Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

At the risk of making myself unpopular for one more minute, all I can say to my noble friend is: Humpty Dumpty.

At an earlier stage of the Bill I asked how we would interpret a particular provision when we were no longer tethered to the European Court of Justice. The response I received was that it would be interpreted in accordance with UK law at the time. If this amendment is agreed, it will be an extremely helpful contribution to UK law applying while taking into account the impact of the recitals.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I cannot think of a better way to end our debate than with a discussion on recitals, which we have talked about a lot during the course of this Bill. I point out to both noble Lords that it was not only me who referred to recitals; they have both done so ad nauseam.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Monday 11th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I wonder whether I might use this opportunity to ask a very short question regarding the definition of biometric data and, in doing so, support my noble friend. The definition in Clause 188 is the same as in the GDPR and includes reference to “behavioural characteristics”. It states that,

“‘biometric data’ means personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of an individual, which allows or confirms the unique identification of that individual, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data”.

Well:

“There’s no art


To find the mind’s construction in the face”.

How do behavioural characteristics work in this context? The Minister may not want to reply to that now, but I would be grateful for an answer at some point.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for engaging constructively on this subject since we discussed it in Committee. I know that he is keen for data controllers to have clarity on the circumstances in which the processing of biometric data would be lawful. I recognise that the points he makes are of the moment: my department is aware of these issues and will keep an eye on them, even though we do not want to accept his amendments today.

To reiterate some of the points I made in my letter so generously quoted by the noble Lord, the GDPR regards biometric data as a “special category” of data due to its sensitivity. In order to process such data, a data controller must satisfy a processing condition in Article 9 of the GDPR. The most straightforward route to ensure that processing of such data is lawful is to seek the explicit consent of the data subject. However, the GDPR acknowledges that there might be occasions where consent is not possible. Schedule 1 to the Bill makes provision for a range of issues of substantial public interest: for example, paragraph 8, which permits processing such as the prevention or detection of an unlawful act. My letter to noble Lords following day two in Committee went into more detail on this point.

The noble Lord covered much of what I am going to say about businesses such as banks making use of biometric identification verification mechanisms. Generally speaking, such mechanisms are offered as an alternative to more conventional forms of access, such as use of passwords, and service providers should have no difficulty in seeking the data subject’s free and informed consent, but I take the point that obtaining proper, GDPR-compliant consent is more difficult when, for example, the controller is the data subject’s employer. I have considered this issue carefully following our discussion in Committee, but I remain of the view that there is not yet a compelling case to add new exemptions for controllers who wish to process sensitive biometric data without the consent of data subjects. The Bill and the GDPR make consent pre-eminent wherever possible. If that means employers who wish to install biometric systems have to ensure that they also offer a reasonable alternative to those who do not want their biometric data to be held on file, then so be it.

There is legislative precedent for this principle. Section 26 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 requires state schools to seek parental consent before processing biometric data and to provide a reasonable alternative mechanism if consent is not given or is withdrawn. I might refer the noble Lord to any number of speeches given by members of his own party—the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for example—on the importance of those provisions. After all, imposing a legislative requirement for consent was a 2010 Liberal Democrat manifesto commitment. The GDPR merely extends that principle to bodies other than schools. The noble Lord might respond that his amendment’s proposed subsection (1) is intended to permit processing only in a tight set of circumstances where processing of biometric data is undertaken out of necessity. To which I would ask: when is it genuinely necessary to secure premises or authenticate individuals using biometrics, rather than just cheaper or more convenient?

We also have very significant concerns with the noble Lord’s subsections (4) and (5), which seek to drive a coach and horses through fundamental provisions of the GDPR—purpose limitation and storage limitation, in particular. The GDPR does not in fact allow member states to derogate from article 5(1)(e), so subsection (5) would represent a clear breach of European law.

For completeness, I should also mention concerns raised about whether researchers involved in improving the reliability of ID verification mechanisms would be permitted to carry on their work under the GDPR and the Bill. I reassure noble Lords, as I did in Committee, that article 89(1) of the GDPR provides that processing of special categories of data is permitted for scientific research purposes, providing appropriate technical and organisational safeguards are put in place to keep the data safe. Article 89(1) is supplemented by the safeguards in Clause 18 of the Bill. Whatever your opinion of recitals and their ultimate resting place, recital 159 is clear that the term “scientific research” should be interpreted,

“in a broad manner including for example technological development and demonstration”.

This is a fast-moving area where the use of such technology is likely to increase over the next few years, so I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that this is an area that needs to be watched. That is partly why Clause 9(6) provides a delegated power to add further processing conditions in the substantial public interest if new technologies, or applications of existing technologies, emerge. That would allow us to make any changes that are needed in the future, following further consultation with the parties that are likely to be affected by the proposals, both data controllers and, importantly, data subjects whose sensitive personal data is at stake. For those reasons, I hope the noble Lord is persuaded that there are good reasons for not proceeding with his amendment at the moment.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked about behavioural issues. I had hoped that I might get some inspiration, but I fear I have not, so I will get back to her and explain all about behavioural characteristics.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 11th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am very glad that the noble Lord is keeping this on the agenda. I had a note to ask what was happening about the meeting to which lots of people were invited at the previous stage. I do not believe that we have heard anything about it. This is not a whinge but a suggestion that it is important to discuss this very widely.

I find this paragraph in Schedule 1 very difficult. One of the criteria is that the processing is necessary for the purposes of political activities. I honestly find that really hard to understand. Necessary clearly means more than desirable, but you can campaign, which is one of the activities, without processing personal data. What does this mean in practice? I have a list of questions, by no means exhaustive, one of which comes from outside, asking what is meant by political opinion. That is not voting intention. Political opinion could mean a number of things across quite a wide spectrum. We heard at the previous stage that the Electoral Commission had not been involved in this, and a number of noble Lords urged that it should be. It did not respond when asked initially, but that does not mean it should be kept out of the picture altogether. After all, it will have to respond to quite a lot of what goes on. It might not be completely its bag, but it is certainly not a long way from it.

We support pinning down the detail of this. I do not actually agree with the noble Lord’s amendment as drafted, but I thank him for finding a mechanism to raise the issue again.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for raising this issue, and to the noble Baroness for her comments. These issues are vital to our system of government, and we agree with that.

Amendment 27 seeks to expand the umbrella term “political activities” to include any additional activities determined to be appropriate by the Electoral Commission. Noble Lords will agree that engaging and interacting with the electorate is crucial in a democratic society, and we must therefore ensure that all activity to facilitate this is done in a lawful manner. Although paragraph 18(4) includes campaigning, fundraising, political surveys and case work as illustrative examples of political activities, it should not be taken to represent an exhaustive list.

Noble Lords will be aware that the Electoral Commission’s main areas of expertise concern the regulation of political funding and spending, and we are of the opinion that much, if not all the activities they regulate will be captured under the heading “political activity”. As I have just set out, fundraising is included as an illustrative example, which ought to provide some reassurance on this point. Moreover, the greater the number of activities denoted by the Electoral Commission, the less likely it is that any other activity would be considered by a court to be a political activity by dint of its omission. The commission, a body which as far as I am aware claims no expertise in data protection matters, would find itself in an endless spiral of denoting new activities as being permissible under the GDPR. Nevertheless, in recognition of the importance of such processing to the democratic process, the Government are continuing to consider the broader issues at stake and may well return to them in the second House. In this vein, the noble Lord made a number of good points, and I look forward to meeting him with the Minister for Digital, my right honourable friend Matt Hancock, on Thursday this week to discuss the matter in more detail than the parameters of this debate allow. We will see what the noble Lord feels about the timing of that after the meeting.

As for the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, we talked about having bigger meetings, and I am sure the time will come. This is just a preliminary meeting to decide on timings and to give the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, the chance to discuss this with the Minister for Digital. I envisage that further meetings will include the noble Baroness.

I appreciate the sentiment behind the noble Lord’s amendment. In the light of our forthcoming discussions, I hope he feels able to withdraw it.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 20th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling these amendments. I know that the Bar Council has raised similar concerns with officials in my department and I am keen that that dialogue continue.

Before I address the amendments, I would like to say something about the overarching principles in relation to the interaction between data protection and legal professional privilege.

The right of a person to seek confidential advice from a legal adviser is indeed, as my noble friend Lord Arbuthnot said, a fundamental right of any person in the UK and a crucial part of our legal system. The Government in no way dispute that, and I reassure noble Lords that this Bill does not erode the principle of legal professional privilege.

It is true that the Data Protection Act 1998 allows the Information Commissioner to use her powers to investigate alleged data breaches by law firms, and sometimes the information she requests in order to carry out a thorough investigation may contain information which is subject to legal professional privilege. The commissioner recognises the sensitivity of material protected by legal professional privilege and has established processes in place for protecting it. Any material identified by the data controller as privileged is isolated if seized during a search and it is then sent directly to independent counsel for review. Counsel then provides an opinion on whether privilege applies. If counsel decides that the data is not privileged, the data controller can still dispute the Information Commissioner’s right to access that material and has the right to appeal to a tribunal, which will carry out a full merits review.

The Government are seeking only to replicate, as far as possible, in the current Bill the existing provisions relating to legal professional privilege in the 1998 Act. It is, for example, vital that the Information Commissioner retains the power to investigate law firms. They, like other data controllers, can make mistakes. If personal data is lost, stolen or disclosed unlawfully, that can have serious consequences for data subjects. It is right that the Information Commissioner retains the ability to investigate potential breaches by lawyers. They are not above the law.

As a final point of principle before we examine the amendments in detail, it is also worth highlighting that Clause 128 introduces a new requirement for the Information Commissioner to publish guidance on how legally privileged material obtained in the course of her investigations will be safeguarded. There was no similar requirement in the 1998 Act, so in that respect the current Bill actively strengthens protections for legal professional privilege. This has been included because historically the commissioner has found that a minority of those in the legal profession refuse to allow her access to personal data on the basis that it is privileged. The profession has not always understood that it must disclose the data and that the commissioner then has processes and procedures to protect that data. This guidance will make it clearer to the legal profession that robust safeguards are in place.

I turn to the amendments in this group. As I have said, Clause 128 provides that the Information Commissioner must publish guidance on the safeguards in relation to legally privileged communications. Amendments 161A and 161B would amend subsection (1) to clarify that any guidance published by the commissioner should cover the handling of any “confidential legal materials” as well as any communications between legal adviser and client. Amendment 161D would then introduce a wide definition of “confidential legal materials”. This, in our view, is unnecessary. I have no doubt that the Information Commissioner will interpret this to include draft communications.

Bills have grown in length over the years and, if we were to cover off permutations and combinations of processing and preparatory work such as this in every clause, we would be debating this Bill until next summer. We would also, through overdefinition, create more worrying loopholes.

Amendment 161C would make further provision about the purposes of the guidance published by the Information Commissioner. It has been suggested that the aim of the guidance should be to make it clear that nobody can access legally privileged material without the consent of the client who provided the material in the expectation that it would be treated in confidence. As I have already said, it is vital that the Information Commissioner retains the ability to investigate, and this amendment would call that into question because an investigation could not happen if the client withheld consent. I hope that the reassurances I have already given about the lengths to which the Information Commissioner will go to keep any confidential information safe are sufficient on that point. We are clear that the commissioner must have the right to investigate.

I said I would return to the issue of the Information Commissioner’s enforcement powers and the interaction with legal professional privilege. When there is a suspected breach of the data protection legislation, the commissioner has a number of tools available to aid her investigation. The commissioner can use information notices and assessment notices to request information or access filing systems, use enforcement notices to order a data controller to stop processing certain data or to correct bad practices, and issue monetary penalty notices to impose fines for breaches of the data protection legislation. However, we understand from the commissioner that the powers to issue assessment notices and information notices are rarely used because controllers tend to co-operate with her request. There are, however, a number of restrictions on the use of these enforcement powers where they relate to legally privileged information. In relation to information notices these are set out in Clause 138, and in relation to assessment notices they are set out in Clause 141. The restrictions ensure that a person is not required to provide legally privileged information. The concept of legal privilege is therefore preserved, although it may be waived by the controller or processor.

Amendments 162A, 162B, 162C, 163ZA and 163ZB intend to broaden the restrictions in Clauses 138 and 141 regarding information and assessment notices so that they apply explicitly to all legally privileged communications, not just those which concern proceedings under data protection legislation. The Government carefully considered whether these restrictions should apply to a wider range of legally privileged material when we developed the Bill. The current practice is for the ICO to appoint independent counsel to assess all potentially legally privileged material, which is not therefore passed on to the ICO if found to be privileged.

Amendment 163B seeks to apply the same restrictions that apply to assessment and information notices to enforcement notices. While we understand that this amendment derives from a concern that there may be a gap in the enforcement notice provisions, as there is currently no reference in those provisions to protecting legal professional privilege I can reassure noble Lords that such provision is unnecessary because, unlike information and assessment notices, enforcement notices cannot be used to require a person to provide the commissioner with information, only to require the controller to correct bad practice.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 164B, which aims to add to the list of matters in Clause 148 that the Information Commissioner must consider when deciding whether to give a data controller a penalty notice and determining the amount of the penalty. If a legal adviser failed to comply with an information or assessment notice because the information concerned was legally privileged, it would require the Information Commissioner to take this into account as a mitigating factor when deciding whether to issue a penalty notice and setting the level of financial penalty. Clause 126 specifically provides that the duty of confidence should not preclude a legal adviser from sharing legally privileged material with the Information Commissioner. As I have previously explained, there are strict procedures in place to protect privileged material.

We have given all these amendments careful consideration, but I hope that I have convinced the Committee that the Bill already strikes the correct balance between the right to legal professional privilege and the rights and freedoms of data subjects. With that, I hope that the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, indeed I will. The Minister mentioned continuation of dialogue. That, of course, is the right way to address these things, but I believe the Bar Council seeks to do what he says the Bill does: replicate the current arrangements.

If it is not necessary to provide specifically for confidential material, I suspect those who drafted these amendments may want to look again at the definition of “privileged communications” to see whether it is adequate. I do not believe they would have gone down this route had they been content with it.

On the amendments that would extend protections to all legally privileged material, not just data protection items—Amendment 162A and so on refer to any material—I am not clear why there is a problem with the extension under a regime such as the one the Minister described. That would catch material and deal with it in the same way as any other. I do not know whether there is a practical problem here.

On Amendment 164B the Minister directed us to Clause 126. Again, I am not sure whether he is suggesting there might be a practical problem. It seems an important amendment, not something that should be dealt with by reading between the lines of an earlier clause. However, I will leave it to those who are much more expert than I am to consider the Minister’s careful response, for which I thank him. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 13th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord referred to the rules as a bit grey and asked for clarity for the volunteer army. I should declare an interest as a foot soldier in that volunteer army.

The noble Lord’s request that party officials should be involved in this process is a good one—I would have thought they would have been. The Minister should be aware of my first question as I emailed him about this, over the weekend I am afraid. Has the Electoral Commission been involved in these provisions?

The noble Lord mentioned the electoral register provided by a local authority. My specific question is about the provision, acquisition and use of a marked electoral register. For those who are not foot soldiers, that document is marked up by the local authority, which administers elections, to show which electors have voted. As noble Lords will understand, this is valuable information for campaigning parties and can identify whether an individual is likely to turn out and vote and so worth concentrating a lot of effort on. I can see that this exercise could be regarded as “campaigning” under paragraph 17(4) of Schedule 1. However, it is necessary, although I do not suppose that every local party in every constituency makes use of the access it has. It is obvious to me that this information does not reveal political opinions, which is also mentioned in the provisions. I would be grateful to hear the Minister’s comments. I am happy to wait until a wider meeting takes place, but that needs to be before Report.

I want to raise a question on a paragraph that is in close geographical proximity in the Bill—I cannot see another place to raise the issue and it occurred to me only yesterday. Why are Members of the House of Lords not within the definition of “elected representatives”? We do not have the casework that MPs do, but we are often approached about individual cases and some Peers pursue those with considerable vigour. This omission—I can see a typo in the email that I sent to the Minister about this; I have typed “mission” but I meant “omission”—is obviously deliberate on the part of the Government.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

My Lords, I begin by repeating, almost word-for-word, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy: engaging voters is important in a healthy democracy. In order to do that, political parties, referendum campaigners and candidates will campaign using a variety of communication methods. However, they must comply with the law when doing so, and this includes the proper handling of the personal data they collect and hold.

Noble Lords will be aware that the Information Commissioner recently announced that she was conducting an assessment of the data protection risks arising from the use of data analytics, including for political purposes. She recognises that this is a complex and rapidly evolving area where organisations use a person’s internet or public profile to target communications or messaging. The level of awareness among the public about how data and analytics work and how their personal data is collected, shared and used through such tools is low. What is clear is that these tools have a significant potential impact on an individual’s privacy, and the Government welcome the commissioner’s focus on this issue. It is against this backdrop that we considered the amendments of the noble Lord.

The amendments seek to amend a processing condition relating to political parties in paragraph 17. The current clause permits political parties to process data revealing political opinions, provided that it does not cause substantial damage or substantial distress. This replicates the existing wording in the Data Protection Act 1998. I have said that political campaigning is a vital democratic activity but it can also generate heated debated. Removal of the word “substantial” could mean that data processing for political purposes which caused even mild offence or irritation becomes unlawful. I am sure noble Lords would agree that it is vital that the Bill, while recognising the importance of adequate data protection standards, does not unduly chill such an important aspect of the UK’s democracy. For that reason I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendments.

I thank the noble Lord for allowing me to reply later to his list of questions. I found it difficult to copy them down, let alone answer them all, but I take the point. In many instances we are all in the same boat on this, as far as political parties are concerned. I shall of course be happy to meet with him, and I take the point about who should attend. I am not sure it will be next week, when we have two days in Committee, but we will arrange it as soon as possible. I will have to get a big room because my office is too small for all the people who will be coming. I take the points the noble Lord made in his questions and will address them in the meeting.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether the Electoral Commission had been consulted. It did not respond to the Government’s call for views which was published earlier this year, and we have not solicited any views explicitly from it beyond that.

The noble Baroness also asked about the provision, acquisition and use of a marked electoral register within paragraph 17 of Schedule 1. As she explained, the marked register shows who has voted at an election but does not show how they voted. As such, it does not record political views and does not contain sensitive data—called special categories of data in the GDPR —and, as the protections for sensitive data in article 9 of the GDPR are not relevant, Schedule 1 does not apply.

Lastly, the noble Baroness asked why Members of the House of Lords are not within the definition of elected representatives. Speaking as an elected Member of the House of Lords—albeit with a fairly small electorate—I am obviously interested in this. I have discovered that none of us, I am afraid, are within the definition of elected representatives in the Bill. We recognise that noble Lords may raise issues on an individual’s behalf. Most issues will not concern sensitive data but, where they do, in most cases we would expect noble Lords to rely on the explicit consent of the person concerned. This arrangement has operated for the past 20 years under the current law, and that is the position at the moment.

I hope I have tackled the specific items relating to the amendments. I accept the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, about the electoral issues that need to be raised in general.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Monday 13th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Griffiths of Burry Port (Lab)]

My Lords, if the House will indulge me, having heard someone who described herself earlier as a foot soldier in her army of volunteers, I can now identify her as a beaver in the battalion of dam building. It seems that by broadening all that falls under the term, “legal claims”, and, of course, on the advice of the Bar Council, some common sense is being alluded to here and therefore we have no hesitation in joining our forces to those we have heard so ably expressed.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Lord Ashton of Hyde) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for making her debut in the Committee stage and to the noble Lord for his comments. By way of background, because I find it quite complicated, it is worth reminding ourselves that article 9 of the GDPR provides processing conditions for special categories of data. In particular, the processing necessary for,

“the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims”,

is permitted by article 9(2)(f). It is directly applicable and does not allow any discretion to derogate from it in any way. Article 10 of the GDPR, which relates to criminal convictions and offences data, takes a different approach. It requires member states to set out in their law conditions relating to the processing of said criminal convictions and offences data in order to enable many organisations to process it. Paragraph 26 of Schedule 1 therefore seeks to maintain the status quo by replicating in relation to criminal convictions data the processing condition for the special categories of personal data contained in article 9(2)(f).

Government Amendment 65, referred to by the noble Baroness, responds to a request we have had from stakeholders to anglicise the language currently used in that paragraph. The Government strongly agree about the importance of ensuring that data protection law does not accidentally undermine the proper conduct of legal proceedings, which is why we have made this provision. We submit that Amendments 63A and 64A are unnecessary. They are predicated on the false premise that government Amendment 65 in some way changes the scope of paragraph 26. It does not, it simply anglicises it. However, even if different wording were to be used in Amendment 63A to that used in Amendment 65, we are certain that the Commission would take a dim view of member states attempting to use article 9(2)(g), the substantial public interest processing condition, to expand article 9(2)(f) in the way that Amendment 63A proposes. In the light of that explanation, I would be grateful if in this case the noble Baroness would withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am still processing the compliment that has been paid to me. If I were standing for election, the noble Lord might find himself being quoted.

The Minister says that the amendment is unnecessary but then goes on to say that it is wrong. The main point is not the five or so lines of wording as what is required or precluded by the articles of the GDPR that he has quoted. I will not attempt to respond today because I could not do his arguments justice, but I suspect that others will try to do so. As I say, his officials have met with representatives of the Bar Council. I am sure that he will be happy for that dialogue to continue, and if necessary for it to extend to some of us who might come along and listen to what the officials are saying and give it a rubber stamp in an effort to progress the argument. There is a real concern about where this exemption should lie and how it should apply, so I will beg leave to withdraw the amendment, not because I am convinced but because there is still more discussion to be had.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I will. I had some inspiration from elsewhere on that very subject—but it was then withdrawn, so I will take up the offer to write on that. However, I take the noble Lord’s point.

We do not think that Amendment 75 would work. It seeks to prevent any decision being taken on the basis of automated decision-making where the decision would “engage” the rights of the data subject under the Human Rights Act. Arguably, such a provision would wholly negate the provisions in respect of automated decision-making as it would be possible to argue that any decision based on automated decision-making at the very least engaged the data subject’s right to have their private life respected under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, even if it was entirely lawful. All decisions relating to the processing of personal data engage an individual’s human rights, so it would not be appropriate to exclude automated decisions on this basis. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that we reflect processing in the digital age—and that includes automated processing. This will often be a legitimate form of processing, but it is right that the Bill should recognise the additional sensitivities that surround it. There must be sufficient checks and balances and the Bill achieves this in Clauses 13 and 48 by ensuring appropriate notification requirements and the right to have a decision reassessed by non-automated means.

[Baroness Hamwee]

As the Minister may be about to move on from that, I think he is saying that the phrase, “engages an individual’s rights” is problematic. Are the Government satisfied that the provisions the Minister has just mentioned adequately protect those rights—I am searching for the right verb—and that automated decision-making is not in danger of infringing the rights that are, as he says, always engaged?

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

Automated processing could do that. However, with the appropriate safeguards we have put in the Bill, we do not think that it will.

Amendment 77 seeks to define a significant decision as including a decision that has legal or similar effects for the data subject or a group sharing one of the nine protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010 to which the data subject belongs.

We agree that all forms of discrimination, including discriminatory profiling via the use of algorithms and automated processing, are fundamentally wrong. However, we note that the Equality Act already provides a safeguard for individuals against being profiled on the basis of a particular protected characteristic they possess. Furthermore, recital 71 of the GDPR states that data controllers must ensure that they use appropriate mathematical or statistical procedures to ensure that factors which result in inaccuracies are minimised, and to prevent discriminatory effects on individuals,

“on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health status or sexual orientation”.

We therefore do not feel that further provision is needed at this stage.

Amendment 77A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, seeks to require a data controller who makes a significant decision based on automated processing to provide meaningful information about the logical and legal consequences of the processing. Amendment 119, as I understand it, talks to a similar goal, with the added complication of driving a wedge between the requirements of the GDPR and applied GDPR. Articles 13 and 14 of the GDPR, replicated in the applied GDPR, already require data controllers to provide data subjects with this same information at the point the data is collected, and whenever it is processed for a new purpose. We are not convinced that there is much to be gained from requiring data controllers to repeat such an exercise, other than regulatory burden. In fact, the GDPR requires the information earlier, which allows the data subject to take action earlier.

Similarly, Amendment 77B seeks to ensure that data subjects who are the subject of automated decision-making retain the right to make a complaint to the commissioner and to access judicial remedies. Again, this provision is not required in the Bill, as data subjects retain the right to make a complaint to the commissioner or access judicial remedies for any infringement of data protection law.

Amendment 78 would confer powers on the Secretary of State to review the operational effectiveness of article 22 of the GDPR within three years, and lay a report on the review before Parliament. This amendment is not required because all new primary legislation is subject to post-legislative scrutiny within three to five years of receiving Royal Assent. Any review of the Act will necessarily also cover the GDPR. Not only that, but the Information Commissioner will keep the operation of the Act and the GDPR under review and will no doubt flag up any issues that may arise on this or other areas.

Amendment 153A would place a requirement on the Information Commissioner to investigate, keep under review and publish guidance on several matters relating to the use of automated data in the health and social care sector in respect of the terms on which enterprises gain consent to the disclosure of the personal data of vulnerable adults. I recognise and share noble Lords’ concern. These are areas where there is a particular value in monitoring the application of a new regime and where further clarity may be beneficial. I reassure noble Lords that the Information Commissioner has already contributed significantly to GDPR guidance being developed by the health sector and continues to work closely with the Government to identify appropriate areas requiring further guidance. Adding additional prescriptive requirements in the Bill is unlikely to help them shape that work in a way that maximises its impact.

As we have heard, Amendment 183 would insert a new clause before Clause 171 stating that public bodies who profile a data subject should inform the data subject of their decision. This is unnecessary as Clauses 13 and 48 state that when a data controller has taken a decision based solely on automated processing, they must inform the data subject in writing that they have done so. This includes profiling. Furthermore, Clauses 13 and 48 confer powers on the Secretary of State to make further provisions to provide suitable measures to safeguard a data subject’s rights and freedoms.

I thank noble Lords for raising these important issues, which deserve to be debated. I hope that, as a result of the explanation in response to these amendments, I have been able to persuade them that there are sufficient safeguards in relation to automated decision-making in the GDPR and Parts 2 to 4 of the Bill, and that their amendments are therefore unnecessary. On that basis, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

Tonight the noble Lord can because the Secretary of State is leading on this important matter. She is as committed as I am to ensuring that such a body is set up shortly. She has been consulting widely with civil society groups, industry and academia, some of which has been mentioned tonight, to refine the scope and functions of the body. It will work closely with the Information Commissioner and other regulators. As the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Patel, mentioned, it will identify gaps in the regulatory landscape and provide Ministers with advice on addressing those gaps.

It is important that the new advisory body has a clearly defined role and a strong relationship to other bodies in this space, including the Information Commissioner. The Government’s proposals are for an advisory body which may have a broader remit than that suggested in the amendment. It will provide recommendations on the ethics of data use in gaps in the regulatory landscape, as I have just said. For example, one fruitful area could be the ethics of exploiting aggregated anonymised datasets for social and commercial benefit, taking into account the importance of transparency and accountability. These aggregated datasets do not fall under the legal definition of personal data and would therefore be outside the scope of both the body proposed by the noble Lord and, I suspect, this Bill.

Technically, Amendment 78 needs to be more carefully drafted to avoid the risk of non-compliance with the GDPR and avoid conflict with the Information Commissioner. Article 51 of the GDPR requires each member state to appoint one or more independent public authorities to monitor and enforce the GDPR on its territory as a supervisory authority. Clause 113 makes the Information Commissioner the UK’s sole supervisory authority for data protection. The functions of any advisory data ethics body must not cut across the Information Commissioner’s performance of its functions under the GDPR.

The amendment proposes that the advisory board should,

“monitor further technical advances in the use and management of personal data”.

But one of the Information Commissioner’s key functions is to

“keep abreast of evolving technology”.

That is a potential conflict we must avoid. The noble Lord, Lord Patel, alluded to some of the conflicts.

Nevertheless, I agree with the importance that noble Lords place on the consideration of the ethics of data use, and I repeat that the Government are determined to make progress in this area. However, as I explained, I cannot agree to Amendment 78 tonight. Therefore, in the light of my explanation, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw it.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Before the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, responds—he will probably make this point better than I can—have we just heard from the Minister an outline of an amendment the Government will bring forward in order to enshrine the body they are advocating? He will understand that, whichever side of the House you are on, you are always aware that a future Government may not have the same ways of going about things as the Government he is supporting at the moment, and whose proposals are entirely laudable. Things may change.

[Lord Ashton of Hyde]

I cannot agree with the noble Baroness’s point. However, I accept that that is a possibility and that things will not last for ever. However, in this case we expect to have the proposals shortly and this Government will definitely be around at that time.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Ashton of Hyde

Monday 30th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has raised the question of the meaning of “broadly equivalent”. It encapsulates a difficulty I have found throughout the Bill: the language of the GDPR and of the law enforcement directive is more narrative and descriptive than language to which we are accustomed in UK legislation. Though one might say we should just apply a bit of common sense, that is not always the first thing to apply in interpreting UK legislation.

In this clause, there is another issue apart from the fact that “broadly equivalent” gives a lot of scope for variation. Although Clause 3 is an introduction to the part, if there are problems of interpretation later in Part 2, one might be tempted to go back to Clause 3 to find out what the part is about and be further misled or confused.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Lord Ashton of Hyde) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their comments and the opportunity, I hope, to make things clearer. Amendment 5 seeks to make it clear that the applied GDPR does not apply to processing activities which fall outside the scope of EU law. Amendment 6 examines the differences between the GDPR and the applied GDPR. The applied GDPR exists to extend the GDPR standards for personal data processing to datasets outside the scope of EU law, which may be otherwise left unregulated. This is an essential extension because, first, we believe that all personal data should be protected, irrespective of EU legal competence; and, secondly, we need a complete data protection regulatory system to secure the future free flow of data.

Chapter 3 of Part 2 and Schedule 6 create the applied GDPR, which is close to, but not identical to, the GDPR. This is primarily because we have anglicised it as it sits within our domestic law, not European law. References to member states become references to the UK. As domestic regulation it is also outside the scope of the functions of the European Data Protection Board, so appropriate amendments are needed to reflect that. Otherwise the same general standards and exemptions apply to the applied GDPR as for the GDPR.