Pensions: British Pensioners Overseas

Baroness Knight of Collingtree Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree (Con)]

My Lords—

[The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Stowell of Beeston) (Con)]

My Lords, I think that the House is signalling that it would like to hear from my noble friend Lady Hooper.

Mental Health: Cost of Living Support

Baroness Knight of Collingtree Excerpts

Thursday 7th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Freud]

My Lords, helping people with mental health problems and similar conditions is, clearly, not easy. The main problem is that they face a huge variety of problems. We need to help them as much as we can to negotiate their way through a complicated system. I have taken a huge interest in this issue myself, and in the most important area in this respect. We now have a study on what we are calling psychological well-being and work, to look at how we can help people negotiate their way into the workplace, with adequate health support on the way.

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree (Con)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware that although people in this category are legally allowed to claim money that will help them get to work if they are able to work, the person allocated to them from the health service to try to give them all the advice they need hardly ever tells them that they can claim money for this purpose? Will he please look at that point?

[Lord Freud]

My Lords, I will look at that point—but we are making real efforts now to join up the provision by the DWP and by the Department of Health. I am working very closely with Norman Lamb in this area. We have put a lot of effort into signposting, and into training our teams in the DWP and the Work Programme providers, who have put in a toolkit to help. However, I will certainly look into whether I can do more.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Baroness Knight of Collingtree Excerpts

Monday 24th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alli]

At the heart of this debate is the basic premise that, given that gay marriage will occur, we should open up civil partnerships to a range of other people. We will see that in a number of amendments as we proceed through Committee. My problem with that is that I do not believe that gay marriage is being opened up as part of this Bill. This Bill creates civil same-sex marriage but it does not create equal marriage in the case of religious organisations. It is an enabling Bill and removes the prohibition for same-sex marriages in England and Wales, with the notable exception of the Church of England, which retains so many locks. The Bill preserves an inequality in religious marriages for the very good reasons we have debated throughout Committee. This is an important point in why I think civil partnerships have a very important role to play going forward.

I have listened very carefully to almost every word of the debate and I detect a real mood on the Benches Spiritual and in other religious organisations to recognise, respect and show good will to same-sex couples. When listening to the debates, there is no doubt that that movement is happening. I pay special tribute to the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury for the way in which he has sought to shine a new light on these relationships. I believe that before we see same-sex marriage in our churches, temples and mosques, we will see civil partnerships celebrated. We will see liturgies and special services created to bless gay couples without the churches having to change their views that marriage is between a man and a woman.

That movement forward in some religious organisations can happen only if civil partnerships stay in place for a little while longer and do not apply to these other categories of people. For example, while I support those who want civil partnerships to be extended to opposite-sex couples, civil partnerships for same-sex couples will have a unique role to play that justifies their position in a way that is not the same for opposite-sex couples. For me, that is a fundamental part of why I want to resist the extension of civil partnerships in this Bill. Religious organisations have made it clear that very soon a number of them will want to bless civil partnerships, and these amendments would remove the ability for them to do so.

In direct relation to Amendment 46A, there has been a huge amount of discussion about the fairness of these relationships but I cannot imagine that many carers or family members who share a house would wish their relationship to be solemnised before God and in the presence of their friends and family. That, for me, is the fundamental difference. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, was quite right to quote me, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, will recall that we had significant and detailed discussions of this issue during the passage of the Civil Partnership Act 2004. The other place was not sympathetic to what was being proposed because of the different aspects for same-sex couples. I really applaud the work of the noble Baroness and that of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, in trying to advance the plight of carers but I implore your Lordships to look at the role that civil partnerships will have in the context of religious organisations and allow them the ability to bless these stunning relationships in a way they see fit. It is the other side of the coin to not having gay marriage in religious organisations.

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree]

I, too, strongly support what the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has said, and I supported the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, in her earlier efforts. It is extremely disappointing to be told, “Not now, another time” or, “Not tomorrow” or, “In a little while”. How do we know that it is going to be a little while? We have no idea. Reviews do not normally take a little while and even then they may not be successful.

I do not doubt the sincerity of the noble Lord, Lord Alli, and his genuine support for the idea behind this, but we are told every time, “Yes, we agree with what you say but this is not the vehicle in which to do it”. What we need to be told is, if this is not, what is? We need some idea of that because the injustices mount as the years go by. Many people, who would have been helped if the original amendment had gone through, are now gone. They are dead, finished; they faced burdens which they need not have faced. I, for one, am not prepared to sit here year after year and hear, “Tomorrow, tomorrow, tomorrow”. Tomorrow never comes.

[Baroness Hollis of Heigham]

My Lords, nine years ago I took part in this debate, as did many others in your Lordships’ House. I was deeply moved then, as was the noble Lord, Lord Alli, by the cases and arguments put by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Cathain, which were repeated so eloquently today by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech.

I agreed absolutely that we need to address the problem of inheritance for people—they may be sisters or may not even be blood relatives—who none the less share a home for a long time and then face the problem of an inheritance tax which could push them into the shadows of residential care. I absolutely accept that that must be addressed. I hoped at the time we argued this, and still hope, that this should be addressed by the Treasury agreeing, very simply—it does not need legislation—that you can roll up inheritance tax on the first death to the death of the second person. As I understand it, that is all one needs to do. The state is not denied any money, but the sibling or carer who is left does not have the threat of losing their home held over them. That is the way to go. When it comes to extending or even considering this as part of an extension of civil partnerships, I obviously have no problem with this being part of a review, but I had two fundamental objections nine years ago and they remain for me today to consider this as possibly an extension of the civil partnership.

First, a civil partnership has a legal entry and a legal exit, which is equivalent to divorce. Take, for example, a mother and daughter who enter into a civil partnership, in good faith, partly to protect the home. The daughter may be in her forties or fifties; her mother dies, she inherits and is protected. If she is in a civil partnership and five years down the line meets a man whom she chooses to marry, she has to divorce her mother—her civil partner—to enter into a new marriage with a man. She may alternatively decide that when her mother has died and that civil partnership has ended she will form another civil partnership with her own grown-up son. Therefore the property cascades down the generations without ever touching the Treasury at any point.

This can be done through a revision of inheritance tax. It cannot in my view be done through a civil partnership which has to be divorced before you can enter another one or, indeed, before you enter a marriage. The notion that a daughter can divorce a mother in order to marry somebody else, or that a sister and brother can divorce each other because they each wish to marry someone else brings the notion of civil partnership, its ceremonies of entering and its divorce, into disrepute.

The second problem, which is why I was engaged fairly heavily the last time round, is that you cannot separate inheritance advantages from social security liability. If two people, whether they are a carer and the person cared for, a mother and a daughter, or a brother and a sister, enter a civil partnership in the hope of avoiding or postponing inheritance tax, they take on mutual responsibility for each other in social security. That means, for example, that if a frail elderly mother and a son enter a civil partnership to spare the son a big inheritance tax bill, he becomes wholly financially responsible for his mother, if he can afford it. For the first time ever, he will be means-tested for his mother’s support; his mother will have no independent rights to social security benefits because she will be his dependant. If he can afford to pay for her, the state does not need to. She loses her independence of social security income because the son, by virtue of the civil partnership, has taken on that responsibility.

I could enlarge on that, but noble Lords can see the consequences. If a sister and a brother enter into a civil partnership, then they become mutually financially responsible for each other in social security terms, including children and the like. The problem is that one cannot separate out the upside, in terms of inheritance law, for carers, or for a mother and a daughter or for sisters, without taking on, in all fairness, the downside of responsibility for social security.

I suggest to your Lordships that for every couple who gain through inheritance, there will be three or five poorer people, with no wealth to enjoy at inheritance and who have fairly modest incomes now, who will be losers. I do not think your Lordships would want that to happen. All I suggest is that noble Lords review and press to review the situation of inheritance tax and the ability to roll it up. In that way I think that we address the problem.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Alli]

My Lords—

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree]

My Lords, I think it is probably the noble Lord’s turn.

[Lord Alli]

I was just trying to be polite; I know that the noble Baroness likes that. If I recall correctly, it was the Conservative Government in 1996 who wrote the specific conditions into the Act. I suspect that the broader supporters of this amendment would have been the very people who wanted that provision written into the Act in the first place. If I recall the nature of the debate at the time, it was about family life and family values. The term was supposed to refer exclusively to heterosexuals, and the reason for it being in the Act was to allow those who did not approve of alternative family structures to be placated. We are now giving access to civil marriage to those who have been denied it. We therefore need to look at these provisions again in that light.

When I think about the majority of the contributions that we have listened to here in Committee and in the other place, there is general consensus that marriage has an important and very special place to play in family life, and in the bringing up of children. I think that we are all agreed on that. While I have heard no one in this place say that one-parent families or divorced, separated or same-sex parenting are somehow inadequate, we have all recognised that marriage can have a unique and special role to play in bringing up children.

The requirements of the guidance will be the same after this Bill is enacted as they were before. My problem with the amendment is not with what it seeks to do, because it is right and proper that faith schools should be allowed to teach the importance of marriage as they see it in relation to family life. That is the case now, as I am sure that the Minister will say. My opposition is to continually writing into the Bill something that is not necessary and should be a matter for the guidance, not the Bill. It would be equally unnecessary for me to amend the amendment, although the right reverend Prelate might allow me to do so, to add the words, “and in doing so, must pay due regard and respect to other forms of relationship, including but not limited to same-sex marriages”. We could keep adding language to the Bill until we are all happy with a whole range of words.

I plead with the right reverend Prelate and the noble Baroness not to reduce this clause to a series of well-meaning words that will not help teachers or children, but may make us all feel a little better that we managed to negotiate it into the Bill. I hope that the right reverend Prelate will reflect on adding any more to the Bill and will withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree]

My Lords, I want to put another point to the Committee, particularly following what the noble Lord has just said. This Hansard of ours is a record for ever of what is said and considered during the course of Bills passed in both Houses. It is very important indeed to make sure that all the necessary points are brought up. The noble Lord, Lord Alli, mentioned teachers. I am quite sure that I am not alone in the volume of letters that I have received about this Bill. In fact, I can say that never before on any Bill while I have been in either House have Members ever received as many letters as we have. Quite a number have come from teachers who are very worried on this point. It ought to be brought out in the debate that teachers themselves, who know perfectly well what their duties are in accordance with the Bills passed in Parliament, have written to express their deep concern that they are going to be forced to teach something to which they have a basic and very important objection.

In an earlier debate on this Bill, I mentioned how concerned I am that the right of a person’s conscience is being eroded, day after day and Bill by Bill. We have now had some 50 years of promises, made by different Governments at different times, stating very clearly that we all have a right to a conscience and to live by that conscience. That is why so many letters have come to us all, I am sure, from teachers on this very point. It is not a question of adding a few words to make people happy. It is about giving people the right to continue to live by the conscience which is in their heart and soul.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree]

I am sorry but I have no recollection of mentioning any Secretary of State whatever. All I am anxious about is that people who have a conscience—I might not agree with their opinions at all—have a right to believe what they believe and to live by it. That is all I said. I have also said that history shows us, time and again, that promises made have to be underlined very carefully and carried out faithfully. So far, they have not been. I cited a number of examples of that but I did not mention any future Secretary of State at all.

[Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton]

I apologise if I gave that impression. I cannot think of any specific, written, recorded examples of the kind that the noble Baroness referred to but I do not doubt that she has them. There is a danger that some teachers in some schools are being frightened by talk of coercion, compulsion and the Government making people do things—I see no evidence of that in this legislation. If one creates fear by things one says, there is always a danger that the people most likely to be frightened will write to the person who expressed that fear.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Baroness Knight of Collingtree Excerpts

Wednesday 19th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 17 and 18, which are in my name. Although they have both been given the heading, “Meaning of ‘compelled’”, each raises distinct points. First, I wish to state my appreciation that the Government are keen to listen to concerns over the current drafting of the religious freedom protections in the Bill. The Secretary of State said in the other place that she,

“would never introduce a Bill that encroaches or threatens religious freedoms”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/12/12; col. 157.]

The Government’s impact assessment helpfully outlined that the Bill should,

“ensure that protections are in place for religious bodies who do not want to perform same-sex marriages, not just from successful legal claims, but from the threat of litigation”.

I am grateful for the Government’s stated intentions but put my name to both these amendments as I believe that the Bill may encroach on such freedoms and that there is a threat of litigation.

I will deal first with Amendment 17. The Government have widely publicised the quadruple locks that supposedly protect religious individuals and organisations. One of those so-called locks is the protection from compulsion, which is supposed to ensure that religious individuals and organisations will not be required, under any circumstances, to conduct same-sex marriages if they object to them. This protection from compulsion is given for two different situations. First, in Clause 2(1), there is a prohibition against compelling any organisation to take the necessary procedural step of opting in, which would enable them to go on to conduct the actual ceremonies. Secondly, in Clause 2(2), there is a prohibition against compelling any person to “conduct” or “participate in” the same-sex marriage ceremony. At first sight, the lock appears comprehensive and wide-ranging, and the Government would have us believe that this is so. However, in reality, the lock is very narrow in scope because there is absolutely no definition in the Bill of “compelled”. That omission creates uncertainty and possibly limits the scope of protection offered by the clause.

This concern was recognised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, in its recent report on the Bill. The report is perhaps interesting in that it is unanimous, despite members of the committee holding different views on the principle of the Bill. Paragraph 69 recommends that the Government reconsider the issue,

“as to whether religious organisations”—

or people—

“may suffer some form of detriment as a result of their position on same sex marriage in a number of contexts which fall outside the scope of the Bill”.

Such reconsideration would, in my view, include considering whether to bring forward amendments such as those that we see today.

The new clause proposed in Amendment 17 would clarify the meaning of “compelled” for the purposes of Clause 2 and thus ensure that the lock provides the breadth of intended protection. The need for clarification was made more evident by the Minister during the Public Bill Committee, when he said that the meaning of “compelled” was,

“absolutely not borrowed from the Matrimonial Causes Act”.—[Official Report, Commons, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill Committee, 28/2/13; col. 280.]

This statement makes it unclear where, if anywhere, the word “compelled” has a legislative precedent. In the limited case law that is available in other contexts, protection from compulsion essentially provides protection only from the imposition of a criminal penalty.

For example, individuals are protected from being compelled to incriminate themselves when giving evidence in court. Clause 2 is therefore likely to protect individuals and organisations from criminal punishment but it is unclear what else individuals and organisations are protected from. The Explanatory Notes state that compulsion,

“would include, but not be limited to, attempts to use criminal or civil law, contractual clauses, or the imposition of any detriment to force a person to carry out such an activity.”

However, Clause 2 as currently drafted does not reflect the Explanatory Notes and may not prevent public bodies treating religious organisations less favourably if they decide not to opt in to the same-sex marriage provisions.

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree]

I just want to ask my noble friend to look at history and recall the number of times—as I made clear in the earlier debate—promises have been broken with regard to the conscience. Time and again, from the Abortion Act onwards, people have been promised that they would be protected and that their right to a conscience would not be taken away. However, we have watched that happen for the past 50 years. We must look not just at the Bill when it comes to promises, but at this road full of broken promises that has led up to it.

[Baroness Berridge]

I am grateful to my noble friend for her intervention and I will look back—I am afraid as a newer member of your Lordships’ House—at the history to which she refers.

The decisions where an organisation can be treated less favourably can be in situations where they are refused contracts, denied the use of public halls or denied funding. The Minister reiterated the narrowness of the behaviour covered in the Bill in the Public Bill Committee when he said that Clause 2 would have,

“the effect of preventing any type of conduct that would have the effect of forcing a person to do something protected under that clause”.—[Official Report, Commons, Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill Committee, 28/2/13; col. 280.]

Therefore, as long as the local authority is merely registering disapproval of the organisation’s views, or penalising the organisation, but is not attempting to compel it to opt-in to provide same-sex marriage, then the religious organisation has no protection under the Bill as currently drafted.

However, the Government’s response is that the religious group need not worry as such detrimental behaviour falling short of forcing it to do anything would be unlawful discrimination by the local authority and the charity would have a remedy for this under the Equality Act. As I mentioned at Second Reading, expecting a charity to swap money, potentially from food banks, to legal fees to fight legal claims is not consistent with the state’s duty, performed in this instance by the local authority, to promote a plural civic square. Such funding reallocation is not, of course, in line with any growth in the big society and is diametrically opposed to the impact assessment of the Government which is the aim of removing the threat of litigation. The impact assessment means that the Government do not want religious groups being defendants in proceedings, so why are they advising the same religious groups to be the claimants in discrimination proceedings?

Just on a straightforward dictionary definition of compulsion, such unfavourable treatment as I have outlined is not, despite the Minister’s comments, covered. It is vital that the meaning of “compelled” is clarified in the Bill because the concept of compulsion is central to the Bill’s religious freedom protections and is not as readily understood as the Government assert.

In Committee on Monday there were many assertions about the effectiveness of the Equality Act, ranging from “foolproof” by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, to “shot through” by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Carey. This amendment would remove the need for a small charity to incur the expense of legal proceedings to establish that such detrimental behaviour is discrimination under the Equality Act. Surely the avoidance of litigation is a good thing.

This new clause will provide the necessary clarification and thus protect religious organisations from all legal penalties, criminal and civil, if they decide not to opt-in. It will ensure that religious organisations do not suffer at the hands of public authorities by making it clear that public authorities will be acting ultra vires if they penalise religious organisations for not opting-in. The onus is properly placed on the state not to act to the religious group’s detriment and not on the religious group to take action against the state. The new clause enshrines in statute the Government’s assurance that religious organisations will not be penalised in any circumstances for deciding not to opt-in to providing same-sex marriages if they object to them. Without further clarification in the Bill, the lock may not turn out to be much of a lock at all.

In relation to Amendment 18, it may be helpful if I turn from locks to keys. The key to a claim under the Human Rights Act, the Equality Act or judicial review is that the decision or action carried out by the religious organisation is clarified as a public function. Amendment 18 is necessary because, without it, religious organisations will be at risk of legal action on the ground that the decision to opt-in may be held to constitute a public function. As the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, has already explained, ministers in religious organisations outside of the established church can be authorised persons and thus conduct marriage ceremonies that are both religious and legally recognised. Such ministers, therefore, perform a public function. As the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, outlined, that was the understanding of the right honourable Jack Straw when he introduced the Human Rights Act and spoke in the other place. However, in the context of the established church, this was also the view obiter of four Supreme Court judges in the case of Aston Cantlow v Wallbank. In delivering his judgment, Lord Hobhouse said:

“Thus the priest ministering in the parish may have responsibilities that are certainly not public, such as the supervision of the liturgies used or advising about doctrine, but may have other responsibilities which are of a public nature, such as a responsibility for marriages and burials and the keeping of registers”.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, I will start by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, my noble friend Lady Berridge, and the noble Lords, Lord Singh and Lord Hylton, for bringing the amendments before your Lordships’ House in Committee. It has given us an opportunity for a very useful debate, which has been conducted in a very courteous fashion. It was clear that genuine concerns were being expressed. What is interesting is that there is no distinction anywhere in the debate between the objectives of what noble Lords wish to see. It is very clear that religious freedom, including the rights of religious organisations that do not wish to opt in, should be secured.

I will take the advice proffered by my noble friend Lord Lester and not reply to every point. However, it is important that I reply to some of them. My noble friend referred to Pepper v Hart, but we cannot get to that stage if we do not in fact say anything. I will also take up his suggestion, echoed by my noble friend Lord Deben, of putting in written form the points that were raised and my responses.

Amendment 13 seeks to ensure that no religious organisation or individual is penalised by a public authority simply because it has exercised its rights under the Bill to not offer or facilitate same-sex marriages, or because it has expressed the view that marriage should be only between a man and a woman. My noble friend Lady Berridge indicated that there was an anxiety that other religious denominations wished to have the same kind of safeguard and security as has been afforded to the Church of England and the Church in Wales. As I indicated to my noble friend Lord Cormack when he moved an amendment on Monday, there is a historic reason for the distinction for the Church of England and the Church in Wales: namely, the duty on priests in these churches to marry people in their parish. This duty is not incumbent on priests, ministers or imams in other religions and faiths.

The specific context of this amendment is Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, which places a duty on public authorities to,

“have due regard to the need to … eliminate discrimination … advance equality of opportunity … and … foster good relations between persons who”,

hold or do not hold a particular protected characteristic.

It is absolutely right—I think that this has been echoed on all sides of your Lordships’ House—that religious organisations and individuals should be free to express their beliefs about same-sex marriage, and to make the decisions protected by this Bill about whether to conduct or participate in same-sex marriages, without fear of repercussion or penalty of any kind. I hope I can clarify for your Lordships that, as the law stands, a public authority would in fact be acting unlawfully if it attempted to rely on the public sector equality duty to treat a religious organisation adversely simply because that organisation did not wish to conduct same-sex marriages, as is explicitly allowed under this Bill.

A policy of penalising people or organisations which have religious or philosophical beliefs with which a public authority disagrees would in itself be discriminatory. One element of the duty is to have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination. It is not meant to be itself an instrument to discriminate unlawfully. For a local authority, for example, to withdraw meeting facilities from a church because it decided not to offer same-sex marriage would be likely to be unlawful direct discrimination because of religion or belief. We believe that it would be subject to successful legal challenge, a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, commented that there is nothing in the Bill which states that it would be unlawful for a public authority to punish a religious organisation which had not opted in. The courts have considered the question of whether a local authority can use equality legislation to punish an organisation with views of which it disapproves. In the case of Wheeler v Leicester City Council, the council banned a rugby club from using its ground after some of its members attended a tour of South Africa. It used the then Race Relations Act to justify its decision. The case went to the House of Lords, which held that the decision was irrational and that it was an improper purpose, because the members of the rugby club were legally entitled to go on a tour, just as an organisation is entitled not to opt in. I believe that the reasoning in that case to have a clear read-over in this particular case. Similarly, a local authority could not have a policy of refusing to promote staff who have expressed a belief that marriage should only be between—

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree]

On that very point, why is it that registrars who from conscience, from their heart and beliefs, will not conduct this kind of marriage have been sacked?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, obviously they cannot yet have been sacked because of this legislation, because it is not yet an Act. As my noble friend may recall, we debated the position of registrars at some length on Monday evening. The explanation given then was that registrars perform a public function. As was pointed out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, judges, who also exercise a public function, are not allowed to pick and choose which cases come before them. Similarly, a local authority could not have a policy of refusing to promote staff who have expressed a belief that marriage should only be between a man and a woman. This would be unlawful direct discrimination, and the equality duty requires public authorities to have due regard to the need to eliminate such discrimination. The equality duty cannot make lawful an otherwise unlawful or oppressive act.

My noble friend Lady Berridge quoted the impact assessment regarding the threat of litigation. It is of course not possible completely to rule out any possibility of somebody bringing legal proceedings. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Alli, who pointed out—and as my noble friend Lord Lester quoted on Monday—some authorities do idiotic things. No legislation can provide for every eventuality. However, we believe that the Bill minimises this possibility as far as possible by making it absolutely explicit that those relying on Clause 2 are permitted to refuse to be involved in solemnising same-sex marriages. There would indeed be no cause of action. We believe that an application for strike-out could be made early in any proceedings, as there would be no reasonable prospect of success in such claims. The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, said that the inclusion of Clause 2(5) and (6) and the protection they provide undermine the protection which we believe is already in place with regard to Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.

The amendments to the Equality Act 2010 in Clause 2 provide that it is not unlawful discrimination to refuse to carry out acts specified in Clause 2(2). These specific exceptions are provided to ensure that the Equality Act is not in conflict with the protection provided in Clause 2, so that the law is clear and consistent. This aspect of the Equality Act is the only area of legislation which requires this explicit treatment, as otherwise it would conflict with Clause 2.

We should also remember, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, indicated, that the equality duty is a duty only to have regard. It is not in itself a duty to act, but rather a duty to think. It does not require that particular action is taken or that any specific objective or outcome is achieved. As the noble Lord said, “having regard” also means that we have to have regard to primary legislation, such as what would be in this Act if the Bill is enacted. I hear what my noble friend Lady Knight says about concerns that sometimes guarantees do not always seem to follow through many years later. However, what we are dealing with here—I think that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made this point—is a fundamental part of the architecture of this legislation: namely, that there should be religious freedom not to opt in. Therefore, it would be unthinkable for a court not to have regard to a fundamental piece of the legislation we are passing. I certainly hear what the noble Baroness—

Children: Contact with Fathers

Baroness Knight of Collingtree Excerpts

Thursday 13th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Freud]

We are clearly in a position where we have a huge deficit and we need to find ways of reducing it. One thing about the spare room subsidy is that if we were to make double provision for children—in other words, a room in two different places—that would cost the state another £50 million. There are lots of desirables that we would all like to see, but we have really got to go to the essentials when we are running the kind of deficit that we are.

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree]

My Lords, referring back to the question about grandparents, does not my noble friend agree that it will be no use relying on grandparents in a few years’ time? Bearing in mind that the non-mixing and matching of parents, such as we have had in the past, is now disappearing, we will not be able to rely on a grandparental relationship when that extends to that generation.

[Lord Freud]

My Lords, one thing that happens today which has not happened so much in previous generations is that we have much more complex family networks, with in-laws and step-parents around. It is a more complicated position, but I suspect that it is possible to form relationships at both the parent and grandparent level, even if that is more complicated than it has been.

Violence Against Women and Girls

Baroness Knight of Collingtree Excerpts

Thursday 22nd November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her suggestion about streetlights. That is clearly an interesting idea. I will take it away and give it further consideration. On the role of the PCCs in taking the lead to address violence against women and girls, clearly the principle behind PCCs is that they are there to decide how to prioritise strategies in their local areas. However, local campaign groups have been very effective in raising those issues with PCC candidates, and I am sure that the organisation that acts as an overall body for PCCs will want to communicate this point to them as well.

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree]

My Lords, will the Minister bear particularly in mind the work done by Judge Crichton? His work is saving a lot of people and proving a lot more successful in its operation than other methods that have been tried. It would be dreadful if it were stopped.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

I will certainly take on board what my noble friend said.