(4 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am rather pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, since it gives me an immediate right of reply. If she looks carefully at the debates last week, which she was listening to, she will find that at no point did I assert that any of the amendments were out of scope—not least because I have put down further amendments myself that are intended to have an impact on the processes for making regulations for trade future trade agreements, and indeed which impact on schemes outwith the text of the Bill. I will come on precisely to that in Amendment 91 in this group.
I say gently to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the making of law is not solely the province of lawyers. There is a very valued tradition in this House that we bring expertise from a range of different disciplines. As it happens, my discipline—my original training—is that of a civil servant. Some 39 years ago I wrote the instructions to counsel for a major piece of legislation, and just under 10 years ago, as Leader of the House of Commons, I was responsible for Parliamentary Counsel and the scrutiny of legislation brought before the two Houses, and for the structure of the legislative programme. For 40 years I have engaged in the process of legislation. The fact that I am not qualified lawyer in no sense excludes me from making the points that I made.
As it happens, I did not say that anything was out of scope. The point I gently made last week was that quite a number of the amendments we were looking at were intended to influence—
My Lords, I am sorry to stop the noble Lord, but I understand that there are still some problems with hearing. Is that true of other Members of the Committee? No? Perhaps we can resume and see how we get on.
I was making the point that in amendments last week, I was trying to help the Committee. The objective of quite a number of the amendments was to influence the content of future trade agreements, but the effect of the amendments would have applied only to the continuity agreements. We will need to understand that in particular on Report, and to seek in some cases to amend the Bill, and to do so with the effect that people are looking for.
To come back to this group, I spoke on Thursday, I think, about Philip Morris. I will not repeat any of that but will simply say that it gives rise to considerable sympathy on my part about the actions of some companies. However, the absence of investor-state dispute settlement—
My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord again, but there has been a request that he starts his speech again, because quite a lot of it was lost. May I trouble him to start again?
Since I have no text, it will not be the same speech, so if you will forgive me, I will not do that. It will appear in Hansard, and I encourage Members to read it there. In any case, I am now talking about the amendments in this group, as opposed to responding to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which noble Lords can read in Hansard.
On these amendments, I have great sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, was saying. When Philip Morris was frustrated on an investor-state dispute settlement, it effectively used Honduras and the Dominican Republic to use WTO procedures. So the absence of ISDS is not enough in itself—we have to ensure that we are proof against that. In fact, where Australia was concerned, as it happens, the public health exemptions in the WTO were sufficient in the last decision of the appellate body that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, regrets the absence of: the last decision it made in June was to uphold Australia’s position. We have to be very mindful of that.
Before I get to my own amendment, I will speak to the others. There is a very legitimate question. Are the Government planning simply to roll over existing EU agreements as they are, including where there are ISDS provisions and including with CETA in due course, where there is an investment court system? I am very interested to know what the Government’s intentions are. Certainly, my expectation is that it will be very difficult to have a continuity agreement while departing substantially from continuity.
As regards Japan, I do not have the text of the UK-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, but while the EU-Japan agreement encourages mutual investment, Article 8.9.4 of it makes clear that, while market access, national treatment without discrimination and most-favoured-nation status are offered, it says that for “greater certainty”, most-favoured-nation treatment
“does not include investor-to-state dispute settlement procedures provided for in other international agreements.”
I will be very interested to know in due course whether the UK-Japan agreement says the same thing. I know that my friends in Japan take the view that we will not be able to accede to the CPTPP without accepting an investor-state dispute settlement. So this is a very interesting moment in understanding whether we are joining with the European Union in moving away from investor-state dispute settlement, or whether we subscribe to the Japanese view that it remains a legitimate vehicle in international trade agreements.
Amendment 43 proposes a multilateral investment tribunal. I wish that we could use such a process. The Doha round did not accept a multilateral investment provision—the proposal failed. We have bilateral agreements, but while they might be desirable they are not sufficiently widespread to allow us to get to a multilateral tribunal. Putting in legislation a requirement for such a tribunal when people have not yet signed up to one seems heroic.
Amendment 91 is not about investor-state dispute settlement; it is about disputes between states. The best example to have in mind is the dispute between the European Union and the United States. As a result of US action, the dispute reached the point where it was lawful under WTO rules for the EU to apply specific import duties against US exports into the European Union.
The Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018 relates to this, but why I am talking about a different piece of legislation? The original Trade Bill and the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill were introduced at the same time, at the end of 2017. They were intended to be considered side by side and they cross-refer considerably. In this instance, it is entirely right for us to look at the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act and ask whether the parliamentary scrutiny arrangements relating to it are correct. Section 15 of the Act gives the Secretary of State the power to impose through regulations additional import duties as a result of an international dispute—for example, regulations to impose import duties on US exports. That power is exercisable through the negative resolution procedure, but in my view it should be an affirmative resolution procedure—this should be added to the list of affirmative resolution procedures in Section 32 of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act.
The argument in the Government’s Explanatory Notes for using the negative procedure in the great majority of cases where customs duties are imposed is that there are so many such regulations that they have to be made in that way, otherwise they become impractical. That is patently not the case here. In this instance, I encourage my noble friend the Minister to agree that there will be relatively few international disputes that give rise to the imposition of such duties and that, when that happens, it will by its nature be of considerable significance and therefore should be in the form of regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.