(6 days, 6 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my noble friend Lord Carlile was kind enough to mention that I was a member of the Select Committee that looked into the whole matter of the Holocaust memorial, and security in particular. As the Minister will recall, the Select Committee said:
“We recommend that the Secretary of State gives serious consideration”
to the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—or something similar—and the promoter, that is the Secretary of State, agreed. Furthermore, and I would very much like the Minister’s reply to this point when he comes to make his final speech, we followed that part in our report by narrating three important recommendations that the promoter accepted. Are these recommendations still accepted?
Going back to the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, we understood that the decision is to be taken under delegation—not by the Secretary of State himself but by a Minister. The recommendations were what the Minister was to do should the planning application come back for decision.
These are important recommendations, because they require a good deal of consultation with people who really know what they are talking about, including the National Protective Security Authority, the Metropolitan Police, the Community Security Trust and others. The next recommendation says:
“The Promoter will make available to MPs and to members of the House of Lords the Promoter’s representations to the Secretary of State”,
and deposit them in the Library of both Houses. Of course, the recommendations fall far short of what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, recommends, but it is very important that the Minister assures us that those recommendations, which the Secretary of State accepted before us in our inquiry, are still to be respected. I hope that he will do so.
I come back to the Buxton memorial. Of course, it was moved; it used to be in Trafalgar Square, I think. The noble Lord, Lord Reid, is perfectly right that it was moved and taken into the gardens. Under the plan before us, the Buxton memorial is to remain where it was placed. It is not to be moved, but its appearance would be greatly affected, because it would be very close to all the uprights that mark the entrance to the underground memorial. The whole appearance of the Buxton memorial will be completely framed by this new development. It is not a question of moving it; it is concealing it. That is a very important point when we consider the importance of that memorial and what is has to tell us about slavery.
My Lords, I want very briefly to take on a couple of inferences in what was said by the noble Lords, Lord Evans and Lord Harper. The sentiment was that we must show courage and face down terrorist supporters. Some of us have been arguing that for some time and, to be honest, there has been an almighty silence from many people in Parliament. I just did not like the inference that, somehow, the movers of this amendment were cowering when, in fact, they are the very people who have argued in many instances for fighting back against the antisemitism that has been on our streets. That was my first point.
I also thought that the suggestion that we in Parliament are so brave and can protect the learning centre next door in the park was slightly ill judged, given that Parliament seems increasingly like Fort Knox. We are, in fact, not in a situation where we are all wandering around freely and bravely, yet we are suggesting that we open up the park to the public for a learning centre and that they can just wander in, whereas we need armed guards, big barriers everywhere and so on. It is an unfair and ludicrous comparison.
There will be, and there should be, a memorial in the gardens—everybody agrees with that. It will be a hugely important symbol. The idea that anyone who does not want the learning centre to be there therefore does not want a learning centre misses all of the hours and hours of debates in which we explained where we did want a learning centre—a fitting learning centre—to be. To be honest, the plan for an underground learning centre is rather insulting, in my opinion. We should recognise that the people putting forward this amendment are doing so in good faith, not because they are frightened of terrorist supporters but because they are being sensible about the real consequences of what we are deciding here today.
(2 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Constitution Committee looked at the Bill with some care and was concerned about two provisions in Clause 11, not just one. The first was Clause 11(7), reference to which has already been made, but it was also concerned about the width of Clause 11(1)(b), which refers to persons who happen to be carrying prohibited objects in an area where the police suspect that these offences may be concerned. The point is that somebody may be carrying something within the area for a completely unrelated reason: they might just happen to be carrying a tool which could be thought to be adapted for tunnelling but was not intended for that purpose at all. The problem with this part of the clause is that it makes no reference at all to the reason why the person was carrying the object. The Constitution Committee thought that that was really stretching the matter too far. I have no problems with Clause 10, but there are these two problems with Clause 11.
My Lords, I support Amendments 46 and 47. I say a very loud, “Hear, hear” to the impassioned intervention of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, which was spot on. I want to answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Deben—on behalf of the Government, noble Lords will all be surprised to know. I thought I would quote what the Home Office Minister said the last time we dealt with this. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, explained why these new powers were necessary:
“it is not always possible for the police to form suspicions that certain individuals have particular items with them.”—[Official Report, 24/11/22; col. 978.]
That is true, but if that is the basis on which we are legislating—that it is not always possible to know if someone has suspicious items on them—then even though you do not know what the suspicions are, it will be all right to stop and search them. This seems to me to bring arbitrariness into the law in a way that can only be dangerous and will not make any logical sense to anybody outside this House.
Think of the consequences of some of this. The Government keep telling us that this is not about stopping the right to protest, and I will take them at face value on that. But let us consider someone who is not doing anything suspicious or carrying anything suspicious, but who is going on a demonstration. The police have the right to stop them, which means that what is suspicious is that they are going on a demonstration: it implies that. Going on a demonstration is pre-emptively seen as something dodgy, and I therefore become sceptical when the Government assure me that this will not have a chilling effect on people going on demonstrations.
I draw attention to a clause that has not been mentioned in these amendments but is related: Clause 14, which we will not need if we vote down Clauses 10 and 11. It contains a new offence of obstructing a police officer in a police-related suspicionless stop and search—for which, by the way, you can go to prison for 51 weeks or get a substantial fine. This clause indicates why Clause 10 and even Clause 11 are so dangerous: they will destroy any feasible community relations with the police.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to the fact that many women might well be nervous if they are approached for a suspicionless stop and search. In all the briefings we have received, people have drawn attention to what happened, tragically, to Sarah Everard. If the police say they have no suspicions but they are stopping and searching you, you might say, as a woman, “Excuse me, I am not having that; I don’t want that to happen.” In fact, a lot of advice was given to young women that they should not just take it on face value if a police officer approaches them and says he wants to interfere with them in some way. But I want to use a more everyday example.
During lockdown, two care workers I know were walking home from work and sat down on a bench in a park to have a coffee. They worked together in a bubble, giving intimate care to people in the care home they worked in throughout the pandemic. They were approached by a number of police officers, who asked them if they lived in the same home. When they said no, the police officers said they were breaking their bubble—if noble Lords can remember those mad days, that is what it was like. They said, rather jokingly, “We’re taking people to the toilet and working intimately with them day in, day out.” The police officers became quite aggressive, threatening to arrest them and all sorts of things. We know those stories from lockdown. The reason I share this story is that the woman who told it to me had never been in trouble with the police before. She had never been approached by the police in that way; she is a law-abiding citizen who would, generally speaking, support the kind of law and order measures being brought in by this Government. However, because this police officer treated her as though she was behaving suspiciously for having her coffee on a bench, having done a long 12-hour shift in a care home, she said that she will never trust the police again. She argued back and they threatened to arrest her.
I fear that, if we give arbitrary powers to the police to use suspicionless stop and search, this Government might unintentionally and inadvertently build a new movement of people who do not trust the police and are not suspicionless but suspicious, with good reason in this instance, that the police are stopping them arbitrarily and that we are no longer a free society. We should all vote against Clauses 10 and 11 and, through that, destroy Clause 14 as well.
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe query about “reasonable excuse” has come up before. It has been suggested that free speech would be used as a “reasonable excuse”. I will try to clarify what I was trying to explain, and perhaps the noble Lord will come back at me. There are many ways in which you could be found to be breaching the criminal law—it is so broad. The noble Lord, Lord Beith, illustrated the variety of things you might be doing that might mean you inadvertently broke the law. I wanted there to be some excuse, such as “I am accompanying someone and having an argument with them”. There are problems with the wording of the clause, and I would be more than happy to be advised how to tighten up my amendment so as to not use this phrase or look as if I am giving the police too much power.
The noble Baroness is wrestling with the same problem I had in dealing with “reasonable excuse” in relation to locking on. There seemed to be cases where people might have had a genuine reason for locking on because it is so widely defined.
One might say that the “reasonable excuse” defence would be suitable if it were sufficiently qualified so that it did not provide the police and the courts with the problem of having to decide whether or not the pro-life argument was a reasonable excuse. If one looked at the offences, one would say that this kind of argument would not stand up to what this legislation is all about. There are other instances where one might find that there was an excuse for what was done which was quite detached from what this clause is really driving at. If the noble Baroness could find a way of expressing this, I should be delighted. That is what I was trying to do in the earlier debate.
I hope I have made my position clear. As it stands, this would not be acceptable. I think that paragraph (b) raises a very interesting point of definition.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I warmly support what my noble friend Lord Pannick has just said. It is a great mistake, certainly at this stage in our affairs, to attempt to legislate in this matter. It may be that the prison estate will be big enough in years to come so that one can segregate by gender reassignment in special prisons of their own, but we are nowhere near that at the moment and the proper way to deal with this is to rely on the discretion that exists at present.
It is quite striking if you look at the wording of the amendment—it makes no distinction between whether we are talking about male or female prisoners, but very different situations arise depending on which of these two characteristics you are considering. It makes no distinction for the time that the person may have lived in that new assignment. It makes no distinction, either, for the extent of the surgery and the appearance of the person over time as the reassignment process takes place.
It is very difficult for those of us who, I assume, have not faced this to appreciate the intense emotional problem that people who believe that they have been born into the wrong sex undergo. It is a very emotional matter, fighting against characteristics you have acquired that you do not believe belong to you. The way you deal with it is to believe that you are actually of the sex—of the gender, I should say—that you think you should have been. That involves not only reconstruction of the body but a mentality designed entirely to live the new life, which you believe is the one you should have been given. It strikes me as very cruel, if I may use that expression, to treat these people as if they had not reassigned themselves. It is not a choice. They are driven by the characteristics they acquired which forced them into their decision.
I make these points just to emphasise that we are dealing here with a very difficult problem. The offender requires as much consideration on the grounds of safety and emotional distress as the people around them in the prison in which they are placed. Legislation is not the way to go, certainly not at the moment. I personally have complete confidence in the way that the prison authorities are dealing with this very difficult problem at the moment.
My Lords, I welcome this amendment and I commend the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in particular, for doggedly sticking with this issue. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, for organising the MoJ teach-in, which I found very interesting and useful. I learned a lot and I listened hard.
I thought this amendment was a nuanced and sensitive way of dealing with all the objections raised by the MoJ at that teach-in, so I am rather disappointed that the Government have not accepted the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, which is a bespoke amendment that protects women’s single-sex spaces while sympathetically and practically managing any challenges faced by transwomen prisoners.
The amendment might be a modest proposal—I think it is—but noble Lords may be interested to hear that it has created a huge amount of interest outside this place over the last couple of days. People on Twitter might look at #KeepPrisonsSingleSex. It has been trending for the last 36 hours. Do look because the messages on there are what I am talking about, rather than the fact that it is trending.
I want to read a few tweets that could maybe help us understand why this amendment matters. One woman said:
“I find it quite baffling that this is even up for discussion! How did we get to the point where we need a debate to include legislation to prevent something so damaging to women?”
Another said:
“Women in UK prisons must not be locked in with convicted male criminals. This is an appalling failure of the duty of care the state has for female prisoners. Female prison staff must not be forced to search male prisoners. Let’s hope the House of Lords shows sense.”
I would like to think the House of Lords would as well, but maybe not. The final one I want to read out says:
“I’ve been to prison and I’m telling you now that for some women it’s their only safe space, due to abuse on the outside. Allowing anyone who claims to feel like a woman to be put in that safe space is wrong! Women, criminal or not deserve to feel safe.”
I say hear, hear to that.