(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for substituting for me in my absence on the first day on Report. She obtained for me a very useful answer to the question that underlies this amendment, which is: how is someone going to know? I would be grateful if my noble friend the Minister would make it clear that the Government understand how important it is to get this guidance clear. Big retailers are going to have to decide whether something is a bladed product or not: they need to be able to take that decision with certainty. A reputable UK retailer does not want to find itself on the wrong side of this legislation. It will have to make these decisions every day in relation to items of kitchen equipment which they might ship, and they need to do it properly. It is really up to the Government to get this right. I would be grateful for an assurance that the Government understand this and will use the provisions in Amendment 106 to achieve that effect. I beg to move.
My Lords, is not really possible to substitute for the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, but I was happy to introduce some of his amendments, as my noble friend did, on our first day on Report. We have Amendments 82 and 86 in this group. Amendment 86 also requests guidance on articles that are not bladed products for the purposes of the Bill—in other words, a negative approach. Amendment 82 would provide that the term does not,
“include a product intended for domestic use which incorporates a blade if the product does not function without the blade”.
I could go off down a separate avenue about the range of experiences that we draw on in this Chamber: I could not have begun to talk about sheep shearing; the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, might want to talk about food processors—I do not know. Clause 20 defines “bladed product” for the purpose of the clauses dealing with delivery to residential premises. Of course, I am not taking issue with the overall approach of my noble friend, but, as the Government have been resisting, this is to look at the detail.
The definition excludes all sorts of things, some of which I have never heard of: flick-knives, gravity knives, knuckle-dusters, death stars and other weapons whose sale and importation is already prohibited, as well as items excluded from the prohibition on the sale of bladed articles to those under 18. I think it is appropriate to pause here, while thanking the Government for providing Keeling schedules, to say that it is really not immediately obvious what is within Clause 18—in other words, what products it will be an offence to deliver to residential premises. There was a degree of confusion when this was debated in the Public Bill Committee in the Commons. We have just heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, about the distinction between a pointed article and an article with a cutting edge, but it seems to me that that must depend on how the items are used. Surely, with something that is pointed, if you pull it down against somebody’s skin it is likely to cut the skin.
In our view, it ought to be clear which items make delivery to residential premises an offence. Apart from its substance, the clause’s complexity and its dependence on orders made under other legislation—more accurately, the exclusion of items that are the subject of such orders—is not in the tradition of well-written Acts of Parliament. One cannot employ the defence of reasonable precautions and all due diligence when there is an issue with the definition.
I have occasionally bought art materials online for delivery at home. Go on to any art materials website and you will find a range of palette knives and craft knives, some of which would fall foul of the definition. Not everyone paints, does craft work or shears sheep—but everybody eats, which is why I picked domestic kitchen items. They are relevant to many people’s lives, as they buy them either for themselves or for others, for instance from a wedding gift list.
Other noble Lords may have received a letter from John Lewis representatives—whom the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and I met a couple of weeks ago—who expressed concern that the definition would prohibit them selling and delivering to a residential address a wide range of everyday kitchen products containing blades, such as food processors and scissors. They described to us the careful age-verification steps they take in respect of sales in store, but said:
“Online sales at John Lewis and partners are a key part of our business strategy and account for over 40% of our total sales … Around 50% of these online sales are delivered direct to customers’ homes. Any restriction on our ability to continue to sell and deliver products, such as food processors, online would negatively … impact our business. We do not believe this is the intention of the Government”—
nor do I—
“and nor do we believe that this would do anything to help address the issue of knife crime”.
We agree. This amendment is not intended as a plug for John Lewis; rather, it seeks clarity and a common-sense outcome in which businesses do not regard more items than is necessary as outlawed from home delivery.
The British Retail Consortium supports the three amendments in this group. In Committee and earlier on Report, we sought to address the issue through the amendments to which my noble friend referred. I appreciate that Amendment 82 only scrapes the surface of the issue, but I wanted to highlight the point.
As we know, under government amendment 106, the Secretary of State “may”—that is the term used—issue guidance. The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, says “must”; Amendment 86, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick, says “shall”. No doubt we will be told that “may” means “will”, or other close synonyms, but guidance cannot override legislation, so it is essential to get that right. Of course, guidance will be produced by the Executive without parliamentary approval and it can be changed without approval. So at least we should hear from the Dispatch Box—I look forward to the Minister’s explanation—what consultation on the guidance the Government intend to undertake. Clearly, it should be thorough. I suspect that the Government have also had a bit of difficulty in pinning down a definition—otherwise we would have one. That simply demonstrates how important this issue is.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeWell, my Lords, perhaps we could enter into some correspondence about that. What Amazon does in this country is the fulfilment; the selling is done from Ireland or Liechtenstein, but certainly not from within this country. We need to be clear that these activities can get split, particularly in the case of big companies. The whole action of selling the knife, preparing it for delivery and delivering it is what should be considered as selling it, not just the technical act of selling.
My Lords, that is why I asked some of my questions, as the activities can be split—although I do not want to promote Amazon. These issues may not be far from the taxation points that arise in connection with some of these organisations. As it happens, I do not quite agree with the noble Lord about who is selling. Last night, I looked up an item that I have only been able to find to buy through Amazon and the website said, “This is dispatched from and sold by” somebody else. However, a lot of questions remain.
That is an Amazon Marketplace thing and not an Amazon own product.
In moving Amendment 61, I shall speak also to Amendment 62. Amendment 61 is intended to remove or make it clear that certain knives do not fall under the prohibition in Clause 21. There are a number of occupations and trades where it is very important to be able to have a knife that can be opened with one hand. This is often a safety-critical feature—if you are a climber, an at-sea fisherman, a parachutist or in various other trades that involve the use of ropes, you need to be able to cut and at the same time use your other hand to hold on to something. The way that is generally achieved is to have a small button looking something like a wart on the blade that you can push using the pressure of your thumb to open it; sometimes the alternative is a large opening in the blade.
I want to make sure that the Government are clear that those sorts of knives are not intended to be caught by this clause, because—coming on to the history behind Amendment 62—when Clause 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 was promulgated, allowing folding knives with blades shorter than three and a half inches, it was widely assumed that that would allow blades that locked, because nobody who is going to use a knife wants a blade that does not lock. A folding knife with a blade that does not lock is a toy—you can use it to sharpen a pencil and nothing much else safely. If you have any use for it in hobbies or business, you need a blade that will lock open. The locking requirement was introduced as a result of case law.
If the Government wish to maintain that, I would like my noble friend to make it absolutely clear that “good reason” is understood to be really quite wide. A tradesman will generally have among his tools a knife with a blade that locks, because that is all that is safe to use. You can therefore expect to find it in and about their vehicle, when their vehicle is in a public place, or when they are moving between, or might be going to, places where they will need to employ their knife.
At present, people who use knives in such ways tell me that the police are understanding, but if we reach the point of being much harder on the carrying of knives, I want to be sure that it really is understood that a locking knife is an essential tool of the trade, that people who have a trade or hobby that requires it will often have it in their possession and that the police take an understanding attitude to that at a time of heightened tension. I beg to move.
My noble friend and I have given notice that we oppose Clause 21 standing part of the Bill. Our concern was that expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, about people who need to be able to open a knife with one hand because their other hand is otherwise engaged in the same operation. We wanted also to know how the needs of disabled people who may have the use of only one hand are to be dealt with. A button, spring or other device that the noble Lord has described seems to be exactly the sort of knife that would fall within this clause. I see a problem there, and I am glad that he has identified it more specifically than we have done. I could not quite see the way to deal with it, so I took the rather wider approach of opposing the clause standing part, but we have to pin it down in a way that satisfies everyone—and not just by the police being understanding.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for saying that there will be guidance. Perhaps we might drop that into the Bill on Report, just to make sure. I think that guidance would be enough, but we should recognise that we have chosen to put into the Bill the words “all due diligence” and “all reasonable precautions”. That is a very high test. If we had meant the current systems to apply, we should have left out the word “all”. Nobody gets killed by being sold a lottery ticket—or at least not just one—but we are looking here at things that might quite quickly turn into serious criminal incidents. If in court someone says, “I looked at his passport”, but the police prove that the person in question has no passport, the poor delivery driver or shop worker is sunk. Noble Lords might remember a rather amusing TV ad from when we watched such things, “We’re with the Woolwich”, where somebody showed their Woolwich passbook to get out of East Germany. This passport or driving licence can presumably be of any nationality. How is a relatively untrained shop worker or delivery driver supposed to know that this is a Polish passport, not a Polish bankbook? We are asking people for whom there is no structured training to act as if they are trained. Under such circumstances we have to—
The noble Lord has made a very interesting point about the phrase “all reasonable precautions” and “all due diligence”. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord can help the Committee, but that looks like a normal phrase. I did not read it in quite the same way as having to take every possible step that might be a reasonable precaution. I wonder whether the officials might help us as to the provenance of the phrase before Report.
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, if the noble Lord scours the GDPR, he may find that the term “data” is used with a plural verb. I wondered whether to put down amendments to that, but I thought that that was pushing it a bit far.
My Lords, I support Amendment 79. I offer as an example the national pupil database, which the Department for Education makes available. It is very widely used, principally to help improve education. In my case, I use it to provide information to parents via the Good Schools Guide; in many other cases it is used as part of understanding what is going on in schools, suggesting where the roots of problems might lie, and how to make education in this country better. That does not fall under “scientific or historical” and is a good example of why that phrase needs widening.
My Lords, there is a lot that demands careful reading and careful thought. I have three questions which I can raise now. First, in the examples which the Minister gave it struck us on these Benches that she was talking about things which are, in fact, criminal offences being dealt with under Part 3, which is the law enforcement part of the Bill.
Secondly, how is all this applied in practice? How does the controller know about the purposes? I am finding it quite difficult to envisage how this might work in real life. Thirdly, the Minister referred to the lawfulness of processing. I wonder whether this is not circular because paragraph 4, in disapplying listed provisions—by the way, I think those listed provisions include many which are very important indeed—makes it lawful, so I have a bit of a problem around that. Of course, I and others will carefully read what the Minister said, but I am sure we will want to return to this at the next stage.
My Lords, I felt entirely comfortable with my noble friend’s examples, but they do not fit with what the Home Office has been doing. What it has done with the national pupil database is not to ask targeted questions when it has a problem with an individual but to collect the whole lot so that it has the ability to trawl, look at, match and use the whole of the dataset. That is a much more dangerous thing because of the consequences it has for the integrity of the data and for the way in which the lawfulness of gathering it is questioned. It is that sort of practice that troubles me. I had not read this clause in the narrow way in which my noble friend described it. I will obviously go away and read it again carefully, but if she would add a letter to her noble friend’s letter enlarging on why this is a narrow provision and giving us comfort, that would be worth while for me.
(7 years, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I welcome these regulations. They are well targeted, have a good concept, good execution, with a sensible set of exemptions and remission for small businesses. I am disappointed that they do not extend to hospitality and construction, both areas where we have a substantial tendency for employers to bring in people from overseas rather than concentrate on training our own people. However, I entirely understand, given that most of that migration is from the EU, why we do not wish to complicate our Brexit negotiations by trying this on the continent just yet. However, when you talk to hospitality employers, they say, “We have to employ these overseas people because the Brits just don’t know how to treat customers”. I say let us bring back the British Airways charm school, which is what I grew up with. We can do this; we just need to train people properly. I do not think that we should accept the excuses of our hospitality industry. We should apply this principle to it to get it to bring our own people up to speed.
However, within the industries this measure is aimed at, it is an excellent idea. It is largely, I think, aimed in practice at IT and industries round that. I would be very grateful if the Minister or his colleagues would agree to meet me and representatives of the tech industry to discuss how to craft training which will meet the needs of employers who are hit by this levy so that the incentive which is provided by it can be directed at the provision of training which will ensure that the objectives of the levy are realised.
We are all being so polite. Perhaps we have learned from the charm school with which the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, grew up. We, of course, support investment in skills and training but it is appropriate to put these proposals in the context of the very tight brief which the MAC, as always, was given. It was required to advise on,
“significantly reducing the level of economic migration from outside the EU”,
taking into account the impact on the economy, including on productivity and competitiveness, and was asked to consider five issues, of which a skills levy was one. As the Minister said, at the time of the review the Government had already signalled an intent to introduce the charge. It is fair to acknowledge the MAC endorsement of the proposal. It said in its review:
“We consider that the imposition of an ISC will serve to incentivise employers to reduce their reliance on employing migrant workers and to invest in training and upskilling UK workers”.
But I also observe that, certainly in the health sector, that gives the term “incentivise” a rather new meaning. The Explanatory Memorandum refers to a collapse in training. Will the Minister tell the Committee whether the Government have analysed why that has been the case?
The letter from the Minister, Robert Halfon, to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee confirms that this is a tax. We know that the Treasury hates hypothecation, but given its rationale it seems to us that those who are paying it must be able to see how it is used and, more than that, be involved in decisions about the application of the funds, because they know what normally works best in their own sectors. There must be a lot of sector-specific experience which should be tapped, as well as this being in the interest of transparency.
The Institute of Directors recognised that “penalising employers” who need to look to the “global talent pool” is,
“not the answer to gaining more home-grown talent”.
To balance that, PwC said:
“The levy will not impact the way that companies recruit as they require the skills they require”.
It raised the spectre of, in the long term,
“parts of businesses moving overseas, if mounting costs become prohibitive and companies risk damaging their brands by providing substandard products or services”.
I recall that during the passage of the Bill an argument used against this, partly in the higher education sector, was that some industries will pay the charge but would not see any benefits because their sectors are not apprenticeship-appropriate. That applied in particular to the health sector. I will leave it to my noble friend Lady Walmsley to deal in detail with the health sector. I know that I will support everything that she says.
During the passage of the Bill we also expressed concern about the costs of the bureaucracy of this exercise. Given the investment that the sectors in question already make in training, there seemed to be a danger of a charge being levied, having administration costs deducted and the balance then returned to them. I have been assured that the deduction will be small because the Home Office visa system will be used, but there will be a deduction. We can add to that the unquantified cost of the loading on to the Home Office, which is overloaded. It probably feels that the light at the end of the tunnel is that ever-present oncoming train.
The MAC also said that,
“it is impossible to conclude, ex ante, whether the benefit arising to employers … will outweigh the costs imposed on Tier 2 sponsors”,
because the Government have not yet determined how the revenue will be reinvested. That is clearly a significant point. It is clear that the health sector has come to a conclusion, and it is not the positive conclusion that the Government want to see. Robert Halfon, in his letter to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, said:
“The cost to the healthcare sector and to the NHS in particular has not been estimated”.
That is quite an astonishing statement.
One other area is that of intercompany transfers. The Minister has referred to the exemption in the regulations, but the exemption is limited to trainees. Why is it so limited? Is it simply because they are trainees? That fits in with the thrust of the proposals. I ask that question and make the implied point because we need to do all that we can to attract, retain and not deter international companies basing themselves in the UK. I do not think that I need to fill in the gaps between the lines there.
There are steps that the Government can take after taking through these regulations, particularly by way of exemptions and by working with different sectors, which would make them more palatable to those who find them unpalatable, and more effective, and might help to avoid unintended consequences, as these charges are clearly going to be significant for some sectors.
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my Amendments 20 and 21 are to the Minister’s Amendment 19, which, as he explained, deals with notification to parents. My amendments would include the child in the notification.
Noble Lords will be aware of provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, both of which are relevant here. Without being technical about it, it seems to me a matter of common sense and principle that a child whose data these are should be part of this whole process. I doubt that I need spend long seeking to persuade your Lordships of that—well, I hope not; if I get a look from in front of me, perhaps I should.
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has made it clear that:
“The realization of the right of the child to express her or his views requires that the child be informed about the matters, options and possible decisions to be taken and their consequences by those who are responsible for hearing the child, and by the child’s parents or guardian”.
Amendment 23 follows an amendment that I had in Grand Committee relating to the provision of information. Noble Lords at that stage regarded what I was proposing as too burdensome, in that it was read as an annual requirement. I had not intended that the provision of information should be anything as burdensome as was understood, so I have brought back a simpler amendment, which would provide that the authority in question should ensure that information is provided to each parent and child on their rights, in language capable of being readily understood by them.
I am not proposing here regular pieces of paper in difficult language—I remember the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington, saying that in her experience, as both a mother and a grandmother, such pieces of paper tend to end up in the washing machine. I am simply saying that it needs to be recognised that information should be readily available, perhaps on the school’s website, along with other information. However, the provision of information in accessible language is an important principle. I understand that there has been some research that indicated that most children using biometric systems in schools had not considered how long their fingerprints would be held for. They were generally not concerned, which the researchers took as a serious matter. I am not entirely surprised that children may not think beyond what is immediately in front of them. However, it points up the need, not to shove it down children’s throats, but to make the information very easily accessible.
The Information Commissioner has made it clear that schools collecting data need to be aware that children are data subjects and that,
“it is they who should in the first instance be informed and consulted about the use of their personal data”.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his amendments. I think they answer the matters that I raised as well as I could have possibly hoped.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I have Amendment 91 in this group, which is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Walmsley. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has obviously not been subject to Black Rod’s little talk about security in this place, which urges us all to wear our passes at all times—which I acknowledge I am not at this moment—rather than rely on people knowing who we are.
My Lords, I know that we are all supposed to do that, but I am sure that the noble Baroness has seen, as I have, groups of guests wandering around with unidentifiable passes and noble Lords with their passes on back to front so that you cannot see even whether they are a Lord let alone who they are. Eyeball recognition by the doorkeepers is much more reliable and efficient, and is probably cheaper at the end of the day.
Perhaps I had better not continue down this route—I could, but it would take more time than the Committee might like to devote to it.
Another point on which I am perhaps not with the noble Lord is that every school knows what every child is up to all the time—I wish that were so. I am sure that we are going to hear from the Minister about the balance between privacy rights and sensible use of technology—I hope that we are not going to hear about feed-in tariffs, which seemed to stretch the analogy a bit far.
The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, did not know, on reflection, what his Amendment 85 was about. I have been in that situation as well, but that is not so on this amendment, against which I wrote “silence equals assent”—I think that it is the difference between opt-in and opt-out.
Before I come to the detail of my amendment, I wish to pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about the technology being used in schools not being as sophisticated, if I can use that term, as technology used in other contexts. Can the Minister say how reliable the equipment is? That was the immediate question I had in response to the noble Lord’s comment.
My amendment does not contradict any of the other amendments that have been spoken to and is not inconsistent with the Bill. It provides that the relevant authorities, schools, academies and FE colleges should tell parents and children of their rights to refuse consent at least once in every academic year—in other words, it is about informed consent. The suggestion comes from the Children’s Rights Alliance for England, which supports the provisions in the Bill for ensuring that the institutions cannot process biometric data if consent is refused. I know that my noble friend will say a word about the convention rights.
I have been told by the Children’s Rights Alliance about research which shows that most children using these systems have not considered how long their fingerprints would be held for and they generally were not concerned. My response to that is that of course they would not—they are children and they do not necessarily think through all the implications of what they are being asked to agree to. Therefore explaining exactly what the subject matter is, both to them and their parents, is important. Other research—again, I am not surprised about this—shows that when schools have introduced a biometric system they have emphasised the benefits and not talked about the problems. All of this is natural human reaction.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred to the report of the Information Commissioner in 2008. The Information Commissioner made it clear that schools which collect data must be aware that children are data subjects and that they,
“should in the first instance be informed and consulted about the use of their personal data”.
This being the first principle of the Data Protection Act, he went on to say that,
“Fairness requires that schools ensure that pupils are informed about and understand the purpose for which their personal data is being processed”.
Our amendment would require that they are in a position to give consent—or, indeed, withhold it—but on an informed basis.
(13 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I wish to speak to my Amendment 148ZZCBA. It proposes to remove subsection (3)(b) of Clause 100, not, as my noble friend might think, in protest at the word “ongoing”, although it is an entirely unnecessary word. Perhaps the clause should refer only to future costs. What costs would be in or out, or out or in, because of “ongoing” being in the clause? The word is totally unnecessary. However, I want to mention this matter because it is a breach in the whole principle of CIL, which should deal with the infrastructure costs that are caused, or need to be contributed to, as a result of the proposed development.
Once you start to allow consideration of future costs, you will allow the whole CIL to be diverted to revenue and you will not get the infrastructure that you are supposed to get, and you will create a large deficit in the provision of infrastructure, because cash-strapped local councils will just hang on as long as they can without building the infrastructure. They will allow the roads to become more crowded and the schools to become fuller until the local authorities have to do something, and spend the CIL money on current costs. This is the sort of budgeting for which we criticised the previous Administration. I am very surprised that we are contemplating it ourselves.
My Lords, perhaps I, too, may ask a question about the provision of infrastructure on an “ongoing” basis. I entirely sympathise with the search for elegance, as my noble friend put it. My question is whether providing infrastructure on an ongoing basis means maintaining it. If that was what was meant, these lines could simply read “providing and maintaining infrastructure”. Presumably, therefore, it means something else. Does it mean something else excluding maintenance or something else and maintenance? Perhaps the Minister can aid the Committee in the interpretation of the provision.