State Aid (Revocations and Amendments) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 Debate

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Department: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy

State Aid (Revocations and Amendments) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts
Wednesday 2nd December 2020

(3 years, 4 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Baroness Fox of Buckley Portrait Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
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My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. I can only emulate his wit and clarity. In this instance, I agree with him. I will make some additional points.

I am opposed to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, just as for many years I was totally opposed to the EU’s state aid rules. It was one reason why I voted to leave in 2016. I was glad to escape them then and I do not want any further delays. I note with some irony that this means I will be supporting the order put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. During the years before the referendum, even the most ardent Eurosceptics in the Conservative Party were rather lukewarm in highlighting the egregious nature of the EU state aid rules. Indeed, Margaret Thatcher was happy to use those rules to roll back the state at home. The Eurosceptic left might well be a dying breed, although there are a few of us left—but, in contrast, for many years they objected to the EU’s state aid rules. The much-missed RMT leader, Bob Crow, the former Labour leader, the right honourable Jeremy Corbyn, and others on the left, such as me, recognised that those rules were anti-democratic. Whatever the UK electorate might have voted for, if those policies involved certain state subsidies to create new jobs or to help certain industries survive, they could be blocked.

EU rules stipulate that Governments need to notify the European Commission in advance for permission. This is an affront to popular sovereignty and why I support this order. This outrageous mechanism, which allows the Commission to overrule elected finance Ministers and claw back payments, is uniquely prescriptive in the world. It goes far further than other economic blocs, such as the World Trade Organization. The WTO allows subsidies by default. Prior notification and approval are not required. Despite what the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, might say, this makes it more democratic than the EU.

Apart from noting the irony that today’s Labour Party seems keen to retain the EU’s anti-worker, anti-state rules, and that the Conservative Party seems committed to escaping them, it is worth considering why there is so much focus on state aid in the withdrawal agreement negotiations, and in this House. Surely, it cannot be because the EU thinks that the UK will be chomping at the bit to increase state aid, once it is free from Brussels, or that the present Government are likely to launch a campaign for the mass nationalisation of industry. Even when it was in the EU, Britain conducted less approved state aid than most other EU members. In 2018, Britain’s official state aid spending amounted to 0.34% of GDP—about half the EU’s average of 0.76% and far below Germany’s 1.45%. Why do the EU and its avid remainer cheerleaders in the UK constantly take such a robust stance over rules that cover a relatively small part of the UK’s GDP and overall state spending? This seems more politically than economically driven. After all, state aid rules are often used by the European Commission as a mechanism for asserting its overall authority and supremacy over its member states, on pain of punishment and at the expense of their sovereign rights. The rules are used as a punitive and enforcing mechanism.

While the UK has formally left the EU, it seems that it wants to use state aid to curtail the UK as a genuinely autonomous nation. That is why I think it is right that the Government seek to protect against a maximalist interpretation of Article 10 in the Northern Irish protocol, because it could give the European Commission extensive jurisdiction over subsidies granted throughout the UK. It is why it was so important to retain Clause 45 of the Internal Markets Bill, but more of that another time. More broadly, regardless of the economic impact of adhering to any version of the EU state aid rules, the main issue is one of national sovereignty. If the British people want more nationalised industries or state support, it is they—and not the European Commission—who should have the final say.

We have heard much hectoring from some noble Lords about the importance of sticking to international law. Interestingly, despite the rigidity of the EU state aid rules, those same rules were effectively waived during the recent European lockdown-induced recession —just as they were during the financial crisis a decade ago—to allow for emergency bailouts and job protection schemes. This rather calls into question the supposed inviolability of international legal rules in all instances. Is this not a case of one rule for them and another rule for the rest of us? I want to get rid of state aid rules as quickly as possible.