(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 23, 28 and 62 in this group, to which my name is attached. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for moving the first of these amendments and for comprehensively covering their purpose. I draw your Lordships’ attention to my entry in the register of interests in that I am a vice-chair of the Local Government Association.
Amendments 23 and 28, supported by London School of Economics research, make explicit the importance of utilising data and technology in the prevention, reporting and detection of domestic abuse and the commissioner’s important role in supporting this. Examples include encouraging the use of new “silent” methods of reporting abuse—especially important during lockdown—and using artificial intelligence methods, alongside better data usage, to determine the likelihood of repeated abuse.
Amendment 62, again based on LSE research, would ensure that, when the need for a handing out a domestic abuse protection notice was being considered, senior police officers could take into account any previous related criminality and convictions held by the alleged perpetrator. LSE research has shown that previous convictions can be a key indicator of the potential for future incidents of domestic abuse and yet are not currently taken into account when they should be regarded as a priority by any police officer considering handing out a DAPN.
Having access to the criminal history of the alleged perpetrator should be a crucial aspect of decision-making. The amendment would improve data sharing to strengthen the ability of the police to make informed, and potentially life-saving, decisions. It would enable immediate protection for survivors following a domestic abuse incident; for example, by requiring a perpetrator to leave the victim’s home for up to 48 hours.
Currently, there are many significant issues with data sharing that can have serious effects on police forces’ ability to identify, prevent and tackle domestic abuse. Not having a systematic way of recording the same person, victim or perpetrator often means that repeat victims or perpetrators are not spotted or that no action is taken to protect and prevent.
Moreover, police forces do not share data systematically, apart from the police national computer, and that only records charges. Even more concerning, there is no data or systematic information exchange between non-profit and police, so abusers are able to be invisible to the police. That is a particular worry right now, when many people are hidden from sight.
There are many examples of where better use of technology and data can help tackle abuse, including helping to determine what level of danger someone may be in so that they can receive help as quickly as possible, and prioritising police resources and responding to domestic abuse calls accordingly. Using machine-learning prediction will go a long way to supporting those who desperately need it.
My Lords, I added my name to speak to this group, primarily in support of Amendment 23. I, too, declare my vice-presidency of the Local Government Association. This matter has been magisterially covered by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, so anything I say will be a mere shadow of what he and the other speakers have put down.
I, too, received the briefings, both before Second Reading and more recently, from the London School of Economics. I pay great tribute to it for having brought that matter to the attention of Members of this House. At Second Reading, I and other noble Lords—in particular the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, who has just spoken—commented on the failure of crime recording to pick up many cases, particularly cases of domestic abuse. In defence of those who are charged with the recording of suspected crimes, especially domestic abuse, they are often difficult to identify in the snowstorm of all the other issues that may be involved. Indeed, domestic abuse may not be the primary purpose of the initiating call to the police or some other agency.
Professor Gadd of the University of Manchester, to whom I had the privilege of speaking last week, suggested to me that we need to be much more curious in our responses to crime, and in particular possible abuse. Complex patterns of behaviour and the way in which they manifest themselves are meat and drink to data analysts. It seems to me that if big tech companies can build up accurate pictures of all our various spending preferences and other things, so too can algorithms help us spot and codify trends of abuse.
I do not claim expertise in artificial intelligence, but I know about the need for accurate input data and, of course, we have had problems with police recorded crime. This obviously has not been helped by failings to record offences in, I would say, several police forces over quite a number of years and, of course, the recent loss of data from the police national computer. Even so, the negative prediction rate of 11.5%, which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, referred to and which the LSE comments on, must be a matter for some significant concern, given the proportion that domestic violence, and repeat behaviour of that, represents as a component of all crime. Any machine-learned means of reducing this, and with it the tragic outcomes that cost this country so much in torment and treasure, must have a place. That is why I support this group of amendments, and Amendment 23 in particular.
However, collecting all the data in the world, as has been pointed out, is not going to be a great deal of use if it is not consistently collated, made available at the right time and shared with people who have a need to see it at the appropriate moment. The sort of checklists that have been referred to under the DASH system—a number of standard questions, consistently recorded, collated and available at the earliest possible stages of a proposed intervention—would, I am certain, be invaluable. There, I am satisfied that technology can help. I do not think that this requires reinvention but better management, oversight and adoption of appropriate IT systems. This would help reduce human errors and omissions. Above all, it is about avoiding unnecessary risk and optimising resources, as has been pointed out. This necessitates good training of call handlers and, as I say, being altogether more inquisitive and interrogative of data and callers to see what is actually lying behind the call. Otherwise, I do not think that we will make the best use of what IT offers. That apart, I believe that these amendments are extremely important in pointing a way forward.