Health and Social Care Bill

Baroness Jay of Paddington Excerpts

Tuesday 25th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

In my clear opinion, yes. The idea of ultimate responsibility being with the Secretary of State is that his is not the first line of action under the statute, assuming it all goes through. Indeed, such statutory bodies already exist in the health service. They have responsibilities, but the ultimate responsibility, and that which brings the Secretary of State to account to Parliament, is the one that we want to fix on. It certainly means that he and his Minister in this House must account for the provision. I use that word; although he does not have a legal responsibility to provide, he has a legal responsibility of accountability to Parliament.

[Baroness Jay of Paddington]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who adequately and precisely précised much of the important part of the Select Committee on the Constitution’s report on this part of the Bill, to which other noble Lords have referred.

I still have some difficulty, although I realise that the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is helpful in addressing the problem that we have all been concerned with about ultimate responsibility to Parliament—the accountability and political responsibility, particularly for the enormous budget of the health service. I take all the noble and learned Lord’s points about the fact that in real life the Secretary of State is not running clinics or bandaging people in road accidents. However, my concern remains over why, as the Constitution Committee said, the provision clause cannot simply be maintained in the Bill. Such a clause was included in the 2006 Act and in all previous legislation—as were the Secretary of State’s responsibilities. I understand that in real life the current words do not necessarily confront the true situation, but his constitutional and legal responsibility are derived through those words.

I apologise to the Committee for not being here for the debate on the previous amendment; I was unavoidably involved at another engagement in the Palace. However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, spoke eloquently on Amendment 1 and repeated to the Committee the effective and powerful words in the 1946 Act. They were widely accepted all around the House as being a forceful example of how the principles behind the Act should be invoked. There was discussion on that amendment as to whether the words should be revisited if we were considering some clause of principles in the preamble to the Bill. I took note of the words that the noble and learned Lord referred to from the 1946 Act, including the words embraced by the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, because they have been placed in every Act relating to the health service since 1946. That is why I still find it difficult to understand why the Government resist retaining these words—although the noble and learned Lord produced an eloquent argument about real life and maintaining responsibilities to Parliament.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Of course the words could be retained, but the question is whether it is right to retain them when, in fact, part of the option has not been in use—it was only ever an option. You should take account of what is actually happening. The passage that I was quoting as indicating what the health service is for was the general passage preceding that. These powers were given to the Secretary of State in order to implement the grand idea that was so well expressed in Section 1 of the 1946 Act. When these powers were given, they were given as options. The Secretary of State did not have to provide, he could do so by securing the provision. That option has always been there. Therefore, there has never been a legal obligation to provide, apart from such an option. When the option that has been chosen in recent years is the second one, it seems only right that the law should proceed on the basis of what actually happens. People in my profession are not unknown for continuing to use expressions from years past, which no longer have real substance to them. I do not think that it is a very good idea for Parliament to do that. However, Parliament may have understood the provision to have been the one whereby the Secretary of State was responsible. Therefore, that is the basis on which I have put forward the Secretary of State’s accountability to Parliament.

[Baroness Jay of Paddington]

I appreciate the noble and learned Lord’s intervention, which is very powerful. But the fact remains that as he said in relation to Amendment 1, those original words are both legally enforceable and very clear. That is in a sense our point. Although there is political capacity to put the points that he has put in his new Amendment 4, about making it ultimately responsible to Parliament, as he said himself on Amendment 1, the present wording is clear, legally enforceable and very straightforward.

Two things are legally difficult, apart from the political and constitutional relationship of the Secretary of State to Parliament and his accountability for the budget, which, again, the Constitution Committee drew attention to. This is in paragraph 9 of our report, which I may quote deliberately, because I would be very interested in the Minister and the noble and learned Lord’s reaction. Under the existing legislation, the words, which are the words in the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, are always read together with the capacity which is in Section 3(1) of the 2006 Act, replaced in this Bill by Clause 10, which enables that provision of services. We can discuss at greater length whether they are adequate in the noble and learned Lord’s Amendment 8, and whether they are read together in the courts. Our paragraph 9 states that,

“the courts have made it clear that the Secretary of State’s duties in these sections are to be read together”.

In the leading case, which was R v North and East Devon Health Authority, colloquially known as the Coughlan case, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, when he was Master of the Rolls, appeared in the Court of Appeal. He ruled that, for example, the Secretary of State in Section 1,

“has the duty to continue to promote a comprehensive free health service and he must never, in making a decision under section 3, disregard that duty”.

The two are to be read together. You cannot dissociate the responsibility which has been in all of the Acts since 1946 from that duty to provide. In that sense, there is a question to both the Minister and the noble and learned Lord how they would resolve that problem, even if the wording in the noble and learned Lord’s Amendment 4 does cover some of the questions about responsibility to Parliament.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

The answer to the noble Baroness’s question is this. The quotation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, is from the first part—the duty is to promote a comprehensive health service for the reasons given. He does not—and could not, in the nature of things—refer to provision in the last part of that as a foundation for his judgment in Coughlan, because the provision was made by others. The question was whether it should be charged. So it is only the first part, not the second part. That is why I regard the first part as extremely important as the introduction to the statute—it is enforceable, and we have an example of it actually being enforced in Coughlan.

[Baroness Jay of Paddington]

This must not develop into a private discussion about the finer points of our report or the law, in which the noble and learned Lord would certainly be more expert than me. Surely the difference now is that, as it says in the guidance on this Bill,

“the commissioning and provision of services will no longer be delegated by the Secretary of State, but will be directly conferred on the organisations responsible”.

So the organisations responsible cannot have the legal duty that is embraced by the present Act. Therefore, the legal responsibilities of the Secretary of State are automatically fragmented. The straight line of legal enforceability and responsibility, through the bodies who have rightly—as the noble and learned Lord has said—been delegated over a number of years to other providers, has been broken. That link in the chain has gone.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, I wonder if she could just help me with—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

My Lords, I am once again tempted, in this case by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, with whose views I almost entirely agree. Indeed, I find myself on an alarming number of occasions having quite a lot of fellow feeling with him. I will return to one or two of those points briefly. Being a singularly modest character, these debates are beginning to induce in me a feeling of considerable intellectual inadequacy—which I suspect is not the case with the noble Lord. I constantly feel that I am in the presence of angels dancing on the heads of pins. I hear the noble Baroness, Lady Jay—I hope she will not mind my saying this—saying, “We might as well retain this, because it has always been there”, even though we know it has never been the reality. At that point, we stop being angels dancing on the heads of pins, and we start dancing round a totem pole. On the whole, if we are going to dance round a totem pole, I would like a totem pole that reflects what we want to happen, not what was written into a Bill 60 years ago. The noble Baroness thinks I am being unfair.

[Baroness Jay of Paddington]

I certainly do not think that the noble Lord is being unfair. I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Newton, that he reflects on what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, said on Amendment 1, which was precisely to invoke the Act of 60 years ago, and to pray it in aid, as reflecting what could be a useful addition to the principles of this Bill. That is precisely what I am seeking to address.

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

I strongly supported and continue to support that, which is very reflective in ensuring that we do rest on the original foundations. I never thought I would be a natural Bevanite, but it appears that I have become one, together with a number of others.

That was not quite the point—we were then talking about a preamble. We are now talking about a slightly different provision. I would be entirely happy to see the preamble of the 1946 Act incorporated into this, with—as I said in my speech earlier—perhaps a little tweaking. However, we are now talking about the best way of ensuring and establishing the responsibilities, in the real world, of the Secretary of State. I have another sense of unreality in all of this, born of many years in the Commons. The idea that, whatever this Bill says and however precisely it is worded, the British political system—the House of Commons in particular—would allow the Secretary of State to dispense £120 billion per year of public money without being answerable and accountable to Parliament, is inherently ludicrous. The system would not allow it to happen. I am all in favour of writing that into the Bill if we can find appropriate terms, but in reality that will be the case whatever we have in this Bill.

I agree—and not for the first time—with everything my noble friend Lady Williams said about the importance of making this clear beyond a peradventure. I am quite happy with that.