Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Fookes and Lord McFall of Alcluith

Monday 9th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

I take that as a kind of personal statement.

[Lord McFall of Alcluith]

My Lords, I shall move Amendment 14, which is in the group Amendments 14 to 18, concerning Clause 11 and the proposed audit arrangements for the Bank of England. As it stands, the Bill provides for the NAO to carry out value-for-money studies at the Bank, but it also imposes a number of constraints on this. First, before carrying out a study, the Comptroller and Auditor-General would have to consult the Court of Directors at the Bank. Secondly, if the court is of the opinion that an examination is concerned with the merits of the Bank’s general policy in pursuing the Bank’s objectives, then it can ultimately prevent the Comptroller from proceeding with an examination.

These provisions contrast sharply with the terms under which the NAO undertakes value-for-money studies in every other public body under the National Audit Act. That legislation gives the Comptroller and Auditor-General,

“complete discretion in the discharge of his functions … in determining whether to carry out any examination … and as to the manner in which any such examination is carried out”.

The National Audit Act prohibits the NAO from questioning the merits of policy objectives. As I will mention later, the NAO has never sought to cross that line. However, the Bill extends this prohibition to cover the Bank’s general policy in pursuing the Bank’s objectives, as well as giving the Bank an effective veto over which studies are undertaken.

That presents the NAO with several major problems. First, as the Comptroller and Auditor-General has said, it therefore gives an impression of greater accountability on the part of the Bank that is at odds with reality. Secondly, it undermines the independence of the NAO to decide what should be examined, and that independence is key to holding public bodies to account. Thirdly, if these provisions are agreed for the Bank, it will encourage others to challenge the independence of the office; perhaps every new body and many existing ones wish for the same ability to veto or limit the NAO’s work—to the great disadvantage of Parliament and the taxpayer, for both of which the NAO has long performed an invaluable function. This is not an issue, therefore, that can be limited to the particular circumstances of the Bank of England.

Why would anyone wish to impose these kinds of constraints on the NAO? Perhaps there is a concern that the Bank should not have its policy decisions examined. That would be entirely understandable, but the fact is that the NAO has had decades of experience of operating without questioning the merits of policy objectives. It has done so without any difficulty in the Ministry of Defence, including the security services, or indeed the Foreign Office, where it has recently been looking at how crises in Tunisia, Libya and Yemen have been handled. It is difficult to argue that if the NAO is capable of dealing satisfactorily with this level of sensitivity, it could not be trusted to steer clear of questioning policy objectives at the Bank.

I know it has been argued that there are no precedents for the equivalent of the NAO being involved with a national bank, but the Government Accountability Office in the US audits the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Banks, with exceptions to the scope of their audits being made explicit, and including transactions for and with a foreign central bank; deliberations, decisions or actions on monetary policy matters; and transactions made under the direction of the Federal Markets Committee. The Comptroller and Auditor-General has made clear from the outset that he would be content it agree similar such exceptions in this country. These amendments seek in the case of Amendments 14 and 16 to bring the definition of “policy” into line with that used in the National Audit Act, Amendment 15 would delete the need for the Comptroller to consult the court before undertaking an examination, and Amendment 17 would remove the veto of the Bank’s Court of Directors over examinations.