United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Baroness Garden of Frognal and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 2nd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

The noble Lord, Lord Judd, has withdrawn, so I now call the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, we have said it before, so I will repeat only briefly: these amendments would never have been needed had the legislation been drafted in consultation and agreement with the devolved authorities. Instead, the legislation, as we have heard, reads like a complete desire to run everything from the centre, as if devolution never happened, and that the UK Government would simply decide and tell the others what they are to do. For example, as we have heard, it gives the CMA a cross-UK role with regard to the internal market but leaves the CMA, which currently has no devolved accountability, with the power to set penalties above the IM without any devolved authority consent.

I keep asking the same question: do the Government just forget about the other three Governments? As I have already said to the Minister tonight, we need the Government to respond to the thrust of these amendments positively and make it clear that they respect and want a proper role for the devolved authorities. The noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, said that little things matter. These are quite little requests, but they certainly matter.

Parliamentary Constituencies Bill

Debate between Baroness Garden of Frognal and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th September 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is an honour to move the very first amendment of the first Bill to be taken in Grand Committee in its hybrid form. It is an unexpected pleasure. I wish the Chair luck in dealing with this new configuration.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

Thank you.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab) [V]]

Amendment 1, which is also in the names of my noble friends Lord Lennie and Lord Grocott, simply re-establishes the existing practice whereby once the Boundary Commissions have done their work, Parliament puts it into legislation. Without this amendment, the Bill provides that the Boundary Commissions’ reviews will be implemented automatically by Order in Council, which, as we know, are not subject to parliamentary approval or any procedure.

There are four reasons to support this amendment. First, there has been no indication of any problem that the Bill seeks to solve with this change. There has been no pre-legislative consultation and no pre-legislative scrutiny of it. We have seen nothing of any debate with the commissions; there has been no suggestion of any demand for such a change and there has been no pre-discussion either with parliamentarians or the political parties, unless within the governing party itself.

Secondly, it is surely clear to the Committee that what happened last time was ample demonstration of the importance of parliamentary oversight to issues that might appear to be merely implementary, but in fact are constitutionally important. The coalition Government decided to reduce the size of the House of Commons to 600, with no reason given for that number. At the same time, they were increasing the size of this House with more unelected politicians. No rationale was given for the number 600 and no account was taken of its implication for Scottish and Welsh seats, or for those in rural or geographically challenged areas. Unsurprisingly, it was, in effect, rejected by the House of Commons. Without that ability of Parliament to have the final say, we would today have only 600 MPs, perhaps with 50 former MPs becoming Peers in compensation. It is proof positive of the need to take the elected House with you when a Government are suddenly seized with an unsustainable notion.

Thirdly, it will be clear from other amendments tabled for today that there is some distrust about the proposed procedure and the ability of the Executive to retain an influence, which under the Bill they will still have, either by the timing of the Order in Council or by the composition of the Boundary Commissions. We might note, therefore, the amendments to be moved by the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Young of Cookham, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, which we will deal with later.

Furthermore, although our Constitution Committee agrees in principle with the change, it particularly said that the proposed automatic implementation of recommendations of the Boundary Commissions will protect against undue influence only if they are genuinely independent. The committee therefore suggests that the House consider safeguards to ensure the independence and impartiality of the Boundary Commissions and their recommendations. We will come to specific proposals on this later, but the themes underlying this resonate with Amendments 1, 2, 5 to 9, and 12. In other words, both the Constitution Committee and these other amendments are in fact all part of a piece, that the Government—perhaps especially this Government—are capable of a certain flexibility when it comes to decisions that they might seek to influence. Their appointment of their friends—Tony Abbott or others whom I will mention in another group later—or the removal of those whose advice they do not like, and here I cite a swathe of Permanent Secretaries, in addition to the sad loss today of the head of the legal service, indicate a willingness to use subtle pressure to get what they want, or less than subtle pressure, as we witnessed over the attempted Prorogation, the threat to judicial review, and basically the attempt to sideline any whose advice or decisions get in their way. We do, therefore, have a concern that without absolute, very solid safeguards, the ability remains with the Government and not with Parliament.

Fourthly and lastly, there is a vital issue about the role of Parliament vis-à-vis that of a quango. I hear what our Constitution Committee says on that matter, and about the exclusion of Parliament. However, this is about the Executive vis-à-vis Parliament. It is about the Government removing a democratic backstop to an issue where decisions are not black and white but involve judgments, and—vitally—affect communities, devolution and regionalism. These are choices which Parliament cannot shrug off to unaccountable appointees, who may, as the Constitution Committee suggests, be looking to their reappointment.

In brief, we do not need this change. It was not requested; it has not been discussed; and it removes an important backstop role from Parliament. I beg to move.