Domestic Abuse Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Garden of Frognal

Monday 15th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

I do wish to move it.

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

Right. The Question is that Amendment 87 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say “Content”, to the contrary “Not-Content”.

I have collected the voices, but the Division will have to be deferred, so voting will take place at a later stage.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Garden of Frognal

Committee stage & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 8th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

My Lords, I regret to say that I have had a late request to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I apologise: there is often a delay when the clerk sends a message to the Woolsack. I call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

Thank you. I apologise for throwing the proceedings. I have just received an email saying that I am about to be called.

My question concerns how the Minister dealt with the fact that information—I hesitate to use the term “evidence”—obtained during a test cannot be used as evidence in legal proceedings. It has only just occurred to me that, of course, family proceedings in particular—as well as civil proceedings—are very important in respect of domestic abuse. I am unclear as to the status of what is learned during a polygraph test for family proceedings. If the Minister cannot answer that now, could he add it to the questions that he will reply to after today?

Domestic Abuse Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Garden of Frognal

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 1st February 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

I have had a request to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) (V)]

The Minister’s reply will obviously take some reading, which we will do. As regards the point on contempt, my question was about the experience of the model. I quoted a ministerial letter—not a letter from the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson—about the why, or at least partly why. In any event, I thank him for responding to that.

My question is about the criminal standard for breach of an order. The Minister said that it applied automatically; he then used the phrase, “in the usual way”. When he writes his letter, perhaps he could add a paragraph explaining how it is automatic and where that comes from, so that we can understand its application. He referred to other civil orders and he might want to refer to whether those are silent in legislation as to the standard of proof when breached or whether they deal with the standard explicitly.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Garden of Frognal

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 25th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, of course I will withdraw my amendment at this point. However, before I beg leave to do so I want to say that, as my noble friend Lord Paddick has pointed out, what goes on in society changes from time to time. At the moment it is county lines. We need safeguarding responses—I would not dispute that for a moment—but we need to look at what is available for safeguarding and what helps with prevention. I mentioned orders. I will also mention domestic violence protection notices and particularly—depending on what happens as we consider later amendments to the Bill—statutory community support. I would have thought that that might have a role, but would not be available if we confined the definition to two people over 16. I look on those measures as part of a raft of preventive measures. I will continue to think about this as we proceed through the Bill, as obviously this is not divorced from the rest of the Bill. I am not going to attempt to answer the noble and learned Baroness, who brings a different concern to the same wording. For the moment, I beg leave—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

Before the noble Baroness withdraws her amendment, I had a very late request from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to have a word after the Minister. Can we please hear from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

I now apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Would you like to complete your speech please? Do you wish to withdraw your amendment?

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

Before I do, I would like to say that I asked about this problem; I do not think my noble friend knows that. It is nobody’s fault in the Chamber, but we might write some sort of pause into the procedure. I have asked if the Procedure and Privileges Committee can consider that, because I was caught out last week. I now beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Garden of Frognal

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

I now call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am sorry to hear the news about James Brokenshire, whom I have known for a very long time. If the Minister is able, I hope she will pass on our best wishes to him.

She said that we would cause uncertainty about Section 29 and referred to a rational basis for decisions. That seems to suggest that we would never need to use the word “reasonable”, but it is used both in codes of practice and in statutes. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. The House is very lucky to have their expertise, and their clear explanations of the importance of what looks like a small amendment but is actually rather significant, based on how these things are applied by the courts.

The statutory code of practice—I accept that it is statutory—is indeed peppered with the term “reasonable”. It is also peppered with the terms “necessary” and “proportionate”, and of course they will be in the Act when the Bill becomes one. However, to say that something is expected—that it is expected that there should be a reasonable belief—reduces the value of what is in the code of practice.

On Amendment 18, briefly, the four months are extendable; it is late, however, and I do not want to go much further with that. However, I do want to come back to Amendment 6. We have not heard an adequate explanation of the Government’s resistance to this, if I may put it that way. I would like to test the opinion of the House.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Garden of Frognal

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st October 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

Does anyone in the Chamber wish to speak? We have not received any requests as yet. Does the Minister wish to reply to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt? No? Then I call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

I am, of course, pleased to hear the Government’s decision on this. From and on behalf of our Benches, I added my name to the previous versions of this amendment. The point has been made throughout the Bill that the amendment is unnecessary, but, given that its proposers have kept on pressing, clearly they have not been satisfied. This is good news, but one always has to think around the subject, and I wonder what the correct level of scrutiny is. To me, it involves stakeholders very widely and the context for consideration of a proposal, which, in this case has to be more than just the immigration provisions which may apply. One thing on which I agreed with the Commons and with others who have spoken is that the social care crisis cannot be solved through immigration alone: it is much wider than that.

The correct level of scrutiny involves the organisation being scrutinised—in this case, the Government and their proposals—not being committed to its initial proposition but being prepared to listen to the responses. We are always faced with statutory instruments where there is no possibility of making a change. It would be tragic—I do not think that is putting it too highly—if the opportunity is not taken on this occasion to adopt a much more open-minded practice. Having said that, I welcome what the Minister has said.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am moving an amendment similar to that moved at a previous stage but with a change to meet one of the points made against it.

It came as a shock to me to learn that there will be restrictions on, and conditions applying to, a UK citizen wishing to return to the UK with a non-British family. In Committee, I asked what the Minister would advise a couple with elderly parents in both countries, for both of whom they wanted to care. This rather follows on from the previous amendment. Following that, I received many emails describing many, varied families affected. They all explained the anxiety they felt.

The minimum income requirement will apply, as the noble Baroness said, after March 2022 as it applies now to a UK citizen wishing to bring a non-UK—currently non-EEA—family to this country. I have always felt that the MIR is very harsh. It presents real difficulties, including as regards the spouse’s contribution to the household income. In the 21st century, most households are necessarily two-income households. In response to the point that these families should be treated the same as families that include non-EEA citizens, I say that it should not apply to them either, but that would not be within the scope of this Bill—although I would have liked to have taken that opportunity. Those families will, in very many cases, have been aware of the situation when the family unit was created.

I understand the Government’s concern that EEA citizens should be treated the same as citizens in the rest of the world after the end of free movement, but the situations are not exactly the same. When marriages were made and families created after we had acquired rights of free movement, who would have given a thought to what might happen if those rights ended, or indeed given thought to whether those rights might end? And who in the British military who met their spouse when they were serving abroad would have contemplated this situation? I do hope that the Secretary of State has read their letters.

The provision may not be retrospective in a technical sense, but in an everyday sense it is. This is not something that is widely understood, even now. The Government’s original proposal in June 2017 did not deal with the issue. As the noble Baroness said, the public announcement of the 2022 date came out in a paper in April 2019 and was presented as a concession. The paper said that the Government recognised that UK nationals needed certainty—this was after we were supposed to have left the EU.

I wondered whether I had missed something here, so I checked on what had been done, and when, to make people aware of the position. Had the Foreign and Commonwealth Office attempted to draw this to people’s attention? Had our embassies raised it in local town hall meetings abroad? One, rather dry, comment made to me was that, if these citizens had voting rights, the embassies would have been able to make direct contact with them. I understand that the targeted FCO campaigns have focused largely on rights in the host country, advising people to register and to change their driving licence, for instance.

On the “Living in France” and “Living in Italy” pages on GOV.UK, I clicked on “Ending your time living abroad” and, after a couple more clicks, found—because I was looking for it—“bringing your family”, which told me that a visa would be needed for them. One might easily stop there. Immigration rules required further clicks, and so on. I understand that all this is still coming as a surprise, and of course a shock, to those who happen to trip over it.

An EU citizen here now or by the end of this year can bring in family members—and quite right too. But is it not right for our own compatriots? This is discrimination against UK citizens. It is not as if what we propose would open any floodgates. It is self-limiting: no-one would qualify after free movement had ended; it is not a “perpetual” or “for ever” right, as it has been badged.

Criticism was made on Report that there was no cut-off date by which a UK national must return to the UK. Ministers say that three years gives a reasonable period to plan. This version of the amendment includes a cut-off date—deliberately long—of 20 years after the end of the transition period. By then, most of those affected, who will have formed settled relationships and families, are likely to be over 50 with parents of 70 or 80, so their families would be in a better position to know whether returning to the UK was likely to be necessary. The Minister in the Commons presented the 2022 date as reflecting a need

“to be fair to other British citizens”—[Official Report, Commons, 19/10/20; col. 804.]

as if there is something “other” about UK people who have married people from the EEA. He also said that the Government would keep the policy “under review”, so I would be grateful if the noble Baroness the Minister could expand on that today: when, how, with whom? She has described the policy as simple fairness. We disagree. What we are proposing is what I would describe as fair, and I will wish to test opinion of the House.

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

The following Members in the Chamber have indicated a wish to speak: the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Oates. I now call the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Garden of Frognal

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued) & Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. I share his concerns about segregation; my heavily edited speech was almost illegible by the time I made it, so I crossed out one of the wrong bits.

I thank noble Lords who have supported these amendments and packed so much into what they have said. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, packed in a lot of criticisms of the whole system, and I agree with every word he said. I hope I anticipated a number of the Minister’s arguments, because they were made in Committee—although I was probably pretty telegraphic in the way I did so.

The Minister said the amendment encourages compliance; the very fact that individuals are plucked out of the community, and do not disappear underground, shows that they comply. The amendment includes in its criteria that detention should be proportionate, which meets the point. It also meets the point about the need to protect public safety. Frankly, it is adding insult to injury—and it really is injury—to the majority of asylum seekers, who are not violent criminals. They are not criminals at all.

However, all this misses the point. It is about detention being indefinite. The Minister says that it is not indefinite; it always has an end and that is not the same as being indefinite. The individuals do not know when it must end. It is that uncertainty and loss of hope which are so inhumane and damaging. I beg to test the opinion of the House.

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

I apologise, but the noble Lord, Lord Green of Deddington, wished to have a word after the Minister. I ask him to be brief.

Modern Slavery Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Garden of Frognal

Wednesday 10th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendments 88A and 91A in this group. I take the point about pre-emption, but the reason for my amendments remains, and will remain if the clause is amended only as the Government propose. At the heart of this is my concern that it should not only be a specified public authority with a duty to notify the Secretary of State, or whoever else it might be, if the authority believes that someone is a victim of slavery or human trafficking. The clause provides that there must be notification if the public authority has reason to believe that a person is such a victim. However, should not all public authorities have that duty, rather than just specified public authorities? If the authority has no reason to believe that a person is a victim, the duty to notify is not triggered—but even if an apparently unlikely public authority comes across a victim, should it not give notification?

When I was trying to think of an example, the Highways Agency seemed to be one of those authorities. In engaging a contractor to undertake work on a motorway, the Highways Agency might well be concerned that with some of those operating machinery or doing the heavy work, the contractor has engaged forced labour. We know that the construction industry is a sector which is at risk, if I can put it that way. Surely, then, it should have a duty, just as a local authority visiting premises—for example, for environmental health—would have the same obligation. I am quite concerned that without any good reason—because, as I say, the duty would not be triggered unless there was a reason to believe—the Government are unnecessarily narrowing the provision in the clause.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

I am grateful to my noble friend for speaking to her amendments, which gives me the opportunity to explain the Government’s approach on who the duty to notify will apply to. We thought carefully about how to define the duty to notify, and to which authorities it should apply. Modern slavery is a complex and hidden crime and we need to ensure that those who are charged with the duty to notify in the Bill have the appropriate expertise to discharge their responsibilities. If we extend the duty too widely, we risk placing a duty on public authorities that lack the necessary skills to identify victims of this complex crime.

We recognise that identification of victims is an area that needs further development. We have ensured that encouraging good practice in the identification of victims is part of the commissioner’s remit and have included statutory guidance on victim identification in the Bill. We will also work with public bodies to improve training and awareness of the issue. The flexibility of specifying public authorities to whom the duty applies means that when we consider that further public authorities have the expertise effectively to identify victims of modern slavery, they can be added to the duty.

The Government do not want to place a legal and administrative burden on public authorities unnecessarily. For example, requiring authorities which simply will not come into contact with victims to provide training to staff and set up data recording systems would not be an efficient use of public funds.

My noble friend mentioned the Highways Agency. If an authority such as the Highways Agency had concerns over modern slavery, it should call the police or voluntarily notify according to the process set out in the duty of notify, so it will have access to people who have more expertise in that area.

Given this clarification, I hope that my noble friend is satisfied that the Bill strikes the right balance between ensuring that the right bodies are subject to this duty and enabling flexibility for changes in the future. I hope she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I certainly will not press the amendment today, but I wonder which is the chicken and which is the egg here. Of course, there is a concern about skills in identifying possible victims, but because this is an issue, it seems to me that it is all the more important that a duty to do something—maybe not to notify the Secretary of State, but to do something—ought to apply.

This is an unprocessed thought from when my noble friend was speaking. She said, rightly, that anyone who is concerned can go to the police. As we are talking about public authorities—and the Government have a relationship with public authorities—should we be thinking about guidance to all public authorities? As a minimum, it would say, “You may not have the skills, but all public authorities should be aware of this and if you have a concern, go to the police—if you think that there is nothing else you can do, always go to the police”. I think there is some scope—maybe not on the face of the Bill—for a bit more thought to go into the way we are operating our response to these issues.

I think that the Box has had time to process the thought that I did not. What I am saying is that I would be uneasy about leaving it there, because we have all identified that there is a problem that needs getting to grips with.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I was taking words from the Bill; “reason to believe” is what triggers the duty.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

Indeed, my Lords. In my reply I mentioned that we are working with public bodies to improve training in awareness of the issue. There will be guidance for public authorities on identifying victims. So my noble friend is quite right to raise this as an issue, but the Government are already working towards that end.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness for tabling this amendment, and to other noble Lords who have spoken with such concern about the issues around the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, particularly its remit.

This Government are committed to ensuring fairness in the workplace, tackling worker exploitation and encouraging and raising levels of compliance with workplace rights across all sectors. We are already doing this through the use of existing enforcement arrangements. We very much welcome the many comments that have been made in support of the GLA and its vital work. It has been operating for less than 10 years but it is a successful organisation doing excellent work in tackling harmful activity affecting workers who are particularly vulnerable to exploitation in the sectors that it currently covers.

We need to consider this carefully and ensure that in seeking to broaden the GLA’s remit, we do not risk undermining the good work that is being done already. As the noble and learned Baroness pointed out, it is a comparatively small body, with only 66 staff. It performs a targeted role in an effective way and has a positive influence in the broader fight against exploitation. We very much want that to continue.

Following the Red Tape Challenge exercise and the triennial review, the GLA is implementing changes that will lift unnecessary burdens on compliant businesses while enabling a stronger focus on enforcement action. It is important that both these aspects are developed and move forward together.

Amendment 97 provides for a very broad power, enabling expansion of the GLA’s scope, remit and powers. Changes in the scope or remit of the GLA may very well be sensible; that is something that we will wish to consider further and which the Government have said that they wish to keep under review. However, we are not convinced that Amendment 97 meets that need or is the appropriate way to deal with the issue at the moment.

The amendment is open-ended. The enabling power could be used to set up the GLA to tackle all forms of slavery, trafficking and exploitation far beyond employment. That is a very big step away from the GLA’s current remit, where it has been so effective. It would require a dramatically different organisational and funding model to achieve a much broader role, which would likely require further primary legislation, as has been alluded to. Amendments 97A and 101A focus specifically on the remit, enabling the current licensing regime to be extended to additional industrial sectors beyond agriculture and food. Noble Lords have mentioned a number of sectors where this would be particularly relevant.

I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, who introduced the Bill in 2004 that established the GLA as a body to carry out a licensing regime and to take enforcement action against unlicensed activities. We need to progress on both these fronts. It would be interesting to discuss with the noble Lord why he did not seek to extend the remit from the two sectors that were mentioned in the original Act.

We have concerns about extending the regime to new sectors without clear evidence that that represents the most effective and efficient approach. Licensing affects the compliant business and the rogue gangmaster alike. The majority of gangmaster businesses are highly compliant small and medium-sized enterprises that are generating employment and economic growth for the UK. We would not want to burden them unnecessarily with regulation.

Simply extending the current licensing regime into new sectors would not necessarily improve efforts to tackle exploitative employers who flout the law. We need to focus on seeking and bringing to justice serious criminals who enslave innocent victims. So we wish to see a GLA with a strong focus on anti-slavery and worker exploitation that will support the Government’s broader strategy on modern slavery. We are working for that through an approach that builds on the GLA’s already excellent work.

I will set out some of the work that is already happening to develop the GLA. Bringing it into the Home Office has already increased collaboration and capability through easier contact with other law enforcement agencies engaged in addressing and disrupting serious criminal activity, including human trafficking for worker exploitation in the UK. The GLA is playing a full part in the better business compliance partnerships—a programme that will begin operation shortly. These pilots will look at more efficient ways of bringing together a wide range of compliance and enforcement officers locally. We expect the GLA to bring knowledge and experience to the problems identified in these areas to tackle worker exploitation and illegal working.

The GLA is working with the University of Derby to devise training and to develop an anti-slavery training academy for use by supply chain businesses. This will build on the GLA’s excellent existing collaboration with business in its regulated sectors. The GLA is well placed to tackle the serious worker exploitation that lies between the more technical compliance offences that fall to be investigated by HMRC and the serious and organised crimes that are addressed by the National Crime Agency.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee raised the concerns of the CBI, which we share, about the appropriateness of this measure and the expansion not just into other sectors but of the remit of the GLA. We have a very good working agency in the GLA and it is tempting to extend it beyond its natural remit too quickly and without due consideration of all the factors that would be required to make entirely sure that any extension was appropriate and as efficient as the GLA.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, mentioned the inadequacy of the fines and the sentencing. Sentencing is a matter for the courts and there have been some low fines issued against convicted unlicensed gangmasters, but she may be reassured to know that the first custodial sentence for an offence under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act was imposed in December 2013 when a Lithuanian national was given seven years for operating without a licence. He ran an organised crime operation in Norfolk and controlled scores of workers brought over from his homeland, using tactics including debt bondage, psychological and physical intimidation, and violence. We have heard from other noble Lords of some appalling examples of the way in which workers can be treated by gangmasters. Fines have been increased for magistrates’ courts and Crown Courts, depending on the seriousness of the offence, so hopefully the levity of the fines is currently being tackled.

I can assure the House that there is a great deal of work going on within government to improve the work of the GLA and to consider its future. We will, of course, ensure that today’s contributions are considered during that work and we will further consider whether it might be expanded in sector or in remit. For the moment we do not feel that this particular legislation and these particular amendments are the best way of moving forward, but obviously we will discuss this again and I hope that meanwhile noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am very pleased to hear of the work that is going on. I do not know whether I missed it but is any work being undertaken to obtain the evidence of the need for an extension of the remit and an extension into other sectors? Many of us have been told about this but more evidence is needed. Is work being undertaken by the Government to satisfy themselves in response to the sorts of concerns that have been expressed? I accept that the Minister may not have that information now but I think that it is a question which it is appropriate to ask at this point.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

It is indeed. I do not have that evidence directly to hand but it is probably something that the University of Derby will be considering in its work in investigating and reviewing this.

Modern Slavery Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Garden of Frognal

Monday 8th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, I welcome the principal provisions, but I share her concerns. I thought that she was entirely clear in speaking to the amendments. Trafficking and slavery are trafficking and slavery. Not to be prosecuted for offences committed when one is trafficked or enslaved is a matter of human rights. Those rights should not be dependent on the individual’s characteristics; they are completely separate issues. I do not need to repeat everything that the noble Baroness said, but I will quickly refer—the title is probably longer than the reference—to Policy and legislative recommendations towards the effective implementation of the non-punishment provision with regard to victims of trafficking, by the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings. She said:

“The penalization of a person for acts that they have committed as a cause or direct consequence of being trafficked must be seen in that context:”—

the context of human rights—

“not only does it unjustly punish and stigmatise victims of serious crime; it would also violate these human rights objectives”.

I come back to that. It is not a small point, but it is very specific and clear, and I fear that we will be muddying the waters if the wording remains as it is.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to the debate, and I am grateful that they felt able to welcome the government amendments.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley. As she set out, Amendments 80A and 82 would remove the “reasonable person” test for children and adults. Whenever any statutory defence is created, we must be very careful to ensure that the line is drawn in the right place so that the people who need it can access it, but also to avoid unfairness or injustice to potential victims of serious crime and to prevent the defence being abused by those seeking to escape justice.

The noble Baroness raised concerns that the reasonable person test would breach EU directive requirements, which would make it difficult for us to work in cross-border operations. However, it does not place the UK in breach of the directive. As the pre-legislative scrutiny committee identified, the UK is already compliant with all its international obligations. The test will have no impact on cross-border operations. However, I note what she said, and the comments of my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Perhaps we can agree to discuss this again before Report.

The reasonable person test is an objective test. The “no realistic alternative” formulation in the reasonable person test came directly from the case law that the noble Baroness mentioned. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on whether the reasonable person would be someone who has suffered the same sort of experiences, that is indeed how that would be applied in these cases. People who have been enslaved or trafficked may commit criminal offences in a wide variety of circumstances. Such a defence may not be justified in every case. For example, the courts have consistently ruled that the defence of duress can never apply in cases of murder. We must not create a defence so wide that it amounts to a loophole in the law. It is important that we protect not just victims but society. An objective test plays a crucial role here: allowing a prosecutor or jury to consider all the circumstances, while also considering the accused’s characteristics, such as age and the other characteristics set out. We consider that removing the objective test would leave the defence dangerously broad.

Turning to Amendment 84A, which deals with Director of Public Prosecutions’ guidance on non-prosecution of victims, the Code for Crown Prosecutors is issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions. It gives guidance to prosecutors on general principles to be applied when making decisions about prosecutions. The code requires the prosecutor to complete two stages: is there sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction, and is a prosecution required in the public interest? It is not the case, and never has been, that just because there is sufficient evidence to bring a prosecution the public interest will require one. That discretion is a vital protection and helps avoid unnecessary or unjust prosecutions. The code is supplemented by a body of legal and policy guidance on specific offences and procedures, which includes guidance on suspects in a criminal case who might be victims of trafficking or slavery. This is updated on a regular basis to reflect case law or any other changes and is published on the CPS website.

Modern Slavery Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Garden of Frognal

Wednesday 3rd December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Garden of Frognal (LD)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for speaking to this amendment and my noble friend Lady Hamwee for tabling it. It gives me the opportunity to explain the Government’s approach to safeguards in slavery and trafficking prevention and risk orders, and in particular the standards of proof required for the orders to be made. The purpose of these orders is to ensure that law enforcement bodies and the courts have appropriate powers to restrict the behaviour of persons who are likely to cause harm to another by committing a slavery or trafficking offence. For the prevention orders in Clause 14 and the risk orders in Clause 23, the courts must be satisfied that there is a risk that the individual may commit an offence, and that the order is necessary to protect a person or persons from the physical or psychological harm that would likely be caused by that individual committing a slavery or human trafficking offence.

These amendments seek to ensure that the court is required in each of these circumstances to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, which is the standard of proof in criminal courts, as has been mentioned. The intention of these amendments is to ensure that safeguards are in place to protect the rights of individuals on whom these orders will be imposed. I recognise the importance of ensuring that these orders, breach of which would be a criminal offence, are not made lightly.

Reference has been made to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the work of that committee. There has been mention of the report that it has published recently. The Government are reflecting on that report carefully.

In this context, protecting the rights of the defendant is important. We have sought to draft these provisions to provide these protections and reflect the need to protect potential victims and remove the risk of harm to them, which is paramount. Although the proceedings by which these orders are obtained are civil proceedings, I put on record that the high burden of proof which applies by virtue of relevant case law in this area ensures that the threshold must in any event be akin to the criminal standard, as my noble friend said. This is the position in respect of existing orders under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which have been used effectively for more than 10 years, and the new sexual harm prevention order and sexual risk order, and is therefore very well established. For these reasons, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary. Courts and practitioners are familiar with the existing evidential test. Departing from the established approach for these orders could cause uncertainty among practitioners and the courts, which may well reduce their effectiveness. There could also be a perception that, by expressly including a different and more rigid test in the Bill, we want these orders to be judged by a different standard from that applicable to the other orders, which would call into question why different approaches are taken in areas notwithstanding the similarities between them.

Under the system I have described, the court has flexibility in determining the standard to be applied and can take into account and balance all the circumstances of the case—for example, the seriousness of the risk posed by the defendant, the degree of relevance of each fact which must be proved by the applicant and the effect on the defendant of making the order. In the sex offending context, the courts have been able to carry out this exercise for many years in a way which protects the rights of both defendants and those persons at risk. Prescribing the standard as the criminal standard would deprive the courts of this necessary flexibility.

My noble friend made a comparison with the anti-social behaviour regime, to which she made a similar amendment. I think your Lordships will agree that, while anti-social behaviour can cause harm to both individuals and communities, it is not as serious as the horrific abuses of modern slavery. That is why we have modelled these orders on those which tackle sex offenders. Those orders do not prescribe the criminal standard of proof in legislation and were recently approved by Parliament.

I assure the Committee that there are several further safeguards as well as the standard of proof to ensure these orders are used appropriately. The type of harm to be prevented is specified and relates to very serious offences. Statutory guidance will be issued, which will describe risk factors and categories of restriction which may be contained in an order. In determining what measures are necessary, the court must have regard to the rights of both the person at risk and the defendant under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Government will also ensure that defendants have the same access to legal aid as is applicable to other civil order regimes.

Legal aid was raised on an earlier amendment. Individuals concerned will have the right to appeal the making, variation or extension of an order and apply to vary or discharge an order if circumstances change. Given that clarification, the substantial safeguards to ensure appropriate use of the orders and my assurance that we shall, of course, continue to reflect on the valuable work of the Joint Committee, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this amendment but hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw it.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I was not surprised by anything that my noble friend has just said; her reply was very much what I anticipated. However, given both the JCHR’s comments and the recent experience with another order considered by your Lordships, I felt that it was appropriate to flesh out the Government’s reasons. I entirely understand the point about case law and comparisons.

The one thing that troubled me about her reply, if I may say so, was the suggestion that because these offences are more serious than anti-social behaviour—I agree with that—it is therefore unnecessary to be clear about the standard of proof, in the way we were with anti-social behaviour. I hope that that does not in any way detract from what my noble friend said about the standard of proof being equivalent—her words were, “akin to”; but I understand that to mean “equivalent”—to the criminal standard of proof. I do not think that that was what was meant but it sounded a bit like it in one paragraph in the middle of her reply. If it is necessary to confirm that after today, I would be happy for her to do so.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

My noble friend is quite right. It was not the intention to imply that they were in any way worthy of less serious measures.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Then I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for moving the amendment, which aims to clarify this part of the Bill. Slavery and trafficking prevention orders are available in respect of individuals who have been convicted of a slavery or human trafficking offence and who pose a risk of causing harm by the further commission of such offences, which makes it necessary to obtain an order to protect the public from that harm. The provisions already have retrospective effect to the extent that the offence, on the basis of which a person can become subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order, may have been committed before the coming into force of the Bill. As my noble friend has pointed out, this is reflected in the list of relevant offences in Schedule 1. It is important that these measures can be sought in relation to all relevant offenders and that we do not leave a gap in the availability of the new orders in respect of individuals who have been convicted of old offences or offences replaced by those in the Bill. The offences listed in Schedule 1 include old offences, as well as offences that will be repealed by the Bill, but which nevertheless relate to similar activities as their modern equivalents to ensure that the orders can be sought in respect of all offenders who pose a risk to the public, regardless of whether that offence is still on the statute book.

I understand that there may be concerns that defendants are not penalised again having already received, and possibly served, sentences from the court, but this is not novel. There is similar provision in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 in respect of the new orders dealing with sexual harm. While this does not amount to formal retrospection, the provisions have retrospective effect in that conduct committed prior to commencement will carry potential consequences that the person concerned may not reasonably have expected.

Moreover, as slavery and trafficking prevention orders are intended to be civil, preventive measures and not a punishment, Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits the retrospective application of a penalty, would not apply. This is supported by the approach taken by the courts to ASBOs and other similar civil orders where the courts have been satisfied that such orders are neither a conviction nor a punishment. In other words, these measures do not involve the imposition of a penalty.

My noble friend asked whether these orders would take place in open court. I can assure her that they would be in open court. The general public interest in the law not being changed retrospectively is firmly outweighed by the need to be able to tackle those involved in slavery or human trafficking as soon as these provisions come into force. With those assurances, I hope that my noble friend will feel free to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am grateful for that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

I thank my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, for tabling these amendments. They raise the important issue of who should be able to use the slavery and trafficking prevention orders or slavery and trafficking risk orders proposed in the Bill, and indeed they relate to the powers of the police across different areas of operation.

The first orders have been designed to manage the risk of harm that would be caused by an individual committing a modern slavery offence. In developing the Bill, the Government have considered carefully who is best placed to be given the powers to apply for these orders and to be involved in the subsequent steps of the process, whether it is receiving the name and address details or applying for variations, renewals or discharge, or whether it is the persons for whom the guidance is intended.

The amendments, although not Amendment 39A, seek to remove immigration officers from the category of persons who can apply for an order. However, the cross-border nature of modern slavery means that it is often linked to immigration crime, and the individuals in the best position to deal with immigration crime are immigration officers. It is therefore appropriate for this group of law enforcement officers to have these powers. They already have law enforcement powers in this country and investigate and support prosecution of immigration and trafficking offences. Given the international nature of modern slavery, this power is appropriate, and to remove them from the list would restrict the role that immigration officers can play in dealing with traffickers and those likely to commit trafficking offences. It means that they would be required to call on the police to apply for the orders, which would add unnecessarily to the burden on the police and, of course, would cause delays as well.

I entirely understand that it is important to ensure there are safeguards in place so that immigration officers apply for these orders only in appropriate circumstances. The legislation is drafted using existing recognised legal persons, and the specific positions of more senior staff in immigration enforcement are not set out in legislation. However, I can assure the House that we will establish, through Home Office policy, that any decision to apply for a slavery and trafficking prevention or risk order by an immigration officer must be approved by the director of criminal investigations within the Home Office. I hope that those assurances will enable my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.

Amendment 39A seeks to include chief police officers for an area with which the defendant previously had a connection in the category of persons who can apply for an order. The role of the preventive orders is to look forwards to prevent the harm that could be caused by future crimes. The provisions about who can apply for an order reflect that. As the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, indicated, this was discussed in the other place and the Government’s position has not shifted from that. In cases where an individual no longer lives in an area, but the chief officer of police has reason to believe they are likely to return, there is a future risk of harm in that area and the chief officer can apply for the orders under the Bill as it stands. As the noble Baroness mentioned, in the few cases where an individual posing a risk is unlikely to return to an area, it would be appropriate for the police to inform the National Crime Agency, as it would be logical for it to take this forward across police boundaries, or indeed the police force for the area where the individual resides. Those two bodies would be best placed to manage the risk posed by an individual where they live now. We shall be coming on to discuss the role of the commissioner in more detail later in the Bill.

Clause 15 as drafted provides appropriate powers for the police in relation to slavery and trafficking prevention orders. For the moment we see no reason to take that further forward. We are satisfied that that will cover the cases in the Bill. Given that clarification, I hope that the noble Baroness will not press her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that reply. She said that the Government would not want to restrict the role of immigration officers. I still find it not so much confusing, but carrying the danger of muddling the issues in the way I explained. What intrigues me, in particular, and I am grateful for the assurance, is that the approval for an application would have to be made by the director of criminal investigation within the Home Office. If that is so, why cannot the police take the matter on and not involve the Immigration Service? I think I had better leave that question hanging and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, the noble Baroness has not stolen my thunder at all, and again I am most grateful to her for tabling this amendment. It picks up on the recommendations made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I want to make one additional point on why this raises an important question of human rights. As we said in our report:

“In order to ensure compatibility with the right to respect for private life, any restriction must satisfy the requirements of legal certainty. It is essential that prohibitions contained in the orders are clear, as a breach of an order is a criminal offence”.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal]

My Lords, I thank both noble Baronesses for speaking to these amendments. They raise the important issue of the prohibitions that can be imposed by the slavery and trafficking prevention orders and risk orders. Prevention is critical to tackling modern slavery effectively and the purpose of these orders is to enable the courts to impose prohibitions on individuals who are believed to pose a risk of causing harm by the commission of a slavery or human trafficking offence. It is important that these orders provide law enforcement agencies and the courts with the ability to respond flexibly to the risks posed by an individual. Clauses 17 and 24 make it clear that slavery and trafficking prevention orders and risk orders will only contain prohibitions that the court is satisfied are necessary for the purposes of protecting people from the physical or psychological harms that would be likely to occur if the defendant committed the slavery or human trafficking offence. These prohibitions can be imposed anywhere in the UK or outside of the UK, they can be for a fixed period of at least five years, and some prohibitions may apply for longer than others.

To enable law enforcement agencies and the courts to respond to changing slavery and human trafficking practices and to tailor prohibitions to the specific risk posed by individuals, we have deliberately not specified the types of restrictions that can be included in the orders. This makes them flexible and capable of restricting any activities that a person undertakes if the court considers it necessary. The approach is in line with existing orders relating to the prevention of sexual harm. Making the amendment requested by my noble friend would restrict the flexibility that these orders need to have. We believe that we have already set substantial and appropriate safeguards to ensure that orders will only be used in appropriate circumstances when necessary to stop the harm caused by these very serious offences, by requiring that the court is satisfied that they and the prohibitions that they include are necessary.

I appreciate the power of the argument of my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and of the arguments of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to ensure that operational law enforcement partners are clear on the types of prohibitions that might be helpful. In line with the Joint Committee on Human Rights recommendation we shall ensure that the statutory guidance in relation to the orders will include guidance on appropriate prohibitions. With that assurance, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, of course I shall seek leave to withdraw it. I had hoped that by referring to regulations that I described as having a degree of flexibility I might have met the point that I anticipated would come. Wanting flexibility in the range of prohibitions that might be applied raises in one’s mind a concern that they might be changed quite frequently. That would go against the certainty that we are seeking. However, I hear what my noble friend has to say and a little more clarity in the guidance will certainly be welcome. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.