Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Tunnicliffe

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Amendments 59, 60 and 86 in this group, which are tabled in my name, seek to give trading standards powers to enforce the relevant provisions of the Bill and a power to investigate alleged breaches of the relevant provisions contained in the Bill. There are excellent examples of good work already going on, which this amendment seeks to build on. Croydon Borough Council has worked with local retailers to improve their understanding of the law around knife sales through training and to encourage them to go further than required by law through responsible retail agreements and has caught traders willing to break the law on underage sales by using test purchasers in person and online. Croydon trading standards now has 145 retailers signed up to its responsible retailer agreements. It ran eight “Do you pass?” training sessions with retailers over the past year, encouraging additional measures, such as Challenge 25 and the responsible display of knives in stores. The training sessions are a good indicator of which retailers are keen to work responsibly and which might not be. Finally, 61 test purchases of knives have been carried out in the past year to identify those retailers which are not complying with the law. We have also seen excellent work done in this regard by the police in Greenwich through test purchases by cadets.

These additional responsibilities will create a resource issue as this will be an additional power and an additional requirement, but one that I think is needed. I recognise that the Serious Violence Strategy released by the Home Office contained the promise of a prosecution fund for trading standards for two years to support targeted prosecution activity against online and instore retailers in breach of the law on the sale of knives to underage people. The strategy is not clear about how much funding will be made available and gives no clarity to trading standards about support two years down the line. Perhaps the Minister can update the Grand Committee on this.

In putting these amendments forward, I am aware that the budget for trading standards has been cut by half since 2010, from more than £200 million to barely £100 million, while the number of trading standards officers has fallen by 56% in the same period. The cuts I refer to have led to the downgrading of the protections that consumers depend on. In many cases, they have been reduced to a system based on consumer complaints. Relying on such a system is not an effective way to enforce laws, particularly when we talk about the purchase of knives or corrosive substances. I hope to get a positive response and that the Minister will speak to her amendments in this group. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am not sure whether the Minister wants to introduce the government’s amendments now, so perhaps I should just ask some questions. At Second Reading, I raised the role of trading standards so it is obviously welcome that it is being addressed.

There are some obvious questions about the Government’s amendments. First, why weights and measures authorities? I confess that I have not looked up the statutory definition of a weights and measures authority, but there must be one. Why is it that rather than local authorities? The Chartered Trading Standards Institute makes the point that if the obligation was placed on local authorities as a whole, they might have more flexibility in how they dealt with the issue. Secondly, why is it not a statutory duty? On that point, the institute says that, in its experience, local authorities are less likely to provide the resources to deal with a problem, let alone with the training and recruitment of staff. The issue of resources is huge, and it is the elephant in the room in this context. We are all aware of the constraints on local authorities. It is a while since I was a local councillor, and I used to think that we had problems then. I do not know how local authorities manage now to juggle the calls on their resources, so I must make that obvious point as well as asking these few questions. It is right that the role of trading standards is recognised here, as is their role with offensive weapons as a whole, given their understanding of how the communities where they work actually operate.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Tunnicliffe

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 28th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving this amendment on behalf of my noble friend I will speak also to Amendment 16. These are nothing like as technical as the matters raised in the previous group. Indeed they are probing, as all amendments are at this stage in Grand Committee.

The first probe concerns condition A, one of the defences in Clause 2, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has already referred. The Explanatory Notes very straightforwardly state of condition A that,

“at the time of any alleged offence being committed, a seller had a system in place for checking the age of anyone purchasing corrosive products that was likely to prevent anyone under the age of 18 from purchasing that product”.

That seems quite straightforward. What is important, as I read it, is that there is a system in place to check that purchasers are not under the age of 18. The amendment would delete the words,

“by the same or a similar method of purchase to that used by the buyer”.

I am not entirely clear to what those words refer. I do not understand them and I apologise to the Committee if they are perfectly obvious to other Members. The purpose of my amendment is to obtain an explanation of what the words add to those in the Explanatory Notes.

Amendment 16 relates to Clause 2(10) and queries the term “supply”. We have a buyer and a seller, a reference to sale and a reference to delivery, which is to be read as its “supply” to the buyer or someone acting on the behalf of the buyer. The offence in Clause 1 is that of sale. That is not the same as delivery. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain the choice of terminology here. I beg to move.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, if I can give some comfort to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I did not understand it either.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am sure that the noble Baroness is very much comforted. I hope I can clarify the meaning.

Amendment 12 seeks to test why it is necessary to include in Clause 2(6)(a) the words,

“by the same or a similar method of purchase to that used by the buyer”.

There are many different ways to make purchases online or in response to an advertisement by post or telephone. The simple purpose of the condition set out in Clause 2(6)(a) is to ensure that, at the time of making the sale, the seller had the required arrangements in place to verify the age of the buyer. This would assist in proving that an offence had been committed.

Amendment 16 seeks to clarify why Clause 2(10) uses the term “supply” instead of “delivery”, given the terms of the Clause 1 offence. The use of “supply” is correct in this context because it is about the actual handing over of the product to a person or their representative at the collection point, rather than its delivery to the address from where the buyer ordered the product. I hope that provides clarification, although the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is looking even more puzzled than she initially was.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 22 but I wonder whether, with the indulgence of the Committee, I can go back to Amendment 12. As it has puzzled at least three noble Lords—three of us have confessed to it—I urge the Minister, as well as writing, to consider whether the wording might be clearer. We would be happy to look at a government amendment on Report because, if it confuses people who are used to reading legislation, there is a good argument for making it clearer to others who will also read it.

Amendment 22 again concerns some detailed wording. Clause 4(1)(c) provides that the clause applies if before the sale the seller has entered into an arrangement for delivery. Why before the sale? Does this apply only if the seller already has delivery arrangements in place? Often that will be the case but I am puzzled as to whether those words might, in a few situations, limit the application of the clause. I beg to move.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

May I join the noble Baroness and say that I too am confused?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I fear that I am about to confuse people further—I hope not—because the noble Baroness is effectively asking why Clause 4 is drafted on the basis that the delivery arrangements for an online sale made to a vendor based overseas will have been made at the point of contract and not subsequently. It therefore might be helpful if I explain how we have drafted the clause in this way.

The purpose of Clause 4(1)(c) is to avoid criminalising a delivery company in instances where an overseas seller has simply placed a package containing a corrosive product in the international mail. By doing this, it then places an obligation on the delivery company, and potentially the Royal Mail, to deliver the item without having entered into a contract or necessarily knowing that the package contains a corrosive product. If we did not have the provision in place and in combination with the provisions of Clause 4(1)(d), which makes it clear that the company was aware that the delivery arrangements with the overseas seller covered the delivery of the corrosive product, then delivery companies such as the Royal Mail would be committing an offence.

We want to mitigate this, which is why we have constructed the offence in this way so that it requires the delivery company to have entered into specific arrangements to deliver corrosive products on behalf of an overseas seller.

The noble Baroness looks far less confused than she did in my previous explanation and I hope I have provided the explanation she seeks.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is in the same territory as my noble friend and I. Like him, we seek to know how one objectively defines “corrosive substance”. His amendment asks what happens if the skin is particularly sensitive. I am not sure that there is such a thing as the “average human hand”, which he refers to in his amendment. I suspect that sensitivity may depend on age—whether one is young or old could affect vulnerability—as well as all sorts of other matters.

Our amendment proposes two points. The first refers to the testing method. That would not help the point, with which I have a great deal of sympathy, about knowing whether a substance falls within the definition but it enables us to ask about the status of the testing kits. The noble Earl has said that work on them is well under way. Can he tell us any more about them? Are they intended to work—as I understand it—like a breathalyser? It is enough to get you taken off for a second and different test, but does it start with a roadside test? As with a breathalyser, it may look as if you have failed it. Again, this is as I understand it; I do not have personal experience of going down to a police station and giving a blood test or a mouth-breath test. The point is about the process.

My second question is about the definition of the substance as one capable of burning human skin. Our amendment refers to eyes, since a lot of awful acid attacks have involved throwing acid into someone’s eyes. Are eyes “skin” for this purpose? We simply want to be sure that we have covered the ground here.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, perhaps I may speak briefly on this rather macabre amendment. First, I am not sure who the testing is to be done on. I cannot see many volunteers being willing to be corroded. My second and more substantive point is that I cannot see why the definition is required because, as I read the Bill—not an easy Bill to read, as we have discovered today—a corrosive substance is de facto defined by Schedule 1. I would have thought it much more satisfactory to retain the concept of a schedule, which can be altered by order, than to have this rather frightening test.

Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Tunnicliffe

Tuesday 30th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 55A, I will speak also to Amendments 60A and 71A, which stand also in my name and that of my noble friend. Again, the amendment deals with notices.

Amendment 55A would apply Clause 12(6) to people over 18 as well as to those under 18, and would mean that a prohibition notice must specify the period for which it is to have effect—certainty, although in a slightly different context, is something which we have touched on a good deal during the passage of this Bill—and that it must not have effect for more than three years.

I cannot envisage circumstances in which it would be appropriate to apply a prohibition notice to anybody for more than three years. I have my doubts about prohibition and premises notices anyway, but if there is a need to apply a prohibition notice for a longer period, surely the circumstances must be such as to suggest that there should be a prosecution—something rather tougher than a notice. At any age, certainty is important. Amendment 60A would apply both certainty and a statutory maximum to a premises notice.

In neither case has an offence been proved. I cannot see what a notice might do that would not be available under other legislation, particularly anti-social behaviour legislation such as a community protection notice. What is achieved by providing that somebody knows that he should not commit a crime and that the police and the local authority have got their eye on him? In a way, a premises notice is more important. I am assuming that if we are talking about head shops the intention is permanent closure. But the straightforward, honest course would be to address that directly with a proper hearing, giving the recipient of the notice more of a chance to deal with his business interests and have his representations heard in a proper way. I am concerned about the extent there.

Amendment 71A would add that what the court should do in an order should be proportionate as well as appropriate. I assume that that is implied because what courts do almost by definition has to be proportionate—but I am seeking confirmation of that at this point. I beg to move.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, I have some limited sympathy with these amendments. Any notice that has indefinite extent, which seems to be where the Bill is, has a certain discomfort about it. Clearly the Government share this discomfort because they are limiting the period of extent to three years for under 18 year-olds. I cannot see, having accepted that indefinite extent is inappropriate for under 18 year-olds, why it should not be inappropriate for those over 18. “Proportionate” is a word we all like to move around in legislation. I found that the Government have used it quite freely throughout the document. I will be interested in their response to Amendment 71A as well.

Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Tunnicliffe

Tuesday 23rd June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I very much support what has been said on this amendment and, indeed, the amendment itself, in particular because we want to avoid driving those human beings who will go on using drugs underground. One small point I want to mention, before I forget about it, is that the impact in Northern Ireland should be looked at, because I wonder what has been happening across the border. The report by Mark Easton yesterday, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, referred, revealed the difficulty that the police have in proving that a substance has a psychoactive effect. That seems to me to be very much at the heart of this, with only four successful prosecutions in five years.

The expert panel talked about “robust” definitions and the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House reported, I think yesterday, on the need for certainty. The Joint Committee on Human Rights probably does not have its full membership yet, but no doubt it would have taken points on the importance of certainty in legislation—it did so for other legislation, particularly the recent anti-social behaviour Bill. The Constitution Committee said:

“The Bill inevitably exists in tension (at least to some extent) with the principle of legal certainty since its raison d’être is the regulation of activities in respect of substances that may not currently exist and whose nature and composition cannot readily be prescribed in advance with any accuracy”.

I thought that was very honest of it. However, it then went on to comment about not making,

“unacceptably broad inroads into the principle of legal certainty”.

We may come on to some of the detail of that on later amendments, but it seems to me to be very relevant to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has made with this amendment.

A proper, independent assessment would mean that we had advice that was not from those defending their own scheme, which can sometimes happen. I hope that we can hear sympathetically from the Minister on this, because I have absolutely no doubt that the noble Baroness will pursue this matter throughout the passage of the Bill and she will certainly have support from these Benches when—not if—she does that.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, somebody has to give the Government some support on this. Amendment 3 talks in the first proposed subsection about an impact assessment and it being used to justify the commencement of the Act. I do not understand Amendment 109, but Amendment 114 is clearly about delaying the commencement of some provisions of the Act until the report of that assessment has been considered. Amendments 3 and 114 between them would delay the commencement of the Act.

Although the balance was a little uncomfortable, we had a very good Second Reading, in which it was clear that the central debate was about whether you believed banning produces a benign effect or not. That was the essence of the debate, as it has been of the debates we have had today. The position of the Government is that effective bans are benign in their effect; the position of Her Majesty’s Opposition is that effective bans will have a benign effect; and the position of the Liberal Democrats was—at least until the election, we thought—that effective bans had a benign effect.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I wonder whether I can quickly try to squash this. A clamp-down on new psychoactive substances, which was in our manifesto, is not the same as a complete ban.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I thank the noble Baroness for that clarification. As I say, we are divided between those who believe that banning has a benign effect and those who do not.

This is a simple, fairly narrow Bill to close a loophole in the 1971 Act which is growing exponentially. We believe that it is appropriate that this loophole should be closed urgently and that there is sufficient evidence to proceed to close it with this Bill, which we believe should be introduced as soon as reasonably possible. We believe new psychoactive substances are not safe and we want them to be illegal as soon as reasonably possible.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Tunnicliffe

Tuesday 13th December 2011 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 101, and there are other amendments in this group. My amendments are quite simple. They are probing amendments. Clause 29(3) provides that provision may, in particular, be made in the code about standards applicable to persons using systems or processing information. When I read that, I hesitated and wondered what was meant by “standards” in this context. My amendment proposes inserting a reference to operational practices because it seems to me that they are relevant, rather than the people who are using or maintaining the systems as individuals. I beg to move Amendment 100 in order to help me understand the clause a little better.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 102, 106 and 112A. I thank the noble Lord for ensuring that the results of the first consultation on the proposed CCTV code of practice were published before the Committee stage in order to ensure proper scrutiny. The opposition amendments in this group seek to probe the Government’s thinking in this area and to tease out more detail of the shape of the final code now that they have reflected on the results of the consultation.

On Amendment 102, we are concerned that any future code should not force local authorities and police forces into disclosing the location of cameras. The consultation notes that some respondents,

“considered that there ought to be public access to a full list of camera locations and data retention periods”.

I note that the Government, although not committing to such a view, stated in response:

“The Government intends that the Code of Practice will increase transparency over the operation of surveillance cameras”.

It is right that, in some cases, CCTV locations are made public. Indeed, many cameras are clearly visible to the public and their visibility acts as an important deterrent to crime. However, it must be right that local authorities and police should reserve the right to conceal the location of other cameras, particularly those positioned in sensitive locations and deployed temporarily in order to apprehend criminals. There is also a real concern that, by disclosing the location of cameras and surveillance centres, there is a risk that these will become the targets of vandals and criminals wishing to prevent the detection of crime. Will the Minister give a clear assurance to the Committee that any future code of practice will not include a blanket requirement to disclose the location of surveillance cameras?

Amendment 106 probes the Government’s intentions with respect to the code of practice in relation to CCTV and ANPR footage that is used as evidence in court. Clause 33 currently provides:

“A court or tribunal may, in particular, take into account a failure by a relevant authority to have regard to the surveillance camera code in determining a question in any such proceedings”.

In fact, this would appear to be the only real enforcement tool at the disposal of the Government. Local authorities will be required to have regard to the surveillance camera code but they will commit no criminal or civil offence if they fail to adhere to it. The implication is that the Government envisage that local authorities and police forces will feel compelled to comply with the code for fear that otherwise evidence provided by their cameras will not be admissible in court.

This view is reinforced by the response to the consultation in which the Government note that the failure to comply can be tested in judicial proceedings. It is one thing to conclude that evidence should be inadmissible on the basis that it violates requirements under the Data Protection Act; however, it is quite another to jeopardise whole trials on the basis that, for instance, the location of the camera in question was not adequately disclosed to the public. What assurances can the Minister give to the Committee that enforcement of the code in this way will not lead to the police being hamstrung in their use of key evidence derived from CCTV cameras?

Finally, Amendment 112A seeks again to probe the Government’s intentions with regard to ensuring that there is clarity for local authorities on the overlap of existing requirements under the Data Protection Act and those under the proposed code of practice. This point was raised by a number of sources when the Bill was debated in another place. Indeed, the Information Commissioner has himself expressed concerns about the implementation of the code in this area. In a letter to my noble friend Lady Royall on 22 November the Information Commissioner noted:

“There is potential overlap between these provisions, including my role, and those set out in the bill relating to the Secretary of State’s Code of Practice and the activities of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner”.

In his memorandum to the Public Bill Committee, the commissioner goes further, stating that,

“there is a risk that regulation becomes frequently fragmented, confusing and contradictory, especially if commissioners take different approaches … there will be overlaps in their responsibilities running the risk that commissioners may adopt differing interpretive approaches and guidance on each other’s statutory provisions”.

The Government’s consultation recognises that there is an issue to be dealt with, and states:

“We shall take note of the concern expressed by respondents in the way we develop the role of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner and how this interacts with that of the Information Commissioner and the Surveillance Commissioners”.

To prevent unnecessary bureaucratic burdens and confusion in the public sector, I ask the Minister to take this opportunity to expand on how the Government aim to ensure maximum clarity and minimum overlap in the roles and requirements of the two commissioners.