Leveson Inquiry Update

Debate between Baroness Hollins and Lord Keen of Elie

Thursday 1st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord McNally, for their responses.

[Baroness Hollins (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, that she will have an opportunity to speak, but as a matter of course at this stage I should respond to the observations already made.

One of the principal points made by both the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord McNally, concerned the terms in which Sir Brian had responded to inquiries. I make it clear that the entirety of Sir Brian’s letter will be available. Indeed, I shall take steps to make sure that it is placed in the Library. It may be subject to redaction if there are particular names which have to be taken out, but I assure noble Lords that the terms of that letter will be available in the public domain and it would not be appropriate for us to give a mere summary of it. I also assure noble Lords that that was always the intention. In fact, I believe that on a previous occasion I indicated that Sir Brian’s response would be available in the public domain.

On the question of what the noble Lord, Lord McNally, referred to as a “political deal”, there is no such political deal; there is a matter of political judgment that has been made in the light of present circumstances. I appreciate that it is not one with which everyone would seek to agree, but that is the responsibility of government and that responsibility has been discharged by this Government in the present circumstances. As for the two amendments that were alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, it is not for me to speculate on how and in what circumstances they will be reversed, but clearly this House will have a further opportunity to consider that matter as and when the Bill comes back before this House and I fully accept that.

On the timetable for the repeal of Section 40, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, in posing his question already knew the answer. The words, “at the earliest opportunity” are as far as I am able to go at this stage. If I had further control of the parliamentary timetable, of course I would elucidate upon that response but I am not in a position to do so at present.

On the matter of cross-party approaches to a review, that will, I understand, be the subject of an Oral Question by the noble Lord and by that stage I may be better equipped to respond to his proposal; I would not seek at this stage to speculate.

On one final point, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, said that IPSO could have come within the Leveson recommendations. I remind the House that in 2016 Sir Joseph Pilling felt that IPSO had essentially come within the Leveson recommendations. He concluded that IPSO largely complied with the Leveson recommendations and I believe that that followed upon some adjustments it had made to its arbitration process. With those comments, I again commend this Statement to the House.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hollins and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, while we have already debated amendments that are challenging to a free press, I fear that this group of amendments would be potentially hostile to the concept of a free press. Where there are abuses the answer is to enforce the law, not to shut down the media. I adopt the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lady Wheatcroft in that regard.

Amendment 53 would remove the requirement to give special weighting to the public interest in freedom of expression and information. This is something that we consider an essential way of ensuring that information that is in the public interest is not buried due to the data protection regime that is put in place. In this context, giving special weight to the public interest in freedom of expression and information is an important way of ensuring that we provide constitutional protection of freedom of speech, as required pursuant to Article 10 of the European Convention and the Human Rights Act.

Amendments 54 and 56 relate to the codes of practice to guide journalists in conducting the essential public interest balancing test that has to be carried out. We have already debated this in the previous group, before the dinner break. Amendment 54 intends to take away the absolute requirement to have regard to the listed codes of practice when determining whether publication would pass the public interest test. This requirement is a way of strengthening the obligations on journalists. In line with the enhanced protection of the GDPR, we are making sure that those journalists who are covered by one of the listed codes must have regard to their relevant code.

In a related amendment, Amendment 56, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has suggested that we alter the language of the condition on the special purposes exemption at paragraph 24 of Schedule 2 to the Bill by changing “relevant” to “appropriate”. This amendment makes it unclear which code should be consulted in a given case. We want to ensure that the code which pertains to a particular set of journalists is the code to which they have regard when carrying out the public interest test.

We are not being unreasonable in resisting Amendments 54 and 56. They may look innocuous, just slightly changing the language of the Bill, but if we are to be true to the GDPR, we must ensure that in our law we have resolved the article 85 requirement to set where the public interest lies in managing the balance between privacy and freedom of expression. If we make the use of these codes discretionary and their application vague, we will simply undermine that balance.

Finally, I turn to the amendments from the noble Baroness that aim to create a special group of exemptions only for those journalists who are members of an approved regulator. As drafted, the Bill is designed to protect journalists who should be able legitimately to rely on these exemptions when undertaking journalism in the public interest, regardless of which regulator they belong to or whether they belong to any at all. The reality of the press landscape today is that the vast majority of publishers are not members of an approved regulator. As such, limiting certain exemptions to only those who are members of an approved regulator would limit the ability of most journalists in this country to undertake investigative journalism in the public interest. Whatever the motive or the intention behind these amendments, they are, I am afraid, either wrecking amendments or amendments designed to force publishers to sign up to a regulator to which they object—and that is not acceptable.

Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 was mentioned. As we have previously discussed, the Government are currently considering Section 40 with regard to part 2 of the Leveson inquiry. We do not believe that using data protection legislation is an appropriate means of trying to incentivise compliance with, for example, Section 40.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, observed just three weeks ago, and earlier this evening, that this is not perhaps the place for this debate. He commented:

“I do not think the Bill is the right place to rerun some of the long-standing arguments about Leveson”.—[Official Report, 22/11/17; col. 195.]


I concur with that observation, which he just reinforced with his observations about the need for us perhaps to look more clearly at what the real issue is rather than being distracted by trying to act as tail-end Charlies to a particular piece of legislation on data protection.

There will be a response to the consultation on Section 40 and Leveson 2, but I shall make one comment with regard to the suggestion about delay in that consultation process. Noble Lords may recollect that the Secretary of State was the subject of a judicial review application which made it impossible for her to proceed with the consultation because the terms of the consultation were the subject of legal challenge. Thereafter, when the consultation proceeded, there were more than 174,000 responses. They had to be analysed and considered, but the fact that there was that number of responses perhaps gives weight to the observation of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, about there being an issue that needs to be addressed, and therefore we must look forward to the response to the consultation. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hollins]

Before the Minister sits down, will he confirm that he will reflect on this debate, which has been very important, and in the light of the promised consultation report allow the debate to continue in the new year?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I cannot guarantee the continuation of this debate, although the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, appears determined to see it continue in the new year, under reference to his Amendment 165, and I look to engaging with him in a further interesting discussion on the topic at that stage. Beyond that, I say to the noble Baroness that the Government and Ministers are listening and considering these issues.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The position with regard to the consultation and the response to the consultation is as I indicated before the break. Sir Brian Leveson has, very properly, asked to see material pertaining to the consultation and the responses to it because he is a necessary party in this context. Until he has had a reasonable opportunity to do that, it would not be appropriate for us to respond.

[Baroness Hollins]

My Lords, I would like just to make one or two corrections for the record. The noble and learned Lord suggested that the amendment, which would reserve some exemptions for newspapers signed up to a recognised regulator, would actually prevent the majority of journalists from engaging in investigative journalism. That is not the case. The exemptions required for investigative journalism remain intact for all journalists, regardless of their regulator.

There are one or two other corrections. The noble Lord, Lord Black, continues to misrepresent the establishment of the Press Recognition Panel, for example by saying that it is subject to interference by the Secretary of State. That is just not the case. It is so patently untrue that I can only assume that the noble Lord has not researched the facts, because it is a point that he has made before.

With respect to my noble friend Lord Pannick’s faith in the legal profession being able to sort out any illegal acts by newspapers, I will just say that affording the money to pay a lawyer and the time to mount a legal claim is not usually possible or a priority for victims of press abuse, particularly when they are in the midst of personal trauma. It is just not a priority. I personally would prefer that newspapers behaved themselves and did not fill lawyers’ pockets with money.

I take exception to being described as a bully. I have heard no compassion or concern for the victims of press abuse. Do noble Lords have any idea what it is like to be bullied by newspapers day after day after day? Any idea at all? To call my amendments bullying is unforgivable. Imagine the effect on the lady I spoke about before, who had lost weight and was described as a “grubby gran”. Imagine what that did to her mental state. I wonder whether she has been able to retain her weight loss.

This is the right Bill for these amendments. They are amendments to data protection legislation, and the victims of press abuse have waited a considerable length of time for an opportunity to take them forward. They are not hastily drawn-up, but the result of an extensive and impartial inquiry, and are as relevant today as they were in 2012. Sir Brian Leveson’s recommendations relate to the processing of data, not to the medium of publication, so it is irrelevant that the media landscape is changing.

I am grateful for the contributions of noble Lords who have spoken, in part because they demonstrate just how much there appears to be two parallel worlds. I assure your Lordships that I will return to this matter, but I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hollins and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 22nd November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Lord makes a perfectly good observation about this provision. It brings me to one of the questions posed independently and neutrally by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, on whether the provisions of the Bill as drafted simply implement the provisions of the 1998 Act or extend its provisions. The answer is that they do not change the regime found in the 1998 Act except in respect of Clause 164(3)(c). I acknowledge the significance of that provision and I am happy to look again at that issue in light of the expressions of concern I have heard from around the Committee about it.

Some noble Lords also questioned the need for the provision of assistance in special purposes proceedings. Under Clause 165, individuals who are a party, or a prospective party, to special purposes proceedings may apply to the commissioner for assistance in those proceedings. For the application to be accepted, the commissioner must be convinced that the matter is of substantial public importance. There is, as I have implied, an equivalent provision in the 1998 Act. I understand that it has only ever been used once. In my respectful submission, that in itself indicates the effectiveness of the provision. It is not necessary because people know it is there and can be relied on, but only if that very high test of substantial public importance is met. Therefore, we consider it appropriate to retain this as a safeguard for data subjects. It is, I respectfully suggest, an important contributor to maintaining the balance between privacy and freedom of expression that has to underlie all these provisions.

Amendment 179A, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, would require the Government to establish an inquiry with terms of reference similar to those contained in part 2 of the Leveson inquiry, but in relation to data protection only. As I have mentioned, a consultation was launched to look at Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, which also asked whether proceeding with part 2 of the inquiry was still appropriate, proportionate and in the public interest. As I stated previously, it is the Government’s intention to publish a response to that consultation by Christmas; therefore, we do not believe that this amendment is appropriate, given the decisions that are currently being taken on that matter.

[Baroness Hollins]

My Lords, the Minister stated that the response to the consultation will be published before Christmas. Can he further reassure the Committee that it will be published before Report so that noble Lords can reconsider their amendments?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness. It is the Government’s intention that the consultation response should be published before Christmas. I cannot say that it will be published before Report but we will keep noble Lords advised of any decision with regard to a specific date for publication.

[Baroness Hollins]

If is not to be published before Report, would it be possible for me to meet the Minister to discuss these matters?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am certainly open to any meeting that the noble Baroness would wish to engage in to discuss these matters. In so far as I am able to inform her, and indeed the Committee, of developments, I will seek to do so.

Digital Economy Bill

Debate between Baroness Hollins and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 8th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. I will address Amendments 233F and 234A together. The amendments, of course, mirror Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 but would apply to digitally published news-related material only, as we know. The House has debated the issue of Section 40 on various recent occasions, including during passage of the Investigatory Powers Act and the Policing and Crime Act. There was also a stand-alone debate just before the Christmas Recess.

There is obviously a great strength of feeling about this matter. I realise that some Members of this House are frustrated by what they see as a lack of progress by government on Section 40. However, the Committee should also recall the strength of feeling on the other side of the debate. Many noble Lords have argued passionately in this House against Section 40 and are concerned about its commencement and its impact upon freedom of the press. That is why the Government ran a consultation to consider the matter further.

The press self-regulatory landscape has changed significantly in the past four years since the Leveson inquiry reported. It is right that the Government take stock, look at the changes which have already taken place and seek the views of all interested parties on the most effective way to ensure that the inexcusable practices which led to the Leveson inquiry being established can never happen again.

A consultation was the most appropriate way to ensure that the Government were listening to all views when considering options for the next step in respect of Section 40. Indeed, the consultation closed on 10 January, and it is estimated that we have received more than 140,000 responses. I know that many Members of this House responded to the consultation, and of course we are grateful that they took the time to do that, but many others have responded as well. It will be necessary to consider the many and diverse views that have been expressed with regard to this matter.

As many Members of the Committee will know, and as the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, mentioned, the consultation is now subject to a legal challenge. While I cannot comment on the ongoing legal proceedings, the Government have committed not to take any final decisions on the matters to which the consultation relates until the judicial review application has been determined. As such, it is not possible for me to set out a timetable for when the Government will respond to the consultation. But of course we hope that that judicial review application will be determined much sooner than later.

That brings me on to the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. The issues that she has raised are of critical importance. I appreciate that she and her family were themselves the subject of press abuse, as were other Members of this House. I also recognise the strength of feeling that parties have on the commencement of Section 40. However, with respect, now is not the right time for this House to consider the present amendment.

News consumption is becoming increasingly global and more and more people are reading their news online from a multitude of sources from around the world. Bringing in a law that effectively mirrors Section 40 but for relevant digital publications only would create an incoherent regime applying different rules depending on the mechanism by which an article has been published.

Noble Lords who have supported these amendments have raised the profile of this issue and given a clear signal of their intent—and of their continuing intent. This has not gone unnoticed in government. But we must ensure that we consider this matter properly. As I said before, a free press is an essential component of a fully functioning democracy and we must ensure that we protect that. I note what the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, said about the position in Ireland. I am not in a position to express a view as to the manner in which that operates but I am perfectly content to indicate that we will look at that going forward as well. I hope that that will satisfy the noble Lord. At this stage, however, I urge the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hollins]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. My hope is for a free and responsible press. However, what is most disappointing for the public is that over the last four years of inertia and of the press’s failure to establish a proper regulator, countless more individuals have been affected by press abuse and have no access to redress. They include victims from the Paris Bataclan attack, the Shoreham air disaster, and many more. This issue is still live and is still troubling. All these individuals have been let down by the Government’s decision to renege on their promises and to prevent access to justice for ordinary victims of press abuse. I am disappointed by the Minister’s response and I intend to return to this on Report. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Baroness Hollins and Lord Keen of Elie

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 31st October 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, we discussed this issue in some detail on Report. As we previously made clear, the cause of action, or tort, provided for in Clause 8 is intended to replicate the safeguard in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. This focuses on circumstances where an individual’s communications are intercepted on a private telecommunications system by a person who has the right to control the operation or use of that system. This was a necessary safeguard to protect individuals, in very limited circumstances, where their employer may unfairly be intercepting communications on a company’s internal computer system, which is not within the scope of the offence of unlawful interception.

A number of noble Lords have spoken about the objective of the amendment. With great respect, the fundamental difficulty is that it really has nothing to do with the purpose or purposes of Clause 8. It is not, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggested, simply a case of deleting “private” and substituting “public” , or of seeking to amend the proposed amendment at this stage or to improve it—it simply has no place in the clause. Clause 8 was not intended to regulate the press or to deal with awarding costs in circumstances where such a case is brought against a publisher. It simply has no application in this context. I quite understand the concerns about Section 40 that have been expressed, and the question of commencements is understood and is under consideration. But to amend Clause 8 in this way is to ignore the very purpose of this part of the Bill.

The Bill already provides for a criminal offence where an individual has unlawfully intercepted communications. An individual convicted of such a crime is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of up to two years, a fine or indeed both. So anyone carrying out phone hacking would face, under this Bill, a criminal conviction. That is a significant penalty and, in our view, the appropriate penalty for such an offence.

As we made clear in the previous debate, there are already avenues for individuals to pursue civil claims against those who carry out unlawful interception such as phone hacking. For example, cases have been brought on the grounds of misuse of private information. Although I agree with the noble Baroness that the outcome of Leveson and press regulation are very important issues, I maintain that this Bill, and in particular Clause 8, is not the appropriate place to deal with them. I therefore invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hollins]

My Lords, thank you for contributing to our understanding of this problem a little further. At no point has the House been told that the amendments are not in scope. In fact, it was suggested to me over the weekend by members of Her Majesty’s Government that I should seek instead to place such amendments within another Bill, such as the Digital Economy Bill. I sought advice from the Public Bill Office but, after considering the matter at length, it advised me that that was not possible and they would not be within the scope of the Digital Economy Bill.

If the House supports the amendment today, as I hope it will, I will be more than happy to work with the Government to find a wording which does no more than provide for as much of the Section 40 costs incentives as could be provided in the scope of the Bill without going any further. I would not be asking the House, in ping-pong, to do anything that destabilises anything else in the Bill. The best solution, of course, would be for the Government to commence Section 40, as they promised and as they should. Then, we could drop all the amendments. It is the Government’s choice and always has been.

On previous occasions when I have had drafting difficulties—and this is a complicated Bill—Ministers have been most helpful in achieving the intentions of your Lordships’ House. I wrote to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, asking whether there were any technical difficulties with the amendment, and the answer was no.

I am not content with the answer given by the noble and learned Lord, and I wish to seek the opinion of the House.

Young Asylum Seekers: Deportation

Debate between Baroness Hollins and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 9th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The majority of unaccompanied minor children making asylum applications are aged 16 or 17 years, have not been here for many years and have not lost contact with their country of origin. With regard to the country of origin, at least one-third of those making applications in 2015 were from either Albania or Afghanistan. In the circumstances where they volunteer to return, appropriate arrangements are made to assist them. Meetings with NGOs or social workers are arranged for them, and they are given considerable assistance, equivalent to a maximum value of £1,500, if they go through the voluntary return procedure.

[Baroness Hollins (CB)]

My Lords, adolescence is a pretty stressful and turbulent time for young people in any circumstances. Obviously, being unable to make plans for your future, and perhaps being terrified of being returned to your country of origin, will make your growing up a little more difficult. Can the Minister assure the House that young people facing deportation will have their mental health assessed, and that the state of their mental health will be taken into account before such a decision is finally made?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Where an unaccompanied minor makes an application for leave to remain, they will be granted leave for at least 13 months or until they reach the age of 17 and a half. An assessment will then be made as to whether or not it would be reasonable to return them. Whether that involves a positive mental health check I cannot say, but I would be happy to write to the noble Baroness on that point.