Immigration Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd February 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Norwich]

My Lords, I rise from these Benches to support Amendment 227 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and others.

The briefing note on Clause 34 to which the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred is a model of clarity. It was certainly very informative to me. It made clear, as the noble Baroness said, the statutory duty on the Secretary of State,

“to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of any child in the UK who … may be affected by any immigration decision”—

that duty is not in doubt—and that,

“the best interests of the child are a primary consideration”.

While I understand that a primary consideration may not be the only one, I do not understand how a primary consideration can be set aside even if it is in some way qualified. If it is trumped by other factors, it does not seem to be a primary consideration. So there must be a risk that Clause 34 unamended could undermine the Secretary of State’s statutory duty.

I do not doubt the Minister’s and the Government’s best intentions here, but there is widespread concern among organisations such as the Children’s Society, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said, which deal with vulnerable children on a daily basis, not least about the Home Office’s capacity to cope with an unamended Clause 34. Without an adequate process to determine the child’s best interests,

“children could be returned to countries and circumstances where they may be at risk of serious harm including sexual abuse, neglect … violence, forced marriage”,

and so on. There is plenty of research to indicate the way in which separation from a parent when vulnerable causes long-term harm to a child’s developmental and emotional well-being. We should not be making such separations more commonplace.

The Home Office briefing argues that appeals from abroad have been effective and fair but, as we have heard, the cuts in legal aid for immigration cases are bound to undermine the capacity of families to put forward evidence, and the danger of not knowing the facts in an appeal must surely grow.

I have been talking generally about the impact of all this, but of course it will always be experienced in particular. An example given by the Children’s Society vividly illustrates the risks. A woman came to the UK 16 years ago to escape forced marriage. After an agent stole her documents, she lived under the radar and now has three children aged 11, seven and two. She received help from the Coram Children’s Legal Centre two years ago—pro bono—to make an application for leave to remain on Article 8 grounds. It was refused, largely because it was said that the family could return to the woman’s country of origin. She appealed and had to wait more than a year for the appeal to be heard, apparently because of a “shortage of judiciary”. The children speak only English; the older two are doing well at school and the eldest child, I understand, is now eligible to register as British.

Under the Bill’s provisions, this woman and her family could have been removed from the UK for more than a year while waiting for her appeal. The children would then have lived in a small African village with their estranged maternal grandmother, with whom they do not have a common language. Their schooling would have been interrupted, since there is no teaching in English locally. The youngest child would have been at risk of female genital mutilation in a place with limited health services. The removal of the eldest child from Britain, the only country he has ever known, would have made him ineligible to register as British since it would have happened just before his 10th birthday.

I want to believe that this family would have benefited from a Home Office caseworker’s laborious and careful sifting of all that evidence, resulting in a recommendation that the family should stay here. But how can this be guaranteed without some amendment of Clause 34? We need full and proper scrutiny before we deport such families or children. I hope that the Minister will offer us some comfort that these points have been heard.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches we support Amendment 227 and the opposition to Clause 34 standing part of the Bill. I will not speak to Clause 35.

The right reverend Prelate has just mentioned legal work provided pro bono. I would like to take this opportunity of echoing a comment made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, from the Dispatch Box the other day when he repeated an Answer to a Question on legal aid. He said that there are a lot of legal firms which are not “ambulance chasers”. Those firms do terrific work in very difficult circumstances, and many of them are engaged in this sort of work.

The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to comments on the last Bill from the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The committee, of which I am a member, has drawn the attention of the House again to particular difficulties which might be faced by appellants if a non-suspensive appeals regime is extended in circumstances in which judicial review is the only means of challenge. This could mean that families with meritorious Article 8 claims are subjected to extensive separation. I think that she also referred to the report of the Constitution Committee, which commented among other things—there were two or three pages on this—on the practical extent to which legal aid is perhaps not likely to be available in respect of judicial review challenges to certification decisions.

We use the term, “Deport first, appeal later”, but of course it is not quite that. It is “Be deported and appeal later”, or deport first and then be appealed against in a situation in which the appellant can apply only in a way that the Court of Appeal and the Solicitor-General have acknowledged is less advantageous—that is the term used in the court. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred to this and it is certainly less advantageous for the appellant or potential appellant. There is difficulty in paying for legal representation and liaising from abroad with legal representatives—if you can find any who can help in the circumstances—difficulty in obtaining, submitting and giving evidence, and difficulty for the tribunal in assessing evidence.

The human rights memorandum published by the Home Office said that,

“there is no intention to apply this power to cases relying on Article 2 and 3 rights”,

and that,

“case law … makes plain that where there is an arguable Article 8 claim, there needs to be the effective possibility of challenging the removal decision”.

If Clause 34 has to remain, it would be good if it could somehow refer to what is in that ancillary documentation.

It struck me during discussions about this how difficult it is to certify a negative. It is almost as difficult as proving a positive. The Secretary of State has to certify a claim, as we have heard, if she considers, first, that removal is not unlawful and, secondly, that the appellant would not face a real risk of irreversible harm. I am sure that the Minister will, as the noble Lord said, refer to the recent Court of Appeal case which ruled that the regime was lawful. However, that was in the context of deportation, and the fact that it was lawful does not make it right.

There is no equality of arms and a perversity about this. As the Law Society has pointed out,

“the spouse of a national of any EEA”—

European Economic Area—

“member except the UK would retain a full in-country right of appeal … whereas the spouse of a UK national”—

not the spouse of any national of any other EEA member—

“would have to leave the country”.

[Lord Ramsbotham (CB)]

My Lords, I am proud to be British and was both proud and privileged to serve for nearly 41 years in the British Army. But I have to admit that I am not proud of much of the thrust of this Bill, which seems to be based on the assumption that every would-be immigrant or asylum seeker is illegal, and should be treated as such. That is akin to regarding everyone awarded a prison sentence as being a combination of mass murderer, armed robber, rapist, arsonist and paedophile, and treating them accordingly. The vast majority of would-be immigrants and asylum seekers are legal, which should be the default thrust of any regulatory legislation.

On 12 July 1910, the then Home Secretary, the 36 year-old Winston Churchill, winding up a debate on prison estimates, said that the way in which any country treated crime and criminals was the true test of its civilisation. He could well have added immigrants and asylum seekers. On Monday night, I heard the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, read from his brief an assertion that:

“The Government already have a raft of guidance and standards in place for ensuring that the regimes in detention centres operate at appropriate levels and in the interests of the welfare of detainees”.—[Official Report, 1/1/16; col.1696.]

In view of my experiences while inspecting them, I thought of Churchill and was completely flabbergasted. Has no one in the Home Office paid the slightest bit of attention to inspection report after inspection report, which point out that what the Minister described as,

“a raft of guidance and standards”,

is not subject to any meaningful oversight? For “appropriate”, he should have said “'wholly unsatisfactory”. So stunned was I that I totally failed to ask the Minister what the word appropriate meant, and who in the Home Office was responsible and accountable for allegedly ensuring the operation of such regimes, and whether their reports could be made available to noble Lords.

That was bad enough. But Clause 34 is so far outside the rule of law, let alone what decent people regard as civilised, that I am ashamed to think that anyone British was responsible for the concept, let alone its inclusion in the Bill. I know that the Court of Appeal has ruled that the imposition under the Immigration Act 2014 of out-of-country appeals in deportation cases is legal, but such appellants have committed serious crimes and received substantial prison sentences before being deported. How can any Home Office Minister seriously bring forward so draconian a proposal for those whose presence in the United Kingdom is entirely legal knowing that, currently, 61% of immigration appeals are either allowed, remitted for the Home Office to retake its decision or acknowledged by the Home Office to be flawed before a hearing? This means that 61% of those whom Ministers intend to force to make their appeal from abroad will have legal grounds for compensation, which is bound to add up to more than the cost of continuing to do the decent and civilised thing.

Included in the 61%, as the Solicitor-General acknowledged to the Committee and the other place, is an appeal success rate of 42%, which the latest figures from the Asylum Support Tribunal show to have risen to 44%. On what grounds do the Government think their proposal to force legal, as well as illegal, potential appellants to leave the United Kingdom before appealing against such appalling and proven faulty decision-taking is justified, appropriate and civilised?

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not immediately apparent to me that it is applicable to this proposal, but in this context one has to bear in mind that a primary consideration is the interests of the child or the children. To that extent, what might be regarded as an aspect of the family test is being applied. That is always a primary consideration. There are circumstances where it may be appropriate for the children to accompany a person out of the United Kingdom, and there may be no difficulty about that. There may be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the children to remain with a parent or carer within the United Kingdom. If there are circumstances where they will have no parent or carer within the United Kingdom and it would not be appropriate for them to leave the United Kingdom, again, there is the safety net of the certification, dealt with in Clause 34, as there is under the existing legislation. To that extent, it appears to me that the matter is dealt with.

The noble Baroness went on to mention again the interests of the child and to ask how many children would be affected by this. It is not possible at this stage to say. On the basis of unofficial and informal figures, I understand that no child has been certified for an out-of-country appeal under existing legislation. Of course, the present amended legislation has been in force for only a short time, since 2015, so it is difficult to discern figures from that.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich referred to particular cases. I hope that I have addressed his concerns. If there was such a serious risk to a child as he alluded to, it appears to me that, with respect, the safety net in Clause 34 would apply.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred to difficulties in producing evidence in the context of an out-of-country appeal. I do not accept that it would be materially more difficult to produce evidence in these circumstances. We are talking about an appeal to a specialist tribunal that is well equipped to decide the form of evidence it requires in a particular case. As I mentioned, when dealing with a case that is going to arise largely on the basis of Article 8 of the convention, if there is to be a convention appeal, one is concerned with family links with the United Kingdom, which are going to be spoken to by persons within the United Kingdom. In so far as there is any factual issue to be addressed by an appellant, it can be done in writing, by video link or even by telephone. That may appear less satisfactory than taking oral evidence but, as the noble Baroness may be aware, it is far from exceptional for appellants not to give evidence in such appeals before a tribunal. It is certainly far from exceptional for appellants not to give oral evidence in such proceedings.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful for that. I did acknowledge the Court of Appeal decision, but I said that in our view it did not make the situation right. However, do the Home Office or the Tribunal Service give information or even assistance to appellants who are outside the country—as a minimum, information on how they can set about dealing with an appeal from outside the country?

While I am on my feet, the Minister credited me with a comment about the best interests of the child which I think came from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I have an amendment on that later so it is understandable that he might have thought that I was going to say what I will be saying.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baroness. Without the benefit of second sight, I cannot say whether I thought she was going to say what she had not said but was planning to say later—but I acknowledge that the original comment came from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I acknowledge the observation made, but I cannot comment on the particulars of such a case. What I can say is perhaps only related and not directly on point. Part of the thrust of the next part of the Bill is to address the time taken for appeals to be processed. That matter will be addressed by my noble friend Lord Bates in due course. In general, it is hoped that appeal processes in simple cases will not exceed six months and even in complex cases will not exceed 12 months, so that there will not be the degree of separation that has been alluded to, even in cases where one child perhaps goes out of the United Kingdom and another remains in the United Kingdom. I rather suspect that that would be an exceptional case—albeit it is amazing when you read the facts of some of these cases just how diverse the family arrangements can be.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Is the noble and learned Lord able to answer the question I asked?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Baroness asked about communication of out-of-country appeals procedures. I do not have that information immediately to hand. I am aware of the tribunal regulations. Perhaps I could undertake to write to her to outline what the guidance is.

My research has come to a conclusion already. There is published guidance on the GOV.UK website on how to appeal from overseas, so it is there. I knew that it existed but I was not aware that it was actually on the website. Whether further steps are taken with regard to this matter, I cannot say. If in fact there is something over and above the website, I will write to advise the noble Baroness.

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[The Lord Bishop of Norwich]

My Lords, I support Amendment 230 in this group. My colleague, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark, spoke at Second Reading of his concern about the architecture of Clause 37 and Schedule 8. I share his belief that the reduced weekly support of £36.95 per person, to which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred, for an asylum seeker under the current system is inadequate. Where that financial provision is refused, it is subject to a right of appeal. I note that in nearly two-thirds of such appeal cases, the appeal is successful or the refusal is withdrawn.

There seems to be an inexorable but ultimately self-defeating utilitarian logic in government policy in this area. The argument seems to be that when an asylum seeker’s application is refused and an appeal is unsuccessful, there is no further need for or right to any financial support. It seems to be assumed that this will be an incentive in itself to leave the United Kingdom. I fully understand the Government’s desire to maintain the integrity of immigration control by ensuring removal, whether voluntary or not, but I wonder how effective this policy will be.

As we have heard, the criteria under the new provisions for any financial support in such situations are destitution and genuine obstacles to leaving the UK, and there is then no right of appeal. What constitutes,

“a genuine obstacle to leaving the United Kingdom”,

is not defined, although it could appear in the Bill rather than be left to regulation. In another place, the Minister expressed hope that greater engagement with failed claimants would lead to many more voluntary departures. He said that under existing legislation such engagement led to 377 people leaving between April and October last year.

The Refugee Council notes that this engagement often went on over months and involved many meetings with families and case conferences. Such experience suggests that a significant period of grace, with some financial support, in such cases is both necessary and constructive. I may have misunderstood but the Bill’s existing provision seems inimical to developing this practice and may well undermine its very aim. Scrutiny of the existing system—one which, after all, involves rather modest financial maintenance—shows that on appeal there are a significant number of corrected decisions. That is why, if the provisions of Clause 37 and Schedule 8 are conceded, they ought to be subject to appeal. I hope the Minister may be sympathetic.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick and I have added our names to the objections to Clause 37 and Schedule 8 standing part, and we have a number of specific amendments in this group.

I will deal with what I have noted as minor amendments —although one of them is not that minor—before coming to the more general point. My Amendment 229ZD deals with “further qualifying submissions”. The provision requires them to fall to be considered by the Secretary of State under the Immigration Rules, which I saw, when I was looking for various things on the GOV.UK website, are described as legislation. But, as noble Lords will be very well aware, they are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The purpose of the amendment is to ask about the process for scrutiny, if any, of current and future amended rules and the application of these to the schedule.

The provision that is the subject of my probing Amendment 229ZE merely changes “claim for asylum” to “protection claim”. My amendment would omit “as may be prescribed”, which applied to the claim for asylum under the previous legislation. I found that slightly odd in the context, but I wonder whether there has been any experience of a prescription claim under the legislation. Perhaps the Minister can flesh that out a bit.

The last of these three specific amendments, Amendment 230ZB, is much more material. Schedule 8 provides for support not to be in the form of cash. The experience of the Azure card is not a happy one. I can just about see that vouchers for certain services might be defensible. Vouchers for goods require the recipient, in effect, to shop in places which are not convenient, do not provide what may be sought within a particular culture and are not the cheapest. In particular, they cannot be used in a market. They may mean travelling to a place where vouchers can be used but vouchers are not available for travel. Getting to essential appointments, such as medical and legal appointments, becomes a huge problem. Children are affected not only through hunger but because the card does not cover things such as school trips or, as I say, travel fares. We have had evidence that the payment system affects people’s mental health—I am sure that this is not news at all to the Minister. It affects their ability to maintain relationships and to participate in social, cultural and religious life. Not every cashier in shops where the card can be used is properly trained, so embarrassment can be caused. The card can generally be a source of stigma because it singles out the recipients.

On Clause 37 and Schedule 8, reference has been made to the current Section 95 regulations. When I was preparing for my Motion to Annul those regulations in October, I was shocked to read how minimal was the provision for essential living needs. One of my noble friends commented to me afterwards that it was obvious from the expressions on several faces opposite, where a number of the Minister’s colleagues were sitting, that they were shocked by what they had heard. The Official Report does not record facial expressions but on that occasion I felt, as I have sometimes felt on others, that the Minister may not be a particularly good poker player.

I was very critical on that occasion of the methodology used to assess essential living needs, which in the case of a child could hardly be called an assessment. It does not include nappies, formula milk and other items specifically for babies. There was a very blunt tool for applying the approach of economies of scale. By just using that rough and ready term, without any disaggregation or analysis, the adult rate was applied. Of course I did not win when I then put the matter to the vote—the regulations have been in force since August—but one outcome was some discussion both privately with the Minister and during the debate about consultation with the NGOs and others who work in the field on periodic reviews of the support rates. The Minister said:

“We would certainly welcome evidence and data”.—[Official Report, 27/10/15; col. 1160.]

That is not of course in the context of the new Section 95A, but it is relevant, and I hope that the Minister can give the Committee an assurance about the process of arriving at the rates.

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[Lord Bates]

I am happy to set that out in a little more detail. I think it would be helpful to say how we envisage that working. The plan is for the family engagement officer—who is a key figure in this, working with the family to manage their return—to have cognisance of their circumstances not only while here but when they return, so that will be taken into account and will be something that we look at. I will write more on that; I am happy to do so.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, while we are on this subject, the noble Lord, in response to my Amendment 233, talked about the current process. The amendment was tabled after discussion with the Red Cross in particular and other organisations that commented on the need for the items set out in the amendment, namely,

“a caseworker … a named point of contact … and … legal advice”.

The part of the amendment dealing with a review refers to,

“the level of financial support provided to failed asylum seekers when they leave the United Kingdom, and … the level of contact with organisations in the country of return necessary for the welfare of the failed asylum seekers”,

which was very much the point my noble friend was making. The Minister has just described a caseworker and named person. I am not clear whether this is intended to be a change from the current process or whether his notes are defending the current process. If it is the latter, the comments I received which led to this amendment indicate that the current process, which the Minister described, is not working.

While I am on my feet, I am afraid I must take the Minister back to the Azure card. He said that, generally, support would be in the form of accommodation and cash. What are the exceptions to that?

[Lord Bates]

First, I am a huge admirer of the work of the Red Cross and pay tribute to all that it does in this area. The noble Baroness referred to my charitable endeavours over the recess. Last year, I raised £90,000 for projects for the International Red Cross in China. My response to the point about the Red Cross study is that we are engaging with it. Home Office officials are in contact with the Red Cross and we are working through its recommendations, which I have read. There is some question—which we need to understand better—about the cohort. I think that the Red Cross looked at some 60 case studies. The majority—all but five or six, I think—were failed asylum seekers, but there was not really sufficient explanation of why they had failed. Suffice to say that we take this very seriously. We want to engage with organisations such as the Red Cross so that we move forward sensitively.

I have said that I will write on the point about the Azure card and perhaps I could include the exceptions. With that, I hope that noble Lords will accept my explanation and withdraw their opposition to the clause standing part.

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[Lord Judd (Lab)]

My Lords, I add my warm support to my noble friend in moving this amendment. For any of us who have been exposed to the realities of the situation, it is impossible to forget the mental turmoil that is so often present in the case of the person going through the process. The minds of those who have suffered torture are already in a pretty twisted and confused state. Just trying to cope with the procedures is physically and mentally exhausting. That is aggravated, frankly, because sometimes they have been through all the injustice of ill-prepared cases against them by the Home Office, which were subsequently totally dismissed as unacceptable, allowing the person to acquire asylum status. All this adds to the psychological pressure.

The other thing that strikes me—both the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and my noble friend referred to this—is the amount of arbitrariness in this process. Some come up against wonderful people in the community. I can think of a case not very far from where the Minister lives where there was a wonderful amount of support forthcoming for the couple concerned, and they roped me in on it, but all the time I was thinking, “But what about all those who do not have this support?”. It was bad enough for them.

Let us consider the arbitrariness that people encounter at the appeal stage in terms of the procedures in court. I was present for this couple’s case, and indeed I was called as a witness. The judge was simply incompetent, but fortunately for this couple, they had a superbly good lawyer to present their case. She was able to shred the case brought by the judge almost within minutes. What was again constantly in my mind was the fact that the couple were fortunate to have the support of a wonderful family and an excellent lawyer, someone who was commended by her own profession for her work, but what about all the others? This indicates that we need to look closely at what is realistically possible.

To be fair, I should add that when I became involved in this case, I was given a lot of helpful support by the Home Office. It was obvious that some people there were unhappy about the situation and they were trying to help. But only a minority of cases have the good fortune of the kind intervention of others. We cannot take the business of fairness lightly and we must be able to think ourselves into the shoes of the people going through this process—what they have been through, what state their minds are in and how capable they are of coping with what is required of them during the period of transition. I hope that the Minister, who I know is an extremely fair-minded man, will listen carefully to the plea of my noble friend and resolve this.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, our Amendment 229 also addresses the issue of people who have been granted refugee status, humanitarian protection and various forms of leave to remain accessing mainstream benefits. I am sure that being able to work, and as a secondary to that being able to access mainstream benefits and accommodation, is what people in this situation want. They do not want to be supported. But delays in the Home Office in issuing biometric residence permits and delays at the DWP in issuing national insurance numbers so that people can get identity documents and thus establish a claim to benefits mean that the system is not working as it should.

Our amendment would not make as many changes as its length might suggest. The relevant addition to the definition of when,

“a claim for asylum is determined”,

are the lines,

“and the claimant or dependants of the claimant do not appear to the Secretary of State to be destitute”.

In other words, adding that in as another condition to be met, as it were. I can understand that it must be much easier to have an automatic time trigger for these things, but we have heard throughout the debate on this Bill how matters are considered on a case-by-case basis, and it seems that this is another occasion when that consideration should be applied.

[Lord Bates]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for moving her amendment, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. In the interests of time, perhaps I may first draw the attention of the Committee to my letter of 21 January and in particular to the accompanying document, Reforming Support for Migrants Without Immigration Status: The New System Contained in Schedules 8 and 9 to the Immigration Bill, and specifically to pages 10 to 12 which deal with the handover situation of people on support from the Home Office and moving them on to a local authority, and how that system can be improved.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, who I respect enormously for his humanitarian instincts, as I do the noble Lord, Lord Judd, referred to the British Red Cross report. It was published on 13 January, I think, which is fairly recent in terms of government decision-making. We are engaging with the charity and we will have more to say on the report in due course.

At the heart of what the noble Baroness wants is whether we will agree to a meeting to look specifically at this issue. The next group of amendments is a significant one about children leaving care. I was going to suggest that we should have a meeting on that issue, which the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, will probably find very helpful. I am happy to incorporate this specific point into that wider meeting, given that we already have five meetings coming up before Report. If that is helpful to her, I shall restrict my remarks to drawing attention to the document I have just mentioned and agreeing to combine this issue with those to be addressed in the meeting as a result of the next group of amendments.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have my name to a number of the noble Earl’s amendments. We have all received a considerable amount of briefing material. He just referred to the work of the Children’s Commissioner. I will use that as the basis for questions—not even that: I will simply read out some of the key questions that it is said need answering. There will be a certain amount of overlap with the noble Earl.

Will the statutory guidance on transition be revised as a result of changes made in the Bill? The noble Earl referred to that. We are all concerned about young people missing from care. The Children’s Commissioner asked:

“Will transfers from local authority accommodation to Section 95A accommodation by adult migrant care leavers be monitored to look at the impact the policy is having on the missing figures and to determine whether the new arrangements have been successful in encouraging former unaccompanied children to leave the UK?”.

I share the noble Earl’s observations about the likelihood or otherwise of these children going back.

Will the Minister clarify what happens to failed asylum seekers without status turning 18 who make further submissions under the Immigration Rules, resulting in either the grant of leave or acceptance of the further submissions as a fresh claim for asylum? Will this group return to being eligible for leaving care support from their former local authority? Will the Minister clarify what provision—whether under the Children Act 1989 or under Schedule 3—will be available to care leavers with no status who do not have a pending non-asylum application or appeal when they turn 18?

Our amendments in this group are all small probing amendments. As I know that the Minister’s briefing will refer to them, I will mention simply three types of amendments. One refers to an “application … of a kind”. This phrase occurs in two places in government Amendment 234G. Does that application of a kind refer to the leave which is applied for? I think that it probably does, but I was not sure about that.

A couple of our amendments seek to replace “may” with “must”. I am beginning to think that I might seek a debate just on this issue; I think that most Members of the House would take part in it. These provisions are about making regulations. The Minister will no doubt tell me that they will be made and therefore I do not need to worry. However, I do worry about these things.

Amendment 234X concerns regulations to be taken into account in making a determination with regard to accommodation and subsistence in new paragraph 10A of Schedule 9 to the Bill. New sub-paragraph (7) states that the regulations may specify factors which the person who is to take the decision,

“may or must take into account in making a determination”.

I would like to take out the words “or must”. I find it a very curious thing to give discretion to somebody to make a determination and then have two categories of factors to be taken into account, some of which the person may take into account and some which he must take into account. If you are giving somebody the job of making a judgment, I do not think that the judgment should be fettered in this way. However, the main points have already been made by previous speakers.