European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lord Hope of Craighead

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendment 40, to which I have attached my name, and will also be speaking to my Amendment 41A.

The two amendments are complementary. Amendment 40 addresses some of the objections raised by the Minister in Committee and helps to bridge a gap in the current law and in the law that the Government may wish to see in their future Bill—a Bill that seems to be receding further and further into the future. Amendment 40 helps us to move towards the ideal but Amendment 41A follows up as a backstop to ensure that at least we do not lose what is already there. The Government cannot say that Amendment 40 goes too far and that Amendment 41A does not go far enough. In the absence of their own Goldilocks amendment which sits happily in the middle, we believe that it is incumbent on them to introduce an animal welfare Bill as soon as possible, and definitely before Brexit day.

In Committee, the Minister responded to my amendment by saying that,

“the purpose of this Bill is to provide continuity by addressing any deficiencies in law as we leave the EU. It is not about improving EU laws that the Government think could be better”.—[Official Report, 5/3/18; col. 880.]

I completely agree, and that is entirely the purpose of my amendment. It is specific and limited: it does no more and no less than is required to achieve the continuity of this Bill.

I was surprised in Committee to see that the only Member of this House to speak against the amendment was the Minister. He said that the Government want to bring forward an animal sentience Bill which goes further than Article 13, which is what we are trying to retain. I am very glad that the Government want to do better. I too want them to do better—much, much better—but I am afraid that at the moment they are absolutely failing. They are failing to hear what is being said in this House and they are failing to hear what people outside this House want. People do not want a lessening of animal welfare. That would be totally against any British feeling about animals and how they are handled.

I ask the Minister whether the next steps for the animal sentience Bill have been published. I do not believe that they have. If not, what does the Minister think can be done in place of that Bill? I believe that the only thing that can be done is to agree to this amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am very much in favour of the idea that lies behind the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Trees, and Amendment 41A, which the noble Baroness has just addressed us to. However, I have a technical problem with the amendment. In making this point, I wish to make it absolutely clear that I am not in any way criticising subsection (1) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 40 or the idea that lies behind it. My point is directed at proposed new subsections (4), (5) and (6), which, as I think the noble Lord hinted at, are designed to exclude judicial review as a means of holding Ministers to account. As the amendment is worded, it is for the Parliament,

“exclusively in the exercise of absolute discretion, to hold”,

Ministers to account. I think that the word “exclusively” is there to make it clear that there is to be no other remedy except to raise the matter before Parliament.

I recall arguments about 15 or 20 years ago when there was a real risk that the Government of the day would put provisions into Bills excluding the possibility of judicial review. There were occasions when the judges made their position clear and they were very unpopular as a result. There was a real risk of the Government taking that measure, and I think that that risk was diminished through various representations made through the Lord Chancellor and others. Eventually it was established as a convention that the Government would not seek to exclude judicial review. They might limit it in some respects, as they have done, by the length of time that can elapse before a petition is brought, and there have been other ways in which the opportunity for judicial review has been narrowed, but they have never excluded judicial review, because it is one of the essential protections of individuals against the state.

We are talking here not about people but about animals, and I can quite see that there is room for some difference, but I respectfully suggest that it would set an unfortunate precedent for us to pass a measure that excluded judicial review. If that were to be picked up later by a Government in areas where individual rights were involved, I think that we would greatly regret it.

I am sorry to raise that technical objection. I wish that we were not on Report but in Committee, where this matter could be sorted out. However, I feel it necessary to make that point clear at this stage.