(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall continue to limit my interventions in Committee to expressing views that I hold simply as a lawyer. The course I took on Tuesday of last week, when we were discussing Clause 11, gave us an early introduction to the very provisions with regard to reinterpreting the convention that we are now concerned with. I reserve the right, when we come to Report, to come in on what I regard as the more obviously mean-spirited and ill-judged other provisions, which are, as is patent, designed to deter as many as possible of those who would otherwise wish to seek refugee status in this country.
Clause 29, as has already been pointed out, is an omnibus provision that takes you into further and more specific, and therefore more specifically objectionable, provisions, which take the convention apart and reinterpret it piece by piece. As both noble Baronesses have said, that is itself intrinsically an objectionable way to proceed with regard to one’s legal obligations.
There are three further stand part notices in this group. I will not touch on all of them because time is the enemy today, as it will be on Thursday. On Clause 33, the protection from persecution, as the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law has valuably pointed out, this clause fundamentally changes the approach to protection from persecution from a focus on meaningful and effective protection against persecution, which our long-established jurisdiction establishes is the correct focus, to a focus on the existence of a reasonable system to prevent, investigate and prosecute instances of where, despite the system, there has been persecution. This refocusing mischievously—and, I suggest, in legal terms, fatally—sidesteps the all-important question of whether the system is likely to protect the individual concerned.
In the interests of time, rather than make comparatively lesser points on the other two named clauses, Clauses 34 and 35, I will pass on. I say only on Clause 35, mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that this is directed to Article 1(F) of the convention. Clause 35(2) goes to Article 1(F)(b), concerning serious non-political crimes, and we will come in the next group to Clause 37, which deals with Article 33 of the convention on non-refoulement. Whatever the position on non-refoulement that may be arrived at under the refugee convention, even if, for example, the asylum seeker was found to be a war criminal and so is denied refugee status under Article 1(F)(a) of the convention—see Clause 35(1) of the Bill—it still is not possible to return that person to their country of origin if they would be persecuted. That is simply precluded by Article 3 of the ECHR.
I have had a helpful exchange of emails with the Bill manager. I asked the Minister at our Cross-Bench meeting a question which he referred to the Bill manager; namely, whether any of these provisions in the Bill were intended or calculated to alter any of the well-established and authoritative case law in this country. Except for one point which the Bill manager made regarding Clause 37, which corrects an ambiguity that arose under Section 72 of the 2002 Act, I am unpersuaded that where there is a departure from our case law, as is recognised, it is properly made under this Bill. I finish at this point.
My Lords, I have been here for only eight years, which is not long in your Lordships’ House, but I have never seen so many attempts to delete clauses from a Bill—and of course that is completely the right thing to do here. With this Government, I always look for dead cats being thrown on the table to distract us from something much worse that is happening under the table, but there are so many dead cats in this Bill that I am assuming they are all genuine bits of the Bill that the Government want to pass, which is quite disturbing.
Here the Government are trying to unilaterally rewrite international law, and they are doing so to appease the far right, both in their party and in the country. That is a pointless thing to do; you will never appease the far right. It is an example of the Government throwing away decades of international progress on domestic and international policies only to appease a segment of society who are outspoken and noisy—like the Greens, I suppose, but, unlike the Greens, they actually have malign intent.
We are sending a signal to the world that we are not competent to run our country any more, and certainly not worthy of being part of any international grouping that believes in progress and the rights of the human being.
I will address Clause 36 very briefly, which I discussed last week in the context of Clause 11. I confine myself today to asking two questions.
First, do the Government accept, as I suggest they must, that Clause 36 would overrule the judgments of Lord Bingham and, among others, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, in Asfaw, fully affirming what had been said on the relevant issues in the judgment I gave in the Divisional Court in Adimi? This has all been elaborated on today by my noble and learned friend, Lord Etherton.
Secondly, if so, are the Government overturning Asfaw and Adimi because, disinterestedly, they genuinely think those decisions are clearly wrong—or because they think an alternative and more anti-asylum seeker interpretation may arguably be available to them?
The idea of people being able to arrive here without going through a third country has been debated before in the course of this Bill—I cannot remember whether it was last week or another time. When we queried how people could get here, the Minister explained that they could come by aeroplane. That might be possible for some, but it is not possible for everyone who might need to be here in Britain rather than somewhere in Germany or France. Perhaps the Minister could give us a better explanation about how people get here, if there are not enough safe routes or aeroplanes.
To me, this is a naked attempt to stop refugees. I do not understand why the Government cannot see this as well. We are taking advantage of our geography and saying, “We’re too far away, you can’t come”. This is ridiculous. As I have pointed out before, we have a moral duty to many of these people. We have disrupted their politics, their climate and their lives—therefore, we owe them. It is not as simple as saying that they want to join their mates.
This Bill should be setting out safe routes and establishing ways to get people to the UK safely and legally. At the moment, we do not have that because the Government are pulling up the drawbridge.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I also support the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, has given us an opportunity to make things a lot better. During that quite irritable debate two days ago—I was irritable, anyway, and I think people got irritable with me—on this policing Bill, it struck me that we just should not have as many women in prison. Some of the things that women go to prison for are ridiculous. It costs a lot of money; it disrupts lives, especially for the women, their children and their support networks; and there is an opportunity cost when compared to the opportunities that we should be providing via rehabilitation and reintegration. Women go to prison for things like not paying their TV licence or their council tax, and that really should not happen. It is hugely disruptive, the cost of doing so exceeds the unpaid debt many times over, and lives are ruined.
For the vast majority of women in the criminal justice system, solutions within the community are much more appropriate. Community sentences could be designed to take account of women’s particular vulnerabilities and their domestic and childcare commitments. Existing women’s prisons should be replaced by suitable, geographically-dispersed, small multifunctional custodial centres. More supported accommodation should be provided for women on release in order to break the cycle of offending and custody. Prisoners should have improved access to meaningful activities, particularly real work, education and artistic and creative facilities. And, of course, all prisoners should be able to attain levels of literacy sufficient to allow them to function effectively in modern society.
That all seems so obvious, but it does not happen at the moment because this Government are obsessed with being “tough on crime”. What does that mean? If it means sending more and more people to prison then it is a very disruptive and damaging way of handling the problem of crime. A royal commission seems an incredibly sensible way forward just to rethink the way in which we handle prisons, prisoners, crime and, in particular, women in prison who really ought not to be there.
My Lords, I too support this proposal. The objectives set out in each of the paragraphs (a) to (h) of proposed subsection (2) of the amendment are plainly and urgently needed. It should not be necessary to establish a royal commission to focus on, pursue and achieve these objectives, but plainly it is necessary. These deficiencies have been identified, recognised and discussed for years but, as for getting anywhere in terms of achievement—on the contrary.
The main parties on both sides of the House, not least this Government, seem ever more intent on winning the law and order vote. Sentences are being increased; minimum and mandatory terms are being imposed. We now need the impetus, the force, of no less than a royal commission to start to recognise the intense problems of our whole penal system and to start to set the matter right.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak very briefly, first, because it is already past my bedtime and, secondly, because noble Lords have already outlined some of the problems. It was a pleasure to hear the noble Lord, Lord Renfrew, speak on this matter in relation to archaeology. I started a speech about 15 years ago, when he was in the audience, by saying that when I was a trainee archaeologist he was such an icon that I thought he was already dead. I am therefore absolutely thrilled to see that he is still not dead; it is always a pleasure to hear him.
I want to put my comments in simple terms so that Members of your Lordships’ House on the other Benches understand exactly what the problem is with the EU withdrawal Bill on this issue. Amendment 28 —and, by implication, Amendment 26—is designed to make sure that we do not miss out on important parts of EU law; namely, directives. EU directives place obligations on our Government to act in particular ways, such as bringing forward particular legislation. Examples include the working time directive, a social measure, and the habitats directive, an environmental measure. These directives cover a wide span of issues. The wording of the Bill leaves huge gaps that these important directives could fall through. The amendments would plug those gaps and make sure that they are all brought over into UK law. They would also allow or require Ministers to make sure that these directives are properly implemented so that we receive whatever benefits, rights and remedies were intended. As has been said several times, the big problem with the approach set out in Clause 4 is that it will exclude legal rights simply because they have not been litigated on. I do not see the sense in that. I am sure the Government will see that it needs a little bit of fixing and that we will see some positive compromises come forward.
I rise to seek clarification on the precise objective of Clause 4(2)(b) in this whole pattern of legislation, and therefore on the effect of the attempt made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to get shot of it. As I understand it, Clause 4(1) faithfully reproduces Section 2(1) of the 1972 Act. On the face of it, these directly effective provisions are to continue to apply. Of course, it is not always easy to decide what is a directly effective provision that comes within the ambit of Section 2(1) of the 1972 Act, which is here given effect to. As I see it, though I may be quite wrong—I should like the Minister to confirm or reject this—subsection (2)(b) is there basically to say: “Look, if it’s one of those doubtful provisions as to whether it is indeed a directly effective provision under the EU legislation, whether it is completely unclear—there isn’t a case on it—and nobody has specifically suggested that it is, it is not to be argued henceforth that it is”. In other words, the certainty and clarity that this legislation overall is designed to achieve is supposed to be advanced by getting rid, in Clause 4(2)(b), of cases where the past jurisprudence simply leaves the thing high up in the air with no proper guidance.