Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Burnett of Maldon

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I tabled the next amendment in this group, Amendment 3, but, having had a conversation with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, I hope that we might hear from him, as I think he would be very helpful to the Committee at this point. I say that in case anyone looks at me and wonders why I am not speaking at this point.

[Lord Burnett of Maldon (CB)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for that suggestion. I hope not to detain the Committee for long. I declare some interests at the outset. When I was Lord Chief Justice, I was president of the Sentencing Council and thus responsible for appointing all its judicial members, with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor appointed all the lay members with my concurrence. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I was present at the Second Reading debate but did not speak. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, spoke, and we considered that, for the sake of all those there, one former Lord Chief Justice was probably enough.

In one way or another, all the amendments in this group seek to confine or define what is meant by the term “personal characteristics” in the Bill. As all noble Lords will have noted, the term is not defined in the Bill and, in accord with various noble Lords who have tabled amendments, my strong view is that it needs a definition. Although there is no definition in the Bill, the Explanatory Notes try to provide some further explanation. They use the term “demographic cohort” as a synonym for personal characteristics, and they contrast “personal characteristics” with “personal circumstances”, but neither of those terms is in the Bill or defined.

In the Second Reading debate, the Minister said:

“The Bill states that personal characteristics include race, religion or belief, and cultural background, but these are examples and not a comprehensive list. ‘Personal characteristics’ is intended to include a wide range of characteristics, such as sex, gender identity, physical disabilities and pregnancy status”.—[Official Report, 7/5/25; col. 1625.]


The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, explores what might be meant by “cultural background”, which is, of course, a term that came from the Sentencing Council’s draft guideline. Like others, I find it an extremely elastic and elusive concept. However, the inclusion of pregnancy status as a personal characteristic illustrates the problem caused by the lack of a statutory definition.

A few minutes later, in the same debate, the Minister said:

“A particular concern was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about how the Bill may impact on women—in particular, pregnant women … To be clear, nothing in the Bill prevents judges requesting pre-sentence reports for pregnant women, nor will it affect Court of Appeal case law, which states that a pre-sentence report is desirable in the case of pregnant or postnatal women”.—[Official Report, 7/5/25; cols. 1626-27.]


With the greatest of respect to the Government, this exposes a degree of incoherence. The Government’s view is that pregnancy is a personal characteristic. It follows that, if this Bill passes in its current form, it would be unlawful for the Sentencing Council to include it in a guideline on pre-sentence reports; and that it would thus be unlawful for the Sentencing Council to give guidance that reflects judgments of the Court of Appeal. Is that really what the Government are trying to achieve? The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, who sits directly opposite me, has an amendment to deal with that extraordinary outcome.

Although the Government have shied away from defining “personal characteristic” in the Bill, they have not had such inhibition in correspondence both to the Constitution Committee, on which I serve, and to all Peers. In a letter to all Peers, in a long section headed “Definition of ‘personal circumstances’”, the Minister explains that the European Court of Human Rights uses the term when considering, for the purposes of Article 14 discrimination, whether a person enjoys another status; the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has already referred in passing to some of the jurisprudence on that matter. However, if I may say so—in complete agreement with the Government—that term in the Strasbourg case law has no crisp definition, and it does not do so for very good reasons.

The Minister refers in his letter to jurisprudence in the House of Lords, where, in the context of Article 14, my noble and learned friend Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury—I am glad to see that he is in his place—and my noble and learned friend Lady Hale provided assistance with the meaning of “personal characteristics”. In his letter, the Minister approbates the interpretation of my noble friend Lord Neuberger, who said that

“the concept of ‘personal characteristic’ … generally requires one to concentrate on what somebody is, rather than what he is doing or what is being done to him”.

If it is the Government’s view that those wise words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, provide the kernel of a definition for the term, “personal characteristics”, why on earth is it not in the Bill? It matters because the correspondence goes on to suggest that the observations of both the noble Lord, Lord Neuberger, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and also, historically, Lord Steyn, would be a legitimate aid to construction to assist the Sentencing Council. I emphasise that it would not be a legitimate aid to construction should the matter ever find its way to a court—that is to say, the noble Lord’s letter, rather than the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger.

That comment, if I may respectfully say so, perhaps illustrates a faint misunderstanding in the Government. It is not only the Sentencing Council that needs to understand with clarity what the term “personal circumstances” means. All those who respond to consultation put out by the Sentencing Council must also be able to understand what it means. In these fevered times, it is not impossible that there might be a challenge to what the Sentencing Council has put in a draft guideline, and which might emerge in a final guideline. So, a court will have to—at least perhaps—interpret this phrase.

It is with that in mind that I support all or any amendments that seek to bring some clarity to what “personal circumstances” means in this context. Without a definition, I fear that the Government are storing up trouble for the future.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 3 and 12 in this group. Like other noble Lords, I am sure, I have found myself very torn. I basically oppose the Bill, but we are having to deal with it today at the level of detail.

I am sorry not to be able to go absolutely all the way with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but I am worried about the term “protected characteristics”. Perhaps this is taking too short-term a view, being too aware of the baggage that the term carries at the moment, but I have a nervous reaction against using a term which is in particular legislation for a particular purpose.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, mentioned the report of the Constitution Committee, of which I am also a member, which recommended that

“the Bill should be amended to ensure appropriate legislative certainty and clarity”,

going on to say there should be

“a full definition of the ‘personal characteristics’ on the face of the Bill or … an alternative term which is clearly legally defined”,

and also commented on retrospectivity. If the Bill is intended to apply to guidelines which are already operational, this should be explicit in the Bill.

Over the weekend, I thought about another approach to this. It was too late to table it as an amendment, but as we will come back to this clause—essentially, the whole of the Bill—on Report, I thought I would float it now. I found myself increasingly intrigued by the phrase

“framed by reference to different personal characteristics”.

Does that mean that the guidelines can include some characteristics if they are not the frame for them? Does it mean framed alone or only by reference to personal characteristics? I want to get rid of the Bill entirely, as I have said, but anything that will ameliorate the effects is worth looking at.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I understood from the noble Lord’s explanation of the amendments that this group is about parliamentary oversight. I am not clear from Amendment 9 whether the submission of guidelines to the Secretary of State is submission for approval. I am also interested in the fact that, as I read the amendment, the Secretary of State would be required to give effect to the guidelines. That raises a question: is the Secretary of State required to give effect to them whether or not she agrees them? I cannot resist this opportunity to say that we all refer to regulations as if they are a panacea but we all know that amendment to them is very rare.

[Lord Burnett of Maldon (CB)]

My Lords, I shall make one or two observations on this group. I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, but, before anyone considers this additional process, it is important to have in mind what already exists. All guidelines that the Sentencing Council eventually issues are subject to extensive consultation—with the public consultation and with interested bodies—but, more importantly, they are subject to political consultation. That arises in two quite different contexts.

The first is that the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice are consulted. Of course, that happened in connection with this guideline, which became controversial although it was not seen as controversial by Ministers who were then in the Ministry of Justice. That is not the end of the political involvement, though, because a statutory consultee for all sentencing guidelines is the Justice Committee of the House of Commons. Again, in this particular instance, the Justice Committee was consulted. As all here know, that committee comprises Members of Parliament from a broad cross-section of parties, and, as it happens, they, too, thought it uncontroversial. So there are those two political consultees. However, that is not the end of the matter because the Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor have on the Sentencing Council itself an observer who is able, on behalf of the ministry, to raise any matters of concern.

So, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and this amendment, it seems to me that upsetting the extremely carefully calibrated scheme enacted by the 2009 Act is unnecessary.