate change targets, but there are also plenty of voices that regard every climate change target and every net zero as a cost and a regulatory burden, and it seems to me that those voices have had very strong sway with the Government.

I suspect, frankly, that we would never have had climate change in among the principles had it not been for Mark Carney, and I very much doubt they will survive in any substance as part of the long-term strategy unless there is something of a volte- face in attitudes as we keep going through very extreme weather conditions and it becomes apparent that there is a huge financial cost and a huge risk to financial stability from the extreme weather conditions and the consequence damage to our overall economic circumstances.

As I say, if the Government wish to change the principles, they should do it through the front door in the way that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, proposes: raise the issues, tell Parliament that they wish to make changes and argue in favour of those changes. But that is a fundamentally different approach from taking principles, which I suspect they dislike, and moving them to a long-term strategy so that they will, over time, dwindle but without visibility or any parliamentary input.

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, this is a welcome amendment because it raises important questions about the structure of our regulatory framework and in particular about whether the regulatory principle set out in Section 3B of FSMA—the eight principles—remain coherent, useful and properly calibrated to the circumstances in which we now find ourselves.

Over time, FSMA has accumulated objectives, secondary objectives, regulatory principles, “have regard” duties, reporting requirements and consultation obligations. Some of those are individually sensible and many were introduced for good reasons, but taken together, there is a real risk of regulatory layering. Duties and principles are added and new obligations are placed on regulators, but very little is ever taken away. The result is a framework that is increasingly complex and it is not always clear which duties genuinely drive regulatory behaviour and which simply sit on the statute book without translating into meaningful change.

The amendment asks the Treasury to review whether those principles are duplicative or remain necessary, and whether the framework could be simplified or improved. There is also a wider question, which was raised by the Financial Services Regulation Committee in its report last year, about whether these sorts of duties actually translate into anything meaningful in practice. It is one thing for Parliament to place a duty on a regulator to have regard to a particular principle or consideration—as my noble friend Lady Noakes mentioned, that is exactly what the Leeds reforms are trying to streamline—but quite another for that duty to shape decisions in a clear, measurable and accountable way.

Needless complexity matters for firms as well as for regulators. A complicated regulatory framework does not stay confined to the regulator; it filters down into consultations, supervisory expectations, compliance systems, legal advice and business decisions. If the statutory framework is unclear or duplicative, the burden ultimately falls on the firms that have to comply with it. At a time when we are asking financial services to support growth, investment and competitiveness, we should be especially alert to unnecessary regulatory complexity. The UK’s high regulatory standards are not in question, but there is a question as to whether the framework through which those standards are delivered is as clear, efficient and proportionate as it can be.

I therefore hope that the Minister will engage constructively with the amendment. I would be grateful if he could explain how far the principles have already been reviewed in preparation for this Bill, in the light of the comments from the Financial Services Regulation Committee. Do the Government accept that the accumulation of regulatory principles and duties can create complexity, and do they believe that the existing Section 3B principles remain fit for purpose? This amendment raises a valuable point; I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

78: Clause 17, page 21, line 34, leave out subsections (2) to (11) and insert—
“(2) In section 3B (regulatory principles to be applied by both regulators), in subsection (1), at the end insert—“(i) the need to consider—(i) the interconnections between private credit vehicles and PRA-authorised banks, insurance companies and pension fund, and(ii) the limitations of the FCA’s regulatory perimeter in managing the interconnection between private credit vehicles and non-regulated financial organisations.””Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment would replace the removal of the regulatory-principles duties in Clause 17 with a new “have regard” to risks to financial stability arising from the interconnection of private credit markets with banks, insurers and pension funds, as well as with non-regulated institutions.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, this is very much a probing amendment, but I thought that we ought to raise this issue; the Bill seemed an appropriate place to do so. Frankly, it is an issue on which we have hardly touched in Parliament.

Private credit markets are a phenomenon that has surged since the crash of 2008. Market-based finance accounts for around half of the UK and global financial sector assets, according to the Bank of England. Global private market assets were estimated at $18 trillion in 2025. As Sarah Breeden, a deputy Governor of the Bank of England, said in a speech made this year:

“They have not yet been tested, at that scale and complexity, by a broad based macroeconomic shock in a higher rate environment”.


At the same time, public debt is close to post-war highs, not just in the UK but globally, making it more difficult to respond to any financial shocks.

People sometimes see the private credit sector as distinct from other parts of finance. In the UK, the banking sector has lent to private credit funds at a scale to provide them with liquidity, with pretty much no transparency to evaluate the quality of funds. There is clearly co-investing and interconnections through derivatives. I cannot find good data to work out where the exposure lies, but there have been enough articles raising warning signs to convince me that there is something serious here that must be looked at.

UK pension funds have invested heavily in private assets. The Universities Superannuation Scheme has £7.8 billion in private credit exposure. Institutional providers such as TPT Investment Management have launched schemes specially for the use of UK pension schemes, and the Mansion House Accord encourages even more investment into these private markets. As I listened to the Pensions Minister during the passage of the then Pension Schemes Bill, I heard what sounded like claims that these private assets are high-return, low-risk assets and perfect for pensioners with very little savings. It is because of such a naive understanding of private credit, among other things, that that Bill was so important. That is why protecting the fiduciary duty of pension trustees dominated its passage; the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and my noble friend Lady Bowles were instrumental in making sure that that fiduciary duty remained primary.

The insurance companies are deep into this, too. According to the Bank of England, in evidence given to the Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee:

“The interconnections between private markets and the life insurance sector have grown considerably, with analysis by the IMF … showing that approximately 35% of assets held by US life insurers and approximately 23% of those held by UK life insurers were allocated to private credit”.


It is clear that if the private credit market goes wrong, it goes wrong for the whole financial sector. It is not an exaggerated fear: the sector has serious liquidity issues. Anyone who picks up a newspaper can see that firms such as Blackstone, Oaktree, Apollo and Morgan Stanley, to name but a few, are now limiting or refusing redemptions. We cannot ignore the canary in the coal mine.

The Lords FSR Committee published a report on this sector in January, entitled Private Markets: Unknown Unknowns. At the end of that process—I give some credit to the committee—the Bank of England announced that it would conduct a system-wide exploratory scenario that will involve the banks, insurers, private equity companies and pension fund investors, but on a voluntary basis. It will report in 2027. The committee is to be commended for focusing on the issues in this sector, but I do not think that this satisfies a reasonable standard of parliamentary scrutiny or reflects a parliamentary responsibility to the public to make sure that we avoid another major financial crash. Therefore, my amendment is designed simply to put pressure on the Bank of England in order to get proper answers. I am still disturbed that it thinks it will do so only on a voluntary basis. I hope that the Bill as a whole can be amended to restore proper democratic oversight, and then Parliament could engage with finding a solution. One of the reasons so few people in both Houses are aware of the concerns about the issue is that there is virtually no vehicle for a debate, for consideration and for action.

The second part of my Amendment 78 addresses a problem that I have never heard widely discussed. If the private credit market goes bad—and the banks, because they are entangled with that market, begin to divest loans—what happens to small businesses dependent on bank credit? We saw this behaviour in 2008. After the crash, banks continued to fund the big companies but found every way possible—many of them legal but I would consider unethical—to call in loans to small companies. In loan agreements that were being paid in full and on time, there would be a covenant somewhere in the documents that said that if loan-to-property values fell below a certain level, the loan could be called. I am pretty sure that the small business never really thought that that was a significant paragraph in its loan agreement, but it proved the trigger and we saw basically every major bank exercise it.

The FCA refused to act and has always held the line that the regulatory perimeter means that it cannot offer protection to small businesses and that, instead, caveat emptor applies. To me, this is untenable in the complex world of finance that we have today. I want the regulators to take a proper look at the whole issue of the regulatory perimeter, if we are to go into a cycle of financial shocks.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on what may be the most important amendment that we will discuss in Committee, and I hope we might discuss it on Report as well. As she said, there is a huge lack of discussion of this issue in Parliament, whereas if you go to the pages of the Financial Times, for example, you will see, pretty well every day, alarming reports and strong headlines expressing concern about the issue. I am aware that we are operating under heatwave conditions, as is the rest of the nation. As with our credit system, we have all been puffed up by a lot of hot air, much of which has indeed been financed by our financial system, so I will be quite brief, but I want to pick up a couple of points that the noble Baroness made.

The powerful argument about a voluntary engagement with the stress test is just laughable—with a sick kind of laugh. We know what voluntary regulation has done in so many different areas of our business sectors, and that is not the way to go forward. The noble Baroness also talked about pension funds, particularly about investing in private credit and the grave concerns that it raises. There is quite a bit of research that indicates that the people profiting from this are the managers and companies, and pension funds are getting the same or lower returns as they are from other investments.

The most useful way I thought I could add to this was to go through the Financial Times private credit headlines for this month alone. I will give a representative selection of them. The first is:

“Are insurers becoming dangerously addicted to private credit ratings?”


It is a question-mark headline, to which the answer is clearly given as “yes” in the article. Here are some of the others:

“Apollo’s flagship private credit fund hit by 17% redemption requests”,


“BlackRock private credit fund honours less than 40% of redemption requests”,


“Partners Group limits withdrawals at private equity fund for wealthy individuals”,


and

“Cliffwater’s flagship private credit fund redemption requests hit 17%”.


Rather than expound at length, I refer noble Lords to a single book: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff.

There is no reason to think that what we are doing now will be different from where we have been before. Private credit is a new structure of a very familiar form, and we have seen what happens with these new financial-engineering structures. The noble Baroness is doing an important job here of at least starting a discussion on this. That discussion should be held at much greater length in the main Chamber, and its subject should worry us all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the focus of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on the vulnerabilities in the private credit system.

Although the Government are clear that the growth of private credit has brought benefits to the real economy, we and the financial regulators are very conscious of the potential vulnerabilities in this sector. Just last month, the Chancellor and the Governor of the Bank of England joined their fellow G7 Finance Ministers and European Central Bank governors in agreeing that potential risks in the private credit ecosystem call for continued monitoring, including that of the interconnections with banks and insurers.

The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, would require the PRA and the FCA to consider private credit’s interactions with the wider financial system in all cases where the regulatory principles are engaged, or else their decision-making could be unlawful. I assure her that the regulators are already working to understand these vulnerabilities deeply and to address them where necessary. This work does not require placing additional duties on the regulators.

I will highlight the existing work of those regulators. First, the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee has been focused on the risks of private markets for many years, and the Chancellor’s most recent remit letter to the FPC asks that that work continues. I specifically note the Bank’s system-wide exploratory scenario on private markets, the SWES—as if we needed another acronym. It is examining how a stress scenario could affect the UK’s private markets ecosystem and interconnected banks, insurers and pension funds, with significant participation across the industry. The UK’s system-wide regulator, the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee, is the right authority to carry out this work, and its findings will be laid before Parliament when it is complete.

For its part, the FCA also maintains a close focus on these risks, including in its firm-level supervision. Where specific issues are identified, targeted interventions follow. We also welcome the FCA’s work to improve the visibility of risks and data availability through its reviews of the alternative investment fund managers directive framework, and its efforts to raise standards on conflicts of interest, valuation practices and risk management.

I note the noble Baroness’s concerns about the FCA’s regulatory perimeter, but I emphasise that the marketing of funds in the UK is indeed subject to UK regulatory requirements, protecting UK investors. Further, the PRA continues to assess and mitigate risks from private markets to the banks and insurers it regulates. This includes its 2024 thematic review of private equity-related financing activities with banks.

Finally, given the cross-border nature of the private credit ecosystem, the Bank and the FCA are actively engaged in international work, including at the Financial Stability Board, which is chaired by the Governor of the Bank of England. The Government believe that, under our regulatory framework, vulnerabilities in private credit are being understood and addressed where needed, but there is of course much room to improve. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will of course withdraw this amendment, but I wanted to get this issue on the agenda, and we need to continue to do so. I say to the Government: do not be complacent in this situation. A few weeks before the crash in 2008, everybody in government would have told you how well the financial sector was functioning. Being a cynic can be quite helpful.

I am particularly concerned about the impact on small businesses when we run into the next financial shock, because there will be one. That regulatory perimeter is a serious issue that the Government should be looking at. I do not know whether you can get the regulators to look at it voluntarily. As far as they are concerned, you go to Parliament only to explain; it is not where you take instruction. I am concerned about these issues. I look forward to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on private credit, which will come later. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 78 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

79: Clause 17, page 21, line 34, leave out subsections (2) to (11) and insert—
“(2) In section 3B (regulatory principles to be applied by both regulators), in subsection (1), at the end insert—“(i) the need to assess the impact on the taxpayer of any provision of backstop arrangements by the Bank of England to private stablecoin.””Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment would replace the removal of the regulatory-principles duties in Clause 17 with a new “have regard” to the risks to taxpayers should the Bank of England provide a liquidity backstop to private stablecoin.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, here I am again with another issue that I want to raise. It does not necessarily look like it, but this is another constitutional amendment. Digital money and stablecoin are coming. As I have said in the House before, I am not King Cnut but I am concerned that both the industry and the regulators treat stablecoin as merely a change in plumbing in the payments system. I understand the desire for the UK to be an attractive place for stablecoin companies and the need to build a substantial sterling stablecoin sector. What concerns me is that, at scale, it has huge consequences for the taxpayer to carry the liabilities, and it determines who has their hands on the levers of economic power. I will not pursue that last issue; it would take about 10 minutes and the Committee is beyond coping with that.

In October, the FCA will publish regulations for the non-systemic stablecoin players but, on Monday, the Bank of England launched its policy statement and draft rules for systemic stablecoin. The document is clearly a loosening of rules previously under discussion, but my attention was grabbed by the Bank’s confirmation that it will introduce a central bank liquidity facility for systemic stablecoin. In other words, if there is a run on stablecoin, the taxpayer is on the hook. It is true that liquidity facilities are offered to the banks but to extend this to stablecoin is a major decision. I am not saying that it is right or wrong, but a decision on this scale, with the liabilities that are consequent, is above the pay grade of the regulator. This should be a decision in which Parliament is fully engaged. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the Financial Services Regulation Committee has also been looking at stablecoin, so I have a few words to say on the topic.

I go back to my earlier point: this is not a regulatory principle that can be applied by the FCA and the PRA. It has very little to do with them, as it is the financial stability part of the Bank of England that has issued the policy. The backstop is just one part of the arrangements, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, will be aware. A very significant part of the assets of stablecoin issuers also need to be held in unremunerated form at the Bank of England—30%, which is a significant amount of money. If the noble Baroness is worried about the cost to the taxpayer, she might also reflect on the gain to the taxpayer for all the time that there is not a crisis because the Bank of England has access to free money, which is part of the whole deal.

The stablecoin package needs to be looked at as a whole, rather than one small part of it being picked out. The noble Baroness may still disagree with it, but it is a calibrated package which balances the risks, including keeping one-to-one asset backing, which will also go a long way to allaying her concerns.

--- Later in debate ---

I also note that, as drafted, the amendment would place requirements on the FCA and PRA to consider the Bank of England’s regulatory regime when making decisions, which would be inappropriate, as the FCA and PRA are independent bodies with their own objectives. That said, effective co-operation between the regulators is, of course, important. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

At this hour, the only thing to do is to withdraw the amendment. I thank the Committee.

Amendment 79 withdrawn.