Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Baroness Hussein-Ece Excerpts

Monday 21st July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

My Lords, I have listened carefully to all the speeches and I must say I find the arguments on both sides very powerful—some very powerful, convincing arguments have been put forward. It is a great pity and does a disservice to this House that an artificial division is being created on such an important matter merely because the Liberal Democrats want to have a conscious decoupling from the Conservatives in the run-up to the general election.

[Baroness Hussein-Ece (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, was not going to take part but the previous contribution was not worthy. This is a very serious subject. I am the mother of a son who was mugged when he was a teenager. He came to the brink when he felt so scared that he wanted to carry a knife but luckily he did not—not to my knowledge, anyway. Young people, particularly young men, are more likely to be victims of crime and we need to have faith in the judicial system—as we have heard from noble and learned Lords this afternoon. We need to allow judges to take and judge each matter on its merits, case by case, and must not dictate from this Chamber and from Parliament.

We heard earlier from the noble Baroness, Lady Howells, about the issue of black youth. The argument was—with respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, whom I respect enormously—that they are disproportionately affected as they tend to be stopped and searched more. That means that others who may be carrying knives are unlikely to be stopped. That is a discrepancy that needs to be taken into account.

The idea that a 14 or 15 year-old boy who feels scared and vulnerable because he may not be in one gang or another but feels the need, however wrong it is—of course it is wrong, but there is no rationality here—to go out with a knife should then have his life ruined as a result of making one mistake is not something that we should support. We should leave it to the courts. We should be listening a little more to young people, which I do not think we are, about which things work and which do not. At a time when knife crime is falling I cannot for the life of me see why we should want to impose this mandatory obligation on the courts.

[Lord Richard (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall be very brief. What I object to in the Government’s proposal is the automaticity built into it. Irrespective of the circumstances of the particular offence or of the offender, there is an automatic assumption now that a second offence will produce a sentence of imprisonment. I do not like that—I think it is wrong. I do not think that is the way in which our courts should behave. Indeed, in 99.9% of the cases that is not the way in which our courts do behave. It is essentially a matter for judges to decide what is the appropriate penalty given all the facts and the circumstances of the case. Therefore, I ask myself, “If that is wrong, why are the Government doing this?”. I suppose the answer is that they want to send a message. What message do they want to send? It is a mixture, I suppose—part politics and part deterrent. I will leave the politics out of it because one of the interesting things this afternoon has been how apolitical this discussion has been. Therefore, let us just look at the deterrent argument. Does it hold water?

My noble friend Lady Mallalieu said that she practised at the criminal courts for 40-odd years. I cannot say that I practised with quite the continuity she did over the past 40 or 50 years but I have done the same. I have to say to the House—as she did—that the idea is fanciful that criminals solemnly sit down and say to themselves, “Well, if we are going to get X years we will commit this crime and if we are caught and we are going to get Y years then we won’t”. That is not how it works. The professional criminal does not think in that way and certainly the youth who may be carrying a knife as part of some kind of teenage bravado is certainly not going to think in those terms. I do not accept the deterrent argument.

So do we want to send a message? If we do want to send a message—a united one, I hope—that we thoroughly disapprove of knife crime and that people who carry knives should be properly punished, and in some cases severely punished, that is a good message and we should send it. But should we send it via statute, in an automatic way? It says, “If you do that, this is bound to happen to you.” I think not. It is totally the wrong approach. Judges have the power to deal with these cases and to send their message. If judges impose heavier sentences for second offences of knife crime, that is a matter for them, and some may hope that perhaps they will. It should not be a mandatory message of the sort that this clause would impose. It destroys judicial discretion and alters the nature of the criminal process. In almost every other area of the criminal justice system of this country we do not have mandatory sentences and I hope that we do not go down that particular road in this area.