(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am sorry. If the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, was here, I would have said that, but since he is not in his place, I did not say it.
Bolton is his President’s man: the President’s views are very close to Bolton’s. The problem with the President is not the one discussed by two or three noble Lords in this debate—his unpredictability. He is all too predictable. Read the inaugural speech. The report from the noble Lord, Lord Howell, helpfully reminds us of the General Assembly speech last year, in which the President said:
“We reject the ideology of globalism … Around the world, responsible nations must defend against threats to sovereignty not just from global governance”,
but other threats as well. Global governance is a threat to the nation state. No wonder Orbán was warmly received in the White House last week. No wonder Bolsonaro is the poster boy. No wonder Mrs Merkel is so disliked. No wonder Trump’s America is out of the Paris accords, the Iran nuclear deal, the UN Human Rights Council, UNESCO and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. No wonder the President is seeking to destroy the WTO body, and is very close to succeeding. It is all too predictable; he told us what to expect from the start.
I used to think there were two pre-eminent threats to the rules-based system—the Bretton Woods system, or the UN system. The one that worried me most in my Foreign Office days was the reluctance of the transatlantic partners—our side of the Atlantic just as much as the Americans—to accept the need to take proper account of the rise of Asia and the Pacific and acknowledge that our weighting in these institutions must decline as our share of the world economy shrank. We were very reluctant to accept that and did so far too slowly. We have not yet really fully accepted it.
More recently, I worried more about whether the system might break down because the ethos of the institutions, rooted so firmly in our ideas about liberal democracy, might come to seem inimical and interfering in regions of the world such as Africa, which are possibly more attracted to a more authoritarian alternative model such as the Chinese model. That is a real risk today.
However, I missed the biggest threat. I did not spot that the greatest challenge to the rules-based system would come from its greatest beneficiary, America. President Trump does not want to reform the institutions. He does not like them; he does not like rules—not if they might bind America. With respect, the Government’s response to the Select Committee’s report seems to be in denial about this. The committee said, I thought uncontroversially:
“In the context of the … Administration’s hostility to multilateralism, the UK will need to work with like-minded nations to move ahead on some global issues without US participation or support”.
However, the Government are not so sure about that. Their reply says:
“The Government will always seek close cooperation with the US on a full range of issues”.
Of course, but the Foreign Secretary told the committee that,
“the way that … large multilateral organisations work at present does not work”,
for the US, and that it is,
“seeking to change that … But I firmly believe that if we can get the … reforms”,
to the institutions,
“we want … President Trump would be a big supporter of that system”.
Yes, like working with the Luftwaffe in 1941 to restructure London’s built environment. The President of the United States wants to bring down the system, not reform it. I wonder how well the Foreign Secretary knows Mr Bolton. It sounds to me as if he might be closer to Dr Pangloss.
I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Jopling and Lord Anderson, about the need to be courteous when the President comes to London, but I hope we will not pull our punches. I served in Washington and I understand the importance of the relationship, but like the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, I think that it has to be based on honesty. I watched Margaret Thatcher handle Ronald Reagan. He respected her because of her insistence on tackling the difficult issues and on plain speaking. If we believe in multilateralism and the rules-based system we must defend them even when the attack comes from our closest ally. We must tell him why and tell him straight. Fudging it, as in the Government’s reply to the committee’s report, would mean forfeiting America’s respect—not just America’s.
But it is not only on transatlantic relations that the Government’s response comes across as a little bland and Panglossian. I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Howell, was absolutely right to send a rather sharp reply to the response in his letter of 3 April. For me the clock struck 13 times when I got to page 20 of the response and read that post-Brexit global Britain will be,
“using soft power to project our values and demonstrating that the UK is open, outward facing and confident on the world stage. The UK will lead on issues that matter”—
presumably we will leave the unimportant ones to the Chinese and the Americans—
“be an innovative and inviting economy; and a normative power setting global standards that uphold our values”.
A trace of hubris? The tone rang a bell with me. It was in Pravda in 1968 when I was in Moscow. The Soviet Union was the world leader—the “normative power”—with the world communist movement applauding and the grateful Czechs cheering the Red Army’s tanks taking away Dubček. No one who read Pravda believed it; no one who wrote Pravda believed it.
Yes, soft power is a huge UK strength, but for its optimal exercise it is best not to be an international laughing stock. Do we honestly think that the Brexit process and paralysis makes us look,
“open, outward facing and confident”?
Do we honestly think that the world sees us as the next global leader on the issues that matter—the “normative power” setting global standards? Perhaps the world has not noticed the humiliations of the backstop, condemning us to follow standards set outside our frontiers while no longer having any say. Perhaps no one has spotted how our influence on global rules will shrink when we leave the Union, which is currently setting the pace in global regulatory standard setting. Is it not a little incongruous to preach the virtues of rules-based free trading systems while planning to leave the world’s largest? I feel sorry for my FCO successors who have to write such stuff. I was luckier.
Twenty years ago, the Commonwealth countries took us seriously because through the Lomé Convention process we were fighting their corner in Brussels and winning. The Americans took us seriously because more enlightened Administrations then supported the EU enlargement process, on which we were leading in Brussels and succeeding. Brussels took us seriously because it was believed that we could bring the Americans along, and sometimes we did. My successors must know that if one pillar of the mutually reinforcing tripod collapses, the others crack too. John Bolton cheers and the Kremlin smirks, but global Britain shrinks. It is not too late to stop the march of self-marginalisation and I hope that we will.
My Lords, I cannot help noticing that while the cat was away, time has slipped a bit. We are slipping back again and I respectfully remind all your Lordships of the advisory time limit of seven minutes. Some have been very good at observing that and, in fairness, perhaps your Lordships could all attempt to do the same.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord has just talked about Boris Johnson, but I want to talk about a great Foreign Secretary. A fortnight ago we lost Peter Carrington, a great Foreign Secretary, a great Defence Secretary, a great Secretary-General, a great patriot and a great European. It is 46 years since I first worked with Peter Carrington. I knew him well and I know what he thought about Brexit. For that generation—that of Denis Healey on the beach at Anzio or Peter Carrington in the Guards Armoured Division liberating the Low Countries—“Never again” really meant something. For that generation, “Never again” meant ensuring no more war in Europe, ensuring the collective defence of Europe against external threat, rebuilding a broken Europe and working for its prosperity, and fostering and entrenching the values of Europe’s better nature. For all his endearingly laconic understatement, the commitment of Peter Carrington was very clear. Britain in Europe was a non-transactional relationship. It was about common values, a common effort to protect, and a commitment to advancement.
What would Peter Carrington have made of this White Paper? We do not know but, if he had written it, I do not think that it would have started with a “facilitated customs arrangement”. One can sense his shudder of patrician disdain. I think it would have started with something about values. It might have said something about the future rights of our fellow Europeans in our country and our citizens in continental Europe. The silence on legal immigration is very strange. As a great Defence Secretary, he might have wanted some restatement of the absolute nature of the British commitment to European defence. Whatever happens between the Brussels bean-counters, when the chips are down the Brits will be there. The Prime Minister fudged that a bit in her Lancaster House speech, but I thought she got it absolutely right in Munich in February. It is odd that the White Paper is totally silent on it. The reference on page 66 to a possible defence “enhanced Framework Participation Agreement” does not quite do the trick. The White Paper is a bit technical and bottom up. It is very transactional and it does not seem to have a lot of vision in it.
That is what Peter Carrington might have thought, but I do not know. He was a very skilled diplomat so he certainly would not have said, as the Prime Minister did on television and as Mrs Leadsom said in the other place, that the proposals in the White Paper are non-negotiable. Concrete on the feet is rarely wise. Of course, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, pointed out at the outset, the proposals have already changed. The passage that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, read out on the facilitated customs arrangement gave the foreigners the good news that we would not insist that third-country flows through their ports should be slowed down while they handled the segregated goods heading for us and operated two systems of taxation and checking. That was a relief for them, I am sure, except that the amendments made in the House of Commons mean that we do so insist that the ports of Rotterdam, Hamburg and Antwerp be clogged up operating two systems. So the proposals are negotiable after all, but only if you are British, Tory and a rebel. The 27 have to operate two systems where they now run one. They will not, of course. Why would they?
Actually, they would not have agreed with the White Paper’s proposal anyway, because the reciprocal regime at our ports is not one that they would be prepared to put up with. It is as inconceivable as it would be unprecedented that the EU should allow a third country, not a member state, to collect its taxes, which are important for its common budget, when no longer under the control of its court. As I mentioned to the House two weeks ago, the EU anti-fraud agency, OLAF, currently has two cases in the ECJ, each worth more than €3 billion, against the United Kingdom for undercharging customs duty and for allowing VAT fraud at our ports. I thought that Monsieur Barnier was spectacularly diplomatic when he said quizzically on Friday about the facilitated customs arrangement, “Would there not be a risk of fraud?”
Anyway, it does not work like that. If we leave the customs union we leave the customs territory and each check will take place at its frontier—unless, of course, we form a new customs union with the EU, as this House recommended when it accepted the amendment to the withdrawal Bill that I moved. We encouraged the Government to explore a customs union with the EU. I really think that they should. The facilitated customs arrangement will not run—it is dead already—and without a workable solution such as a genuine customs union I do not see how we can avoid the hard border in Ireland. The situation is now really very grave. We have accepted that a solution to the Irish question is integral to the withdrawal agreement. If we do not get one we do not get the other. We would kill off the transition period, so the no-deal cliff edge would be not December 2020 but next March.
Then there is the point from the noble Lord, Lord Bowness. The Minister appeared to put himself in the same camp as Mr Raab, who yesterday asserted that if what we have put in our White Paper is not agreed by the EU by October and if there is not an agreed framework text by October, we will resile on our financial commitments, refusing to pay the sum that we agreed in December that we owed. I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that it is the cost not of the future but of the past. These are commitments. If we were to do a runner all bets would be off, with no deals doable, and not just with the EU. Third countries would be very chary of striking agreements with a UK that had no working relationships at all with its 27 neighbours—we would not have while they were dunning us in the courts for the money that we owe them.
I still hope that wiser counsels will prevail. I wish that we had a Carrington to provide them. I think that he would have been much less dismissive than Mr Johnson of the concerns of business on the no-deal scenario and of the importance of the Good Friday agreement. On the debt question, I think that he would have thought the idea of doing a runner a tiny bit dishonourable.
How do we get out of this mess? I have two suggestions. First, the Government should look again at the amendment proposed by the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, which the House also passed. No one knows—at least I do not—why the Prime Minister sent in the Article 50 notification on 29 March 2017. I have no idea. No one can assert that the country voted on 23 June 2016 to leave the EU on 29 March 2019. An extension is possible under Article 50 if all agree. Would they agree? I do not know. The noble Lord, Lord Birt, was doubtful. I think that it would depend on why we asked.
Let us bear in mind that if we go over the cliff in March, it is suicidal for us but it is bad for all 27 as well. Nobody wants that to happen. The EU has contingency plans for dealing with the European Parliament election should our departure date be pushed back. Mr Benn’s committee in the other place has recommended that it should be pushed back. The issue should be explored; it would be irresponsible not to. It would be irresponsible to crash out in eight months’ time if there is no done deal, doing huge damage to the economy, to jobs, to the stability of Northern Ireland and the well-being of our fellow citizens. Mr Rees-Mogg would be just fine—he has his money in Ireland—as would the Bullingdon boys, but as Sir John Major said at the weekend, the people who have the least would be hit the worst.
My final point is one that I have made before—I am afraid that I have made it tediously, but I must do it again. An Article 50 invocation is not an irrevocable act. Withdrawing the invocation would carry no price, political or financial. We would never have left. The terms of membership would not have, and could not be, changed without our agreement. If the Government cannot negotiate a Brexit which even remotely resembles what was promised in June 2016 and if the red lines which Mrs May wrote in September 2016 in the party conference speech turn out to preclude any workable solution to the Irish border, the country should certainly be asked whether—knowing what we now know—they would prefer that the notification be withdrawn. That might mean an election; it might mean a referendum; it might mean both. It would certainly mean an Article 50 extension, and this is the scenario in which we can be absolutely certain that we would get that extension. The 27 would unanimously agree straightaway to give us an extension if the purpose was to permit a people’s vote. The case for such a vote, before the people’s EU citizenship rights are extinguished and before the damage to their well-being really starts to bite, seems to me to grow stronger with every passing day and with every new lurch by the Government away from what a Carrington would have thought about Britain in Europe and about responsible leadership.
My Lords, while the contributions are extremely interesting, the advisory time limit has been somewhat generously interpreted. In deference to the speakers further down the list, perhaps your Lordships could see what they can do to co-operate in rough adherence to the advisory time limit. Otherwise, we will be very unfair to some of the later contributors. We want to hear from them as well.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, let me start on a positive note. My noble friend Lord Callanan was indeed pleased to add his signature to Amendment 53, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, which will remove the ability under Clause 9 to amend the Act itself. I note that this amendment is supported not just by the noble Lords in whose names it lies but by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of this House. It was one of that committee’s recommendations for the Bill and, given that the Government are happy to support this amendment, we are pleased to be in such illustrious and learned company. It is a heady experience, I have to say.
I am sure that noble Lords will welcome this amendment to a part of the Bill that has continued to cause concern to many throughout its passage. It is important to explain why the Government included such a measure at the time of introduction—this may partly address the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. When the Bill was first drafted, this provision was not an attempt to hold open a back door to circumventing or undoing any of the protections or constraints in the Bill. Rather, it was seen as a necessary step to provide the flexibility to respond to developments in negotiations. Indeed, the fact that aspects of the Bill may need to be amended, depending on the outcome of these negotiations, still remains. Our acceptance of this amendment does not reflect a change in that regard. Rather, the decision to introduce in due course a withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill, which will give effect to the implementation period, the citizens’ rights agreement and the financial settlement, among other provisions of the withdrawal agreement, provides another door through which the Government may make all the changes required.
Without a strong justification for retaining Clause 9’s ability to amend the EU withdrawal Bill once it becomes an Act, the Government are indeed content to remove that ability. As with our amendment to remove Clause 8, I hope this shows the Government’s commitment to working with Parliament and I reassure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—
Before the Minister moves on, can she clarify what the answer is to the question asked from the Opposition Front Bench? On the face of it, if the words “including modifying this Act” are removed, it leaves simply this sentence:
“Regulations under this section may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament”.
Do you make a substantive change by withdrawing those words? It is not clear to me that you do.
I listened with interest to that point, but I am not sure that I entirely agree with that construction of the change to Clause 9(2). Amendment 53 means that we will not be able to amend the Bill when it is an Act. It therefore restricts the scope of the power, which seems to have met with the satisfaction of those who have put their names to it. As I have said, that is a positive and, I hope, a helpful reassurance from the Government.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate as well as those who have worked very constructively with the Government behind the scenes to reach the position we are in today. This is an important group of amendments and, if noble Lords will excuse the football metaphor, I can say that this is an amendment grouping of two halves. In the first half we have Clause 8, where I believe the Government and the opposition’s thinking are aligned, and in the second half we have Schedule 4, where there remains some disagreement.
I will begin with Clause 8, perhaps specifically in response to the points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Beith. The Clause 8 power was originally included in the Bill to ensure that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU did not affect its reputation as a nation which honours its promises and respects its international obligations. The power also includes the ability to prevent breaches of international obligations outside retained EU law and to meet any existing obligations requiring an imposition or increase of taxation. This element of the power, in particular, has been the subject of much debate in both Houses, as Amendment 43, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, demonstrates.
We were concerned that this power might be necessary to ensure that the UK could continue to comply with all its existing international obligations. As the Bill has progressed through Parliament, the Government have continued to plan for multiple scenarios and it has become clear that there are better and more effective ways to ensure that the Government’s international obligations continue to be met than through the use of Clause 8. Therefore, in line with our policy to take delegated powers only where there is a clear and present need for them, the Government have tabled amendments to remove Clause 8 and the corresponding power for devolved authorities in Schedule 2, Part 2. I am grateful to noble Lords who have indicated that the Government’s proposition has found favour.
Any measures still required to remedy or prevent breaches of our international obligations will be made in other primary legislation—perhaps that reassures the noble Lord, Lord Beith—or under other delegated powers where that is permissible. I think we have now managed to reassure noble Lords that the Government are very sensitive to the points which have been raised in debate in Committee and on Report. As a consequence, the Government do not now think that there is a need for an entirely separate clause in this Bill, hence our amendment to remove Clause 8. Given that, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, will be happy to withdraw his amendments in light of the Government’s proposed offer. I hope that this offer demonstrates that the Government are willing to act on the constructive discussions that take place in this House. We try to consider all amendments carefully as long as they do not undermine the primary purpose of the Bill and, where we can, we act upon them where appropriate.
I turn briefly to my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering’s Amendment 47. It has rather interposed itself into this group so I am doing a bit of shuffling of notes here. I might begin with a point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith: my understanding is that once the implementation period ends, the EEA agreement will no longer apply to the UK. I also understand that in triggering Article 127 our legal position remains unchanged. Article 127 does not need to be triggered for the agreement to cease to have effect. I hope that clarifies the points that my noble friend sought clarification on.
I agree with the reading by the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, of whether one has continuing membership of the EEA after one has left the EU: one does not. However, I am struck by what the Minister has just said about the moment when one leaves. I am not sure that it is at the end of the transition period. I think it may be at the moment when we leave the EU—in other words, in March next year, not 21 months later. I am not quite sure why the lawyers in the EEA, EFTA and the EU should accept that once we have left the EU we still remain in the EEA.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank you all very much indeed for contributing to a genuinely extremely interesting and useful debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, for his very warm words of welcome. I fear that it is inappropriate to say this to someone bearing the name Adonis, but I fear I may be doomed to disappoint him. I will try to deal as best I can with the various points that have been raised.
The Government share with this House the objective of building a close and co-operative relationship with the EU on issues relating to defence and security, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, or to foreign affairs, security and intelligence, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. These are indeed vital matters. The continued security of Europe and of our citizens is paramount to us. It would just not be in our interests to see that co-operation diminish.
The purpose of the Bill is, I suppose, mechanical and rather tedious, but it is a mechanism to try to ensure that the UK statute book continues to function after we leave the EU and that it is not riddled with gaps and holes. That is what this Bill is all about. Amendment 12, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, is about the future relationship with the EU and securing it. That is vital—nobody disputes that—but it is of course inevitably, and I am sorry to use the platitude, subject to the current negotiations. Given that the Government have already committed to providing Parliament with a meaningful vote on any final deal, I respectfully suggest to the noble Lord that perhaps this Bill is not the appropriate forum to raise these concerns. I still think that the debate is an appropriate forum in which to articulate them.
Could the noble Baroness reassure me that there is a negotiation going on on the future relationship between the UK when it has left and the common foreign and security policy of the EU? Is there a negotiation going on? I have the impression that there is not. I was trying to say that we should start one by making a proposal now.
I am sorry, I think that I may have been misunderstood. I did not talk about the United Kingdom withdrawing from being a P5 member of the United Nations Security Council. I said that when we withdraw from the EU, the EU will be left with only one member, which is France. The position of the UK in that respect is powerful and influential, and I am pointing out that Taskforce 50 thought that it could certainly merit a specific dialogue and consultation mechanism with the UK.
It is pretty clear, particularly when there are many in this Chamber much more knowledgeable than I am about these important and technical matters, that to underpin our future co-operation we will seek regular institutional engagements, including specific arrangements on secondments and information sharing—that would seem to be at the heart of constructing any relationship. The nature of the threats that we face mean that we should seek a framework that could be scaled up in times of crisis. One needs a relationship which can be tested against need if situations arise when the partnership, agreement or whatever it is to be has to swing into action.
The United Kingdom intelligence community already works closely with other members of the EU. The heads of the German BND, the French DGSE and the UK secret intelligence services issued a joint statement at the Munich security conference committing to close co-operation and stating that cross-border information sharing must be taken forward on themes such as international terrorism, illegal migration and proliferation of cyberattacks after the UK leaves the EU. We want to do all that. I am trying to explain to your Lordships that there is straw with which to make my bricks. I am not just clutching it out of the air; I am trying to indicate that there are substantive matters that can be the foundation for something very firm and enduring.
Perhaps I may try to deal with one or two particular points raised. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, raised the important matter of sanctions. We have just passed a sanctions Bill which will provide the UK with the powers to implement our own independent sanctions regime, but we would delay these powers coming into force if we could agree arrangements with the EU concerning sanctions co-operation during the implementation period. On sanctions, as with co-operation on foreign and security policy more generally, we seek to consult and develop a co-ordinated approach before decisions are made. To enable such co-operation, we will need consultation mechanisms; for example, regular sanctions dialogues. I was very struck by the contribution from the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, who raised real and poignant issues. Nobody would disagree with that, which underlines why we need close co-operation on these vital issues.
On Amendments 164 and 166 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, the Political and Security Committee and the Foreign Affairs Council are of course bodies of the EU. They are attended by member states and are intended for the development of the EU’s policy.
We are leaving the European Union and are not seeking to participate in these meetings on the same basis as EU members. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, identified these problems. But, given our historic ties and shared values, we are likely to continue sharing the same goals and we will therefore want to co-operate closely on a common foreign policy. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said very cogently that we are not talking about a zero-sum game. It was racy language for the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, but I totally agree with him. We are not talking about a zero-sum game: well established and good relationships already exist which will not just evaporate. We will seek to bind these and tie them in to our new post-Brexit relationship. We want to establish an enhanced partnership with the EU that reflects the unique position of the UK. This will include close consultation in a variety of fora. Attending the Political and Security Committee and the Foreign Affairs Council, however, is not the only means by which we can achieve that.
Amendment 165 was also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. This amendment seeks to bind the UK—“bind” is the important word—to follow the EU’s foreign policy objectives regardless of our own views. This would limit the UK’s ability to respond independently to developments in the world post Brexit, and such a restriction would be profoundly undesirable. Of course, on many foreign policy issues the UK and EU will continue to share the same goals and will want to co-operate closely, whether that is by continuing to support the Middle East peace process or by tackling the threat of piracy off the Horn of Africa—but, again, I do not think we need texts and primary legislation to underline what are already our shared values and beliefs.
Amendment 185 was also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, and refers to the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre. I reiterate the Government’s unconditional commitment to European security. In the exit negotiations we will work closely to ensure that the UK and EU continue to co-operate closely, including through the sharing of information, to safeguard our shared values and to combat common threats, including threats of terrorism, organised criminal groups and hostile state actors. The precise modalities and arrangements to enable this partnership will be decided in the negotiations. I do not expect this to satisfy the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Wallace of Saltaire, but I hope that it will provide them with sufficient reassurance of the Government’s commitment to continue close co-operation with the EU and its agencies and that, in these circumstances, they will see fit not to press their amendments.
I will say in conclusion—I reiterate it because the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, raised the point—that the Government have been clear that the UK remains unconditionally committed to European security. In the exit negotiations we will work to ensure that the UK and EU continue to co-operate closely to safeguard our shared values and to combat common threats, including terrorism. A partnership where we can build on the existing structures and arrangements—because it is not a zero-sum game—to improve processes will enable us to go further to respond to the reality of these. I hope that this will provide your Lordships with sufficient reassurance of the Government’s commitment to continue close co-operation with the EU and its agencies.
Before the Minister sits down, perhaps I may say to her that she will have responded to this debate admirably if she can think of a way of conveying to the Foreign Secretary—it might be relatively easy since he is here—that there are at least some in this House who believe that the right way of advancing the dossier of co-operation with the EU that we have left on a common foreign and security policy would be for us to put forward a draft treaty now—not waiting for the other side, not waiting for the Commission, the expertise of which is not on foreign policy, but putting forward a treaty drafted by the Foreign Secretary, with all his detailed, forensic skills.