Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Grey-Thompson Excerpts

Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Keeley (Lab)]

My Lords, my Amendment 420 could sit beside Amendment 419 from my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, but it has not been put in this group. This group is labelled “drafting changes” but, as we have just heard, the effect they would have goes further than that. I have tabled Amendment 420, to be discussed in a later group, to address a concern that the grounds on which a co-ordinating doctor can drop out are already too wide, but I see that the amendments in this group from my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer compound that problem by expanding the grounds even further. I therefore feel I must speak briefly in this debate, despite the fact that my amendment comes later, because your Lordships’ Committee needs to be aware of the concern I am seeking to raise, which the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, also has.

My Amendment 420 highlights that these provisions should be limited to cases of death or illness. Clause 14 fails to define in which situations it would be acceptable for the state not to be concerned that the doctor is unwilling. As the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, has highlighted in her Amendment 420A, the danger is that the current wording would allow the risk of changing doctors until the wanted answer is given. These probing amendments are going to be discussed later, and they will focus on the need to restrict the grounds for changing the co-ordinating doctor by excluding the word “unwilling”, which Amendments 420 and 420A both address.

It would be helpful if my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer could answer these questions on this matter. How do we distinguish between a doctor who is unwilling due to conscience and one who is unwilling due to suspicion? Without a requirement to record the specific reasons for unwillingness, is there a danger that we are creating a black box? If a doctor steps away because they are uncomfortable, for instance, with a family member’s influence, surely the system needs to capture that specific hesitation before a new doctor is appointed. Will my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer specify what circumstances cross the line where the state should be more curious about why the doctor is unwilling?

[Baroness Grey-Thompson (CB)]

My Lords, I originally requested that later amendments that I have on disability language, as defined under the Equality Act, be moved into this group, but they were not. I think it is important that we have a chance to debate them as well. Language is the dress of thought, and “person with a disability” is not language that is used in the Equality Act. However, if the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, seemed to misunderstand these amendments, I think I have misunderstood them as well.

I am particularly concerned about Amendments 290, 366 and 931 around domestic abuse and coercive control, which I have spoken about in other debates. I believe that these amendments go beyond mere drafting changes. The wording as it now exists waters down what the training around domestic abuse is likely to be. For example, it could be a course on physical or sexual abuse, but that does not necessarily mean that it is as comprehensive as I believe it needs to be. I am conscious of time, but I would be interested to know whether the noble and learned Lord or the sponsor in another place, the honourable Member for Spen Valley, has spoken to the honourable Member for Lowestoft, Jess Asato, about the impact of these amendments on her work. It important that we understand the context of what we thought was coming from the Commons and what these changes might mean to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I do not need to withdraw the amendment, because if the noble Lord objects to it, I will not press it in Committee. It depends on what we get to when we get to Report. What I am saying is that, at the moment, I cannot see the difference. I am more than happy to talk to him before Report. If there are valid points, let us put them in. However, at the moment, it looks to me to offer just as good, if not better, protection.

[Baroness Grey-Thompson (CB)]

I would not be able to accept the amendment as tabled because I have numerous other amendments on disability, language, BSL, different levels of interpretation and Makaton that are all important when having these conversations. Following the offer that the noble and learned Lord made to the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, I would be delighted to join the meeting as well, to see how the noble and learned Lord’s amendments can be improved to move further down the road. What we are trying to do is to make sure that people go into this decision-making process clearly understanding the decision they are taking.

[Baroness Hollins (CB)]

If such a meeting were to take place, I would be delighted to ask the noble and learned Lord to consider the alternative wording I proposed when I spoke to the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Captain of the King’s Bodyguard of the Yeomen of the Guard and Deputy Chief Whip (Baroness Wheeler) (Lab)]

My Lords, while we are on the subject of interventions, I remind the Committee that a Member who is speaking may be interrupted with a brief question of clarification. A Member may justifiably refuse to give way. Let us try to stick to the people who have their names on the amendments and make progress.

[Baroness Grey-Thompson (CB)]

My Lords, my Amendments 13 and 309 are probing amendments. I recognise that the 60 months and the 12 months in my two amendments do not quite tally, but they were tabled at quite different times.

Amendment 309 is quite simple. It looks to open a discussion and seeks to protect asylum seekers, immigrants without indefinite leave to remain, and anyone in the asylum system.

On Amendment 13, it was very interesting to listen to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. I recognise that 60 months will have raised some eyebrows. It was my clumsy attempt to talk about death tourism and look at how we can provide consistency within the Bill. One of the reasons that we are consistently given for needing the Bill is that those who can afford it can go to Dignitas, which promotes inequality. However, if we do not get this section of the Bill right, that inequality will still exist.

My noble friend Lady Finlay raised some important points on where someone is able to die, and I have other amendments on certification of those areas. This needs more thought because, in many of the letters I receive, individuals who want the law to change talk about wanting to end their lives at a time and place of their choosing. They may get roughly the time that they want, but they may not get the place.

We have been talking about people living in different countries. The latest statistic that I can find online is that at any one point there are between 4.5 million and 5.5 million British people living abroad, and they need clarification about how the Bill could affect them.

I am concerned about the possibility of different processes existing in different parts of the UK and the Crown dependencies, because it could be possible that, if you have money, you could purchase or rent a small property in another jurisdiction to enable you to access this. That might be totally fine, but people need to understand what this is going to bring, and that inequality could still exist.

The phenomenon of death tourism represents a documented concern internationally. The Isle of Man explicitly incorporated a five-year residency requirement into its assisted dying legislation, following recommendations from scrutiny committees examining the Bill’s clauses. That is why I picked 60 months. However, we have to be careful that we are not turning jurisdictions into destinations for accessing end-of-life services. Such relocation could create several problems. It might indicate that the person’s wish to die is not deeply rooted in their established community context. It could create practical and ethical difficulties for healthcare systems, which are unprepared to provide end of life to transient populations. It also raises questions about whether individuals are making decisions in isolation from their established support networks.

Whatever we end up with in terms of what residency looks like, we have to take into account what has happened in other jurisdictions. I was pleased that the noble and learned Lord said in the previous debate that in the Bill the age will not drop below 18. It is important that we get the residency right, because in other jurisdictions over time it has changed. In 2014, Belgium removed any age restriction and Vermont lifted its residency requirements in May 2023. At least 26 people have travelled to Vermont to die who were not resident there. Vermont is a tiny US state, but that represented nearly 25% of reported assisted deaths in the state from May 2023 through to June 2024, as listed in Vermont Department of Health data.

In Oregon, the same thing has happened: the residency requirement has been lifted, and around 6% of those choosing to end their lives in Oregon have been from out of state, according to official Oregon Health Authority reports. The oncologist Charles Blanke, whose clinic in Portland is devoted to end-of-life care, has said Oregon’s total is likely an undercount and he expects the numbers to grow.

Adequate residency duration enables meaningful healthcare relationships to develop, and I have amendments on relationships with GPs in a later group. For me, it is about providing appropriate healthcare and the right information. It is about being able to look at patterns of depression, changing wishes, family dynamics and coercion, which we have already debated. It is about providing stability and the authenticity of the person’s desire for assisted dying. It is also about whether the correct palliative and psychosocial support is there.

I do not think 60 months is the right number, but we have to be careful and clear about what will happen in terms of people being able to access this service. Finally, longitudinal research on end-of-life preferences demonstrates significant variability in expressed wishes over time. That is why we have to be really clear that we get this right.