Victims and Prisoners Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I raise an issue with regard to the time limit. It is not from the wording of the amendment, which I support, but the wording in the victims’ code. At the moment it says that, first:

“The Attorney General must consider the matter as soon as possible”.


What does that mean? Secondly, it says that they must do so

“no later than the 28th calendar day after the sentence was imposed … in business hours and”—

I emphasise this—

“with sufficient time for consideration”.

How can the victim know how long the Attorney-General needs before the 28 days runs out? It is a hard cut-off, but with something rather woolly leading up to it. The victims’ code could do with a little revision to make it quite clear, in addition to the points that my noble friend has made and the very tough example that she gave, just how this would operate. I would not know, to meet that condition, how long before the end of the 28 days I should get a note through the Attorney-General’s door.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I support the principle put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, that there should be proper information provided to victims. This should be proper in the widest sense, so that they fully understand; we do not want disappointment and secondary victimisation. The whole question of time limits and extending them is not a suitable matter for debate at this hour of the night. What is important is the principle.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, given the experience of those who have put their names to the amendments in this group, I wonder whether I should say nothing so as not to damage the arguments—but I will join in.

It will be clear enough to the Committee that we on these Benches have considerable concerns about this part of the Bill. I hope that the Committee will understand that this does not mean that we do not take very seriously indeed the threat and actuality of terrorism and the work undertaken by our agencies. I say that because our amendments to the Covert Human Intelligence Sources Bill, which we completed earlier, seemed to be heard by some noble Lords as opposition to covert sources period when we were directing ourselves to authorisations to commit crime by the mechanism of making the action not a crime. I do not want too much to be read into what I am saying. This is not opposition, as I say, to the work of those who keep us as safe as they possibly can.

We are not hugely keen on TPIMs, especially on their acquiring extensions that take them back closer to control orders. We consider it appropriate to test these administrative measures in terms of how they measure up to the presumption of innocence, fair trial, liberty and all the matters that we as a society hold to be important, knowing the damage that might be done by letting them slip. We are of course aware of the Government’s argument that it is not the TPIMs themselves that we should be looking to, but the application of particular measures. If you look at that from a slightly different perspective, it is a good argument for legislative safeguards.

At the time of the last three-monthly report to Parliament on 30 November, only three TPIM notices were in force, there having been six the previous May. That begs the question as to the need for these clauses. The Home Office fact sheet on lowering the standard of proof tells us that this would

“increase flexibility by making it more practical for operational partners to demonstrate an individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity.”

That requirement should indeed be more than merely suspected.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, referred to the statement in the Commons by the Minister. The current standard of proof does not seem to have prevented the imposition of TPIMs. The current independent reviewer has made the same point, so this is not even a matter of administrative convenience. These measures may be civil but they can, quite understandably, be perceived as a parallel system of punishment without trial, but currently on the basis of the civil standard.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, seek to meet the Government part way. We take the view that the alterations are not justified. I have referred to the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. To quote from his note on this part of the Bill,

“it is inevitable from the nature of intelligence that mistakes may be made. The significance of an individual’s actions may potentially be misinterpreted; their adherence to a cause overstated; their intentions misunderstood, if only partially. A safeguard that requires the Secretary of State to consider the intelligence presented to her by officials, and decide whether the individual has actually been involved in the terrorist-related activity that is alleged against them, and which allows a court to review that decision in the light of all information presented to it, is not an impediment to safeguarding national security.”

We oppose this clause standing part of the Bill.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, spoke with such eloquence in making all the points that I can confine myself to making four short points.

First, as he rightly stressed, this is an important part of the conditions for TPIMs because it enables a judge and the Home Secretary, when making the decision, to concentrate on the factual evidence in relation to terrorist activity. The other conditions are more difficult to establish, or it might be more a question of judgment, but this at least concentrates on the facts.

Secondly, the amendment seeks what some may feel is an overgenerous compromise. I do not think so; I think that it is right to say that, for the first and initial period, a lower standard can be acceptable.

However, thirdly, that cannot be acceptable when one is looking at longer periods where a person’s liberty is to be constrained—particularly with the amendment that we will come to next, which concerns the indefinite detention period.

Fourthly, and finally, it seems to me that there can be no justification for making such a change unless there is evidence. Indeed, what was said about the position in the other place has been clearly set out.

I ask the Minister to set out fully what he believes is the evidence for this change. If he cannot do so in public on this occasion, there must be a means of informing those who are interested in this matter of the evidence so that it can be carefully reviewed before we impose on people accused of obviously very serious issues a standard of proof that really is completely unacceptable in any civilised society.