Metropolitan Police: Use of Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 16th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. It is a judgment call for the Metropolitan Police. As he says, the protests have affected airports and the Tube. As my noble friend Lord McColl mentioned last week, they caused difficulty for people accessing medical treatment at St Thomas’, but that did not seem to bother the protesters.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the major litigant in the case that has come to court today, challenging the Met’s application of Section 14 powers over the whole of London. Does the Minister agree that it would surely be cheaper for the Government to start to deal with climate change than try to suppress protest?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I think that we are talking about two entirely different things. Nobody disputes the right to protest. Everyone is well educated on some of the climatic changes that are taking place. This is about bringing a capital city to a standstill.

Road Closures in Central London

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 8th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I completely agree with the noble Baroness: for an ordinary member of the public, the balance feels to have been skewed. I understand that the Met was last in contact this morning and, as I said, half the sites have now been cleared, but nobody should be in the position where they simply cannot access their place of work, not least the people making laws in this country.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, it is not often that I am driven to protect the reputation of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, but on this occasion I think that some balance has been achieved. I deeply regret that any Members were not able to get in but, if we are going to talk about gridlock, is the Minister aware that the gridlock on Lambeth Bridge this morning was from cars, and almost every car had a single occupant? They were also, of course, polluting. On air pollution, is the Minister aware that air pollution levels in central London have probably dropped—I monitor this quite closely—simply because our roads are full of brave Extinction Rebellion planet protectors, rather than filthy, dirty cars?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness about balance, and that is what the Met police are trying to achieve, but I cannot agree with her about the Extinction Rebellion protesters. I have had a little campaign of my own over the past 24 hours, which has been to go around photographing single-use plastics, which are strewn all over Westminster. The amount of pollution caused by the gridlocked cars is unbelievable, and the pictures of very old diesel 4x4s going along country roads on Sunday, as if somehow making a difference to the planet, were just ridiculous.

Children: Criminal Exploitation

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 9th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I totally agree with the noble Earl. Children in care are vulnerable for all sorts of reasons, and we estimate that children who are vulnerable to county lines activity are generally between the ages of 15 and 17 and are generally boys, although not always. A child in care needs a safeguarding wraparound like no other.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, a few weeks ago I asked the Minister about the issue of child spies: children who are caught committing drugs offences, for example, by the police, who then send them back into the gangs to be spies for the police—it is an incredibly dangerous manoeuvre. A whistleblower told me that the police were apparently going to ramp up the numbers, and the Minister said that she would check for me. Does she have any information on that?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I do not have any up-to-date information for the noble Baroness, who refers to juvenile covert human intelligence sources. I understand her point, but we must not forget that there are very few of them, as the report stated, and that they are used only in very rare cases. As the noble Baroness pointed out, those children may well have been involved in that sort of activity.

Immigration and Asylum Applications

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 19th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I do not think—in fact I am categorically certain—that no assumption is made that all applicants are lying, but where I would concur with the noble Lord is that the quality of the interview is incredibly important in the initial decision-making process. On the cohorts that we discuss quite often in the House such as LGBT people or people of faith, we have well-trained staff dealing with these applications. For LGBT and faith-based applications—I thank my noble friend Lady Berridge for establishing faith as a basis for an application—the training process for the staff has been much improved.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, does the Minister have any suspicion that the hostile environment created by our current immigration system might be contributing to the more overt hate speech that we are seeing on all social media as well as in wider society at the moment?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Baroness will know perfectly well that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary wanted to end the notion of a hostile environment, a term which was of course coined under a previous Labour Government, and move more towards an environment of compliance in the area of immigration. As she knows, hate speech is derived from a number of complex and different factors, so to talk about a hostile environment as the deciding factor for hate speech would be incorrect.

Hate Crime: Homophobic and Misogynistic Attacks

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 11th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the noble Lord will know that I do not think they are in any way less serious. However, I acknowledge the concerns over the parity of different strands of hate crime within existing legislation. That is precisely why we asked the Law Commission to conduct a full review of hate crime legislation and where there might be gaps. I know that it will consult widely later this year and make recommendations to government on this next year.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, as I have already pointed out to the Minister, one of the gaps in hate crime legislation is the fact that misogyny is still not a hate crime. As she said, this was a hate crime of sexual orientation but also of misogyny. Will the Government just get on their feet and make misogyny a hate crime?

Stalking

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 14th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord is absolutely right to point out that stalking is, at its heart, an obsessive undertaking. Often these obsessions are linked to mental conditions and the police need to recognise what stalking looks like. We have, therefore, talked about training, which is the only way to catch perpetrators and, in many cases, to bring them to justice.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, one option that would benefit the police when dealing with this sort of crime is for misogyny to be made a hate crime, along with racial and religious hatred, homophobia and so on. Is that something the Government are thinking about bringing forward legislation on? We obviously have a fair amount of time here and could probably deal with it quite quickly.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Baroness makes a good point. She will know that we have asked the Law Commission to look at various types of hate crime. Misogyny is among the things they could look at to see whether there is anything further we can do in legislation to enhance the types of crime we consider hate crimes.

Protestors’ Rights

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 9th April 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, peaceful protest is a vital part of democratic society. It is a long-standing tradition in this country that people are free to gather together and demonstrate their views, provided that they do so within the law. The granting of injunctions is a discretionary matter for the courts.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank the Minister for her Answer, and that is of course true. However, one of the big problems with these injunctions is that they are so wide-ranging and some of the decisions are made in secret meetings, which I think anyone would be concerned about. One thing that the Government could do is look at the Civil Procedure Rules and, where persons unknown are included in the injunction—which of course makes it very broad—if a legal representative were appointed to represent those persons unknown, there would be fewer infractions of the human right to protest. Will she commit to reviewing the Civil Procedure Rules?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I think I know the case to which the noble Baroness refers, and there has been an appeal of the ruling in that case. I recognise the point that she makes about persons unknown. Because an appeal has been upheld, it will be up to the company involved to relook at the prime reason for the application for the injunction. The point about applications being wide-ranging is certainly something the court may take into consideration.

Children: Covert Human Intelligence Sources

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 18th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government, further to the debate on the regret motion on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) (Amendment) Order 2018 on 16 October 2018 (HL Deb, cols 435–50), what assessment they have made of the recruitment, use, deployment, numbers and oversight of children used as spies by the police.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, Lord Justice Fulford, undertook to report on this issue. He has now written to the chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights with his findings, and a copy of the letter has been placed on his website.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank the Minister for that response. Does she agree that the police setting targets for increasing the number of child spies in each region goes beyond what the Minister told us before—that this is a rarity? I have been alerted by a whistleblower that the police are doing exactly this. There is no way I can check, so will the Minister check for us and report back to the House?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I most certainly will. Obviously, the police are operationally independent of the Home Office, and I do not know why they would be setting targets for this. The noble Baroness referred to the letter of Lord Justice Fulford, which says that 17 juvenile covert human intelligence sources, or CHISs, have been used in the past three years. When she refers to targets, I assume she means targets upwards, but I will certainly look into the matter.

Homophobic Hate Crime

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Tuesday 22nd January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord raises another trend of hate crime online—that meted out against people with disabilities—which is particularly cruel. I have met with disability groups, such as Changing Faces, which noble Lords may have seen in the Telegraph campaign over Christmas. All the efforts we are making with regard to the online harms White Paper and the subsequent legislation will address that cohort of people as well.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

In her opening Answer, the Minister mentioned several categories of hate crime. When will misogyny be included as a hate crime?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As the noble Baroness will know, we commissioned the Law Commission to look into other types of hate crime to see whether there are current gaps in the law, and we expect it to report back in the next 12 to 18 months. That will include things such as misogyny.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 3rd December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I heard what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, had to say, but I do not agree. I hope that the reasons I set out explained why I do not agree.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

I thank the Minister for her assurances. I do not accept that Amendment 1 nullifies Clause 1; that is not true. I thank the other noble Lords who have spoken this afternoon.

I feel that I represent in this House someone against whom the law has been used illegally on other occasions. I am very law-abiding, I am extremely respectful of the law, but, at the same time, I have been targeted by the police. Therefore, I come from a particular perspective, which is that if definitions are not tight enough, they can be used against the innocent. This is personal. I have been in your Lordships’ House for five years and feel passionately about a lot of issues and have moved amendments to many Bills, but this is the first time that I am moved to divide the House.

Immigration (Health Charge) (Amendment) Order 2018

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 28th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I can certainly undertake to take this away and provide for the noble Baroness and other noble Lords a more fulsome illustration of the impact. I have an illustrative example of a nurse and I can write to noble Lords with that.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

Before the noble Baroness returns to her response, I want to say that it is not appropriate to compare this country with places such as America, because we have a national health service and they do not. The point about our National Health Service is that it helps us to have a healthy and perhaps happier population, and that is good for everybody: it is good for the Government and for every single person who lives here. Therefore, it is not a gesture of good will from the Government to create a good National Health Service; it is imperative to our democracy.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I gave the example of America precisely because we have a national health service. Were I to migrate to America for a job, I would have to have healthcare insurance at a huge cost. The noble Baroness is right. There is a huge disparity in healthcare outcomes in America between those who can afford health insurance and those who cannot, and I am glad that we have an NHS for that very reason.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

My point was that we are not taking into account the wider implications of immigrants paying into our tax system, but then charging them on top of that. To me, that just does not seem fair.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As I said earlier, if I went to America and paid my taxes, I would still need health insurance on top of that. The point I am trying to make about the surcharge is that, compared to what one might pay for private healthcare insurance in most countries, this is a very reasonable charge to access what I think is one of the best healthcare systems in the world.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

You are not going to convince us.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

No.

Police: Serious and Violent Crime

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 15th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I acknowledge that a public health approach is not a quick fix, but in Scotland, where there has been a public health approach for some time, it has been incredibly effective. I know that officials have been talking with the Scottish violence reduction unit and sharing its experience and insight into just how effective a public health approach can be.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

My Lords, in conversation with two ex-Met officers recently, they told me that good policing can reduce drug-related crime, which is obviously serious for young people, but it can never affect the scale of the problem simply because drug criminals keep being replaced. So is it time for the Government to regulate illegal drugs and take the business out of the hands of criminals?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the Government have no plans to legalise drugs. The noble Baroness is right that good policing can reduce drug crime and all the effects that we are seeing from drug-related crime now. She is right, but we are not intending to legalise drugs.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, we have already debated a number of points related to the new ports powers under Schedule 3 to the Bill. Groups of amendments to come will address other aspects of these provisions. That being the case, I will limit my remarks in responding to this stand part debate to explaining the overarching case for these new powers to combat hostile state activity. Schedule 3 will serve to address a current gap in our ability to tackle the threat from hostile state actors by introducing provisions to allow an examining officer to stop, question, search and detain persons at a UK port or the border area in Northern Ireland to determine whether they are or have been engaged in hostile activity.

For the purposes of this legislation, a person is or has been engaged in hostile activity if they are or have been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of a “hostile act” that is or may be carried out for or on behalf of a state other than the United Kingdom, or otherwise in the interests of a state other than the United Kingdom. An act is a hostile act if it threatens national security, threatens the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, or is an act of serious crime. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, asked about the types of activity that would threaten the economic well-being of the UK. Acts of that kind include those which damage the country’s critical infrastructure or disrupt energy supplies. The power absolutely will not be used to target the legitimate activity of foreign businesses, an example of which was given by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The noble Baroness also asked whether the power will be used in a discriminatory fashion. The response is an emphatic no, it will not. That is because selection based solely on ethnicity, religion or other protected characteristics is quite clearly unlawful. Selection for examination will be informed by a number of considerations, including available intelligence about hostile activity, as listed in the criteria set out in the draft code.

The events in Salisbury were a stark reminder of the impact that hostile activity can have on the safety and security of our communities. The use of a military grade nerve agent on UK soil demonstrated very clearly the lengths to which hostile actors such as the Russian state will go in order to achieve their illegitimate ends. We should not underestimate this threat. The Director General of MI5, Andrew Parker, set out the position in stark terms in a speech delivered in Berlin in May:

“We are living in a period where Europe faces sustained hostile activity from certain states. Let me be clear, by this I … mean deliberate and targeted malign activity intended to undermine our free, open and democratic societies; to destabilise the international rules-based system that underpins our stability, security and prosperity … Chief protagonist among these hostile actors is the Russian Government”.


It is not often that the general public are so exposed to the work of hostile actors. These actions highlight a contempt for public safety, the rule of law and international norms. However, they are consistent with the activities of the Russian state and others which our operational partners work tirelessly to counter.

In introducing these new powers, the Government are seeking to provide the additional capability needed better to detect, disrupt and deter the threats from these hostile actors. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, put it in his evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee in January, if it is accepted that we need powers to stop and examine people at ports to combat terrorism, should not the police have similar powers to stop people on a similar basis who pose an equal but different threat to national security? In the Government’s view, the answer to the question must be an unequivocal “yes”.

It is worth reiterating that the provisions of Schedule 3 are not entirely novel. They will in many respects mirror existing powers to stop and question persons at the border to determine whether they are terrorists, but will instead be used to determine whether a person is or has been engaged in hostile state activity.

The Government are not saying that, simply because we have these powers for counterterrorism purposes, it justifies expanding them to hostile activity. Rather, we are saying that we have experience in exercising these powers; we already know the vital role that they play in countering the activities of terrorists, and we have taken into account the views of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation on the exercise of the powers to ensure that the subject of an examination is appropriately safeguarded.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked for examples of hostile activity that would not be considered a serious crime or even be captured under current UK law or constitute terrorism. Examples might include unauthorised disclosure under the Official Secrets Act 1989; foreign intelligence officers building relationships with government officials with a view to influencing decision-making or recruiting them as an agent, or foreign intelligence officers receiving protectively marked information or stealing research plans for the UK’s next aircraft carrier. Section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 is applicable to tangible and in-action property, but does not cover information. It may be possible to prosecute a person for theft of the medium on which sensitive information is recorded, but the offence would carry limited sentencing.

The threat to this country from hostile state activity is greater now than it has ever been. It is therefore vital that the police are equipped to disrupt and deter such activity.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

I have not quite understood. If these stops by border guards are to be based on intelligence, why do they not need reasonable suspicion?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I think we went through this the other day. It is because officers may have fragmented information which does not amount to reasonable suspicion but may show a pattern emerging. That may not reach the “reasonable suspicion” threshold. As the noble Baroness said, we cannot just stop and search black people arbitrarily; there has to be some rationale for stopping that person. It would not be arbitrary but would not meet threshold of reasonable suspicion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I hope that I can reassure noble Lords with my explanation, but I thank those who have raised their concerns about the use of Schedule 3 powers to compel a journalist to reveal their material, including confidential material.

In drafting the Bill, we have been alive to such concerns and at pains to ensure that adequate safeguards, which I think noble Lords are talking about, are in place to protect confidential material, including confidential journalistic material. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, pointed out, the new retention powers in respect of confidential information require the authorisation of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who has to be satisfied that certain conditions are met before granting that authorisation.

In earlier debates on the powers under Schedule 3, I explained that a number of foreign powers and hostile actors are becoming even more bold and inventive in their methods. For example, as I outlined earlier, intelligence officers and their agents actively use the cover of certain professions, including journalism, the law and others. To ensure that our police officers are equipped to detect, disrupt and deter such activity, it is critical that they are able to retain, copy and examine documents or other articles that may include confidential journalistic or legally privileged material. That is why Schedule 3 introduces new powers and mechanisms to allow for such action to be taken where the article, which may include confidential material, could be used in connection with a hostile act or to prevent death or significant injury.

I recognise that the protection of journalistic material held by any individual examined under ports powers is a sensitive matter and one where we clearly need to get the safeguards in the Bill right. I want to be clear that the powers in Schedule 3 are not intended to disrupt or impede the vital work of journalists in any way. Journalistic freedoms of speech and expression are the absolute cornerstone of our democracy, which should be protected in the exercise of any police powers. The provisions in the Bill, however, are aimed at those who seek to abuse our legal frameworks to put our national security at risk and who are often trained to do so.

Amendment 68 would allow a person to refuse a request for documents or information where the information or documents in question consist of journalistic material, as defined by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Investigatory Powers Act, or are subject to legal privilege. In practice, this would prohibit the examining officer from verifying that the material in question was confidential and would require the officer to take the examinee at their word. Amendment 69A is similar and, while it does not quite go as far as allowing a person to refuse to provide requested documents or information, it would prohibit an examining officer from verifying that that material was confidential. Instead, it would be for the IPC to determine the question.

Restricting powers in this way would be problematic, particularly where the examinee is a trained hostile actor. Amendment 68 would provide a ground for a person to refuse to hand over documents or information simply by claiming that the material is journalistic or legally privileged. Furthermore, it would mean that the examining officer could not seek to examine such material, where there was a need, by retaining the material and applying for IPC authorisation. Amendment 69A is also concerning, as it would impose a restriction on the examining officer such that they were unable to establish their own reasonable belief that the article consisted of confidential material. The police have a duty to protect our citizens and prevent crime. They cannot be expected to take at face value the word of someone they are examining who, in some cases, will be motivated to lie.

It is important to note that there are additional safeguards to govern the retention of property under Schedule 3 that consists of, or includes, confidential material. The IPC will authorise the retention and use of the material only if satisfied that arrangements are in place that are sufficient for ensuring that the material is retained securely, and that it will be used only so far as is necessary and proportionate for a relevant purpose—that is, in the interests of national security or the economic well-being of the United Kingdom; for the purposes of preventing or detecting serious crime; or for the purposes of preventing death or significant injury.

The Government are of the view that it is reasonable to expect that an examining officer will need to review material, to conclude one way or the other that specific items are, or include, confidential journalistic or legally privileged material. That being said, the draft Schedule 3 code of practice is clear:

“If during the process of examining an article it becomes apparent to the examining officer that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the article consists of or includes items that are confidential material, the examining officer must cease examining and not copy these items unless he or she believes there are grounds to retain it under either paragraph 11(2)(d) or (e)”.


The provisions in paragraph 11 of Schedule 3 contain the retention powers involving oversight by the IPC and the safeguards that I described earlier. I acknowledge that handling confidential material requires vigilance and discretion to safeguard it against unnecessary examination or retention, which is why the mechanisms under paragraphs 12, 13 and 15 of Schedule 3 in relation to these retention powers require prior authorisation of the IPC to be sought, save in exceptional circumstances, before an examining officer is able to examine such material.

We are therefore confident that the safeguards provided for in Schedule 3 and the associated draft code of practice are sufficient to protect the work and privacy of legitimate journalists and lawyers, and are consistent with the Court of Appeal’s judgment in the Schedule 7 case of Miranda that,

“independent and impartial oversight … is the natural and obvious adequate safeguard”,

in examining cases involving journalistic material.

Amendment 69 would extend this bar to information and documents where the material falls under the definition of journalistic material, as defined by the PACE and IP Acts. Such a position would go much further than safeguarding the examinee against self-incrimination. By extending the statutory bar to cover information or documents that are considered journalistic material, Amendment 69 could prevent evidence of a hostile act being used in criminal proceedings where it had been acquired through the legitimate examination of confidential material on the authorisation of the IPC. This would significantly undermine the ability of the police and the CPS to prosecute hostile actors who have used journalistic cover to disguise their criminal activities and been uncovered through the Schedule 3 examination powers.

In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, an officer can proceed to verify that material is confidential, subject to IPC authorisation, and look at confidential material, even if satisfied of the credentials of the journalist who might nevertheless be a hostile state actor.

Amendment 71 concerns the definition of “confidential material” in paragraph 12(10) of Schedule 3 and the associated protections. For the purposes of Schedule 3, confidential material adopts the definition of the IP Act. This definition covers, for example, journalistic material and communication that the sender intends the recipient to hold in confidence. As I explained, this material would fall under the definition of confidential material. It cannot be used or retained by an examining officer unless authorised by the IPC.

With those explanations—I am sorry they were so lengthy—I hope that the noble Baroness will feel happy to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

My Lords, I have listened very carefully and will reread the Minister’s arguments tomorrow. I do not feel entirely comforted. I hope that the Government feel that this has been a useful debate in terms of perhaps adjusting their position. I very much hope that that will happen. While we talk all the time about hostile actors and people who could lie, we also rely so much on the individual who is stopping them, and on their discretion and judgment. When there is so much leeway for these people, there are opportunities for wrong decisions that could impact quite heavily on some people. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Knife Crime

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 5th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The difference between then and now—and I pay tribute to the noble Baroness for all the work that she has done in this area following the terrible death of her son—is that the increase in knife crime has become quite unprecedented over the last few years. Therefore, the Government, through legislation, through non-legislative measures and through their work with the police and local communities, are determined to tackle it.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, the Minister will know that knife crime is only part of the problem. There have been 100 murders in London this year—45 happened in houses and flats and 21 of those were as a result of domestic violence. Is it time for the Government to make misogyny a hate crime?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, in terms of the types of hate crime that police forces choose to prioritise and the resources that they use to prioritise them, I do not disagree with the noble Baroness that reports of domestic abuse are on the increase. In some ways, that is good because people are actually reporting incidents. But what the police home in on has to be a matter for local police forces and what they think are the trends and needs in their areas.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their many and varied points on the amendments and, up front, I apologise if I take some time to respond to all of them.

This is the first of a number of clauses in the Bill that update existing terrorism offences to ensure that the police and prosecutors can respond effectively to the current terrorist threat and contemporary methods of radicalisation.

I should say at the outset that I am well aware that this clause addresses a sensitive area of the law—namely, freedom of expression—and I recognise that concerns have been raised both in the House of Commons and in this House. As has been so eloquently explained, it is such concerns that have motivated the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and my noble friend Lord Attlee to table their amendments. However, I hope that I can allay such concerns and persuade the Committee to support Clause 1 as drafted by explaining exactly why the Government believe that this measure in its current form is necessary, the types of cases it is aimed at and how it will operate in practice.

Under the law as it stands, it is already an offence under Section 12(1)(a) of the Terrorism Act 2000 to invite another person to support a proscribed terrorist organisation such as Daesh or the racist neo-Nazi group National Action. What is an “invitation” in this context? The Court of Appeal addressed this question in the 2016 case concerning the extremist preacher Anjem Choudary, who was eventually convicted for the Section 12(1)(a) offence. The court made the following point:

“The use of that word means the offence in section 12(1)(a) is one where ‘the words descriptive of the prohibited act ... themselves connote the presence of a particular mental element’, as per Lord Diplock in the 1970 case of Sweet v Parsley. As the judge said, it is difficult to see how an invitation could be inadvertent”.


The invitation may be explicit or more indirect, implicit or opaque, but either way, for a conviction to be secured, the prosecution must be able to prove an intention to influence others to support the terrorist organisation. I recognise that at first blush this might appear to be the right threshold for the offence. However, having conducted a careful review of our terrorism legislation, the requirement always to prove intent to influence others has been highlighted by the police, MI5 and the CPS as a gap in their ability to act against certain individuals: those who, despite it not being possible to prove that they intend to do so, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said, none the less clearly and unambiguously risk harm to the public by virtue of their expressions of opinions and beliefs which have the effect of encouraging others to support proscribed groups, with the associated harm that flows from such support.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

Perhaps I should have asked this question earlier of some of the noble and learned Lords here or perhaps of the former police officers, but is there another criminal offence where a person who expresses an opinion has to police themselves to make sure that there is no risk of any outcome from what they write? That seems to me utterly illogical. Are there any other criminal offences of that kind?

Children: Covert Human Intelligence Sources

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 13th September 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is the youngest age at which a child has been authorised to act as a covert human intelligence source under section 29 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, there are no national statistics currently available relating to the authorisation of juvenile CHISs. However, the Home Office has been made aware of academic research into the use of juvenile CHISs which contains a number of case studies. They include the age of the juvenile CHIS, the youngest of whom is 15 years of age.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank the Minister for her reply. I had hoped that the Home Office would itself start recording the names and ages of these children, who are vulnerable young criminals who have been caught by the police and are then put straight back into criminal gangs to act as spies. Will the noble Baroness please commit the Home Office to keeping a proper record of these children—their names, ages and the serious crimes for which they have been arrested before being sent back into these gangs?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I certainly will not undertake to commit the Home Office to giving the names of these individuals, because that would breach data protection laws. However, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner recently wrote to the Joint Committee on Human Rights with an estimate of how many children we are talking about. He estimates that there are fewer than 10 at any one time. He has now undertaken to collect statistics on the number of juvenile CHISs in place and will consider how that information and his oversight in this area can be appropriately included in his annual reports in the future.

Investigatory Powers (Codes of Practice and Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2018

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 18th July 2018 Grand Committee

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord did ask that and I did not answer it satisfactorily. I will write also on that point.

Perhaps I could move on to the oversight regime. The independent oversight of these investigative powers was first legislated for by the Police Act 1997, and the powers are now overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who also oversees the powers provided for in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. The commissioner, like those oversight commissioners his role has replaced, provides the guarantee of impartial and independent scrutiny of the use of these tactics. The oversight commissioners have published reports annually, and, in his final oversight report in 2017, the Surveillance Commissioner commented that,

“standards of compliance have steadily improved in my view, and addressing it generally, they are high”.

The Government accept that the Explanatory Memorandum originally laid alongside the juvenile CHIS order did not go far enough and, as the noble Lord, Lord Haskel, said, the revised version was laid last week. It provides greater detail on the changes made by the order and on the use of juveniles as CHISs more generally. However, I have to make it clear that the Explanatory Memorandum should not be read alone. As I have set out, those charged with authorising and handling young people who act as CHISs have access to extensive guidance available to them to ensure that juveniles are safeguarded. The Explanatory Memorandum is clearly not the right place for the detail that the code contains. Such detailed guidance on the use of these sensitive tactics is necessarily not in the public sphere, as to do so may undermine operational practices and have the potential of putting the CHIS in harm’s way.

The fact that these two orders were laid at the same time is not a fluke—rather, it is the continued development of a suite of statutory safeguards and associated guidance, revised and updated to ensure that these powers are used proportionately and in accordance with the law.

I will now turn to some of the issues which were raised by noble Lords. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, talked about using children as spies—and this relates to the numbers. I can say to noble Lords that the numbers are extremely low. We do not disaggregate by age, but as I say, the numbers are low.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

How do we know that they are low if the numbers are not kept?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As I understand it, while we do not distinguish between different age groups, we know from discussions with public authorities that the number of juvenile CHISs is low as young people would not normally be deployed in this role, unless there is absolutely no other way to achieve the same result. That is how we know that the numbers are low.

Consideration will always be given to whether the same result could be achieved by other means, and only if it cannot is it necessary to authorise a CHIS. The police and other public authorities must conduct a risk assessment before a juvenile is deployed as a CHIS. That assessment must take into account the risks to their physical and psychological health, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said. The codes of practice make it clear that the welfare responsibilities continue after the deployment ends.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about amending the combined warrant provisions. We are making this amendment because one effect of the IP Act is that certain combined warrants that include an authorisation for intrusive surveillance that has been signed by a senior official rather than the Secretary of State would last for only two days. The shorter duration is appropriate under pre-existing legislation, RIPA, where the signature and issue of such an authorisation personally by the Secretary of State is a key safeguard. When that does not happen, the warrant has a shorter duration unless renewed by the Secretary of State personally. However, in the context of such an authorisation being included as part of a combined warrant under the IP Act, which is subject to the additional safeguard of judicial commissioner approval, it is not necessary or appropriate to limit the duration of the warrant to two days.

On consultation with organisations involved in safeguarding, there is no requirement to consult publicly on changes to the 2000 order. We did consult broadly with the operational community and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s office, which was involved in these discussions. All those who use juvenile CHISs have a duty of care to the CHIS and duties to safeguard children and young people. This was taken into account as part of the consultation with intelligence and law enforcement agencies. We consulted on the changes to the code of practice in late 2017 and, while that version of the code did not reflect the changes we have since made in respect of juvenile CHISs, no respondents to the consultation commented or raised any concerns about the use of juvenile CHISs more generally.

I think that I might finally be able to answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about who can be a responsible adult for a juvenile under the age of 18. The existing 2000 order puts in place a requirement that all discussion with a juvenile CHIS under the age of 16 must take place in the presence of an appropriate adult, who must be a parent or guardian of, or person with responsibility for, the young person, or any other adult. The order strengthens the safeguard by amending the definition of “appropriate adult” to prevent a person with no links to the young or any appropriate qualification from acting as an appropriate adult. In future, an appropriate adult would have to be a parent, guardian or person, such a youth social worker, who is otherwise qualified to represent the young person’s interests. The appropriate adult is an important safeguard to ensure that the young person is comfortable with what they are agreeing to. I have talked about the distinction between 16 year-olds and 18 year-olds and those aged under 16. Although there is no statutory requirement for those aged over 16 to be accompanied to meetings, the decision on whether to inform a parent or guardian of a source aged over 16 is taken on a case-by-case basis.

All noble Lords have referred to human rights. All public authorities must act in compliance with the ECHR as a result of the Human Rights Act 1998. The human rights obligation has been in force since 2000. As a result, the human rights of the CHIS must be complied with.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, asked about the double lock of a judicial commissioner’s approval. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 followed three reviews into powers relating to obtaining communications. The Act, and therefore the safeguard of judicial commissioner approval, relates to those powers and does not extend to the powers being debated today.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I take the noble and learned Lord’s point.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, asked about undercover police work. The CHIS code confirms that police officers deployed as undercover officers in England and Wales must comply with and uphold the principles and standards of professional behaviour as set out in the College of Policing code of ethics introduced in 2014. The code specifies that officers must,

“not engage in sexual conduct or other inappropriate behaviour when on duty”,

and,

“not establish or pursue an improper sexual or emotional relationship with a person with whom you come into contact in the course of your work who may be vulnerable to an abuse of trust or power”.

Of course, this instruction applies as much to undercover officers as to any law enforcement officer.

The noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy, asked about the best interests of the child. The code of practice requires that any public authority deploying a CHIS takes into account the safety and welfare of that CHIS and that a risk assessment is completed by the authorising officer before any tasking takes place. The order retains the requirement of the 2000 order that these risk assessments for juvenile CHISs are enhanced risk assessments. Furthermore, the code requires that the ongoing welfare and the security of the CHIS after cancellation of the authorisation be considered and reviewed throughout the duration of the deployment and beyond. These authorisations must be reviewed at least monthly and records maintained for at least five years.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether we are changing this because of law enforcement agencies. This is not about seeking to legitimise practice that was non-compliant with previous codes of practice; it is about reflecting the fact that new investigative techniques are being used by the police. He asked about the code changes. The overall impact of the changes to the codes will be to strengthen the safeguards provided in the codes and improve the guidance for practitioners. The changes reflect current practice and aim to improve operational practice, including expanded guidance to assist investigators in their use of these powers in an online context. It is important that investigators are able to make full use of the internet to assist their work, and equally important to take into account the privacy of people using the internet.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked a very pertinent question about why parents might not be involved. It is true to say that in some circumstances it may not be appropriate that parents of a young person deployed as a CHIS are informed: for instance, where they support the ideology or, indeed, the criminal intent of those against whom the juvenile might be employed. He asked whether it is just for serious offences. There is no specific limitation on seriousness, but the strict tests of necessity and proportionality apply—the point about shoplifting should be seen in that context. He asked about the differentiation between “should” and “must”. The 2000 order requires that an appropriate adult “must” be present, and we have not changed that requirement.

I apologise once again for the less than satisfactory quality of the Explanatory Memorandum and for my inability to answer certain questions, but at this point I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

Forgive me, I know it is late—and forgive also my ignorance. But, given that there are some unknown components in this, does that mean that the Government will pause?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

No. What I have offered to do is write to the noble Baroness and to noble Lords whose questions I have not fully answered. Generally, in Committee, that is accepted—but the noble Baroness may not accept it.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

I was hoping that the answer would be that these problems would be corrected in a new draft.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

No—what I was offering was to write to noble Lords on the points I could not fully answer.

Cannabis: Medicinal Use

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 16th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

There is not, and that is because of some of the harms associated with drugs. Yes, Dame Sally Davies made her position quite clear, but of course we work closely with our health partners. In the last few weeks, the noble Baroness will have seen the way in which clinicians and medically based evidence were used to arrive at some of the decisions that were made.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, how many people have been prosecuted and convicted in the past five years for the possession or growing of cannabis for medical purposes? If the Government realise that they have been in the wrong on this, will those people get unconditional pardons?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I think the noble Baroness is deliberately conflating two different things—judging by the smile on her face, she is. We are talking about the medicinal use of cannabis, and she is talking about possession, which are two entirely different things. She knows that. Cannabis was the most commonly used drug in 2016. About 2.2 million adults aged 16 to 59 have used it, but I cannot give her the possession figures. I can tell her that there were nearly 100,000 seizures of the drug in 2016-17.

Police: Firearms

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 4th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

We expect that Michael Lockwood will complete his review soon. He is quite new in post and is looking at the Section 22 draft statutory guidance on achieving best evidence in death and serious injury matters, while taking into account the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice for armed policing post-incident procedures.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, the point has been raised that the timeliness of these investigations is quite poor. That does not give justice to the families of the people who have been shot, nor to the officers who have done the shooting, so are there plans for the Government to review the processes so that they can be run concurrently rather than sequentially?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The timeliness is improving. A number of changes made to the IOPC have resulted in better performance from it, including in the time it takes to investigate.

Police: Emergency Calls

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 22nd March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I agree with the noble Lord’s point about PC Keith Palmer and the bravery of our police forces. They often put their lives at risk in the line of duty. I also agree with him that 999 is a last resort. He talked about people who had been man enough to call deserving the response required. Sometimes, it would be good if someone were woman enough to call—because often these people are victims of domestic violence—but I understand the point of the noble Lord’s question.

In terms of resources, the Minister for Policing, Nick Hurd, has visited every police force in the country. Hence, we have arrived at the settlement that I outlined to both noble Lords who asked about this. The police are operationally independent of government. It is up to the police to deploy the resources that they get in their priority areas. It is absolutely right that 999 calls are answered. If you look around the different police forces, you will see different performance levels. It is not necessarily those police forces with the most money who perform best.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I wrote last week to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Cressida Dick, and pointed out that the working conditions of the armed officers here on the Palace Estate are not very good. They work a two-hour shift. If they get wet or cold, as they did in the snow, they are not very effective. I have photographs of officers with snow on their shoulders and hats. I cannot help but feel that, if they were horses or dogs, they would get some shelter. Is the Minister going to do something for these armed officers who are risking their lives in their jobs?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I can certainly take the noble Baroness’s comments back. I agree with her that dogs and horses are sometimes more important to the public than humans. I look forward to hearing the response from Cressida Dick to the noble Baroness.

Police: Undercover Officers

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what communications they have had, over the last 30 years, with police forces regarding the tactic of undercover police officers forming sexual relationships to develop their cover stories.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, as part of its terms of reference the undercover policing inquiry is investigating the state of awareness of undercover police operations of Her Majesty’s Government since 1968. The Home Office is a core participant in that inquiry and is in the process of making disclosure to the inquiry of material relevant to the terms of reference. The inquiry will report its findings once all the evidence has been reviewed.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her response, which of course was not an answer to my Question. Is she aware that, over a period of 24 years from 1985 to 2009, almost every single year there was a state-sponsored sexual relationship between a police officer and a woman who at no point was accused of doing anything illegal—not arrested, not accused? I just do not understand how the Minister can think that this is all right. This strikes at the heart of the ethics and integrity of our police forces and our security services. I stress that the cases we know about are only the ones we have heard about: those are the only police names in the public realm. Until we know all the names of the undercover police we will not know how many victims there were. I am also concerned about the inquiry. The Minister may know that there was a walkout today by the whole legal team of the women involved and the women themselves. How will the Government restore the credibility of that inquiry?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Baroness says “state-sponsored”. I refer her to the terms of reference of the inquiry, which state that it will,

“ascertain the state of awareness of undercover police operations in Her Majesty’s Government”.

That is precisely what the inquiry was set up to do. As for the walkout today, I have been made aware of that and I am aware that the hearings are still ongoing. I encourage all core participants—indeed, anyone impacted by undercover policing—to participate fully in the inquiry so that we can learn the lessons and get to the truth.

Security and Policing: Facial Recognition Technology

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Thursday 1st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for that and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for bringing forward this debate on a very important issue, now and in the future. I start by stressing the importance the Government place on giving law enforcement the tools it needs to prevent terrorism and cut crime. However, it is also important to build public trust in our use of biometrics, including the use of facial images and facial recognition technology.

Biometric data is of critical importance in law enforcement, and various forms and uses of biometric data have an increasingly significant role in everyday life in the UK. However, the technology is of course changing rapidly. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about gait analysis technology, voice technology and other types of technology that are rapidly emerging. We are committed to producing a framework that ensures that organisations can innovate in their use and deployment of biometric technologies, such as facial recognition, and do so, crucially, in a transparent and ethical way. Noble Lords have talked about ethics in this as well. Maintaining public trust and confidence is absolutely key; achieving this involves a more open approach to the development and deployment of new technologies. We remain committed to ensuring that our use of biometrics, including those provided to law enforcement partners, is legal, ethical, transparent and robust.

In answer to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, we will publish the Home Office biometrics strategy in June this year, as I outlined to the Science and Technology Committee. The strategy will address the use of facial recognition technology. There is ongoing work to implement last year’s custody images review, which provides a right to request deletion, and we are planning improvements to the governance of police use of custody images and facial recognition technology.

Automatic facial recognition, or AFR, is a rapidly evolving technology with huge potential, as the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and others powerfully illustrated. There have been some suggestions that there is no guidance on police use of AFR. The Home Office has published the Surveillance Camera Code of Practice, which sets out the guiding principles for striking a balance between protecting the public and upholding civil liberties. The noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Lord Evans, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans all pointed this out, as did others. Police forces are obliged under the Protection of Freedoms Act—POFA—to have regard to this code. Similarly, the Information Commissioner’s Office has issued a code of practice, which explains how data protection legislation applies to the use of surveillance cameras and promotes best practice. However, to address the point of the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, we believe that more can be done to improve governance around AFR and we are discussing options for doing this with the commissioners and the police. I am very pleased to see the really good practice already being followed in this area, such as the work being done by South Wales Police, which I will go into in a bit more detail in a few minutes. We are working to ensure that this is consistently applied across all areas by tightening up our oversight arrangements of AFR.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and others talked about the retention of custody images and whether that was illegal, following the 2012 High Court ruling. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also alluded to this. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 gives police the power to take facial photographs of anyone detained following arrest. The regime governing the retention of custody images is set out in the Code of Practice on the Management of Police Information and statutory guidance contained in the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice. The Police Act 1996 requires chief officers to have regard to such codes of practice. In addition, the Information Commissioner and Surveillance Camera Commissioner promote their respective codes of practice.

Following the custody images review, people who are not subsequently convicted of an offence may request that their custody image be deleted from all police databases, with a presumption that it will be unless there is an exceptional policing reason for it to be retained, such as if an individual has known links to organised crime or terrorism. Assuming that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has links to neither—

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

Not yet.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Not yet—you heard it first at the Dispatch Box. I suggested some months ago that the noble Baroness should request that her image be removed. I am assuming that she has now done so and that, therefore, it is in the process of being removed. But the police should automatically review all the custody images of convicted people that they hold, in line with scheduled review periods set out in the College of Policing’s Authorised Professional Practice to ensure that they retain only those that they need to keep.

On the point about illegality suggested by a couple of noble Lords, the court did not rule that there was an issue with applying facial recognition software to legitimately retained images. Following the CIR, we are clear that unconvicted people have the right to apply for the deletion of their image, with a presumption in favour of deletion. However, the police, as I said, have the right to retain an image in the cases that I outlined.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, talked about oversight. This is a very good question which was brought out by the Science and Technology Committee. Noble Lords also talked about the Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group. In line with the recommendations of the triennial review of the Home Office science bodies, the Biometrics and Forensics Ethics Group’s remit has been extended to cover the ethical issues associated with all forensic identification techniques, including, but not limited to, facial recognition technology and fingerprinting. The Government are exploring the expansion of oversight of facial recognition systems. They are also seeking to establish an oversight board to enable greater co-ordination and transparency on the use of facial recognition by law enforcement. Noble Lords will not be surprised to hear that we are consulting with stakeholders such as the NPCC, the Surveillance Camera Commissioner, the Information Commissioner and the Biometrics Commissioner.

Noble Lords mentioned two specific instances: Notting Hill and the South Wales Police. I think that I have time to talk about both events. In 2016-17, when facial recognition technology was piloted at the Notting Hill Carnival, the Metropolitan Police published this on its website. This is in line with the fact that it is a pilot and that it is important that police let people know about it. The public were informed that the technology involved the use of overt—not covert—cameras, which scan the faces of those passing by and flag up potential matches against a specific database of custody images, and that the database had been populated with about 500 images of individuals who were forbidden to attend the carnival, as well as individuals wanted by police who it was believed might attend the carnival to commit offences. I must stress that this system does not involve a search against all images held on the police national database or the Met systems. The public were also advised that if a match was made by the system, officers would be alerted and would seek to speak to the individuals to verify their identity, making arrests if necessary. I think that it was the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who talked about mismatches with BME people, even between men and women. That goes back to the point that this is evolving technology and in no way would it be used at this point in time other than in a pilot situation.

South Wales Police took a very proactive approach to communications in its pilot. In addition to the more formal press briefing notices, it used social media in the form of YouTube and Facebook to explain the technology to the public and publicise its deployment—and, most importantly, it published the results. In its publicity, South Wales Police has been very aware of concerns about privacy and has stressed that it has built checks and balances into its methodology to make sure that the approach is justified and balanced. It consulted the Biometrics Commissioner, the Information Commissioner and the Surveillance Camera Commissioner, all of whom are represented on the South Wales Police automatic facial recognition strategic partnership board, and gave them the opportunity to comment on the privacy impact assessment that was carried out in relation to the pilot. This resulted in a very positive press response to the pilot. The force also published a public round-up of six months of the pilot on its Facebook page.

I will go on now to the PIA, which links to that point. The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, asked about the Government doing a privacy impact assessment. I can confirm that the Home Office biometrics programme carried out privacy impact assessments on all of its strategic projects to ensure that they maximised the benefits to the public while protecting the privacy of individuals and also addressed any potential impact of data aggregation.

The noble Lords, Lord Harris and Lord Kennedy, asked about arrangements for the storage of images. The Police National Database is based in the UK. Images are taken from custody systems run by each police force and then loaded on to the PND.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, asked whether passport and driving licence photos were available to police. They are not used by the police when deploying facial recognition technology. They may be used under specific conditions for other policing purposes.

I thank noble Lords once again for their participation in this debate and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.

Deaths in Police Custody

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Monday 30th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I do not know whether this will entirely answer the noble Lord’s question. I suspect that it may not, in which case I shall write to him afterwards. The independent office for police conduct and the existing commission structure will be replaced with a new single head—the director-general—with ultimate responsibility for all investigative decisions. This position is barred to anyone with a policing background—hence the independence. The director-general will have statutory powers to determine which posts in the IOPC are barred to former police. From the noble Lord’s gesture, I think that I shall write to him.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, three things leapt out at me from the report—things which are lessons learned in the past but which are apparently still unlearned. The first is the disproportionate racial element to the deaths—the fact that young black men seem extremely vulnerable to police interventions. The second is the idea of having cameras in police vans. I have completely forgotten the third, but in relation to the first two, surely these things have been learned before. Why is there still a problem? Why is it still happening and, to repeat the question from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, what are this Government going to do differently?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am glad that the noble Baroness forgets parts of questions because I forget parts of answers. In terms of whether black and minority ethnic people are more likely to die in police custody, the report commissioned by Dame Elish found that deaths in custody are representative of the detainee population and that the proportion of black people who die in police custody is lower than the proportion arrested for notifiable offences. In addition, in 2011 the IPCC published the results of a 10-year study that it had carried out into deaths in custody from 1998-98 to 2008-09. It found that 22 deaths—that is, 7% of deaths—were of black individuals. The report noted that the ethnicity of the deceased in police custody was broadly in line with the ethnic demographic of detainees. On the question of cameras in police vans, I shall have to come back to the noble Baroness.

Terrorist and Extremist Propaganda: Online Sources

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Baroness Williams of Trafford

Wednesday 28th June 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right not only that the internet is a useful tool to challenge this sort of activity, but that freedom of speech and use of the internet are important in our society. There is a fine balance between freedom of speech and speech that is downright extremist and hateful. That is why we have adopted our approach, which is to take down extremist material and put up a counternarrative, in the meantime, helping to educate people about the dangers of radicalisation.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, following that answer, can the Minister tell us what definition of “extremist” the Government are using?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The Government are not using the definition of extremism which I know the Metropolitan Police has designated the noble Baroness with. “Extremist material” refers to content that is assessed as contravening UK terrorism legislation.