Future Defence Capability

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Wednesday 26th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My noble friend raises an extremely important point about Iran and its proxies. We will continue to work with our international partners to hold Iran to account for its destabilising activity, the things that it has done in the Middle East and, indeed, the threats it poses on UK soil. To do that, the increased defence spending that we have announced today will help us to deal with this very real threat. Let Iran make no mistake: we will both deter and respond to any threat that it or its proxies pose to us. I thank my noble friend again for his question.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, the Government’s focus on defence and the further clarification of intended funding, as evident from the Chancellor’s Statement this morning, are welcome. While further detail about the additional funding and the phasing of the route to 2.5% by 2027 is needed, it is equally important to understand what liabilities may fall on defence; otherwise, we cannot make sense of the overall picture. Can the Minister say whether the cost of the Chagos deal is going to paid for by defence?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The Chagos deal is extremely important for our own security and that of the US. When the deal is finalised, it will be put before Parliament with the costings and then Parliament can debate it. The future of the base at Diego Garcia, which is crucial to us and our allies, is secured, and that is the important point of any deal that is finalised.

Armed Forces Commissioner Bill

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 24th March 2025 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Goldie]

13: Clause 4, page 4, line 18, leave out from “proposal” to end of line 19 and insert “at least seven days before the Commissioner intends to exercise the power under subsection (1).”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the Commissioner must give the Secretary of State a minimum of seven days’ notice before entering service premises.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to join you all this afternoon on day two of Committee on the Bill. I should explain that last Wednesday, consideration of an important non-defence Bill in the Chamber precluded me from attending Grand Committee, so it is a particular pleasure to be able to be here this afternoon.

In speaking to Amendment 13, in my name, I will speak to the other amendments in the group. At Second Reading, I raised the extent to which, with reference to access to premises, powers seem to have leached away from the Secretary of State and transferred excessively to the commissioner. I am absolutely satisfied that this is for no malign reason at all—it is just a consequence of drafting. I was encouraged by other contributions at Second Reading that I had support for my concerns.

The amendments in my name, Amendments 13, 14 and 15, simply attempt to restore control to the Secretary of State. I freely admit that I may not have found the perfect solution to this, but I thought it would be helpful to have a debate, so that the noble Lord the Minister can understand the spectrum of views.

Without amendment, under the Bill the commissioner can, in the United Kingdom, access MoD premises without the Secretary of State being aware. That is not acceptable, and it raises two issues. As a matter of principle, is that really the position we want to put the Secretary of State for Defence into? Just think of the wide range of premises within the MoD, some at the top levels of security protection. Much more practically, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, pointed out at Second Reading, it is not only the location of the premises which matters but the activity taking place within them. As he observed, a base commander has overall responsibility for security, and I am afraid that entirely predictable is a clash of wills between the commissioner who seeks entry to a premises, and the base commander who says, “No, I am denying entry”. That is not sustainable.

My amendments may be clumsy, but I have restored power to the Secretary of State, who must have notice of intended access and must then inform the commanding officer of the relevant premises of the commissioner’s intended visit. I have provided for seven days’ notice, unless evidence is in danger of being lost or there is continuing risk to personnel using the premises. But in that event the commissioner must still intimate in writing to the Secretary of State why he is not giving notice; then, at least the Secretary of State will have some idea of what is going on.

The important lens through which to look at this is defence and security and the rightful overall authority of the Secretary of State, and I feel that the Bill has not got that balance quite right.

I look forward to the debate, and particularly to the response from the noble Lord the Minister, who may very well want to take away what he hears today and reflect upon these contributions. I beg to move.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I share the concern, expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, that lies behind the amendments, although these particular ones do not in fact capture, in my view, the solution to the problem.

The problem is that the nature of classified locations varies. There will be some sites to which the Armed Forces commissioner would not, presumably, be denied access entirely. However, many sites have large areas that will be, and should be, open to the commissioner, but within which there are particular discrete locations where classified activity is conducted, to which he or she should not be admitted.

The Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State may well draw up a list, as was intended, of classified locations. Although the list will be classified and therefore will not be in secondary legislation, as the Minister has pointed out, it will deny the commissioner access to those sites. But the problem with lists is that they are seldom comprehensive and seldom up to date. We are talking about a very large span of estate with a very large spread of activities. The idea that such a list can be kept up to the minute will involve, first, a huge bureaucratic effort and, secondly, will almost certainly be doomed to failure.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, pointed out, it is the responsibility of local commanders to ensure that national security is preserved and that classified information is not available to those who should not have access to it. Therefore, it seems to me that there is only one sensible answer to this conundrum: for the Bill to provide commanding officers with the power in the last resort to deny the commissioner access to specific locations on the grounds that they contain classified activities or classified material. The commanding officer should of course then be required to justify themselves through the chain of command to the Secretary of State. But if we do not provide them with that backstop authority, we are, frankly, hanging local commanders out to dry with the legislation as it now stands.

These amendments do not provide the solution that I see as necessary, but can the Minister undertake today to take away these very real and important concerns and consider how they might be addressed before we get to Report? I repeat what I have said earlier: I entirely understand that such conflicts are likely to be very rare. The commissioner is going to be engaged in looking at service accommodation and other general conditions of service, so most of the time they will not be seeking access to such sites. But it is entirely conceivable that he or she will need such access, particularly if they are considering thematic issues to do with working conditions—and just once is once too many when it comes to national security. I ask the Minister to reflect on this, and perhaps we can have some discussions outside Committee before we get to Report.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I understand that, and I will come to the “no notice” point in a moment. I was simply pointing out to the Committee that, as the Bill stands, new Section 340IB(3) states:

“If the Commissioner proposes to exercise the power under subsection (1), the Commissioner must give the Secretary of State notice”.


The expectation is that the Secretary of State would then tell the commanding officer; however, sites can be excluded on national security grounds because a list will have been drawn up. But new Section 340IB(4) states:

“Subsection (3) does not apply, so far as relating to service premises in the United Kingdom”—


this goes to the point the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, made—

“if the Commissioner considers that giving notice would defeat the object of exercising the power”.

As I say, in all this there is a balance to be struck between notifying the Secretary of State; the Secretary of State notifying the commissioner; the ability, however, to have “no notice” visits; and alongside that protecting national security and indeed personal safety. The noble and gallant Lord made the important point that you might want to protect an entire base or facility, and perhaps everyone would be more open to understanding why that base is excluded. But he also pointed out that it may be a question of protecting just part of the base, and even a commanding officer might not know some of the things going on there. So he raises an issue which we will need to come back to between Committee and Report, because it is important and we need to consider it.

I hope that, in addressing the issues and pointing out the various pathways to a visit by the commissioner—or not—I have shown that we are trying to balance the various demands in order to make the commissioner’s visits effective, to maintain national security, and to give no notice where appropriate, while being fair to the bases being visited. I have tried to answer noble Lords’ specific questions, and I hope that those remarks are helpful.

I will just read the formal points into the record, because I think that is helpful. On Amendments 13, 14 and 15 and the commissioner’s power of access to service premises, I thank again the noble Baroness for her characteristically thoughtful consideration of this issue, and indeed I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup.

As we have just seen, one of the challenges when drafting the Bill was ensuring that the correct balance was struck between the independence and power of the Armed Forces commissioner on one hand, and the power of the Secretary of State, notably to protect the interests of national security and the safety of individuals, on the other.

Although the commissioner has the power to enter service premises and prepare independent reports and recommendations, this is balanced with the Secretary of State’s ability to prevent the exercise of these powers in the interests of national security and personal safety, thus ensuring proper and responsible regard to delicate security issues surrounding defence premises. We believe that the Bill achieves this balance, and that to provide more prescriptive restrictions, such as the ones contained in the proposed amendments, may risk offsetting it.

We must also remember that much of the commissioner’s remit as set out in Clause 4 is solely focused on the general welfare of service persons and their families. The exercise of these powers can only be in pursuit of this issue. It is important that we keep that in mind when considering the role of the Secretary of State in restricting their powers.

In its current form, the Bill grants the commissioner discretion as to how much notice to give service premises ahead of the commissioner’s proposed visit. This could be within seven days, as the noble Baroness suggests, or indeed longer, and we anticipate that that will be the case for the vast majority of the time.

Creating a legal obligation on the Secretary of State to notify the commanding officer of each service premises that the commissioner has given notice of a proposed visit could risk creating a substantial administrative burden on the Secretary of State. It could also prove to be complex, given the multitude of service premises and personnel involved. This additional requirement could frustrate and delay the commissioner, making it harder for them to fulfil one of the most crucial elements of their role: to meet with our Armed Forces and their families in a timely way and to understand the realities of service life. However, we would expect the Secretary of State’s office to inform the relevant commanding officer when they are informed of an impending visit, as I mentioned to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup.

Further, in its current form, the Bill deliberately provides that it is up to the judgment of the commissioner as to when giving notice would defeat the object of exercising their power of entry to service premises. Removing this and replacing it with two prescriptive circumstances when the commissioner would be able to conduct no-notice visits risks inadvertently precluding circumstances when no-notice visits would be appropriate. Furthermore, to place a legal obligation on the commissioner to inform the Secretary of State of all instances where and reasons for which they have exercised their discretion not to give notice of planned entry to a service premise would, again, add an administrative burden and could significantly infringe upon their independence.

However, I appreciate the noble Baroness’s concern that it would appear difficult for the Secretary of State to prevent the exercise of powers under subsection (1) of new Section 340IB, proposed by Clause 4(2) of the Bill, on national security grounds should the commissioner decide that a no-notice visit was appropriate. I assure the noble Baroness that we are working closely with partners in defence and across government to understand areas where the Secretary of State—and, where appropriate, the Foreign or Home Secretary—may wish pre-emptively to exercise the restriction power. For example, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said, access to certain parts of sites or the ability to take documents from certain terminals may be restricted. Given its sensitive nature, any such list will be a classified document; however, the sites in question and the commissioner would be aware of this in advance.

We will continue to engage with the relevant agencies during implementation. This will be accompanied by a communication and engagement campaign across defence to ensure that sites and personnel are aware of the commissioner and their remit. However, should the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, find it useful, I would welcome meetings with them to discuss this and other matters of national security in relation to the commissioner; that is an open invite to other noble Lords, should they also wish to attend.

I hope that this provides the necessary reassurance to the noble Baroness. On these grounds, I ask her to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, not for the first time, a debate of brevity has actually been one of substance. I am grateful to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for their contributions; I am also grateful to the Minister for his customary willingness to engage.

What has emerged is a concern—I detect that there is some sympathy with it—that the Bill has not quite got the balance right. However, I think that it is possible to find a workable solution. As I listened to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, it occurred to me that, if we are all trying to be too clever—I simply tried to follow and work with the grain of how the Bill’s draftsmen approached these provisions—he may have a more elegant solution. The simplest thing may be to ask whether the Secretary of State really must be brought into this, because what matters is that national security is not compromised.

I very much welcome the Minister’s invitation to meet before Report and would like to avail myself of that opportunity. I would be very surprised if we cannot find some pragmatic way to improve the Bill. It may be that, despite the noble and gallant Lord’s reservations about it, the list could well be a starting point in terms of reassurance that there are certain places that the commissioner will not be getting into.

If we go back to the view of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, that we dislocate at our peril the commanding officer of a base who has overall responsibility in law for the security and safety of that base, that might be a worthwhile starting point, from which you then turn the process around. If the commissioner says, “I’m coming”, the commander of the base says, “Not tomorrow, but you can come on Thursday”, and the commissioner says, “No, I want to come tomorrow”, at that point perhaps the Secretary of State can be brought in. But it seems to me that the critical practical issues are: what is going on in a location at a particular time, and could national security be compromised?

I am absolutely satisfied that there is an intelligent solution to be found. I would welcome the opportunity of a further discussion with the Minister, which I think colleagues who have contributed to the debate would find extremely helpful. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 13 in my name.

Amendment 13 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Goldie]

16: Clause 4, page 5, line 12, at end insert—
“340IC Commissioner’s functions in relation to whistleblowing(1) The Commissioner may investigate any concern raised by a whistleblower of which the Commissioner becomes aware (whether because the whistleblower has contacted the Commissioner or for any other reason) but only if the whistleblower informs the Commissioner, before the beginning of the investigation, that he or she consents to an investigation taking place.(2) In deciding whether to investigate, the Commissioner must take into account the public interest.(3) The Commissioner must, when carrying out an investigation under this section, take all reasonable precautions to ensure the anonymity of the whistleblower.(4) For the purposes of this section, a person is a “whistleblower” if—(a) the person is, or was at any time, subject to service law,(b) the person raises a concern that is about another person subject to service law, and(c) the matter to which the concern relates is not about the conditions of service of persons subject to service law.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a new whistleblowing duty for the Commissioner, to ensure service personnel can raise concerns with anonymity.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich for putting his name to my Amendment 16.

At Second Reading, I expressed my concern about the position of Jaysley Beck, who tragically took her own life in 2021. The coroner had recently published his findings, which made for grim reading. Since Jaysley’s death, many far-reaching changes and improvements have been made; I know that because the former Secretary of State Ben Wallace drove them through and, as a Minister, I supported him in every way I could. There is encouraging evidence that these changes are yielding results. For example, a number of instructors have been summarily dismissed for inappropriate sexual relationships with students, and I believe that there have been other dismissals of personnel from the Armed Forces for inappropriate behaviour.

What was always much more difficult to assess was whether women were fearful to make a complaint in the first place for fear of prejudicing their careers. All the procedures, processes and structures in the world do not work if a scared woman feels unable to make the complaint in the first place. That, sadly, was the case for Jaysley Beck. I am concerned that women in our Armed Forces still feel inhibited from raising unacceptable behaviour. That cannot be tolerated; we need to plug that gap. We have to find a way of giving them a safe space so that they or their friends can let someone know what is going on.

This proposal seems to dovetail perfectly with the creation of an Armed Forces commissioner and the ethos of that office. If whistleblowing cannot be accommodated within his independent office, I do not know where it can be. The amendment provides for the commissioner’s functions in the Bill to include investigating

“any concern raised by a whistleblower”.

I have tried to keep it as simple as possible. I am told that the virtue of whistleblowing is twofold. First, it provides that safe—and currently missing—space for someone to raise a concern. Secondly, it makes it more obvious more quickly if a problem is emerging in relation to a particular location or individual because, where there is a problem, concerns are likely to emerge in a cluster pattern.

If we can plug this hole, using the creation of the new Armed Forces commissioner to such powerful effect, what a positive message that would be for the MoD. To have, under one umbrella, real action to support and help our Armed Forces women would be a striking, tangible piece of support. I feel very passionately about this: it is the missing piece of the jigsaw and I hope the Minister feels able to respond with some encouragement. I alert him that I am not giving up on this; I have got my teeth into it, and I will be back on Report. I beg to move.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. I will reiterate to the Minister concerns I raised about an earlier amendment on recruits and their training. It is absolutely the case that in a military organisation, training must be tough and realistic—and, at times, discipline must be hard—if we are to have an effective fighting force. That means that there is a very clear risk that people could overstep the bounds. The risk is greater in that kind of environment than in most others; therefore, we have to be particularly vigilant in a military environment to guard against that.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, what an important amendment the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, has brought forward. It has enabled the noble Baroness, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, to make the comments they have.

Let us start with the whole point of the commissioner. Obviously, we intend that the commissioner will have the power to investigate all the various issues and matters that noble Lords have brought forward in this Committee.

The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, said, “I am not going to give up”. I say to her that she should not give up; nobody should give up. She was forthright on this matter when she was a Minister, as was the noble Earl, Lord Minto—indeed, as is every noble Lord in this Committee. When the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, had the very senior responsibilities he had in the military, he, like all of us, was trying to tackle this behaviour whereby some are tarnishing the reputation of the whole of our Armed Forces, which utterly unacceptable.

I say to the noble Baroness that, as she will see as I make my remarks, some progress has been made as a result of the policies the previous Government pursued. As noble Lords know, I am a proud Labour politician, but I also admit where progress has previously been made. Is it good enough? Is it satisfactory? Of course not, as we have seen from Gunner Beck’s awful circumstances.

The demands made by the noble Baroness, the noble Lord, and the noble and gallant Lord—indeed, by every single person in this Committee and beyond—have started to change the culture, which is ultimately what this is about. Will these things stop? I wish I could wave a magic wand and stop every case of bullying, sexism and misogyny, but what I do know is that, if the role of the commissioner is passed as it is now, it will, along with the other reforms that have taken place, help us deliver what we want to do.

I absolutely take the point made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, about training new recruits and how we protect and develop them. I know there has been controversy about Harrogate, but it has taken really powerful action to try to deal with that. There have been other instances that we can all refer to. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, is right: this is about trying to generate confidence in people so that they feel they can come forward.

There is also the countercultural point that people sometimes do not come forward not only because they are frightened but because that would somehow break the code—the unwritten rules. It is a nonsense. I used to teach, and you get this in schools, where people will not grass up others, even though they think what they did was wrong, because it somehow breaks a social norm. It is ridiculous and unacceptable, but each and every one of us knows that it is there. The real challenge for institutions, whether schools, offices or the Armed Forces, is how to generate that desire and will to come forward in what are sometimes difficult circumstances, because there is no excuse for that sort of behaviour.

Let me turn to the amendment on whistleblowing. I assure noble Lords that the Ministry of Defence already has a comprehensive whistleblowing system, for military and civilians alike, and it includes robust policy, procedural investigation teams and a confidential hotline, so the amendment is not required. What is required is asking, “How do you get people to use it? How do you get people to come forward? How do you get people to have that confidence?” The noble Baroness, the noble Lord and others who went before them introduced lots of different hotlines, confidential arrangements and changes, but the things that we do not want to happen are still happening. It is about driving things through to bring about that change.

As I pointed out to the noble Baroness, as a consequence of what has happened—noble Lords will know this if they have read the Defence Select Committee’s evidence from last week, and the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Ben Key, spoke about it in public, so it is out there—21 people have been discharged from Royal Navy service after a whistleblower flagged misconduct and inappropriate behaviour on board submarines. I repeat: the First Sea Lord said that, as a result of whistleblower policies currently in place, 21 people were dismissed from the Submarine Service.

Is that a solution? Is that the end of the problem? Does that mean that nothing terrible is happening or will happen? Of course not, but it shows that we must drive people to have the confidence to use the various procedures and systems that are in place. Otherwise, you can change anything, but, if people do not have the confidence that the noble Lord, Lord Russell, spoke about, they will not use it and will not come forward. So, as I say, this shows that demonstrable action is being, and will be, taken against those who have transgressed when people are willing to come forward.

The term “whistleblowing” can cover a range of issues much wider than general service welfare matters. The Government’s intention is to focus the commissioner’s remit on service welfare matters. However, I can further reassure your Lordships that nothing in the Bill precludes anyone from raising a general service welfare issue with the commissioner anonymously; nor does it prevent the commissioner acting on that information.

On maintaining anonymity, for all general service welfare matters raised with the commissioner, there is no obligation imposed by the Bill to disclose the identity of any individuals. Indeed, all defence personnel are protected in relation to whistleblowing under the Ministry of Defence’s “raising a concern” policy. I hope that what I have said about anonymity, whistleblowing and some of the things that are starting to change means that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw the amendment, but, again, I would be happy to discuss any of this with her—indeed, with any noble Lord—because it is so important.

It seems to me that the real challenge for us is around how we can give people, whether they are recruits or people who have been serving for a considerable period of time, the confidence and willingness to come forward and use the measures that are there. Knowing that they can do that both anonymously and in a way in which they will be treated with respect, seems to me the crucial part because, if that does not change, we can change the system but it will not actually deliver the result that we would all want. We are united in our desire to do something about that.

I look forward to the noble Baroness—along with the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup—continuing to demand better of the system because that is what we all want to achieve and what we all want to happen. What is still happening is unacceptable; we want, and are determined, to do something about that. We think that the commissioner will help in this regard.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, again, this has been a short but very substantial debate. I thank the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, for their contributions—and, indeed, the Minister for his response. What is really encouraging is the unanimity of view that we can keep doing better. I am grateful to the Minister for his observations about the previous Government. From my engagement with him when he was the opposition spokesman on defence, I know how encouraging and supportive he was as we tried to bring forward much-needed change.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

The Division Bells are ringing. Does the noble Baroness have much more that she intends to say? Would she prefer to return after the Division?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

It might be as well to adjourn for the Division.

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[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I will try to be as brief as possible. I had thanked the Minister for his kind remarks about the previous Government. It is the case that incredible progress has been made.

As I listened to the contributions, I was struck by two things. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, gave a realistic assessment of what we are dealing with on the ground at the moment. I said in my introductory remarks that we have to change culture, attitudes and behaviour, and that we will need more training—all of that—but, as we speak, there is probably a terrified young woman somewhere on an Armed Forces base who has been treated inappropriately and does not know what to do. I do not think that we can provide too many ventilation shafts, conduits or means for that young person, whoever they may be, to know that they can speak to someone and that they will be listened to in confidence. If that person is the Armed Forces commissioner and one of his or her responsibilities in the Bill is whistleblowing, that is fine. It seems to me that we cannot do too much to reassure our Armed Forces personnel.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I just want to reinforce the noble Baroness’s point about speaking in confidence. We need to get this point about anonymity across to people. Something that, I hope, comes across from the noble Baroness’s amendment, my response and the comments of others in the Committee is that people can do this in confidence or anonymously if they wish to come forward. That is a really important point.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister. All I shall say in conclusion is that there is an opportunity here to provide another vent, shaft or conduit, which could provide immediate help to someone—we know not where—who, at this moment, is feeling insecure and uncertain as to what to do. If we pass a Bill creating an Armed Forces commissioner and enabling them to deal with whistleblowing, it is a public, tangible representation by the MoD of its willingness and desire to do its level best.

In the circumstances, I would very much appreciate discussing this further with the Minister, but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 16 withdrawn.

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Tabled by

[Baroness Goldie]

22: Schedule 2, page 12, line 14, leave out from “2000,” to end of line 15 and insert “for “Service Complaints Ombudsman” substitute “Armed Forces Commissioner”.”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes the Commissioner subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I hope that I am about to endear myself to the entire Committee. I do not propose to move Amendment 22, with the explanation that the phrase “too clever by half” comes to mind here. This amendment sought to fix what we thought was an omission, only for the Minister to point out—helpfully—that another part of the Bill addresses the omission.

Amendment 22 not moved.

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[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, I will take it from the Minister that this is a technical change that is necessary as a consequential. I will not raise further questions.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, we may be getting near the end of the business, but my work here is not yet done. I thank the Minister for his comments and address my remarks particularly to Amendment 23. The group has indeed been given the title “minor and technical” by the Government, and I know that the Minister has, in good faith, accepted the advice of his officials in that respect. But this amendment makes consequential provision to Clause 3, and it therefore actually makes a substantive change to the process by which complaints are handled—and, crucially, who is responsible.

As the Minister outlined, Clause 3 substitutes the words “a person” for “an officer” in Section 340B of the Armed Forces Act 2006. That section outlines the procedure for making a service complaint. Currently, the process begins with a person subject to service law making a complaint to an officer, and that officer then decides whether the complaint is admissible, as per regulations from the Defence Council. If that officer decides that the complaint is not admissible, the person who made the complaint can apply to the Service Complaints Ombudsman for a review, and the ombudsman can then make a decision that is binding on the complainant and the officer to whom the complaint was made.

Section 340N sets out the proposal for a referral of an allegation, whereby the ombudsman—soon to be the commissioner—may refer an allegation to the appropriate officer. Clause 3 therefore changes the process for an admissibility decision so that a person subject to service law can make a complaint to a person other than an officer, which could be a civilian or, I presume, someone of any other rank. If that person decides that the complaint is inadmissible, the complainant can appeal to the commissioner. Government Amendment 23 means that the commissioner may refer an allegation to an appropriate person, who could also be a civilian—but what civilian? Is the type of civilian to be further specified in statute, or by statutory instrument?

It seems to me that this proposal does not simply alter the language of the 2006 Act to permit a complaint to be made to the commissioner; it also enables a civilian to make an admissibility decision, which can then be referred to the commissioner. That is a major change to the current system, and it begs the question: why would the commissioner need to be able to refer an allegation to a person who is not an officer, and why would a person who is not an officer make a decision about the admissibility of a complaint? The implication is that there will potentially be a civilian in between the person making a complaint and the commissioner, yet the complainant may be content to involve the chain of command.

Can the Minister establish whether this is a substantive change to the 2006 Act? Does it mean that civilians could be dealing with allegations referred by the commissioner? If so, does this mean that a civil servant, perhaps, could take over the role of complaints and welfare, as opposed to officers—and, if so, would that not interfere with the chain of command? It appears to me that this amendment, which is no doubt well intended and which may be the consequence of a desire to keep drafting neat, introduces some very real concerns. It is not technical—it goes a lot further than that—and, as I said, could risk interfering with the chain of command. Can the Minister confirm whether this change is intended to grant responsibility to other ranks or civilians in respect of service complaints?

For the record, I should say that it is the policy of the Official Opposition that substantive government amendments to Bills should be made not in Grand Committee but on the Floor of the House. Consequently, if this amendment should be shown to be substantive, which I suspect that it is, rather than minor and technical, I would be obliged to object to it today and ask the Minister to bring it to the House on Report so it can be properly scrutinised. Having said that, we want to probe this change and understand it fully, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply. He may wish to consider, depending on what his views are, withdrawing Amendment 23 and using Report to clarify the position—but I am very happy to listen to his comments.

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[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Beamish. This amendment concerns an area of technical expertise that is way beyond my ken—although, when I was a Minister, Gibraltar was raised on numerous occasions in relation to legislation. I am not an expert, but I look forward to what the Minister has to say in response to what seemed to be very significant comments from the noble Lord.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I congratulate my noble friend Lord Beamish for his outstanding realisation that he was moving the amendment and for swiftly jumping to his feet to put forward some very important points.

Given that this matter is legal and technical, I shall read out the legal points, because some very important points are contained within them. The relevant piece that we are looking at is the extent points in Clause 6; that is what we are referring to. Although it is very technical and legal, is quite an important part of the Bill.

Amendment 24 relates to the application of the Bill to Gibraltar, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, for tabling it and my noble friend Lord Beamish for introducing it. It seeks to include Gibraltar alongside the other British Overseas Territories in the permissive extent clause of the Bill. While I understand that the noble Lord may be concerned about the exclusion of Gibraltar, I shall give him some reassurance.

My colleague, the Minister for the Armed Forces, met the Chief Minister of Gibraltar towards the end of last year. He was very welcoming of the Bill and confirmed that he is content to legislate in the Gibraltar Parliament on Armed Forces matters. In this case, UK and Gibraltar officials will now take steps to mirror the UK legislation in Gibraltar law, thereby continuing to demonstrate the close co-operation and collaboration between the UK and Gibraltar on all defence matters.

I take this opportunity to thank my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, who has responsibility for the Crown dependencies and overseas territories, for his recent letter to the MoD on these matters, in which he praised the approach of the department and expressed a desire to promote this across government.

I reassure the noble Lord and my noble friend Lord Beamish that although the Bill will not extend to Gibraltar, it will still apply to UK service persons subject to service law, and their families, wherever they are in the world. Members of a British Overseas Territories force, including the Royal Gibraltar Regiment, are subject to service law when undertaking any duty or training with UK Armed Forces. That also applies to other overseas territories, as my noble friend mentioned, provided they are subject to service law. It will also apply to UK Armed Forces premises worldwide, provided they fall within the required parameters set out in the Bill. I hope that that is of some reassurance to my noble friend, and I respectfully ask him to withdraw the amendment.

Ukraine (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Thursday 6th March 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, it has been a pleasure, albeit a sombre one, to listen to this debate. I first pay tribute to my noble friend Lord De Mauley for his tireless work in chairing the committee and to all the noble Lords involved in the production of this report.

As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, observed, committee chairs sometimes feel aggrieved at the sluggish progress from a report’s publication to the actual debate on it. However, recent events have certainly thrust this report into stark relief, emphasising how timely some of the warnings were and, at the same time, flinging us into new territory, which was probably not at the forefront of the committee’s thinking. Unchanging is that Ukraine is of critical importance. I pay tribute to the Prime Minister’s sure-footed diplomacy and his unwavering support of Ukraine. I suggest that we can support his endeavours by reaffirming our political unity for that support, so that the clearest possible message of unity is heard from this Parliament.

The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, rightly reminded us of the brutal and repugnant reality of Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Saliently, the report takes head-on the post-Cold War role of NATO and the distinction between a defensive alliance ready to come to the aid of each other and the need to develop that into a deterrent alliance. It is fair to say that the illegal invasion of Ukraine by Putin galvanised a NATO rethink about purpose, resilience and kinetic responsiveness. If we consider recurring NATO exercises, JEF and the enhanced forward presence, a lot of that was actually there and was already happening. As a Defence Minister, I saw that collaboration in practice.

Where I think the committee report compels serious reflection is on the need for coherence between nuclear—the ultimate and ever-present deterrent—and conventional deterrence. I commend the Government’s recognition of that in their response and of the clamant need to deny our adversaries the chance to perceive deterrence gaps in which they may operate. This requires forensic military analysis, intricate strategic planning and a committed response from, if I may say so, principally European NATO members. My noble friend Lord Soames is absolutely right beyond doubt: Russia is, and will continue to be, a threat. I realise that the Minister will be limited in what he can share with us about this new future but, if there is encouragement on that front that he can offer, we should be very pleased to hear it.

The committee was clear about the need for increased defence expenditure; numerous contributors have spoken on that. From my perspective, the Government’s recognition of and response to that is very welcome. Although the strategic defence review has been operating as a pause button on procurement, crystal clear to everyone is how the pace of increased defence expenditure will have to accelerate post 2027. That has been a clear message from this debate, and I hope that the Government are receptive.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, is absolutely right to call for clarity about rearmament and to emphasise a potential real cost. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is absolutely correct that this threat environment and the rearmament imperative must be shared with the public. There is an urgent need for re-education of what it means to live in an age of live threat and to understand the implications of that.

Let me just clear my throat; this Room, unlike the Chamber yesterday, seems to be very warm. Specifically in relation to Ukraine, events are fast-moving and unpredictable, but there are some certainties. Whatever happens in the near future, I think that these are the following certainties. Ukraine’s long-term security requirements require us to be not reactive but anticipatory. Can the Minister provide clarity on the Government’s long-term thinking for supporting Ukraine’s military capabilities, economic resilience and, of course, reconstruction efforts. How do we maintain that commitment beyond the immediate crisis, ensuring that Ukraine is safe and can defend herself in future?

The report rightly highlights:

“Developments in Ukraine are relevant to UK national security and, in particular, the protection of its critical national infrastructure”.


It also highlights the importance of resilience within our own society. Hybrid warfare, cyberthreats and disinformation campaigns are tools that we have seen be used by hostile states to undermine democracies. We must enhance our national resilience by countering disinformation, securing critical infrastructure and strengthening cybersecurity.

My noble friend Lord Soames’s suggestion of a dedicated civil resilience unit—whether that is a ministry of civil defence or not—is, at this point in our affairs, a very serious suggestion meriting close attention. I hope that the Minister will feel able to respond to that. Can I also ask the Minister to elaborate on what measures are being taken to specify and fortify our national resilience against such threats?

My noble friend Lord De Mauley mentioned the Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations. The RFCAs are a strong British tradition with a deep connection and sense of service to our Reserve Forces and cadets, much of it emanating from voluntary activity. I commend my noble friend on his excellent work in this field. I agree that the Ministry of Defence should be very cautious about doing anything to jeopardise that underpinning voluntary ethos. I have to say, this is a classic case of there being a high risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. That would not be good; indeed, at this geopolitical time, it would be very bad. I say to the Minister that, if this NGU concept is being promoted from within the department as a box to be ticked somewhere in the depths of Whitehall, I think that it will face a very rocky road in the House. There are far more pressing defence priorities demanding our attention.

If we have learned anything else from the war in Ukraine, it is a stark reminder of certain things. The international rules-based order cannot be taken for granted. If we wish to deter future aggressors, we have to learn the lessons of a conventional deterrence failure and transform that into an effective deterrence future. We have to invest in our defences at pace. We have to stand unwaveringly with our allies. We must not allow the practice of principled, professional and decent diplomacy—very much manifested by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, both today and, if I may say so, in his day—to be traduced by aberrant transgressions.

The Prime Minister has been an exemplar of the former. He demonstrates how to do it and why we need it. It is very important that, in whatever lies ahead, the Prime Minister’s example is supported by us all, because a world without that decent, professional, principled diplomacy—this goes back to the point about communication made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton—would be a poorly informed world. It seems to me that, if we can take away these lessons and look at much of what the report suggests, we have the solution for how to create a safer world—and, perhaps most importantly, how to send a message to any potential bullies and say, in the words of the Scots, “Wha daur meddle wi’ us?”

Armed Forces Commissioner Bill

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 5th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I first place on record my admiration for and appreciation of our Armed Forces personnel. They are great. They make incredible sacrifices to keep us safe, as the Minister so eloquently and poignantly described, as do their families, and they deserve our unqualified gratitude and support.

His Majesty’s Opposition will adopt the same approach to the Bill as our colleagues in the other place. We want to be a critical friend. The Bill is well intended; we respect that it is a government manifesto commitment, and we shall support it. But for the sake of our Armed Forces, we owe it to them to ensure that the new position created by the Bill—an Armed Forces commissioner—does what it says on the tin, and that everyone is quite clear what the tin looks like. Our scrutiny will be diligent but, I hope, constructive. We have to be sure that the abolition of one structure and the creation of another creates neither gaps nor unintended consequences. I thank the Minister for his customary courtesy in engaging with me and my noble friend Lord Minto on the Bill.

I will start with a couple of process observations. Clauses 1 and 2 establish the job spec of the Armed Forces commissioner. As the Minister articulated, these are important functions: the general welfare of service personnel and their family members, and improving the public’s understanding of the welfare issues faced by service personnel and their families. Clause 1 also contains a wide suite of extensive powers. Clause 2 abolishes the role of the previous Service Complaints Ombudsman, so the new Armed Forces commissioner is taking on a very big job.

There needs to be greater parliamentary scrutiny of the initial appointment of the commissioner. Interestingly, the German model on which this is based is a parliamentary model, and that has not been totally replicated by the provisions of the Bill. I am not quite sure why that is, but perhaps the Minister can offer clarification in his wind-up.

As the Minister said, the commissioner is very free standing and deliberately independent, as far as possible, of the Ministry of Defence. For these reasons, the Defence Select Committee in the other place should offer an advisory opinion to the Secretary of State for Defence on the suitability of the candidate prior to any formal appointment.

The Bill makes explicitly clear that the individual will be neither from the Armed Forces nor a civil servant, so two obvious areas of expertise are excluded. That is fine in principle, but there needs to be total transparency about the chosen candidate, their qualifications to do the job, their relevant experience and of course their security suitability. Similarly, the commissioner’s accountability to Parliament needs to be more explicit, but that is something we can explore further as the Bill proceeds.

One broad but important issue that I have identified as emerging from the Bill, which I have shared with the Minister, is quite simply the proper balance of power between the Secretary of State for Defence and the commissioner. While the commissioner must be independent, the MoD is one of the most sensitive departments in government, and proper and responsible regard must be had to the delicate security issues surrounding defence premises, widely defined under the Bill. These could include nuclear facilities, Porton Down or premises that are the subject of operational activity.

I should like to see the commissioner’s deference to the Secretary of State on issues of security and safety more fully spelled out. There is recognition of this but, for example, if I understand the Bill correctly, if the commissioner proposes to exercise these powerful provisions for entry to premises, notice must be given to the Secretary of State within a period determined by the commissioner, and if the premises are in the United Kingdom, the commissioner is not required to give any notice at all if the commissioner considers that it would defeat the object of exercising the power. While the Bill quite rightly says that the Secretary of State can prevent or restrict the exercise of that power on grounds of national security or safety, that is a little challenging when they may not have received any notice from the commissioner that entry to premises is happening.

Would it not be more sensible to turn this around and to require the commissioner to give a minimum notice period of seven days to the Secretary of State of intended access to premises, unless the commissioner considers that there are extraordinary issues of potential loss of evidence or usage of currently unsafe premises, when the notice requirement would be suspended? In the latter case, the commissioner should be required to give the Secretary of State an explanation in writing for proceeding without notice. The advantage of that approach is that it would minimise compromise of national security and safety and avoid potential direct confrontation between the commissioner and the chain of command. The Secretary of State would at least have knowledge of any intended access.

The Bill will achieve an amalgam of what the Service Complaints Ombudsman used to do. I too pay tribute to Mariette Hughes and thank her for her unstinting hard work. That is a big block of work that will now land with the new commissioner, in addition to the new duties of general service welfare, as previously described.

There needs to be a clear separation of what the Armed Forces commissioner is reporting on in his annual report. There are two separate sets of distinct responsibilities here; we need to achieve clarity as to how they are being addressed under the new arrangements. That leads on to a question about resource. I am sure the Minister will be able to reassure the House that proper thought has given regard to that. However, from looking at the ombudsman’s annual report for 2023, we see that the current workload is hefty. We are talking about a significant volume of work falling on this new commissioner.

I will move on to the issue of drafting. I am smiling as I see former chair of the Constitution Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, is in her place. I became aware under her wise stewardship, as a member of that committee, just how important the drafting of legislation is, and how we should not inhibit those who have a responsibility—such as the noble Baroness’s former committee—from pointing out where they think there are issues.

This legislation achieves effect by changing another Act. That means it is quite difficult to get the whole picture from looking at the Bill; you have to do a bit of detective work behind the scenes. We have to live with that and I realise why that has been adopted as a modus operandi, but there is reliance on secondary legislation. I have shared with the Minister that that is quite extensive. As he is aware, there are various provisions in the Bill that provide for subordinate legislation, such as new Section 365AA(2)(b) and (5), and new Section 340IA(4)(e) and (8).

I hope the Minister, with his Bill team, can look at this and seriously consider whether we can put more information in the Bill. For example, the functions of the commissioner are the functions, so why can we not just define them and leave it at that? The Bill seeks to specify what the Armed Forces commissioner cannot investigate. Fine; if that is it, that is it. Equally, the Bill seeks to specify “family members”. Surely the Bill can be much clearer about who they are. I would have thought immediate family members within the circle—perhaps those residing with Armed Forces personnel—would likely be included, and I do not think it is meant to be a wider family connection, but I would not have thought it was beyond the skill of drafting to try to be more explicit about that.

The noble Lord is well placed to set a good example in drafting. He is a model Minister in every respect, and I know he will not disappoint me on this front either. I look forward to hearing his thoughts on whether we can make a better fist of trying to make the Bill a little more explicit.

In conclusion, we cannot anticipate what issues of general welfare may arise that the commissioner will feel obliged to investigate, but the tragic case of Jaysley Beck, to which the Minister referred, and her death, so recently reported on by the coroner, was deeply troubling. Our thoughts and sympathies are with her family. I am aware that far-reaching changes have been made in the MoD since Jaysley’s death in December 2021. The chain of command no longer investigates complaints, there is zero tolerance of unacceptable sexual behaviours —an instructor found to have engaged in such behaviour will be immediately dismissed—and where criminal activity has taken place there is now the Defence Serious Crime Unit and a victim support unit. However, Jaysley’s case demonstrated that she did not feel able to complain in the first place through fear of what that would mean for her career.

No matter how effective other processes and procedures are, the only way to address that fundamental fear is to have some type of anonymous whistleblower system. If the Minister is sympathetic to that, that function could sit well in the new Armed Forces commissioner’s office. I do not know whether we need statute law to establish it; it may be within the executive authority of the Secretary of State for Defence to do it now. I offer the proposal as a serious suggestion, and I welcome the Minister’s comments in his winding-up speech. Like him, I also look forward to the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry. Finally, I look forward to the debate on this Bill. These Benches wish it well, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

UK Defence: Hypersonic Missiles

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Monday 3rd March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord makes an important point on the importance of space and satellites. That case has been made with vigour to the defence review and we await the outcome of that. On the second part of the noble and gallant Lord’s question and his point about Scotland, of course it is important. Part of what we are saying with the growth in defence spending is that we need to ensure that there is an emphasis on UK manufacturing and on the regions and every nation of the UK, so that they too can benefit from that. It informs and helps develop the Government’s growth agenda.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, there is already in place a framework to develop a sovereign UK hypersonic missile, with £1 billion identified over a period of seven years. Given recent events, can the Minister say whether he agrees that the enhanced global security obligation now falling on the UK requires us to consider accelerating that programme? It will require more money. In that case, can the Minister reassure this House that, if the Chagos deal goes ahead, not one penny of the defence budget will be required to pay for that?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

We will await the outcome of what happens on the Chagos deal. No deal has been made at the present time. On the £1 billion the noble Baroness referred to, this is in respect of the Missile Defence Centre which, as she knows, was established some 20 years ago and has been supported consistently by different Governments. The Missile Defence Centre looks at the capabilities that we have and will need. It was initially set up to deal with ballistic threats but has since had its remit extended to look at the threat we will have from hypersonic missiles as well. As such, I think it is important. And let me just say that, in terms of accelerating, I think we are going to have to accelerate a lot of our defence capability.

Armed Forces Personnel: School Fees

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Wednesday 5th February 2025 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Goldie]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what engagement they have had with armed forces personnel whose children are currently educated at fee-paying schools to ascertain the impact on such families of imposing value added tax on school fees.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Ministry of Defence is continuing to monitor the impact of the Government’s change to VAT rules for private schools on service personnel who claim the continuity of education allowance. The Ministry of Defence recalculated CEA rates based on the new fees published by schools for January 2025, and this increased the income tax-free amounts available to claimants.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord. I am aware that the continuity of education allowance has been uprated, but that still leaves a parental contribution. What we do not know is by how much the parental contribution will increase as a consequence of VAT on school fees. Indeed, even the combined talents of Sherlock Holmes and Einstein would fail to penetrate MoD methodology on this issue. We know that Armed Forces personnel will have to pay more in school fees. Can the Minister answer a simple question? How much more will they be paying?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her question. I will always check the figures and, indeed, check hers, as she will know. She will also know that the allowance contributes towards the cost of boarding school education, with the MoD paying a fixed rate of up to 92% of fees for children attending state-maintained schools and up to 90% of fees for those attending independent schools. I would say to her that, in essence, this is exactly the same policy as the previous Government had.

Fiscal Policy: Defence Spending

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Monday 3rd February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, last week I raised my profound concerns about the funding fog surrounding defence. Specifically on the Government’s fiscal policy, I want to ask the Minister the following questions. First, given the recent gloomy projection by the CBI on job losses, what discussions have the Government had with major defence suppliers to assess the impact of the NIC increase on their workforce? Secondly, if the Government really value our Armed Forces personnel, why are they landing families with the full impact of VAT on private school fees, when the continuity of education allowance will meet only part of that increase—and yet they are prepared to exempt United States armed forces personnel in this country from paying VAT on private school fees?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her important questions. We are working closely with NATO in developing industrial capability. In particular, we are looking at how we develop interoperability between NATO partners—which, as the noble Baroness will know from her work, is an important consideration—to give us the capabilities we need.

The noble Baroness will know that the Government have increased the continuity of education allowance to meet 90% of the cost of school fees, which is line with the consistent use of that policy to meet school fees. On the US military exemption, the VAT rule applies to all businesses supplying services to US forces, so there has been no change in that regard.

Major Defence Contracts

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Monday 3rd February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

We are supporting the SME sector by spending billions of pounds on defence. The noble Baroness makes an important point about the importance of small and medium-sized industries. We often talk about the primes—the really big companies— but they are often supported by small and medium-sized businesses, which are extremely important, along with ensuring we get investment across the country.

I will tell noble Lords the other thing that needs to be done. For decades in this country we have had a shortage of skilled workers and skilled apprenticeships, and certainly small and medium-sized businesses need help to recruit the skilled labour they need to deliver the products that they have on offer.

The final point I will make is that, clearly, we are now in a period of transition from pre Ukraine to post Ukraine. That obviously results in looking at who we are buying from and the sorts of things we are purchasing, and the defence review will deal with some of that as well.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, further to the point raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, it is the case that our defence industry sector has never been in greater need of the skills and talents of our brightest students, and the Minister failed to address the point specifically raised by the noble and gallant Lord. This House wants to know what are the Government doing to address the unacceptable intolerance whereby companies are hounded off campuses and barred entry to careers fairs? In particular, what are the Government doing to ensure that this obstruction to the supply of talent to the defence industry sector is removed?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am sorry if I did not answer the point raised by the noble and gallant Lord. The point the noble Baroness makes is extremely important, and she asks what the Government have done about it. The Secretary of State for Defence, and I think the Business Secretary, wrote to the universities concerned and asked them to ensure that obstructive factions within the student unions in their universities did not prevent the legitimate recruitment, with respect to the RAF, and the legitimate activities of defence companies as well to try to recruit. It is extremely important for all universities to understand that of course we accept the right of students to protest, and all the rights and freedoms that come under a democracy—that is what we are standing for in many of the conflicts in which we are involved across the world. But with that comes the universities’ responsibility to do what they can to ensure that people pursuing legitimate activities—which will help the defence and security of our nation and our allies—are protected, and this Government will do all they can to ensure that they are.

Russian Maritime Activity and UK Response

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Tuesday 28th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, Russian maritime activity has increasingly been a matter of concern, and I thank the Secretary of State for Defence for his timely update on the UK response, through the agency of the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. Equally welcome is the candour that has been deployed. It is important for Parliament to understand what the response is, but the detail that the Secretary of State has been willing to disclose is unexpected and certainly helpful and reassuring. It sends a clear message to President Putin that we know what he is up to, and his covert and menacing activity is being closely monitored, with an appropriate Royal Navy intervention.

These Benches support the Government’s response to this brazen maritime activity. We commend the Secretary of State on changing the Royal Navy’s rules of engagement, and his robust attitude towards this provocative intrusion by a Russian spy ship deserves praise.

It is clear from the Statement that the Government are also cognisant of the wider Russian threat and helpfully lists both the RAF and Royal Fleet Auxiliary response, together with our contribution to NATO and JEF activity. All of that has the support of these Benches, as does the Government’s continuing support for Ukraine. But all of this comes at a cost, and if our UK defence capability is to continue to operate at a level necessary to meet these continuing threats, we have to know how the Government intend to resource that new level of response.

In anticipating the reference of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, to the SDR report, which we are led to believe is expected in March, I gently remind him that by then the Government will have put defence funding into the deep freeze for nine months. Given the news stories now swirling around, with the financial challenges hitting the Chancellor head on, is 2.5% of GDP for defence by 2030, regardless of what the SDR comes up with, off the agenda?

Given President Trump’s very robust approach to defence spend, believing 5% to be necessary, what are the repercussions for the special relationship if the UK fails to make 2.5% by 2030? In particular, what are the implications for our mutual defence engagement?

Against this backdrop of defence funding fog, what types of MoD orders are currently in limbo? What preparations are in hand to adapt to the new and harsh reality of cutting our defence coat according to the Government’s visibly reduced and increasingly threadbare cloth?

In conclusion, there is a patent irony that the Chancellor can find £9 billion to hand over to Mauritius, thereby reducing our national security, while slapping inheritance tax on to our Armed Forces personnel, who fight for our security, and at the same time exempting US armed forces personnel from paying VAT on private school fees in this country while clobbering our own Armed Forces with VAT on school fees.

Will the Minister, who I know is a champion of defence and the Armed Forces, convey to the Chancellor, in his own unvarnished language, which I know he is more than capable of using, how illogical, how unfair and how unacceptable this is?

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches, I associate myself with the first remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, in supporting His Majesty’s Government in their response to the Russian ship, and thanking the Minister for being here today to answer questions, as well as the Secretary of State for his Statement last week. It is clearly important that parliamentarians have the opportunity to understand what is happening: equally, we understand the Secretary of State’s point that there is a limit to how much operational information can be given.

We support the Government’s action, but I have a series of questions. The Minister will probably be quite relieved that, for once, they relate not to defence expenditure but to defence posture and practice. We are looking in our own waters at the North Atlantic area —the Euro Atlantic area—which is the most important for our security. We are, in many ways, benefiting from the fact that NATO has two new members, Sweden and Finland. They are both committed to serious defence and Finland, in particular, is committed to national resilience. At the end of the Secretary of State’s Statement is a point about securing the UK’s borders and our own security. What are His Majesty’s Government doing in terms of United Kingdom resilience? Are we considering giving further information to ordinary civilians about the security concerns that we are aware of but perhaps they are not thinking about?

That is not necessarily to go as far on civilian training as Finland does—I am certainly not calling for conscription—but are we at least thinking about widening the discussion with society to include the threats in not just traditional hard military concerns but cyber? Are we thinking about the need for us all to be vigilant and to be aware that we need to think about the threats coming from Russia as a whole society? At the moment, there is a reluctance to understand that we need to devote more time and resource to defence. This is a plea not for a percentage of defence expenditure but about the need to talk to citizens about the threats we all face.

There have been clear threats in our waters, but we have also seen threats in recent days in the Baltic states and a potential threat to Danish and Greenlandic sovereignty. To what extent are His Majesty’s Government willing and able to speak truth to power, in the form of the President of the United States? The idea that the United States somehow requires a sovereign territory for its own security is wholly unacceptable. For it essentially to threaten the sovereignty of a fellow NATO member state is also unconscionable. While I do not expect the Minister to tell us what the Prime Minister and the President spoke about recently, will he at least suggest to the Secretary of State, the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister that we need to ensure that NATO is fit for purpose and that the whole edifice is not in danger of coming down? After all, NATO has kept us secure for over 70 years.

Undersea Internet Cables

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mountevans (CB)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, the principal response to this threat in the Baltic is coming from NATO. May I press the Minister a little further on the contribution that United Kingdom naval assets are making to that endeavour? In particular, the planned multi-role support ship was always intended to be an important contributor to that. May I ask for a report on progress on that important new addition to the fleet?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

If I understand the noble Baroness rightly and she is talking about the provision of a second additional ship to support and augment the ship “Proteus”, that will be part of the defence review. On the other assets that she talks about with respect to the Baltic, she will know that in December 2023, under the previous Government, a huge maritime collection of ships across NATO and JEF was sent to the Baltic, including UK maritime assets and UK surveillance aircraft. There was a further initiative in June 2024, again under the previous Government, and just recently we have had the announcement of Operation Nordic Warden, as I have said. All the way along, there have been significant UK contributions.

Another thing that is important, since we are often questioned about this, is that it is not only the contribution that we make in terms of our assets but the thought leadership, co-ordinating power and other leadership potential that the UK provides. Let us remember that it was in 2014, under the previous Government, that JEF was set up under UK leadership. It has worked particularly well. We should sometimes recognise what this country contributes to the defence of the world as well as some the challenges that face us.