Atrocity Crimes

Baroness Helic Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Helic (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome this debate, and I too pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and his team for their tireless work that focuses on atrocity prevention and human rights.

The question before us is practical and legal. How do the Government assess the risk of genocide and mass atrocities, and what do they do when the risk is evident? Article 1 of the genocide prevention convention is explicit. We undertake

“to prevent and to punish”

genocide. That is a binding obligation which we have signed up to.

History shows that genocide is rarely sudden. It does not start with a mass grave, a massacre or a rape camp. It is preceded by recognisable patterns: dehumanising language, othering, scapegoating of minorities, pressure on independent media and civil society, corruption and state capture, and security forces or militias acting without constraint. Those are the conditions in which atrocity crimes become possible. We have seen this sequence too often, in Rwanda, Darfur, Srebrenica, in the persecution of Yazidis, Christians, as my noble friend said, and the Rohingya—now before the International Court of Justice, alongside allegations related to persecution of Uyghurs—and in Ukraine and Gaza. The common thread is not lack of warning, but delay and the failure of resolve and political will while action was still possible.

Others have already addressed many contexts in which genocide has happened or is happening. I will focus on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thirty years after the genocide that was committed in Srebrenica, the risk of relapse must be treated seriously. A recent policy briefing on Bosnia produced by the Standing Group on Atrocity Crimes—here I declare an interest as one of the members of its advisory board—identified familiar risks: the hollowing of state institutions, normalised hate speech, genocide denial, the celebration of convicted war criminals, corruption and parallel security structures. These are not isolated incidents.

The evidence is clear. Senior political figures in the Bosnian entity of Republika Srpska—ethno-nationalists aligned with the Kremlin—have denied genocide and publicly honoured convicted war criminals, including Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. In this climate, all the non-Serbs are again spoken of not as equal citizens but as a threat—a threat that needs to be dealt with.

I welcome the Government’s stated support for Bosnia’s sovereignty and the Dayton settlement, and their stated commitment to EUFOR Althea, but the central question is whether this deters those prepared to push the boundaries. Deterrence is not achieved by statements. It exists only when spoilers calculate that consequences will follow from their actions.

With this in mind, I will ask several questions. Recently, the United States has regrettably lifted sanctions on the very people who are looking to destabilise the country, denying genocide and seeking separatist actions. Will the Government state unequivocally that the United Kingdom will not follow suit?

On enforcement, what concrete steps are being taken to prevent sanctions evasion through proxies, front companies and permissive jurisdictions? What further actions will be taken against those who finance and facilitate destabilisation? Additionally, I hope that the review of the foreign influence registration scheme and lobbying rules will look into paid political influence activity carried out in the United Kingdom on behalf of foreign authorities and organisations whose senior leadership is subject to UK sanctions.

On EUFOR, annual renewals at the UN Security Council create a cliff edge and an invitation to brinkmanship. Will the Government press for a more resilient mandate, including longer authorisation, so that the stability of Bosnia is not exposed to predictable yearly risks?

There is also a practical signal available right now. Would the Government consider the deployment of a small UK specialist training contingent to Bosnia, with a readiness to bolster troop strength if required? In parallel, will they also work with supportive states on co-ordinated sanctions, including asset freezes and travel bans, to secure compliance with international law of those bent on destabilisation?

Atrocity prevention depends on timely decisions, credible consequences and consistent enforcement. I believe that Bosnia is a country where deterrence can still work and where acting now can prevent not only instability but the crimes that so often follow it.