State Aid (Revocations and Amendments) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

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Wednesday 2nd December 2020

(4 years ago)

Lords Chamber
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Moved by
Lord Callanan Portrait Lord Callanan
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That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 29 October be approved.

Relevant document: 30th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (special attention drawn to the instrument)

Lord Callanan Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Callanan) (Con)
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My Lords, these draft regulations are made under the powers in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 as amended by the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, which I will refer to as the withdrawal Act. The purpose of these regulations is to remove redundant EU state aid law from the domestic statute book after the end of the transition period. This is both appropriate and necessary to provide legal certainty for UK businesses and public authorities that EU state aid rules no longer apply in the UK, except where they apply directly under the Northern Ireland protocol.

I begin by explaining the European Union’s approach to subsidy control, which is known as state aid. State aid is support in any form, from any level of government, which gives a business or other entity an advantage that could not be obtained in the normal course of business. If this advantage has the potential to distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between EU member states, then state aid is present and the rules for state aid are triggered. The state aid rules were devised by the European Union to ensure that EU member states operate in a way compatible with the internal market, and the rules are of course very much a European Union concept. They derive from Articles 107 to 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which, together with the EU regulations and decisions made under that treaty, control how and when member states can grant aid. Responsibility for enforcing the rules sits with the European Commission. However, having left the European Union and the single market, the UK will no longer be bound by EU state aid rules after the end of the transition period.

If changes to domestic law are not made in time for the end of the transition period, EU state aid law would become part of UK law, as retained EU law through the withdrawal Act, but the law would then contain some fundamental deficiencies. These deficiencies would make this retained EU law on state aid inoperable in the United Kingdom. Revoking the EU law on state aid will make it clear to businesses, courts and public authorities that state aid rules will no longer apply in the UK, except, as I said, where they apply directly under the Northern Ireland protocol. Instead, the UK has announced that we will have our own subsidy arrangements to support a competitive, dynamic market economy.

From 1 January, the Government will follow World Trade Organization rules on subsidies and other international commitments agreed in free trade agreements, and we will consult on whether to go further, including whether to legislate on this matter. We will, of course, work closely with businesses and public authorities across all parts of the United Kingdom to consider how best to design an approach to subsidy control that works for the United Kingdom economy.

In terms of the technical detail, this statutory instrument disapplies and revokes retained EU state aid rules that are preserved by Sections 3 and 4 of the withdrawal Act. As I mentioned earlier, Articles 107 to 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, together with the EU regulations and decisions made under that treaty, govern the state aid regime. Article 107(1), for example, defines state aid and sets out the general prohibition on giving aid. That prohibition operates by providing that aid is incompatible with the EU internal market in so far as it affects trade between member states, unless the aid has been approved by the European Commission.

Article 107(2) and (3) sets out when the Commission must give approval and those areas where the Commission has discretion over whether to approve aid or not. Article 108 sets out the Commission’s role in monitoring state aid and obliges member states to notify aid to the Commission in advance. Aid cannot be awarded until approved by the European Commission; this is known as the standstill obligation. While the Commission has exclusive competence to decide whether aid is compatible with the internal market, national courts can enforce the standstill obligation. In effect, national courts can suspend an aid measure until the Commission has considered whether the measure is compatible with the internal market. However, after the transition period, the UK will no longer be bound by EU state aid rules. The rights and obligations I have just described will no longer be relevant. This SI ensures that they are not retained in UK law by the withdrawal Act.

Other EU regulations that enable the EU state aid regime to operate across member states would, after the end of the transition period, become retained EU law through the withdrawal Act. These broadly consist of procedural and exemptions regulations. The procedural regulations, for example, set out how the state aid regime operates and make clear the roles and responsibilities of the Commission and the member states. They set out the procedures to be followed in notifications and investigations and give the Commission information-gathering powers. The exemptions regulations set out the conditions under which an aid measure is exempt from the requirement to notify the Commission in advance. Yet these provisions would not be able to be complied with or enforced in the United Kingdom because the Commission will not have a role in the UK’s domestic subsidy control arrangements. The SI will therefore revoke these now redundant provisions.

Removing retained EU law from the UK statute book that is both deficient and no longer relevant avoids any possible confusion about whether state aid rules must be complied with or not. Importantly, this SI also ensures that domestic legislation can continue to operate appropriately beyond the transition period, when EU state aid rules will no longer form part of domestic law. The SI does this by making consequential amendments to other retained EU law and UK domestic legislation which refers to state aid rules.

It is important at this point for me to make it clear how these regulations will operate in light of the Northern Ireland protocol. While these regulations remove retained EU law from the UK domestic statute book, Article 10 of the Northern Ireland protocol will allow state aid rules to continue to apply after the transition period. The application of state aid rules under the protocol will be limited to measures relating to goods and wholesale electricity affecting trade between Northern Ireland and the EU. The regulations will not affect the application of the Northern Ireland protocol, which is given effect through Section 7A of the withdrawal Act made in 2018: they make amendments only to UK domestic law.

This SI is necessary to make corrections to domestic law, by revoking retained EU law on state aid from the UK statute book and fixing any technical deficiencies in other retained EU law and UK domestic legislation which refers to state aid rules. This instrument will ensure legal certainty for businesses, aid-granting authorities and the courts from 1 January 2021, when EU state aid rules will cease to apply in the United Kingdom. I therefore commend these regulations to the House.

Amendment to the Motion

Moved by
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Lord Callanan Portrait Lord Callanan (Con)
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I thank all noble Lords for their interesting contributions to this debate. There have been many contributions on a range of subjects, very few of which had anything to do with this instrument. Fascinating though discussions were on the fate of the Austin Allegro, and Galileo, I say to my noble friend Lady Wheatcroft that they were totally irrelevant to today’s debate and nothing to do with the instrument being discussed.

The EU state aid rules were created to meet the needs of the European Union. With the UK’s departure from the European Union, we will no longer be bound by EU state aid rules after the transition period. We have been clear that we will not align with EU rules as part of any free trade agreement. My noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Moylan were absolutely right to say that what subsidy control regime we have in future is an extremely valid debate. We will, no doubt, have that discussion in this House at great length, but it is nothing to do with the merits, or otherwise, of this statutory instrument. Many noble Lords who contributed seem to be confused about that. The point of this instrument is that businesses must have clarity on the UK statute book to plan for investments and to receive the support that they need to innovate and grow.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, has moved an amendment expressing regret, as he is perfectly entitled to do. However, I hope that noble Lords can see that revoking retained EU state aid law is appropriate and necessary. Furthermore, consequential amendments to other retained EU law, and UK domestic legislation which refers to state aid rules, will ensure that these regulations continue to operate appropriately. I repeat: state aid is support in any form, from any level of government which gives a business or other entity an advantage that could not be obtained in the normal course of business. In the way it is defined in the EU, if this advantage has the potential to distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between EU member states, then state aid is present and the rules for state aid are triggered.

The state aid rules were devised by the European Union to ensure that EU member states operate in a way which is compatible with the internal market. The rules are very much a European Union concept. We will no longer be part of the European Union or the single market and the EU will no longer have any jurisdiction in the United Kingdom, and nor will the European Commission. At present, the UK Government or devolved Administrations proposing any form of state aid need to get the permission of the European Commission. In future, the Commission will have no jurisdiction in the United Kingdom. It makes no sense to leave these rules on our statute book, which is what noble Lords are proposing today.

From 1 January, the Government will follow the World Trade Organization rules on subsidies and other international commitments. Before the end of this year, the Government will publish guidance for UK public authorities to explain these commitments. As I have said before, during debates on the internal market Bill, we will also consult in the coming months on whether to go further, including on whether to legislate.

A number of noble Lords posed questions, very few of which had anything to do with this particular instrument. I will, nevertheless, endeavour to answer them. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asked about legislating for the UK-Japan free trade agreement. In general, where implementation is required, the Government will use the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The Act ensures that existing laws which implement the EU-Japan free trade agreement continue to have effect.

The noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, in another contribution that had nothing to do with this debate, asked what any new regime would mean for new subsidies. We are clear that we do not intend to return to the 1970s approach of government bailing out unsustainable companies. I shall say a little more about the negotiations later.

I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, about the Northern Ireland protocol. It is important to note that after the end of the transition period the EU state aid rules will not apply to Northern Ireland as they do today. State aid provisions apply only to trade that is subject to the protocol, which is limited in scope to goods and wholesale electricity markets. Northern Ireland will enjoy new flexibilities with respect to support for its service industries, but let me be clear that the instrument that we are debating does not affect the application of the state aid principles in the Northern Ireland protocol.

My noble friend Lady Altmann, who I think was referring to our previous debates on the internal market Bill rather than to this statutory instrument, mentioned consultation with the devolved Administrations. Officials have been having technical discussions on this instrument with the devolved Administrations and other Governments’ departments at the official level and no concerns have been expressed about it by their officials. I recognise that on the general issue of a future state aid policy they wish to make a contribution, and we have said that we will consult them, but they have expressed no concerns about this statutory instrument.

The noble Baroness also referred to the shared prosperity fund. Again, that has nothing to do with the instrument that we are debating, but it will be consistent with the UK’s approach to subsidy control following the end of the transition period to ensure that it invests fairly in local economies. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asked about common frameworks. Obviously, we debated these issues at length when considering the internal market Bill, but let me reiterate the points I made then. The devolved Administrations have never previously been able to set their own subsidy control rules, as covered by the then EU state aid framework. They will continue to have responsibility for spending decisions on subsidies within any future subsidy control system.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and my noble friend Lady Noakes asked why the Government are using secondary legislation to remove the state aid regime and whether this is a policy change. The answer is no. This is not a policy change and it is no more than is appropriate to revoke redundant retained EU law and make amendments to address deficiencies in other retained EU law and UK domestic legislation that refer to EU state aid rules.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, also raised the UK-Japan agreement, on which I have already answered. My noble friend Lord Trenchard and a number of other noble Lords asked about the status of the negotiations. Obviously, they are ongoing literally as we speak and the future of state aid is, of course, an important subject within them. Noble Lords will understand that there are limits on what I can say about it, but perhaps I may refer to comments made by my noble friend Lord Frost when he spoke to your Lordships’ committee about our approach that might be helpful. He said:

“If subsidies are granted, for example, there must be clear statements that they must contribute to and be justified on public policy or market failure grounds. They must be proportionate. There must be openness and transparency about what they are. They must be aimed at bringing about a degree of change in behaviour. They must be the right instrument for the purpose, and you should not in general subsidise if there are negative effects on trade and investment. Those are all commitments that we are willing to make and that we think are important parts of a good subsidy system.”


However, as I said, the negotiations on this matter are very much ongoing.

The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, asked whether we are swapping an effective regime for a dysfunctional one. I have said why we cannot retain the current EU regime: there is no point in giving the European Union jurisdiction over state aid in the UK when we are no longer members of the EU. The ASCM is the appropriate standard for global subsidy control and is a more appropriate basis for regulating subsidies than the EU state aid regime, which of course is designed for the European single market which we will no longer be a part of. Some 164 countries follow WTO rules on subsidy control, showing that they are a well-recognised common standard.

I am running out of time to speak, but I hope that I have explained why the statutory instrument before us is worthy of noble Lords’ support and why it is essential to the clarity and well-being of the UK statute book. Noble Lords raised many concerns about other issues, to which I am sure we will return in the future, but in the meantime, I commend this statutory instrument to the House.

Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall Portrait The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
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My Lords, I have one request to ask the Minister a short question for elucidation. It is from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.

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Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Portrait Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
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The Minister did not answer any of my questions, which I presume is because he felt they were out of order. At the same time, I did ask how we were going to make sure that public authorities understand the impacts of this statutory instrument. He did not answer that.

Lord Callanan Portrait Lord Callanan (Con)
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I answered many questions. It is not a matter of being in order; it is whether questions were relevant to this particular debate. I think I said in my reply that of course we intend to publish guidance for local authorities, the devolved Administrations and others active in this field before the end of the year, but the noble Baroness will understand that this is still very much a live subject in the EU negotiations. When we have a complete picture of how the regime will operate in the UK, any commitments that we may wish to enter into as part of those negotiations will be legislated for in the future relationship Bill, but we will ensure that guidance is issued before the end of the year.

Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall Portrait The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
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My Lords, I have no further requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara.

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16:20

Division 1

Ayes: 278


Labour: 138
Liberal Democrat: 76
Crossbench: 46
Independent: 14
Green Party: 2
Plaid Cymru: 1

Noes: 258


Conservative: 204
Crossbench: 37
Independent: 12
Ulster Unionist Party: 2

Motion, as amended, agreed.