Immigration (Guidance on Detention of Vulnerable Persons) Regulations and the Detention Centre (Amendment) Rules 2018 Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Department for International Development
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for bringing this Motion forward. I start from the position that immigration detention does not do anybody any good. I find it hard to think that one would be liable to be harmed, whether one is vulnerable—a term I do not find easy—or not. Which of us would be robust enough?
In a previous debate, I quoted from Never Truly Free, a recent British Red Cross report on the humanitarian impact of the UK’s immigration detention system, including the mental health of detainees after release. It concluded:
“Immigration detention has a known negative impact on mental health. Most detainees will have experienced some form of trauma in their life before detention, the effects of which can be exacerbated in detention”.
It also stated:
“The damage done by detention does not simply go away once someone is released and the negative impact on mental health persists long after detention”.
I say this because I do not want to belittle, by implication, the experience of detainees who are not vulnerable—or at any rate, not “particularly vulnerable”, as per the phrase in Section 59—and to make the point that the definition of torture might be a little less difficult if we detained fewer people and for no longer than a maximum fixed period.
I have some sympathy with those who struggle with that definition, but this will always be a problem when you start from the wrong place and grapple with something that is not necessary. As has been asked, why is it necessary to distinguish torture from ill treatment for this purpose? The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to Shaw—like Leveson, he must have got used to becoming a noun. It prompts me to ask whether he had any input in the content of these statutory instruments. Indeed, has he approved the definition?
As we have heard, we have been briefed by organisations with considerable experience of both working with victims of extreme cruelty and advancing the understanding of torture. They are very critical of the Government’s approach, both the detail and the principle. As we have also heard, the court did not require the Home Secretary to define the term.
What are we to make of the paragraph on “Consultation outcome” in the Explanatory Memorandum to the two instruments? It states that,
“the Home Office has discussed the proposal”—
that is, the definition—
“with interested non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The Home Office has considered comments made by NGOs and has committed to engaging with them as the detailed guidance and training for decision makers are developed”.
I was not aware that NGOs had the limited opportunity described to give their views to the Home Office, but those views are not reported in the memorandum. I take it that they were not accepted. As a matter of good practice, it seems to me that the memorandum should be much clearer on this.
My confidence in the process was not helped by the Explanatory Note to both instruments. It states:
“A full regulatory impact assessment has not been produced for this instrument as no impact on the private or voluntary sectors is foreseen”.
I do not know about a financial impact, but by definition there will be an impact on those undertaking Rule 35 assessments and on the numbers held in detention. There must be an impact. Medical practitioners have a difficult enough task in making assessments with time and other constraints and in a place and in circumstances which are far from the safe and supportive environment needed to work with such patients—I use the term deliberately—and which are likely to contribute to ongoing trauma, to exacerbate symptoms and to impede the healing process.
I am also interested in the concepts of control and powerlessness in the definition. At any rate, they certainly allow for the argument that a victim with a particular history of being controlled and powerless will experience detention as torture. With regard to that history, what is meant by powerlessness? The noble Lord has raised this point. Will the Minister confirm that the definition is not confined to a physical situation and that control and powerlessness may be different for different people?
Under the draft guidance, an individual is regarded as at risk—we discussed this at Questions the other day—if they are,
“particularly vulnerable to harm if placed or remaining in detention”.
Why is this in addition to the history? Why has it been added? In fact, as a matter of the construction of paragraph 7, is that something that the individual needs to declare, or is it an objective matter for the third party? I have read the paragraph several times and I am not sure.
I understand that the guidance introduces a wider range of immigration factors than before, placing far greater emphasis on non-compliance. My final question is: does this not of itself affect the balance, which we are told is sought, between,
“protecting the vulnerable and ensuring the maintenance of legitimate immigration control”?
That comes from paragraph 1, on the purpose of the guidance.
In summary, these Benches support the Motion. We share the noble Lord’s regret and our regret goes much wider, too.
I add my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for providing us with this opportunity to debate this issue of concern over the Government’s actions and decisions on the welfare of vulnerable people in immigration detention. We agree with the concerns that the noble Lord expressed about how the Government are dealing with this matter and his proposals for addressing the situation.
As I understand it, it is meant to be Home Office policy that vulnerable people, which includes the victims of torture, should be detained only in exceptional circumstances, for example, if they are likely to offend or cause a public safety risk. However, that does not always appear to be the case, because in the year ending last March there were apparently well over 26,000 exceptional circumstance cases in immigration detention. Once again, as I understand it, these are not even people whose removal is imminent, since about half are released back into the community.
In his first review, Stephen Shaw said that detention in and of itself undermines welfare and contributes to vulnerability. Half a dozen court cases in the last few years have drawn attention to the unacceptable treatment of detainees. I believe that the death rate among detainees in immigration detention has risen. Last year, 11 people died in custody.
The situation reached such a state that in 2015 the now Prime Minister, then Home Secretary, asked Stephen Shaw, the former Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, to conduct a review of the welfare of vulnerable persons in detention. His report concluded that the safeguards for vulnerable people were inadequate, that immigration detention was used too often and for too long, and that the impact on mental health increases the longer detention continues. However, in implementing their adults at risk policy, the Government did not fully address the concerns raised by Stephen Shaw. Indeed, the Government’s detention centre rules and guidance on the detention of vulnerable persons seemed to increase the risk of harm. In its first 10 weeks of implementation, the Government’s adults at risk policy was applied incorrectly in almost 60% of 340 cases. Torture survivors continue to be detained and torture is one of the 10 indicators of risk in the adults at risk policy.
The guidance on the detention of vulnerable persons increases the burden of providing evidence on the vulnerable individual, since specific evidence will be needed that detention is likely to cause harm and the risk of harm in detention has to outweigh a range of immigration factors, such as the risk of absconding. In effect, it requires a person to prove that they will not abscond, which one would have thought was extremely difficult to do. The guidance already includes a broad range of immigration factors that can justify detention, even of torture survivors.
The result has been that the release rate, following a report designed to screen torture victims out of detention, has fallen considerably. In the third quarter of 2016, before the policy change, nearly 40% of those in the report in question were released. In the first quarter of 2018 that number had fallen to just 12.5%. Those figures were borne out in a 2017 High Court ruling in a case brought against the Home Office that the adults at risk policy unlawfully imprisons through immigration detention hundreds of victims of torture. The Home Office had previously decided to narrow the definition of torture so that it refers only to violence carried out by state actors. Apparently, it now excludes vulnerable survivors of non-state abuse, such as by ISIS, Hezbollah or the Taliban.
The Government have tabled the two statutory instruments we are discussing in response to the High Court’s ruling. However, the organisation that brought the successful case against the Home Office has said that the new torture definition is inappropriate and too complex for caseworkers and doctors to apply to specific cases, and that even when applied correctly the definition will exclude a group of victims of severe ill treatment who do not fall within the other indicators of risk.
As I understand it, the Government were actually asked by NGOs to await the publication of Stephen Shaw’s re-review into the welfare of vulnerable people in detention to allow consideration of his findings before laying changes before Parliament. The Government have now had the Shaw re-review for some two months, but others have not been given a chance to consider his latest recommendations since, subject to the Minister saying otherwise, it has not been made available by the Government.
The Government’s argument for not allowing consideration to be given first to the findings of Stephen Shaw’s re-review appears to be that they could be in difficulty if they have not produced a revised adults at risk policy within 12 months of the October 2017 High Court judgment. But did the judgment specifically say that, and did it say that the Government should not await the outcome of any re-review before revising their adults at risk policy? The Government have had the Shaw re-review for two months. There is nearly a further four weeks to go before the Summer Recess, without taking account of the two-week short sitting in September. If this Government want to speed up processes, they have previously shown that they can do so. They could have, and still can, in this case and ensure that there is an opportunity to consider these two statutory instruments while they are still drafts in the light of the findings of Stephen Shaw’s re-review. Doing so might avoid the Government having another uncomfortable day in court.
I think the Minister might be getting us a bit mixed up, because the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, spoke more about consultation. What she wanted to know, and therefore what I will ask now, is: what was the response? That was not made clear in the Explanatory Memorandum. The response to us was that the organisations are very unhappy about this, which is why this Motion has been brought this evening.
Perhaps I may come back on that. I quoted the paragraph on the consultation outcome because the implication of the Home Office saying it has considered comments from the NGOs is that there is no difference between them, or at least nothing substantial, and that we should not be worried about whether the NGOs made critical comments—which we have discovered they did.
I take both noble Baronesses’ point. We did engage with the NGOs. What are the differences between us? I will get back to the noble Baronesses and place a copy of the letter in the Library in due course, because I do not have the information on what the feedback was.
The noble Baroness asked about powerlessness being confined to physical situations. It is also a consideration in cases where no physical harm takes place, so it could apply in a situation in which, for example, an individual is subjected to psychological abuse.
Perhaps I may conclude with a word on training. Over the past six weeks, officials have delivered an extensive training programme for caseworkers making detention decisions and for healthcare staff based in immigration removal centres and residential short-term holding facilities. One thing that NGOs have been able to do is observe that training and provide feedback, which the trainers have taken on board.
On the broader question, I hope that both noble Baronesses will allow me to get back to them on that. New and comprehensive guidance will be provided for caseworkers and healthcare staff. I hope that we will be able to provide caseworkers with the guidance and the knowledge that they need to make consistent and fair decisions, which is what we all seek. We will keep the guidance under review.
The Government are committed to discharging their duty to control immigration effectively and to secure our borders, but I can assure noble Lords that of course at the same time we are absolutely committed to the welfare of all detainees and to protecting the victims of torture and other vulnerable people in immigration detention. Those aims are not incompatible, and it is to these complementary ends that we are implementing the court’s judgment now.