Sentencing Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Monday 1st December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 52 would provide for the Secretary of State to make an assessment of the benefits of mandatory rehabilitative programmes regarding healthy relationships for individuals sentenced for offences when the victim is a woman or girl and to lay a copy of that assessment before Parliament. I declare an interest as a trustee of Safer London, a charity which works with young Londoners affected by, or at risk of, violence and exploitation. Among these are young Londoners who display harmful sexual behaviours. Often, they may not have a full understanding of their actions, where their behaviours may stem from or that they themselves need support.

I am under no illusion that an intervention is likely to be quick or easy. These are young or not so young people who have had no role model or a bad role model, who may be neurodiverse, who may be resistant to relevant specialist treatment and support. They may not understand what a healthy relationship is like. They may believe that what is harmful is what a girl or woman wants. The picture over recent years has become further confused by what they see online or on social media. I am under no illusion that this is easy, but it is important. A Bill seeking to reduce reoffending is just the place where this kind of action should be taken. I am not asking for such programmes immediately, though it is good if there are some that can be accessed. However, I would like to see put into the public domain an assessment of the benefits of programmes such as this.

The other amendments in this group are in the name of the Conservative Front Bench. They seem to focus largely on the number of rehabilitation activity days. The number of days is a factor, but it is neither the first factor nor the only one; the content of rehabilitative activity and the reasons for that are more important. In other words, the approach should be more reasoned and nuanced than these amendments might suggest.

I beg to move.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments, many of which are in my name—Amendments 53, 54 and so on—address the Government’s proposal to transfer a significant element of sentencing discretion from the courts to probation practitioners: determining the number of rehabilitation activity days under community orders and suspended sentence orders. The amendments seek not to frustrate reform, although, as we made clear on our first day in Committee, we oppose the changes. They are intended to ensure that, if such powers are to be reallocated to the probation officer or practitioner from the judges, they are supported and buttressed by the same principled framework of accountability, transparency and procedural safeguards that have underpinned judicial discretion through the years.

The constitutional architecture of this country has long rested on the independence and authority of our judiciary. Sentencing is a judicial function and the product of reasoned evaluation of seriousness, culpability, risk and proportionality. Judges exercise that responsibility transparently, in open court and subject to appellate review. These protections exist because sentencing is a public act in which legitimacy rests on visible fairness. Society, represented by the third limb of the constitution—the judiciary—is passing sentence on outlaws and criminal offenders.

Clauses 11 and 12 would shift this discretion from judges to probation practitioners. Probation professionals are dedicated and skilled, of course, but they were never intended to assume quasi-judicial responsibilities. The Government may describe this as flexibility, but flexibility cannot become a veil for judicial discretion exercised behind closed doors without consistency or oversight. If probation offices are to take on direct decision-making powers that influence the substance of a sentence, proper safeguards must apply; the Bill, we submit, contains none.

Amendment 53 would therefore require the Secretary of State to establish, by regulation, clear national criteria governing how rehabilitation activity days are to be determined. Decisions of such consequence must not depend on local practice, staffing pressures or administrative expediency; in these straitened financial times, I emphasise “staffing pressures or administrative expediency”. Judges operate within well-established frameworks. Probation practitioners should not be left to improvise.

Amendment 54 would require written reasons for the determination of rehabilitation days. Giving reasons is a cornerstone of fairness. Offenders must personally understand what is required of them. Victims must be able to trust the process, and the courts must be able to review what is being done in their name.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Monday 10th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I hope the Minister will not feel beleaguered or besieged by this amendment, which is a probing amendment prompted by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation’s note on the Bill published on his website.

Clause 8 is about co-ordination and co-operation. I have always found it a bit difficult to get my head around the notion of a statutory requirement to co-operate, although co-ordination might be a bit different. The amendment addresses subsections (5) and (6), which place a duty on someone who is not responsible for the premises but who has

“control to any other extent of the premises”.

The duty is subject to enforcement by the regulator. The amendment is to ask what “control to any other extent” means. The Explanatory Notes say that it is intended to apply to the freehold owner of the premises or the superior landlord who leases to the person who is primarily responsible under the Bill.

The independent reviewer gives a particular example. The owner of a premises rents them out to the responsible person, who uses them, in this example, as a bingo hall with a capacity of more than 800. The lease has 12 months to run and provides that no alteration may be made to the structure of the premises without the owner’s consent. There are no plans to renew the lease—indeed, the owner of the premises wants to sell them to a developer. The responsible person decides that, to comply with his duty under the legislation, he must make a structural change, putting in a new exit where there are currently windows. The owner would be entitled to refuse the alterations, particularly because they would adversely affect the value of the premises. There are conflicting considerations. Does Clause 8(6) mean that the owner has a duty to give consent? It is practicable for him to do so, but is it reasonable? What is the policy intention? Does it matter that the lease gives the ultimate say to the owner over building alterations, or is the lease now overwritten?

All this amounts to a question whether Clause 8 is intended to overwrite commercial considerations. The clause has the capacity to impose new terrorism-related duties on many building owners and landowners, not only in the property investment sector. Its effect, the independent reviewer writes, is “uncertain”. He suggests that

“since the Bill imposes unprecedented terrorism-related duties on members of the public, and has the capacity to interfere with commercial relationships, the intended impact … should be clearer”.

In this group, Amendments 24A and 24B are in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. I will leave it to him to introduce those. However, on Amendment 24B, in which he proposes that the tribunal must issue its determinations within a reasonable time—that being defined in regulations by the Secretary of State—I wonder whether he can tell the Committee whether this is entirely novel. He will know far better than I do, given his background and experience, whether the tribunal is required to meet a timeframe in other equivalent contexts. That is my question on his amendment. I beg to move my Amendment 24.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, in this group, I have Amendments 24A and 24B. Amendment 24A to Clause 10 is very simple. It gives the option in the case of non-enhanced duty—that is, standard duty—premises for the responsible body to delegate responsibility to more than one person. That will not dilute responsibility but, if we suppose that two people were given responsibility where it was a small and informal group, it would allow for a degree of flexibility. That is important in small, informal organisations which normally have fewer than 200 people but, in any case, fewer than 800 at an event. This is for smaller events—I do not mean that they are unimportant—and those in charge are likely to be smaller and much less formal organisations than for big places. If such organisations are to engage with all this, very often, if there are volunteers, person A may not be available because they may be on holiday, so we say let us have person B. It is not a big, structured organisation that we are talking about, necessarily.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I can see force in what the Minister has said, so I will not press my amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, will not pursue his amendment. As noble, and noble and learned, Lords will have understood, my question to him was a coded form of opposition. He said “It doesn’t matter that there’s no precedent”, but I think that it matters very much.

On my Amendment 24, I hope it is appropriate to summarise the Minister’s response as saying that there are two conditions for subsection (6) to apply: practicality and reasonableness. He is nodding—I say that so that we will get it into Hansard, because it answers the question raised by the independent reviewer. If we need to come back for any clarity, or if I am misconstruing him, perhaps there will be an opportunity.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Sandhurst

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, brought his copy of Hansard from Second Reading with him. My recollection of the Minister’s explanation regarding Section 19(1)(b) was that the matter had not been tested by the courts. That sticks in my mind because I thought it was curious, since the Government are rather critical of people running off to the courts for interpretations of the law.

I will say quickly, because I want to put it on the record, that I subscribe to the view that no asylum seeker can be illegal and to the comments about international law which have been made. I am afraid that I am going to retreat from the big picture and Second Reading to Amendment 1—possibly unconventionally. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for tabling it, because it made me start thinking about the definitions of a lot of other terms used in Clause 1. The term he has singled out—I agree with him that it needs clarity—raises a lot of issues. There is a sort of endless loop of argument about compliance by the individual and compliance by the Government in their assessment of what they are doing.

In my mind, that is not the only phrase in Clause 1(1) that needs to be clearer. The same sentence uses the wording,

“and in particular migration by unsafe and illegal routes”.

That raises a lot of issues, does it not? Unsafe, of course, is a matter of judgment. As for illegal routes, in legislative terms, how does a route become illegal? What does “and in particular” signify in this context? Does the reference to unsafe and illegal routes exclude other routes? I really do not know. It is good prose, but not in this context.

Another phrase which bothers me at a technical and, I have to say, a political and a practical level is

“in breach of immigration control”.

Superficially, one understands what that means, but I do not know and was unable to find whether this is a technical phrase and so legally clear within domestic law. Immigration control is breached by a contravention of legislation, I would think, at a given time. That is clear enough. However, in the area we are discussing, the Immigration Rules—which we know are constantly changing and which come from Ministers and do not touch the sides for parliamentary scrutiny—are part of immigration control. So, I would be interested to know what that means in this context. It seems to me that one could portray this as delegation to Ministers by another mechanism. It is not clear—this is the political point, I suppose—so it is not a deterrent. I think it is inappropriate and gives more power to the Executive, which the Constitution Committee reports are given

“an unusual degree of power”

by the Bill.

I have added my name to Amendment 84. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, is not in his place; I did not expect to find that the debate on this would come today, and possibly neither did he. I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate for highlighting compliance with the anti-trafficking conventions. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that we need to come together with a single list that we can gather around.

I do not want to pre-empt debates on the substantive issues regarding trafficking and slavery—I say that without intending to suggest that the conventions and directives are not significant; they are—but will simply say that I expect the term “world-leading” to be used quite a lot with reference to the Modern Slavery Act when we get to that part of the Bill. The international nature of trafficking means that the UK has to consider it internationally and comply with conventions and directives—which brings us directly back to the point that many other noble Lords have made.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 2, 4, 84 and 148. I shall not speak to Amendments 1, 3 and 5. As for those later amendments, I will wait to hear what the Minister has to say about their meaning and effect on the Bill.

I turn to Amendment 2. Let me begin by way of introduction by explaining what I understand to be the effect of Clause 1(5) of the Bill, which will disapply Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Importantly, it does not mean that the convention ceases to apply to matters covered by the Bill or to acts by Ministers and officials; they will still be covered by it. Section 3 provides that

“primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights”.